Classics in the History of Psychology

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Definitions Moh - Mor

Posted August 2001

Mohammed, or Mahomet, or Mohamed, or Muhammed. (cir. 570-632 A.D.) An Arabian prophet, born at Mecca. His father died about the time of Mohammed's birth, and his mother in his sixth year. He was raised by a grandfather and an uncle. The latter, Abu Talib, was his faithful friend and protector all through life. Accounts of Mohammed's youth are legendary: he probably tended flocks until his twenty-fifth year, when we entered the service of a rich widow named Chadîdja, whom he married. In his fortieth year Mohammed saw his first 'vision' and received his 'message.' In four years he made forty proselytes, and it was revealed to him that he must preach openly. As his followers increased in numbers, he was forced to the most careful watchfulness to save his life. About 622 he moved to the friendly city of Medina, and the Mohammedan era dates from the first month of the following Arabic year. Mohammed now became the law-giver, judge, and ruler of Medina and of two powerful Arabian tribes. In the first year of the new era, he assumed hostilities against his enemies. War followed, and in the sixth year of the new era the first pilgrimage to Mecca was announced, but not carried out until the following year. The Meccans concluded peace with him, however, and he had become an equal power. His missionaries passed throughout Arabia, and even beyond its borders. Mohammed's forces being defeated in a battle with the Christians, the Meccans broke the peace-treaty. Mohammed defeated them, however, and his religion became supreme in Arabia. He was likewise successful against a combination of hostile tribes in the eighth year of the new era. Two years later, at the head of forty thousand Moslems, he made his last solemn pilgrimage to Mecca. See MOHAMMEDANISM.

Mohammedanism [Arab. al-Islám, the religion of 'self-surrender' or 'resignation' to God's will]: Ger. Mohomedanismus (Islam); Fr. Mahométisme (Islam); Ital. Maomettismo (Islamismo). It should be observed, however, that the Prophet, according to his own view and that of his followers, restored rather than created the religion of Islám, the faith of Abraham; and that hence the term Muslim -- less correctly but more commonly written Moslem -- is constantly applied by them to persons who lived before the time of Muhammad or Mohammed (less correctly Mahomed, Mahomet). The religion founded by MOHAMMED (q.v.) may be defined as the latest of the great Semitic religions, teaching as its cardinal doctrines the Unity and Personality of God, the prophetic mission of Mohammed -- 'the last of the prophets and the seal of the prophets' -- the plenary inspiration of the Qur'án (Koran, Coran), the resurrection of the body, and a system of rewards and punishments in a future life.

The simplicity of the Mohammedan confession of faith -- 'I bear witness that there is no god but God, and I bear witness that Mohammed is his servant and his apostle' -- is at once its strength and its weakness; its strength, because the deliberate utterance of this formula is sufficient to secure to him who utters it the rights, privileges, and status of a Muslim; its weakness, because it may be, and has been, interpreted in the most diverse senses. Hence we find the wide diffusion of Islám amongst many races, including alike the most subtle and spiritual and the most stupid and material, corresponding with an immense variety of sects amongst its adherents; a fact fully recognized by the Muslims themselves in the oft-cited tradition: 'The Magians are divided into seventy sects, the Jews into seventy-one, the Christians into seventy-two, and the Muslims into seventy-three, of all which sects but one shall be saved'; and the tradition: 'My Church shall become divided into seventy-three sects, whereof but one shall be saved, while the rest shall perish.' Nor are the differences which separate some of these sects of a trivial character; the thorough-going pantheism of some of the Súfís (see SÚFÍISM) stands at the opposite pole to the rigid monotheism of the orthodox followers of al-Ash'arí; the strong belief in free-will held by the Mu'tazilites (the dominant party under the early 'Abbásid caliphs) offers the sharpest contrast to the extreme predestinarianism (commonly regarded as an essential feature of Islám) which prevailed later; while amongst certain sects of the extreme Shí'ites (see SUNNÍTES AND SHÍ'ITES) the most grotesque forms of anthropomorphism and metempsychosis are to be found, notably amongst the Isma'ílís, Nusayrís, Druzes, Hurúfís, and certain of the Bábís.

If, however, we except Persia (which is, from the point of view of a Turk, Egyptian, Afghan, or Moor, almost entirely unorthodox), the ordinary orthodox Sunní doctrine teaches in addition to the essentials already enunciated: (1) the plenary inspiration of the Qur'án, which is throughout regarded as the direct utterance of God, conveyed from time to time to the Prophet as occasion arose; (2) the resurrection of the dead, and the judgment and recompense of all mankind; (3) pre-destination of both good and evil; (4) the consummation and conclusion of the prophetic function in Mohammed; and the following obligations: (a) declaration of the divine unity; (b) prayer, preceded by ablution, at five specified periods of the day; (c) almsgiving; (d) fasting in the month of Ramadán; (e) pilgrimage to Mecca once at least in a lifetime, for all whose health and wealth enable them to undertake it. Abstinence from certain foods (notably pork, and all intoxicating drinks) is also obligatory; while circumcision, though not theoretically indispensable, is in practice universally observed.

The doctrines of Islám are based on, and deduced from, (1) the Qur'án, the Word of God; (2) the Hadíth, 'Traditions,' or sayings of the Prophet; and (3) the Sunnat, or practice of the Prophet, his 'companions,' and their immediate 'followers.' The Qur'án alone is not only insufficient for that minute regulation of every detail of daily life which Oriental peoples are prone to expect from their religion, but is, in fact, often inconsistent with itself, reflecting, in its various portions, the changing moods of the Prophet, and the very diverse circumstances of failure, success, hope, despair, and ultimate triumph in which at different epochs of his prophetic career (A.D. 610-32) he found himself. In general, the earlier or Meccan súras (chapters) are shorter, more vigorous, less doctrinal, and in some respects (notably in their attitude towards the Jews and Christians) more tolerant than those revealed at Medina after the hijra (Hegira) or 'Flight' (A.D. 622); and since the 114 súras which constitute the Qur'án are arranged, on the whole, according to their length, the shortest coming last, it has been truly observed that he who would study the evolution of the Prophet's doctrine would do better to read them in inverse order than as they are now placed. These inconsistencies, however, did not greatly trouble the Arabs (an essentially practical people, little give to metaphysical speculations), to whom primarily Mohammed addressed himself; nor, in any case, were the stirring times in which he and his immediate disciples lived favourable to the elaboration of a complete theological system. This was reserved for their successors, more especially the non-Arabian peoples on whom the valour, ambition, and proselytizing zeal of the conquering Arab Muslims soon imposed the religion of Islám. Amongst these the Persians were conspicuous, and, as has often been observed, it was to them especially that the elaboration of what is often miscalled Arabian science and Arabian philosophy (see the topics to which reference is made under ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY) was due. Arabic, it must be remembered, was, for the first four or five centuries of Islám, the language not only of religion, but also of philosophy, science, poetry, and diplomacy throughout the Mohammedan world, and even at the present day in Persia it is still the vehicle in which serious treatises on religious or philosophical subjects are written; while the semi-Persian character of the 'Abbásid rule, which had its centre at Baghdad, and reached its zenith in 'the golden prime of good Haroun Alraschid,' is now generally recognized.

It was, then, by these more civilized and speculative peoples that the elaboration and synthesis of Mohammedan doctrine was effected. The inconsistencies of the Qur'án were removed by the science of 'the abrogating and the abrogated' (násikh wa mansúkh); and its deficiencies were supplemented by the collection and critical examination of a vast number of traditions as to how the Prophet and his companions behaved, and what they said and did, in various circumstances and emergencies. The older traditionists (of whom al-Bukhárí and Muslim are the most celebrated) spared no pains in the collection and selection of these traditions, gathered orally in many long and laborious journeys through Arabia; and though the severe critical method which they adopted proved fatal to the pretensions of the greater number, enough remained to form a basis for a pretty complete system of theology and jurisprudence. At a later date, when the critical faculty waxed weaker and a less honest and more partisan feeling prevailed, spurious traditions (often fabricated with some obvious political or polemical purpose) were freely coined: 'I have observed,' says a traditionist who died in A.D. 827, 'that the pious man is in nothing more ready to lie than in what concerns the Hadíth,' and the Shí'ite theologians are generally regarded as particularly open to criticism in this respect.

