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This volume pursues a different method, in its treatment of the problems of folk psychology, from that employed in my more extensive treatment of the subject. Instead of considering successively, the main forms of expression of the folk mind, the present work studies the phenomena, so far as possible, synchronously, exhibiting their common conditions and their reciprocal relations. Even while engaged on my earlier task I had become more and more convinced that a procedure of this latter sort was required as its supplement. Indeed, I believed that the chief purpose of investigations in folk psychology must be found in a synthetic survey. The first prerequisite of such a survey is, of course, a separate examination of each of the various fields. The history of the development of the physical organism aims to understand not merely the genesis of the particular organs but primarily their co-operation and the correlation of their functions. An analogous purpose should underlie an account of the mental development of any human community and, finally, of mankind itself. In addition to the problem of the relations of the separate processes to one another; however, we must in this case face also the broader question as to whether or not mental development is at all subject to law. This it is, therefore, that the sub-title of the present volume is intended to suggest. That we can he concerned only with outlines, moreover, and not with an exhaustive presentation of details, [p. xiv] follows from the very fact that our aim is a synthetic survey. An exhaustive presentation would again involve us in a more or less detached investigation, of single problems. A briefer exposition, on the other hand, which limits itself to arranging the main facts along lines suggested by the subject-matter as a whole, is, without doubt, better adapted both to present a clear picture of the development, and to indicate its general amenability to law, the presence of which even the diversity of events cannot conceal.

This being my main purpose, I believed that I might at once reject the thought of giving the various facts a proportionate degree of attention. In the case of the better known phenomena, it appeared sufficient to sketch their place in the general development. That which was less familiar, however, or was still, perhaps, generally unknown, seemed to me to require a more detailed discussion. Hence the following pages deal at some length with the forms of original tribal organization and of the consummation of marriage, with soul, demon, and totem cults, and with various other phenomena of a somewhat primitive culture. On the other hand, they describe in barest outline the social movements that reach over into historical times, such as the founding of States and cities, the origin of legal systems, and the like. No inference, of course, should be drawn from this with regard to the relative importance of the phenomena themselves. Our procedure, in this matter, has been governed by practical considerations alone.

The above remark concerning the less familiar and that which is as yet unknown, will already have indicated that folk psychology in general, and particularly a history of development in terms of folk psychology, such as this book aims to give, are as yet forced to rely largely on suppositions and hypotheses, if they are not to lose the thread that unites the details. Questions similar to the ones which we have just mentioned regarding the beginnings of human [p. xv] society, or others, which, though belonging to a later development, nevertheless still fall within the twilight dawn of history -- such, for example, as those concerning the origin of gods and of religion, the development of myth, the sources and the transformations in meaning of the various forms of cult, etc. -- are, of course, as yet largely matters of dispute. In cases of this sort, we are for the most part dealing not so much with facts themselves as with hypotheses designed to interpret facts. And yet it must not be forgotten that folk psychology rests on precisely the same experiential basis, as regards these matters, as do all other empirical sciences. Its position in this respect is similar, more particularly, to that of history, with which it frequently comes into touch in dealing with these problems of origin. The hypotheses of folk psychology never refer to a background of things or to origins that are by nature inaccessible to experiential knowledge; they are simply assumptions concerning a number of conjectured empirical facts that, for some reason or other, elude positive detection. When, for example, we assume that the god-idea resulted from a fusion of the hero ideal with the previously existing belief in demons, this is an hypothesis, since the direct transition of a demon into a god can nowhere be pointed out with absolute certainty. Nevertheless, the conjectured process moves on the factual plane from beginning to end. The same is true, not merely of many of the problems of folk psychology, but in the last analysis of almost all questions relating to the beginning of particular phenomena. In such cases, the result is seldom based on actually given data -- these are inaccessible to direct observation, leaving psychological probability as our only guide. That is to say, we are driven to that hypothesis which is in greatest consonance with the sum total of the known facts of individual and of folk psychology. It is this empirical task, constituting a part of psychology and, [p. xvi] at the same time, an application of it, that chiefly differentiates a psychological history of development, such as the following work aims briefly to present, from a philosophy of history. In my opinion, the basis of a philosophy of history, should henceforth be a psychological history of development, though the latter should not intrude upon the particular problems of the former. The concluding remarks of our final chapter attempt, in a few sentences, to indicate this connection of a psychological history of development with a philosophy of historical development, as it appears from the point of view of the general relation of psychology to philosophical problems.

                                                                                                                                                W. WUNDT.
        LEIPZIG,
                March 11, 1912.