The earlier sects of Islám (Khárijites, Murjiyya, &c.), including most of the early Shí'ites, or partisans of 'Alí and his family, were mainly political, but the Mu'tazilites ('Separatists'), or 'partisans of the divine justice and divine unity,' as they called themselves, who were the dominant party under the early 'Abbásids (especially in the 9th century of our era), strongly opposed the separation of the Attributes from the Essence of God, the doctrine of predestination, the theory that the Qur'án was increate and existed from all eternity, and the beliefs that God could be seen with the eyes, and that wicked Muslims should not suffer eternal punishment, in all of which points they were in antagonism to the 'orthodox' party, which, for all their liberal tendencies, they vehemently persecuted. Favoured by the court of Baghdad, and armed with the logical weapons which they had borrowed from the Greek philosophers, they enjoyed for a long time undisputed superiority, both intellectual and political, over their opponents; and, had they been able to maintain their supremacy, the whole future history and development of Islám might have been very different, but unfortunately their political ascendency was checked by a change of view on the part of the caliphs, while the desertion from their ranks of the celebrated Hasan al-Ash'arí furnished their adversaries with the controversial weapons of which they had hitherto enjoyed a monopoly. Except for a few highly educated and intelligent natives of India, notably Syed Ameer Ali, author of The Spirit of Islam, the once powerful Mu'tazilites hardly exist at the present day; while even these 'neo-Mu'tazilites' are rather to be regarded as modern 'broad-church' Muslims than as the lineal successors of the ancient sect.

The Sunnís, who greatly outnumber the Shí'ites, comprise the four orthodox schools or sects of Abú Hanífa (Hanifites), Ibn Hanbal (Hanbalites), ash-Sháfi'í (Sháfi'ites), and Ibn Málik (Málikites), which differ from each other in comparatively unimportant points of doctrine and practice. Of the Shí'ites, the 'Sect of the Seven' (Sab'iyya), or Isma'ílís, has still a few adherents in Syria, and is represented at Zanzibar, and by the Khojas and other cognate sects in India, notably at Bombay (where Aghá Khán, the spiritual head of the Khojas, resides) and in Chitrál. The great bulk of Shí'ites at the present day belong however, to the 'Sect of the Twelve' (Ithná 'ashariyya), which is now the national religion of Persia. In Syria they commonly go by the name of Metáwila. At the opposite pole to them stand the Wahhábís, those Puritans and reactionaries of Islám who created so great a turmoil in Arabia and the adjoining regions at the end of the last century, and whose denunciations and attacks were especially directed against the adoration of saints, the superstitious veneration of holy places, and tobacco-smoking.

The finest conception of Islám promulgated by the Prophet himself occurs in the second súra of the Qur'án, v. 172, and runs as follows: --

'Righteousness is not that ye turn your faces to the East and the West; but righteousness is this. Whosoever believeth in God, and the Last Day, and the Angels, and the Book, and the Prophets; and whoso, for the love of God, giveth of his wealth unto his kindred, and unto orphans, and the poor, and the traveller, and to those who claim an alms, and for the release of the captives; and whoso observeth prayer and giveth in charity; and those who, when they have covenanted, fulfil their covenant; and who are patient in adversity and hardship, and in times of violence: -- these are the righteous and they that fear the Lord.'

To appreciate Mohammed's work at its true value, we must remember what he found his people and what he left them. The contrast between the early Muslims and the heathen Arabs is nowhere better brought out than in the reply made by the fugitives at the Abyssinian court to the Nejáshí or sovereign of that country and his bishops and nobles. 'O king!' they said, 'we were a barbarous folk, worshipping idols, eating carrion, leading sinful lives, violating the ties of kinship, evilly entreating our neighbours, the strong among us oppressing the weak; and thus we were until God sent unto us an apostle from among ourselves, whose pedigree we knew, as also his veracity, integrity, and chastity, who summoned us unto God, that we should declare His unity and worship Him, putting away the stones and idols which we and our fathers used to worship in His stead; and who bade us speak truly, faithfully discharge our trusts, observe the ties of kinship, act rightly towards our neighbours, and refrain from forbidden things and from blood; and who forbade us from sinful practices, vain words, consuming the property of orphans, and misusing virtuous women; and who commanded us to worship God, associating none with Him, and to pray, and give alms, and fast.'

Literature. Qur'án: eds. by FLÜGEL (1834, 1837, 1869) and others; trans. into English by SALE (1774 and numerous later editions), with an excellent preliminary discourse, RODWELL (1876), and E.H.PALMER (1880): into French by A. DE BIBERSTEIN KAZIMIRSKI (1854); into German by G. WAHL (1828) and L. ULLMAN (1862); TH. NÖLDEKE Gesch. d. Qorâns (1860).

Biography of the Prophet: IBN HISHÁM (A.D. 828-9), ed. Wüstenfeld (1859-60), trans. into German by WEIL (1864); also monographs by SIR WILLIAM MUIR (4 vols, 1858-61); TH. NÖLDEKE, Das Leben M.'s nach d. Quellen populär dargestellt (1863); SPRENGER, Das Leben u. d. Lehre des M. (1861-5, 1869); R. BOSWORTH SMITH, Mohammed and Mohammedanism, Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in Feb. and March, 1874 (2nd ed., 1876); SYED AMEER ALI, Spirit of Islam and Life of Muhammad (2nd ed., 1896).

History of Islam: SIR W. MUIR, The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline, and Fall (2nd ed., 1892); G. WEIL, Gesch. d. Chalifen (1846-60); DOZY, Het Islamisme (1863 and 1880), with Fr. trans. by Chauvin (1879); RENAN, Mahomet et les Origines de l'Islamisme (1864); HUGHES, Dict. of Islam (1885, 1896); BON KREMER, Culturgesch. d. Orients unter d. Chalifen (1875-7); Gesch. d. herrschenden Ideen des Islams (1868); Culturgeschichtliche Streifzüge auf dem Gebiete des Islams (1873); GOLDZIEHER, Muhammedanische Studien (1889-90); T. W. ARNOLD, The Preaching of Islam (1896).

Sects of Islam: SHAHRISTÁNÍ (A.D. 1153), Kitábu'l-milal wa'n-nihal (ed. Cureton, 1846), German trans. by HAARBRÜCKER (1850); Dabistán (a Persian work composed in India about the middle of the 17th century; several Oriental editions), trans. by SHEA and TROYER (1843); GOBINEAU, Religions et Philos. dans l'Asie Centrale (2nd ed., 1866; 3rd ed., 1900). (E.G.B.)

Molecule and Molecular Force: see MATTER.

Molinos: see QUIETISM.


Moment [Ger.]: an element or FACTOR (q.v.). It is coming into use in English. (J.M.B.)

Moment (of force) [Lat. momentum, movement]: Ger. Kraftmoment; Fr. moment; Ital. momento (della forza). The product of the intensity of a force acting along a line DF by the perpendicular DP from that line to some given point P. The amount of the moment therefore depends on the position of P, which may be any position required by the special problem in hand. Cf. MOMENTUM. (S.N.)

Momentum [Lat.]. Ger. Moment, Bewegungsmenge; Fr. quantité de mouvement; Ital. momento. The product of the mass of a moving body into its velocity.

Moment of momentum. In the case of a particle moving along a line DF (see MOMENT of force) by the perpendicular distance DP from the line to a given point. It differs from the MOMENT (q.v.) of force only in that the momentum of the particle is used instead of the force acting upon it.

In the case of a body or any other system of particles, the sum of the moments of momentum of the different particles. The following is a fundamental property: the moment of momentum is a minimum when for P we take the centre of gravity of the system, and remains constant so long as the system is not acted upon by any force but the mutual action of its own parts. (S.N.)

Monad (Monadism, Monadology) [Gr. monaV, unit]: Ger. Monade; Fr. monade; Ital. monade. In ancient philosophy, the unit in arithmetic, or unity as opposed to duality; it figures in this sense in the numerical speculations of the Platonic school and the later Pythagoreans. The special case of the number two, considered as unit or constituent of being, was known to the Pythagoreans as the Dyad (for Zenocrates' doctrine of the Dyad see ONE). (A.S.P.P.- J.M.B.)

(1) With the Pythagoreans, the monad was the number one considered, as well as we can make out, as the first creative deity (Zeller).

(2) In other Greek schools a monad is simply an individual. With the Atomists, an atom.

(3) In the philosophy of Leibnitz a monad is a being pursuing its development according to an inward law, in pre-established harmony with other beings. The idea may be illustrated by two pendulums, each moving according to a formula of its own. This illustration is used by Leibnitz himself. This theory has been resuscitated by Renouvier (La Nouvelle Monadologie, Paris, 1898).

(4) In the logic of RELATIVES (q.v.), a proposition with one term left blank, to be filled in if the proposition is to be completed. In chemistry: a radicle with one free bond. (C.S.P.)

In its modern signification the term appears to have been first made current by Giordano Bruno, who uses it, in conscious opposition to the atoms of Democritus, to denote the individual imperishable elementary substances in which the divine essence of the universe manifests itself. Each monad combines form and matter; it is at once spiritual and corporeal. The universe is thus living throughout its minutest parts, and each monad is a microcosm or mirror of the whole. God is called the Monas monadum. Bruno's conception of the monads thus combines an intense individualism with a thorough-going pantheism. The analogy of Bruno's conception with the later doctrine of Leibnitz is obvious, and it has been supposed that Leibnitz was indebted to the earlier thinker both for the doctrine and the term. Ludwig Stein, however, who traces very carefully the development of the doctrine of monads in Leibnitz's writings, adduces good grounds for the conclusion that Leibnitz worked out his doctrine of individual substances independently of Bruno, and that the term itself, which he first used in 1696, was suggested to him not by Bruno, but by a contemporary of his own (Van Helmont the younger), with whom he was in correspondence, and who visited him in that year. Had Leibnitz taken his view from Bruno, he would have taken the term at the same time; but the term is used for the first time in 1696, some years after the doctrine had taken definite shape in his mind, and is constantly used thenceforward as the technical term by which he desires to indicate the peculiarity of his own position.

Leibnitz's Monadology is the result of his revision of the Cartesian doctrine of substance. Substance, he maintains, is to be conceived as activity or active force; and whereas, according to the abstract definition of substance as the self-existent, it follows that there can be only one substance, room is left, according to the new definition, for an infinite variety of individual substances. These are the monads, not material or extended like the atoms of the physicists and the mechanical philosophers, but 'metaphysical points' or immaterial centres of force, their inward force or life being conceived, after the analogy of mental life, as a grade of 'perception' or ideation, though the grade of mentality may be so low as not to be properly spoken of as conscious. Each monad is entirely self-contained, developing all its experience from within, but each mirrors or 'represents' the universe from its own particular point of view. The system or hierarchy of monads, rising continuously from the lowest to the highest grade of perfection, constitutes the pre-established harmony in which the universe consists. God is represented as the creator of the monads, in so far as he conferred real existence on what pre-existed ideally in the divine thought. At other times, however, God would appear to be, in metaphysical consistency, only an expression for the harmony of self-subsistent monads.

Monadism, in accordance with the foregoing, might be defined as spiritual atomism or spiritual individualism. If the individual substances are supposed to be metaphysically self-subsistent in their isolation, monadism would be a doctrine of ultimate pluralism, at variance with the monistic impulse in which speculation has its rise and by which it is maintained. But a thinker like Lotze, who has his roots in the Monadology, conceives the monads or spiritual substances not as absolute or unrelated reals, but as organic members of one world, moments in the life of one Being, which conditions them all and makes reciprocal interaction possible.

The doctrine of MIND-STUFF (q.v.) or the theory that every atom or material fact has its inner side -- its atom of sense or consciousness -- presents a monadic character; but, in the form originally given to it by Clifford, it dissolves the unity of consciousness into bits or ultimate units of mind-stuff which compound themselves into what we call a mind. It is simply atomism done into terms of mind. (A.S.P.P.)

Literature: EISLER, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, sub verbo; LEIBNITZ, Monadology (Eng. trans., in J. of Specul. Philos., i. (1867) 129, or in ed. by Latta); DUNCAN, Philos. Works of Leibnitz (trans.); LOTZE, Microcosmus, and Hist. of Philos.; L. STEIN, Leibnitz and Spinoza. (J.M.B.)

Monasticism: see ASCETICISM.

Monergism [Gr. monoV, alone, + erton, work]: Ger. Monergismus; Fr. monergisme; Ital. monergismo. The doctrine of those Augustinians who deny the co-operation of the human will in the work of regeneration, and hold that it is wholly the work of the Holy Spirit, the human will being passive. See SYNERGISM. (A.T.O.)

Moneron [Lat. monus, alone, single]. A name given by Haeckel to the simplest known organisms, including naked Protozoa, such as Amoeba, Protomyxa, and Vampyrella. See E. Haeckel, Gen. Morphol. (1866); Hist. of Creation. Cf. AMOEBA, and PROTOZOA. (E.S.G.)

Money [OF. moneie, Lat. moneta]: Ger. Geld; Fr. monnaie, argent; Ital. moneta. A thing which, by common consent of the business community, is used as a basis of commercial obligations.

There are two quite distinct purposes for which supplies of money are needed by the business community and its individual members: (1) as a reserve to secure solvency; (2) as a medium of exchange.

The latter function seems at first sight much more important than the former; so much so, that most writers have made it the basis of the definition of money. It was so in large measure with Smith and Mill; it is much more explicitly so with some modern writers. 'Money is the medium of exchange,' says Walker. 'Whatever performs this function is money.' To this view there are two objections. First, the actual medium of exchange for important transactions is the bank cheque; and Walker himself shrinks from calling this money, though it is a legitimate consequence of his own definition to do so. Second, the thing which a man must have in order to do business is not a convenient medium, but an acceptable reserve. If he has this, he can transfer title in any way he pleases. To lay stress on the means of transfer instead of that which is behind it, opens the way for fallacies both theoretical and practical.

Literature: JEVONS, Money and the Mechanism of Exchange; treatises on political economy and finance. (A.T.H.)

Monism [Gr. monoV, alone]: Ger. Monismus; Fr. monisme; Ital. monismo. Monism is, in strictness, a name applicable to any system of thought which sees in the universe the manifestation or working of a single principle. Cf. DUALISM, and PLURALISM.

Such a unity may be said to be at once the tacit presupposition and the goal of all philosophic effort, and in so far as a philosophy fails to harmonize the apparently independent and even conflicting facts of experience, as aspects or elements within a larger whole, it must be held to fall short of the necessary ideal of thought. Dualism, in an ultimate metaphysical reference, is a confession of the failure of philosophy to achieve its proper task; and this is the justification of those who consistently use the word as a term of reproach. But the contradictions of experience are so profound, and the difficulties of an ultimate synthesis accordingly so great, that monistic systems are apt to reach their unity by neglecting or overriding fundamental distinctions. Dualism in these circumstances is frequently the reassertion of these distinctions against a monism which the critic considers too 'cheap and easy'; and in the mouth of such critics monism in turn tends to be used in a dyslogistic sense, and to be applied specifically to systems which, by merging the variety of existence in a pantheistic unity, leave no room for individuality or freedom. The doctrine of the Eleatics in ancient, and that of Spinoza in modern, philosophy might be taken as types of such systems. Schopenhauer's pantheism of the will would be a more modern example. Lotze's reference to the 'bold monism' of Hegelian idealism hovers between the two usages of the word, for he expressly recognizes a monistic explanation as the goal of philosophy, while, at the same time, he contends that Hegel's synthesis is overhasty, and does not do justice to all the elements of the problem. Ladd points out (Introd. to Philos., 403) that there are 'two fundamental and irremovable distinctions, the distinction between matter and mind and the distinction between moral good and evil,' the denial or insufficient explanation of which, by speculative systems, provokes, and relatively justifies, the recurrent protest of dualism. But 'we give credence to dualism only in order to be more cautious and penetrating in our philosophical analysis, more patient and comprehensive in our attempt at a final philosophical synthesis. In being consistently and persistently philosophical we are always seeking some form of monistic system.'

The term 'monist' seems to occur first in Wolff, who uses it, in connection with the relation of mind and body, to designate those thinkers who acknowledge only one principle, whether mind or body. It thus includes both idealists and materialists, and is opposed to dualist, dualism being Wolff's own position. After Wolff the term was not much used till it was revived by the Hegelian school in the first half of the present century. Göschel published a book in 1832 called Der Monismus des reinen Gedankens. Sir William Hamilton uses it much in the Wolffian sense, in connection with the question of external perception, to include (1) idealists, (2) materialists, and (3) those who maintain that 'mind and matter are only phenomenal manifestations of the same common substance' (Lects. on Met., i. 296). The term thus includes with him all philosophers except those whom he designates natural dualists (e.g. Reid) and hypothetical dualists (e.g. Descartes and Locke and the 'great majority of modern philosophers'). Hamilton's classification, however, is made with too exclusive reference to a single epistemological problem, instead of being undertaken from an ultimate metaphysical point of view.

In recent discussion the term has come into popular use in connection with the psychophysical question of the relation of MIND AND BODY (q.v.). It is used by a number of writers to denote what is otherwise known as the double-aspect theory or the theory of parallelism. According to this view, 'we have no right to take mind and body as two beings or substances in reciprocal interaction. We are, on the contrary, impelled to conceive the material interaction between the elements comprising the brain and the nervous system as an outer form of the inner ideal unity of consciousness. It is as though the same thing were said in two languages' (Höffding, Outline of Psychol., chap. ii). As this doctrine obviously reproduces the Spinozistic theory of parallelism between the attributes of thought and extension, it is sometimes spoken of as Neo-Spinozism. It sometimes claims merely to state an empirical concomitance, and to rank therefore as a scientific law, without involving a decision on the metaphysical question of the ultimate ground of existence. But in general the theory is not limited to the case of 'minds,' or even of living things, but is made coextensive with existence, each particle of matter being supposed to possess a mental aspect. It passes, therefore, into a metaphysical theory which represents the world of consciousness and the world of matter as parallel manifestations of one underlying substance. Philosophically, such a theory must be regarded as imperfect, in so far as it offers no explanation of the duality which it empirically accepts, and throws no light on the nature of the identical substance which it speculatively asserts. In any case, this application of the term monism is an unwarrantable limitation of the term to a single form or variety of monism regarded as a philosophical theory. It is sometimes known as 'scientific monism.'

Literature: works on metaphysics generally, and BIBLIOG. B, 2, f. In relation to the last-mentioned use of the term cf. HÖFFDING, as cited above; LLOYD MORGAN, Compar. Psychol., Prolegomena and chap. ii; ROMANES, Mind, Matter, and Monism; CARUS, numerous papers in the Monist, i. ff.; E. HAECKEL, Natürliche Schöpfungsgesch.; Monismus als Band zwischen Wiss. u. Religion (1895, Eng. trans.); and Riddle of the Universe (Eng. trans., 1900); E. MORSELLI, La Filos. monistica in Italia, Riv. di Filos. scient. (1886); and GIORDANO BRUNO, Commem. Address, Rome, 1887 (1888). (A.S.P.P.)

Monitorial System [Lat. monitor, from monere, to advise]: see BELL AND LANCASTER.

Mono- [Gr. monoV, single, only]: Ger. Mono-; Fr. mono-; Ital. mono-. (1) In one respect: as MONOMANIA (q.v.; also termed, by Clouston, monopsychosis). (2) Affecting one part or member of the body: as monoplegia, paralysis of one limb; monocular, relating to one eye; monologue, repetition of one sound (Lall-Monologe, Preyer: see LALLING). (J.J.)

Monogony: see AGAMOGENESIS.

Monoideism [Gr. monoV, alone, single, + idea, idea]: Ger. Monoïdeismus; Fr. monoidéisme; Ital. monoideismo. A state of mind in which the attention is fixed for a somewhat extended period upon a single idea, with a certain artificial concentration known variously as 'paralysis,' 'rigidity,' 'spasm,' static contraction,' &c., of the attention. It occurs in cases of pathological FIXED IDEAS (q.v.), HYPNOSIS (q.v.), and what is variously called 'charming,' effect of 'evil eye,' &c.

This is in opposition to the usage (Ribot) which applies monoideism to normal attention, in which the ready and facile movement of attention over a field, and transition from one object to another, is in sharp contrast to the fixity noted here. (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)

Monologue: see MONO-, and LALLING.

Monomania [Gr. monoV, single, + mania, madness; according to Esquirol, derived from mhnh, moon, maniac being the Greek form for the Latin form 'lunatic']: Ger. Monomanie; Fr. monomanie; Ital. monomania. Introduced by Esquirol for partial insanity and melancholia (in its original sense), in distinction from the more diffuse disorders -- mania, dementia, and imbecility. Prichard introduced it in English (cf. MORAL INSANITY).

The existence of such limited disorders cannot be questioned; but they appear under so many distinct conditions that it is more customary and better to sacrifice the merely descriptive term monomania for one which suggests the actual clinical process involved. Indeed, the term is at present mainly of historical interest, and reflects an uncritical attitude which classifies symptoms on superficial resemblance instead of on ground of their origin, development, and correlation (cf. PSYCHOSIS). Even for those psychoses in which the symptom-complex remains throughout that of partial delusional insanity, most writers have abandoned the term monomania in favour of PARANOIA (q.v.). The word mania is no longer used for delusional states or delusions in psychiatry; and even if it were, there are too many cases of this type in which more than one 'mania' exists (e.g. delusions of grandeur and delusions of persecution). Moreover, it seems dogmatic to merely call the delusions themselves abnormal, and not to acknowledge the weakness of the 'normal part' of the reasoning, which fails to counteract the formation of the delusions. Prichard himself admits that one careful inquiry it will often be found that the mind is in many respects in a different condition from that of perfect health.

The forms which Esquirol classified under this term are now divided as follows: --

(1) PARANOIA (q.v.) and paranoic conditions. (2) Residuals from processes of deterioration: chronic delusional conditions representing the result of katatonia and dementia praecox. See PARANOIA (secondary). Esquirol's cases of 'erotomania' are paranoic forms of dementia praecox. (3) Epidemic hysteria of religious character. (4) Manic-depressive insanity (several of Esquirol's instances of monomanie raisonnante are cases of recurrent hypomania). (5) Constitutional neurasthenia or psychopathic inferiority (phobias, tics, impulses, &c.). Prichard also includes melancholia, hypochondriasis, and paranoia with somatic delusions, &c. Cf. the topics cited.

Literature: ESQUIROL, Des Maladies mentales, ii. 1 ff. (1839); PRICHARD, Treat. on Insan., 26 ff. (1835); SPITZKA, Insanity (1883); BALLET-MORSELLI, Psicosi (1896). (A.M.)

Monophysites [Gr. monoV, single, + fusiV, nature]: Ger. Monophysiten; Fr. monophysites; Ital. monofisiti. A sect of Eastern Christians taking its rise in the 5th century, who, while admitting the union of the two natures in the incarnation of Jesus, yet maintain that his nature is essentially simple, the human element being virtually absorbed into the divine.

This doctrine gave rise to an important controversy, which involved both the political and ecclesiastical relations between Rome and Constantinople. The doctrine was finally declared heretical, and Severus, its principal exponent, condemned. The doctrine survived, however, being especially strong in Egypt. The American Church of the present is nominally of the Monophysite belief.

Literature: DORNER, Christliche Glaubenslehre, ii (1880, also Eng. trans.). (A.T.O.)

Monopoly [Gr. monoV, exclusive, + pwlein, to barter]: Ger. Monopol; Fr. monopole; Ital. monopolio. (1) An exclusive trade privilege. (2) The control, in whatever way obtained, of all the sources of supply of any commodity in a particular market. (3) The control of a specially good source of supply.

The advantage under (3) is more properly called a differential gain than a monopoly.

The most common instances of (1) are patents and copyrights. They are granted not so much because of any theory of property in ideas, as on account of the fact that few people can develop a new process or issue a new book unless assured of some valuable gain in case of success to counterbalance the large loss in case of failure.

Monopolies of form (2) arise chiefly in this way: when the most economical supply of the market requires a mass of concentrated capital, there may not be an aggregate demand sufficient to support more than one such concern at any price; and even where things have not reached this extreme, there will often be so few concerns as to render continuation easy and the advent of a new competitor slow and difficult. Railroads and waterworks often furnish an example of the former class; manufacturing TRUSTS (q.v.) of the latter. (A.T.H.)

Monosyllogism: see SYLLOGISM.

Monotheism [Gr. monoV, alone, + qeoV, God]: Ger. Monotheismus; Fr. monothéisme; Ital. monoteismo. (1) In religion: the belief in one God.

This term is more in use in the history of religion than in philosophy, and is used chiefly in contrast to polytheism. Hence Xenophanes is frequently spoken of as a monotheist on account of his polemic against the polytheism of the popular faith of Greece: 'One God there is, greatest among gods and men, neither in form nor in thought like unto men.' So also Judaism is characterized as a monotheistic religion in contrast with the polytheistic nature-worship of the surrounding peoples, and the same epithet has been applied in later times to Mohammedanism. Monotheism, as a reaction from nature-worship, involves the conception of God as a spiritual being distinct from nature, which is regarded as his creation. This distinction of the Creator from his creation tends, in the typical monotheistic religions mentioned, to pass into an abstract separation, which reduces God to an externally active Cause and Lawgiver. Hence monotheism is treated by some writers as a defective doctrine -- a stage on the way to a philosophical theism (see 2, below). Thus, for example, Edward Caird, in his Evolution of Religion (ii. 67), says, speaking of the relation of Judaism to Christianity: 'Nothing could meet the want of the time but a religion which should unite the immanence of pantheism with the transcendence of monotheism.' Historically, there are two conflicting theories of the order of religious development; the one regarding polytheism as the corruption of a purer form of monotheistic belief; the other representing monotheism as an evolution from pre-existing polytheism. (A.S.P.P.- A.T.O.)

(2) In philosophy: the doctrine that God is one indivisible being and the embodiment of the unitary principle of reality.

Monotheism, in philosophy, is a genus of which THEISM and PANTHEISM are species (see those terms). It is to be distinguished from henotheism, the doctrine of a supreme being in a hierarchy of deities. Monotheism may stop short of the assertion of the personality of God, as in pantheism. Its one distinctive feature is its dogma of the unity of the divine nature.

Literature: see the topics named, especially THEISM, and BIBLIOG. E, 2, e. Also ZELLER, Development of Monotheism among the Greeks; S. B. GOULD, Hist. of Monotheism; E. CAIRD, Evolution of Religion. See also under THEISM. (A.T.O.)

Monothelitism [Gr. monoV, alone, + qelein, to will]: Ger. Monothelitismus; Fr. monothélitisme, monothélisme; Ital. monotelitismo. A modified form of the Monophysite doctrine to the effect that the dual nature of Jesus Christ possessed but one energizing will.

This doctrine, brought forward as a compromise between Monophysite and orthodox parties, gave rise to a temporary truce, but was finally condemned as a heresy in 680-1, after which it disappeared.

Literature: SCHAFF, Christ and Christianity, 62; DORNER, Doctrine of the Person of Christ, ii. Pt. 1; WATSON, Ketzerhistorie, IX. iii. 666; MÖLLER, in Herzog's Real-Encyc. (A.T.O.)

Monotypic and Polytypic Evolution: see EVOLUTION (in biology), and cf. PHYSIOLOGICAL SELECTION.

Monster [Lat. monstrum, a prodigy, a wonder]: Ger. Missgeburt, Monstrum; Fr. monstre; Ital. mostro. An organism congenitally much malformed. Cf. SPORT.

No definite line can be established between malformation and monstrosity, as the difference is one of degree only. When the malformation is so great that the appearance of the individual organism differs widely from the normal, the term monster is applied. These abnormal forms are not infrequently developed in the human species during the period of gestation. Such abnormal forms follow more or less certain types, and have therefore been classified. The study of monstrosities is called TERATOLOGY (q.v.).

While ordinarily used in regard to anatomical malformations, it is also employed in a psychological sense, especially in reference to absence or perversion of the moral and emotional sensibilities. (C.S.M.- J.J.)

Literature: IS. G. ST. - HILAIRE, Hist. des Anomalies (1832); C. DARESTE, Production des Monstruosités (1891); L. GUINARD, Tératologie (1893); T. H. MORGAN, The Frog's Egg (1897); W. ROUX, Gesammelte Abhandl. ü. Entwickelungsmech. d. Organismen (1895); TARUFFI, Storia della Teratologia (1895). (E.S.G.)

Montaigne, Michel Eyquem, Seigneur de. (1533-92.) Born at Périgord, France, and educated at Bordeaux, he studied law at fifteen, and in 1554 became a counsellor in the Parliament of Bordeaux, where his friendship for Étienne de la Boétie began. Resigned in 1570 and devoted himself to literature. In 1580 he travelled in Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and the north of France. In 1581 became mayor of Bordeaux. Fled from the city, 1585, to escape the plague.

Montanism: Ger. Montanismus; Fr. Montanisme; Ital. Montanismo. The doctrine of a sect of Christians, in the second century, founded by Montanus, which combined belief in the continuance of the miraculous gifts of the Apostles and in the personal inspiration of Montanus, with the expectation of the second coming of Christ in the near future and the practice of a rigorous ascetic discipline.

The significance of Montanism lies almost exclusively in its claim of a continuance of miraculous gifts in the Church. This was, on the one hand, an anticipation of the ecclesiastical doctrine of infallibility, and on the other, the first assertion of the principle of the progressive revelation of Christian truth. Newman takes this view, while Ritschl, in Harnack's words, regards it 'as a reaction against secularism in the Church and an effort to conserve the principles of primitive Christianity.'

Literature: J. H. NEWMAN, Essay on Devel. of Christ. Doctrine (1845); BONWETSCH, Gesch. d. Montanismus (1881); A. HARNACK, Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.), art. Montanism; McCLINTOCK and STRONG, Cyclopedia, art. Montanism. (A.T.O.)

Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de. (1689-1755.) Educated in the Oratorian college of Juilly and (in law) at Bordeaux. Became counsellor in the Parliament of Bordeaux, 1714, and president, 1716. Chosen to the Academy, 1728. Travelled in Germany, Austria, and Italy, spending two years in England, studying methods of government. Returned to France, 1731, and devoted himself to historical study.

Mood [Lat. modus]: Ger. Stimmung; Fr. humeur; Ital. umore. Pronounced emotional tone not connected with particular mental objects, and having much colouring from organic sensations.

Literature: STOUT, Manual of Psychol., 286 f.; the titles given under EMOTION, and in BIBLIOG. G, 2, k. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Mood (in grammar): see CONJUGATION (linguistic), and INFLECTION.

Mood (in logic) [Lat. modus syllogistici, trans. of Aristotle's tropoV sullogismou]: Ger. Schlussmodus; Fr. mode; Ital. modo. Kind of SYLLOGISM (q.v.), varying with the quantity and quality of the premises and conclusions.

In each syllogistic FIGURE (q.v.) sixteen combinations are possible of the propositions A, E, I, O. Only certain of these are recognized as valid, to which names are given as cited under MNEMONIC VERSES AND WORDS (q. v., 8). For the 'rules' for testing the validity of the various modes see SYLLOGISM. Historical citations on the topic may be seen in Eisler, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, 'Schlussmodi.' (J.M.B., C.L.F.)


Moral Argument (for the existence of God): see THEISM.

Moral Courage: see COURAGE.

Moral Faculty: Ger. moralische Fähigkeit; Fr. faculté morale; Ital. facoltàmorale. The mental capacity or 'power' in the individual by which is apprehended the moral quality of actions or the distinctions between right and wrong.

The term is used by Butler as a general term which implies no special view of the nature of the power of distinguishing between right and wrong. 'That we have this moral approving and disapproving faculty is,' he says, 'certain, from our experiencing it in ourselves and recognizing it in each other.' Its existence is presupposed, 'whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason, whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding or as a perception of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both' (Diss. on Virtue, apud init.). The term, which was frequently employed by the English moralists and Scottish philosophers, has for the most part fallen out of use with the decay of the 'faculty psychology.' Cf. CONSCIENCE, MORAL SENSE, and PRACTICAL REASON. (W.R.S.)

Moral Insanity: Ger. moralischer Irrsinn; Fr. folie morale; Ital. pazzia morale. 'A morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, temper, habits, moral dispositions, and natural impulses, without any remarkable disorder or defect of the intellect or knowing and reasoning faculties, and particularly without any insane illusions or hallucinations' (Prichard, 1835).

The word moral was used not in the sense of ethical, but as a contrast to 'delusional' or 'incoherent,' referring to Locke's remark: 'Madmen do not appear to have lost the faculty of reasoning; but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths, and they err, as men do that argue right from wrong principles.' The cases which Prichard alludes to are mostly mild forms of manic-depressive insanity (see MANIA), of which he describes very plainly the ups and downs of exaltation and depression with absence of any delusion or immorality. Other cases have merely 'a liability to violent fits of anger breaking out without cause and leading to the danger or actual commission of serious injury to surroundings, persons,' or criminal impulses (irresistible impulse to break things, to put fire to buildings, to commit every kind of mischief, to steal), or nostalgia, erotomania, satyriasis, and nymphomania (unusual intensity of sexual passion). Prichard also includes epileptic irascibility and finally the senile insanity in which 'the pious become impious, the constant and happy discontented and miserable, the prudent and economical imprudent and ridiculously profuse, the liberal penurious, the sober drunken.' Further, he mentions eccentric wayward and antisocial individuals in whom heredity of mental diseases, and even previous attacks of insanity and profound change of character, are demonstrable.

The term 'moral insanity' is now commonly replaced by the terms respectively which characterize the actual psychosis of which it forms a manifestation. As illustrated above, it occurs symptomatically in hypomania (see MANIA), in the restless and adventurous period of certain types of general paralysis or senile dementia, with prominent deterioration of character, in licentiousness and sexual crimes, stealing, &c., or in alcoholic deterioration; and in paranoia (acts of persecution for supposed wrong or of inspiration, as in the well-known case of Guiteau, the murderer of President Garfield) or in epilepsy (impulsive violence, stealing, &c.). There are, further, some cases which are now commonly thought of as real instances of 'moral insanity,' in which, notwithstanding normal educational opportunities, a peculiar deficiency of appreciation of moral values lasts beyond childhood, or crops out at the period of puberty, when a larger scope of individual and social responsibilities may normally be expected to arise. These cases belong to the category of constitutional psychic inferiority, and are properly classed as moral imbecility, whether they are combined with or occur in the absence of intellectual, emotional, and impulsive deficiency. In these cases there is an inability of adaptation to the demands and existing order of society, a predominance of vicious, antisocial, and even criminal instincts, resulting in discomfort and injury to those immediately affected and to society at large. Various forms of the defect occur: there may be a complete lack of appreciation of right and wrong, or a general appreciation of the difference without any desire to act accordingly, or a desire to act differently, but no sufficient power of will to convert motive into action, i.e. a sort of moral abulia. Sexual immorality, prostitution, alcoholism, disregard of family and other duties, a fiendish passion for making trouble, stealing and forging and lying (Delbrück's pseudologia phantastica) are the most frequent types of action expressive of moral insanity.

A special reason for the survival of the term is its antagonism to certain concepts of English law which ignore completely the undeniable fact that there are states of merely diminished responsibility. This law recognizes irresponsibility only where the perpetrator is unable to distinguish between right and wrong in the act committed; while undoubtedly there are states where the criminal recognizes this distinction but is practically unable to choose between right and wrong, owing to the psychopathic conditions mentioned above.

Literature: see the topics mentioned; also DELBRÜCK, Die pathologische Lüge und die psychisch abnormen Schwindler (1891); BLEULER, Über moralische Idiotie, Vtljsch. f. gerichtl. Med. (1893); KAHLBAUM, Über Heboïdophrenie, Allg. Zeitsch. f. Psychiat., x1vi. 461-74; ERDMANN MÜLLER, Arch. f. Psychiat., xxxi. 325-77; J. C. PRICHARD, A Treatise on Insanity (1835); HACK TUKE, art. Moral Insanity, in Tuke's Dict. of Psychol. Med., with literature. (A.M.)

Moral Judgment: Ger. sittliches Urtheil; Fr. jugement moral; Ital. giudizio morale. (1) The judgment passed upon the ethical quality of conduct or character. See CONSCIENCE. (W.R.S.)

(2) Judgments of value, WORTH (q.v.), or appreciation, distinguished from intellectual judgments, or judgments of relation, predication, assertion. Cf. JUDGMENT.

Intellectual judgments reflect what is true or consistent, moral judgments what is fit with reference to some sort of standard or ideal which may not be realized at all. Even on the theory that moral judgments are not absolute but relative, there is still a distribution of values, of which the given worth is one, with reference to a scale; and this in turn implies an ideal of excellence. The common element which perhaps justifies the use of the term moral judgment is the subjective attitude of assent or endorsement which it shares with cognitive judgment. It would be better to give up the use of the term moral in application to all sorts of worth (in such expressions as 'moral sciences,' and in the French 'fortune morale'), and to restrict it to the ethical, as in the definition (1). The word PRACTICAL (q.v.) is being more and more used in this general sense, and that term is available. See also PRACTICAL REASON and PRACTICAL JUDGMENT.

Literature: ORMOND, Foundations of Knowledge, Pt. III. chap. iii; and citations under WORTH. (J.M.B.)

Moral Order: see ORDER (moral).

Moral Philosophy (and Science): see ETHICS, and ETHICAL THEORIES.

Moral Progress [Lat. progressus]: Ger. sittlicher Fortschritt; Fr. progrès moral; Ital. progresso morale. Advance towards perfection, or the process of the realization of the moral ideal.

Moral progress is a characteristic idea of Christian thought, both as regards the individual and society. The moral idea being conceived as infinite, the moral life is apt to be regarded as a progressus in infinitum. Thus Kant deduces from the infinity of the moral task the immortality of the moral being. Of the evolution moralists, some identify progress with evolution, and hold that the progress of society and that of the individual proceed pari passu, their common goal being the complete adaptation of the individual to his environment. Others find in social organization a reflection of the ethical progress made by the individual, at the same time that the individual's ethical nature has arisen for the fulfilment of social utilities. According to Mill, Spencer, and Stephen, the chief factor in moral progress is sympathy; according to Alexander, progress is the result of a struggle of ideals, in which the best or fittest survive. According to Leslie Stephen, the direction of progress is from conduct to character, from the form 'Do this' to the form 'Be this.' On the other hand, the fact of moral progress, and especially the identity of progress and evolution, has been denied. Cf. Huxley's Romanes Lecture, 'Evolution and Ethics' (discussed by Royce, Baldwin, and others in Int. J. of Ethics, 1895), and A. J. Balfour's 'Fragment on Progress,' in Essays and Addresses, 241 ff. The pessimists hold that the course of things is from bad to worse, a regress rather than a progress. Cf. SOCIAL PROGRESS.

Literature: many works on ethics, especially by the writers named, as cited under ETHICS, and ETHICAL THEORIES; see also BIBLIOG. F, 2, f, n. (J.S.)

Moral Science: see ETHICS.

Moral Sciences: Ger. Geisteswissenschaften; Fr. sciences morales; Ital. scienze morali. Those branches of inquiry which deal with mind and conduct, as opposed to matter and life; i.e. they are contrasted with the physical and natural sciences (see SCIENCE), and are often described as the 'mental and moral sciences.'

In this general division all knowledge of man, apart from his body and its history, falls to the moral sciences; history, political economy, law, and statistics, as well as psychology, anthropology, and ethics. The psychological factors involved, such as desire, emotion, effort, and the pursuit of ideals, stand in the way of the treatment of the phenomena by the formulas of quantitative measurement. The French cover the distinction by their phrase 'la FORTUNE PHYSIQUE (q.v.) et la fortune morale.' (J.M.B.)

Moral Sense: Ger. sittliches Gefühl; Fr. sens moral; Ital. senso morale. The specific feeling -- or faculty of feeling -- attaching to the distinction between right and wrong.

The term moral sense is described by Adam Smith (Moral Sentiments) as 'a word of late formation and not yet English.' The term 'moral sense writers' is now commonly used to denote a succession of English moralists, of whom Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were the chief. The term moral sense is used by Shaftesbury (in the margin of his Inquiry concerning Virtue) as synonymous with 'sense of right and wrong,' and as indicating a feeling in the individual which accompanies right or wrong action or disposition. It is spoken of as a 'reflex affection,' because the 'objects of the affection' are 'the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, which are brought into the mind by reflection.' So that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike' (Inquiry, Bk. 1. Pt. 1. § 3). The doctrine of a moral sense was, however, most fully elaborated by F. Hutcheson in three works -- Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Philosophy (published posthumously in 1755). The moral sense is described by him as a 'determination of our minds to receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of objects.' 'By a superior sense, which I call a moral one, we perceive pleasure in the contemplation of such [sc. good] actions in others, and are determined to love the agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves) without any view of further natural advantage from them' (Inq., 106, 124). It is described as a 'taste or relish' (Syst., i. 59); and its 'gratifications are constituted by nature our most endurable pleasures' (Essay, xix). In Hutcheson's latest work the reflex nature of the moral sense is most distinctly brought out, and it is said to have reference to 'affections' or dispositions, rather than to actions (i. 97). Adam Smith replaces this view of a distinct moral sense by his doctrine of sympathy (Mor. Sent., VII. iii. 3). (W.R.S.)

Moral Statistics: Ger. moralische Statistik; Fr. statistiquemorale; Ital. statistica morale. A branch of practical STATISTICS (q.v.). An examination of the French criminal statistics by the statistician Guerry in the year 1829 showed that the conduct of the population from a moral point of view might be made a subject of statistical investigation. Hence arose moral statistics.

The development of statistical inquiry among civilized communities within the present century has let to a corresponding expansion of the field of moral statistics. In addition to criminal statistics, moral statistics now include the statistics of suicide, of illegitimacy, of divorce, and in fact of any manifestation of human conduct in its moral aspects which admits of enumeration and effective comparison. Moral statistics draw material from almost every department of practical statistics. The birth-rate belongs to the statistics of population, but it is also of great value to the moral statistician. It not merely supplies him with the number and ratio of births which take place outside bonds of wedlock; it also assists him to discover how far the natural increase of the community is checked among the married population by artificial means. Ecclesiastical statistics may also be utilized by the moral statistician. The growth or decay of ecclesiastical or secular marriages is in its way a symptom of the moral condition of the community. Trade statistics, where they are concerned with the consumption of alcoholic drinks or with the statistics of luxuries, are to a certain extent an index of the moral standard of the people. Educational statistics and the statistics of pauperism have a close relation to moral statistics. Conduct depends on vital, intellectual, economic, religious, and political conditions, and the statistical materials which these conditions supply are all of value to the moral statistician.

Moral statistics admit of almost as much subdivision as society itself, and the subdivisions run upon somewhat similar lines. Morality is a characteristic of the human race. Hence moral statistics are international in character, and the first subdivision of moral statistics may be appropriately described as international moral statistics. The results of international moral statistics, in so far as it is possible to get results, are arrived at by the method of comparison. All civilized communities collect statistical material which enables them to give the ratio of crime, suicide, illegitimacy, divorce, &c., occurring in such communities within a strictly defined period of time. The task of international moral statistics is to collect these ratios and to present them in a comparative form. When this has been done, we see the rate of crime, the rate of suicide, the rate of illegitimacy, and so on, which exist in the civilized world at a given time, and the difference between one nation and another with respect to these ratios. Let us take the international statistics of homicide as an example.

Homicides per million inhabitants.

Italy, 1880-4 . . . . . . . . . . . 96.
France, 1880-4 . . . . . . . . . 15.
Germany, 1882-4 . . . . . . . 10.
Spain, 1883-4 . . . . . . . . .  76.
Austria, 1877-81 . . . . . . . 24.
England, 1880-4 . . . . . . . . 5.
Ireland, 1880-4 . . . . . . . . .10.
Scotland, 1880-4 . . . . . . . 5.

This table, which is extracted from Professor Ferri's L'Omicidio, shed considerable light on the international distribution of homicide. It is not, however, to be taken as an absolutely accurate representation of the facts. Penal law, penal procedure, the definitions of crime, differ in different communities. These differences affect the statistical returns, and all that we get as a result of international statistical comparisons is an approximation to the facts. But approximations, although falling short of complete accuracy, are often of great value. They lead the student of moral statistics to inquire into the various conditions which tend to produce a high or a low rate of homicide or suicide, or whatever the subject under consideration may be. The conditions, for instance, which make homicide vary so much in different countries may be partly climatic, partly racial, partly social, partly economic. International statistics, although they are too incomplete to be taken as a test of the position occupied by nations in the scale of morality, are, nevertheless, an invaluable means of awakening communities to the moral evils which exist within them; and when such statistics afford a clue to the conditions which produce these evils, they may help to pave the way for removing them.

National moral statistics embrace a narrower area, but are more accurate in character than international statistics. In national statistics the accuracy of the returns is not disturbed to the same extent by differences of method in the collection and arrangement of the statistical material. Practically the same method of collection and arrangement may exist for a considerable period of time. When this is the case, a comparison of the moral conditions of one period with the moral conditions of another attains a considerable degree of accuracy. This is exemplified, for instance, in the statistics of illegitimacy in England and Wales during the last quarter of a century. During that period there has been little or no change in the method of collecting the statistical data relating to the general birth-rate. In the 'quinquennial period 1876-80 the rate of illegitimate births to the total number of births was 47 per 1,000. In the quinquennial period 1893-7 the illegitimate birth-rate had sunk to 42 per 1,000. It may be fairly assumed from these returns that the vice of illegitimacy is diminishing in English social life. but it would be hazardous to argue from this fact that there has been a corresponding improvement in sexual morality as a whole. It is possible that this may be the case, but the decrease in the proportions of illegitimacy is not in itself a conclusive proof of it. In England the tendency of the population for a long period has been to concentrate in large cities. Prostitution is almost entirely a product of city life. The effect of prostitution is to diminish the proportions of illegitimacy. In London, for instance, the rate of illegitimacy is lower than it is in the population as a whole. But it would be rash to infer from this fact that the morality of the sexes is on a higher level in the metropolis than in other portions of the kingdom where illegitimacy is more prevalent. While illegitimacy is comparatively high in the country districts, the reverse is the case in France and also in Germany. M. Levasseur, in his remarkable demographic work La Population française, gives the following table exhibiting the proportions of illegitimacy in urban and rural France: --

Illegitimate births per 1,000 in 1879-83.

Department of the Seine . . . . . . . . . . 24.
Urban population of France . . . . . . . 101.
Rural population of France . . . . . . . . 42.
Average for France as a whole . . . . . 74.

Notwithstanding the fact that prostitution tends to diminish illegitimacy, we find that it is urban and not rural France which has the highest proportion of illegitimate births. This leads the moral statistician to the conclusion that prostitution is only one of the conditions affecting the movement of illegitimacy. As far as France is concerned, M. Levasseur says that the other conditions are the growth of large cities, the development of industrialism, the obligation of military service, the weakening of the religious sentiment, and indisposition to accept the burdens of family life, the temptations of luxury for poor girls, and the prescriptions of the French law, which forbids 'la recherche de la paternité.' In addition to these causes the high rate of illegitimacy in many French and German cities is to be attributed to the growth of certain political and social ideals among the masses of the population. In certain anarchist and socialist circles the ideal of normal sexual relationship is regarded not as a legal but as a purely voluntary union. Where this ideal is practised, the offspring of such relationships are illegitimate in the eye of the law; and if this ideal is practised to any considerable extent, it at once heightens the proportions of illegitimacy. In such cases a high ratio of illegitimacy does not necessarily presuppose a correspondingly low level of sexual morality. It will also be observed, in connection with the statistics of illegitimacy in France and England, that international moral statistics sometimes assist us to interpret the meaning of national statistics, and to widen our grasp of the conditions which contribute to produce the statistical results.

In national moral statistics the difficulty of arriving at accurate results arises from the fact that we cannot compare contemporaneous periods as in international statistics, but must compare different periods, as, for example, the present with the past, or one period in the past with another period in the past. Even where the collection and arrangement of the statistical material remains the same, the material itself is often considerably affected by changes in the law, or changes in the administration of the law, or by a combination of both. It is the operation of these circumstances which makes it so difficult to estimate exactly the national movement of crime over lengthened periods. Criminal law in the course of a generation undergoes considerable change. Old enactments are repealed or modified in their operation. New enactments are made. The development of legislation is constantly adding new crimes to the statute book, and to a limited extent removing old ones. In England the coming into force of the compulsory Education Act, which compelled every parent under a penalty to send his child to school, at once added enormously to the number of persons tried and convicted before the criminal courts. The growth of industrial legislation has worked in the same direction. Employers' liability Acts, factory and workshop Acts, mines and quarries Acts, merchant shipping Acts, are all Acts with penalties attached to them, and all of them have tended to add to the ratio of persons coming before the criminal courts. These facts must all be borne in mind and due allowance made for them when comparisons are made between two periods where the legal conditions differ under which the population live. If the moral statistician looks merely at the criminal returns relating to the total volume of offences for trial before the criminal courts, he will see that these offences are increasing; and if he does not look outside these returns, he will be led to the conclusion that crime, in its widest sense, is increasing, and that the morality of the population is deteriorating. If, on the other hand, the moral statistician looks merely at the growth of social legislation, if he counts up the number of education Acts, of industrial Acts, of municipal Acts passed into law in order to improve the intellectual and physical condition of the population, he will come to the conclusion that the moral sense of the community is developing, otherwise such Acts would not have come into existence. Both views would be one-sided, because neither view takes account of all the statistical material at hand for forming a comprehensive judgment. On the one hand, the statistics of social legislation show the growth of the sentiment of social duty; the statistics of the growth of offences, on the other hand, show the moral danger of bringing larger and larger sections of the population under the lash of the criminal law. The ultimate problem in this case would be whether the danger is greater than the benefit, or the benefit than the danger.

The examples which have just been given show to what extent national moral statistics are affected by changes in legislation when these statistics cover a considerable period of time. They are similarly affected by changes in the administration of the law. If a law is very rigidly administered, if all offences under it, however trivial in character, are prosecuted without exception, the annual return of trials and convictions for such offences will be at a maximum. If, on the other hand, the law is administered with forbearance and consideration, the annual return of offences will not be nearly so high. And yet in both cases exactly the same number of offences may have been committed. One of the principal reasons why the juvenile population in English prisons has diminished so much in recent years, is that magistrates and judges are now exercising greater patience and forbearance with the juvenile offender. Instead of sending him to prison, they are cautioning him, or fining him, or committing him to an industrial school. In the same way the adult prison population in England has been greatly diminished by resorting on a larger scale to the penalty of fining rather than the penalty of imprisonment, and by the growing practice of passing shorter sentences on offenders committed to prison. All these circumstances have to be taken into consideration when we begin to interpret the contents of national moral statistics. The statistics themselves are little more than the raw material. They are meaningless and misleading until we have made a study of all the circumstances connected with them and affecting them. Comparisons between one period and another of the moral statistics relating to the national life must never be undertaken till a preliminary study has been made of all the conditions bearing upon the returns. It is the neglect of this elementary precaution which has done so much to bring statistical methods, when applied to social phenomena, into contempt.

A third subdivision of moral statistics is the moral statistics of the various localities, whether they are provinces, states, or counties, of which a nation is composed. The local or, as it is often called, the geographical distribution of divorce, suicide, crime, &c., is very uneven. In some parts of the country the ratio is above the average for the whole population; in other districts it is below the average. It is the business of moral statistics to attempt to account for the conditions which produce these differences. In France, for instance, the rate of suicide is highest in the departments around the capital, and lowest in the extreme west and in the departments along the southern frontier. In the United States, homicide is highest in the south and west, and lowest in the east and north. In England, illegitimacy reaches its lowest in such counties as Middlesex and Essex, and its highest in Cumberland and Hereford. In the case of local moral statistics, all the statistical material is collected and arranged in the same manner in European communities, and thus lends itself to exact comparisons between district and district. In the United States this is not the case. Before interstate statistics can be compared, differences in legislation and in administration must be taken into consideration. But in local statistics, where law, administration, and the arrangement of the statistical material are identical, the problem before the moral statistician is considerably simplified, and his results are much more assured.

The moral statistics of classes, trades, and professions form another subdivision of moral statistics. Bosco, in his monograph on homicide in the United States, shows that the unskilled labourer is most addicted to homicide, and that this kind of crime is most rare among the liberal professions. Yet another subdivision of moral statistics is the moral statistics of the population according to civil condition -- married or single, widowers or widows. In the third volume of the Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft, Julius Wolf points out that in Germany widows are more addicted to crime, suicide, and prostitution than women who have husbands. Wolf accounts for the moral degradation of widows by attributing it to the wretched economic conditions into which a large proportion of them are plunged by the loss of their husbands.

We have another division of moral statistics in the moral statistics of sex and age. Moral statistics of every kind exhibit the difference which exists between the sexes with respect to certain immoral or abnormal kinds of conduct. Such statistics show that women are on the whole less addicted to crime and suicide than men. They also show that the criminal age, and the age when suicide reaches its maximum, is not the same for women as for men. But moral statistics, while giving these facts, do not give the explanation of them. This explanation must be sought in the social economic and biological condition of the sexes. In recent times the attempt to account for certain kinds of human conduct on biological grounds has led to an extension of the domain of moral statistics. Criminal anthropology is the name usually given to studies of this kind. Criminal anthropology attempts to explain the criminal act by a reference to peculiarities and abnormalities in the structure and functions of the individual who commits the crime. All these peculiarities are collected and tabulated; and when a convicted person exhibits a combination of them, he is declared to be a born criminal. One anomaly, or even two anomalies, are not necessarily sufficient to relegate the offender to this unfortunate class, and in most cases external conditions must co-operate with the anomalous personal conditions. But when the external and the personal conditions are both present, it is contended by the criminal anthropologist that the criminal act is the inevitable result. In many instances the theories of criminal anthropology have been carried too far, and the data on which these theories are based have not been subjected to a sufficiently rigid statistical and scientific scrutiny. But after all deductions have been made on this account an element of truth remains in the teachings of criminal anthropology. It is undoubtedly true that individuals of a degenerate physical or mental type are handicapped in the economic struggle for life. They usually find it hard to get or to retain employment. This fact alone has a powerful effect in driving them into the ranks of crime or suicide or insanity. It is possible that some creatures of this type may be purely the victims of a defective organization. But in the case of criminals it is practically impossible to prove this. All that can at present be adequately proved is that adverse biological conditions, unless counteracted by favourable social conditions, lead to social adversity, and social adversity in its turn leads to crime.

A summary of the preceding observations with reference to the subdivisions of moral statistics shows that such statistics may be classified in the following order: -- international moral statistics; national moral statistics; local moral statistics; the moral statistics of classes, trades, professions; the moral statistics of civil condition; the moral statistics of sex and age; the moral statistics of biological condition. This classification might possibly be enlarged, but it contains the main heads of moral statistical inquiry.

A fruitful source of inquiry in the domain of moral statistics is the confrontation of one set of moral statistics with another; such, for instance, as the confrontation of the ratio of divorce and separation with the ratio of suicide, or the ratio of illegitimacy with the ratio of pauperism, or the ratio of education with the ratio of crime. When these confrontations are made, the problem is to discover whether there is merely a parallelism between the two ratios or a real causal connection.

Literature: GUERRY, Statistique comparée (Paris, 1829); QUETELET, Physique sociale (Paris, 1869); A. VON OETTINGEN, Die Moralstatistik (1882); A. WAGNER, Die Gesetzmässigkeit in den scheinbar willkürlichen menschlichen Handlungen (Hamburg, 1864); DROBISCH, Die Moralstatistik (Leipzig, 1867); RUEMELIN, Reden u. Aufsätze (Freiburg, 1875); G. MAYR, Die Gesetzmässigkeit im Gesellschaftsleben (München, 1877); SCHMOLLER, Zur Litteraturgeschichte d. Staats- und Social wissenschaften (Leipzig, 1888); MORSELLI, Il Suicidio (1879; Eng. trans., 1881); C.D. WRIGHT, Report on Marriage and Divorce in the United States (1889); LEVASSEUR, La Population française (Paris, 1891); RICHMOND MAYO-SMITH, Statistics and Sociol. (London, 1895); G. MAYR, Statistik u. Gesellschaftslehre (Freiburg, 1895); E. DURKHEIM, Le Suicide (Paris, 1897); W. LEXIS, Handwörterb. d. Staatswiss., Vierter Band, Moralstatistik (Jena, 1892); A. BOSCO, L'Omicidio negli Stati Uniti d'America (Roma, 1897); Bull. de l'Inst. Int. de Statistique; A. L. BOWLEY, Elements of Statistics (London, 1900). (W.D.M.)

Moral Theology: Ger. moralische Theologie; Fr. théologie morale; Ital. teologia morale. (1) The doctrines of theology developed as postulates of the moral as distinguished from the logico-speculative reason. (2) That branch of systematic theology which treats of morals in its theoretic and practical forms.

Moral theology in the first sense had its distinctive origin in Kant's separation of speculative and practical reason, and his derivation of the postulates of religion from the latter. This position was further developed by Lotze, in whose system the basis of theology is the judgment of worth or value. The modern Ritschlian movement in theology is in this sense moral rather than speculative.

In the second sense, moral theology includes ethics as a branch of Christian doctrine developed either dogmatically or speculatively, and casuistry, which treats of the application of ethical principles to practice.

Literature: KANT, Critiques of Pure and Practical Reason, and Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason; LOTZE, Metaphysics, and Philos. of Religion. Also see RITSCHLIANISM. (A.T.O.)

Morality [Lat. moralis, moral]: Ger. Sittlichkeit; Fr. moralité; Ital. moralità. (1) The relation of conduct or character to the moral standard. For different views as to the nature of the moral standard see ETHICAL THEORIES. (W.R.S.)

(2) Disposition or conduct which is ethically good, contrasted with immortality. (J.M.B.)

Morality, Moral Obligation, Moral Consideration (in law): Ger. Naturalobligation (moral obligation), (gesetzliche) Moralität; Fr. obligation naturelle (moral obligation), moralité légale; Ital. obbligo (in ethics), moralità legale. A Moral Obligation is a duty, for the violation of which the law gives no redress; a Moral Consideration is a just but not a legal consideration of a contract, and which therefore will not suffice to support an action in the contract; Morality, so far as such a conception as legal morality exists, is conformity of external conduct to the rules of law and equity (using 'equity' in its technical signification of the principles upon which courts of Chancery or equity act). See Pollock, Jurisprudence, chap. ii. 44.

Law and morality have in great part a common descent from custom. 'The word mos, from signifying what is customary, has come to signify what is right' (Markby's Elements of Law. § 118). The English chancellor was originally the keeper of the king's conscience, and decided causes upon his view of right. From the long succession of decisions in Chancery, certain principles of 'equity' were developed or generalized, which became accepted rules for all equity courts, and have replaced any direct appeal to the principles of morals (Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, ii. §§ 49, 62, 424; Smith, Right and Law, § 49 ff.; Holland, Jurisprudence, chap. v. 50). Pothier, in his Traité des Obligations, art. prél., distinguishes between obligations imparfaites, like gratitude, which do not even bind one in conscience, and obligations naturelles, which are real duties, though not enforceable by law.

Literature: works above cited, and BENTHAM, Mor. and Legisl.; MAINE, Ancient Law, chap. i; CUQ, Les Institutions juridiques des Romains, Liv. 1. iii, III. ii, and 'Conclusion.' (S.E.B.)

Morbid [Lat. morbidus, sickly, from morbus, a disease]: Ger. krankchaft; Fr. morbide; Ital. morboso. (1) Abnormal, diseased; thus morbid psychology is used as synonymous with ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY (q.v.). A morbid train of thought is one with an unwholesome trend, or one characteristic of an abnormal or an insane mind. (2) Specifically applied to an over-sensitive and usually morose state in which there is much self-conscious rumination and in which an exaggerated significance is attached to emotional fluctuations. (J.J.)

More, Henry. (1614-87.) An English divine, educated at Eton and Christ's College, Cambridge, where he held a fellowship from 1639.

Morphology [Gr. morfh, form]: Ger. Morphologie; Fr. morphologie; Ital. morfologia. The philosophical study of comparative anatomy, being chiefly concerned with the genesis and homology of the structure and parts of living organisms. First used by Goethe, in 1817, to denote the study of form.

Literature: HAECKEL, Gen. Morphologie (1868); CARUS, Gesch. d. Zool.; art. 'Morphology' in Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.). (E.S.G.)