DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Michelet, Karl Ludwig. (1801-93.) Studied law and, later, philosophy at Berlin; assistant professor of philosophy there, 1829. He is sometimes classed as one of the 'older' Hegelians, one of the right wing.

Microcephalic [Gr. mikroV, small, + kefalh, head]: Ger. mikrocephal; Fr. microcéphale; Ital. microcefalo. Having an abnormally small head, or one below a certain standard; in the adult less than 431 mm. or 17 inches in circumference, or 1,350 c.c. capacity of the cranium.

The deficiency mainly affects the brain, and is proportionally most marked in the hemispheres. Microcephalic persons are almost always of defective intelligence, and are frequently idiots of extreme types. Only a small percentage of idiots, however, are microcephalic. The causes of this condition are obscure; the frequency with which the sutures of microcephalic skulls are found closed is significant. Extreme cases of microcephaly have attracted attention from ancient times to the present. Cf. IDIOCY. (J.J.)

Literature: W. W. IRELAND, Idiocy (with literature); VOGT, Les Microcéphales ou Hommes-singes (1867); GIACOMINI, Cervelli dei Microcefali (1890). (J.J.- E.M.)

Microcosm: see MACROCOSM.

Micro-organism [Gr. mikroV, small, + organon, an instrument]: Ger. Mikroorganismus; Fr. micro-organisme; Ital. microrganismo. An organism too small to be visible to the naked eye. Chiefly applied to the lowest fungi, but occasionally to some of the Protozoa. Cf. UNICELLULAR ORGANISMS. (C.S.M.)

Mid- [AS. middle]. The median. See MEAN AND MEDIAN.

Used, in various compounds, in the terminology introduced by F. Galton (Natural Inheritance) for the mathematical treatment of problems of heredity. Mid-stature: 'the median [stature] of the general population' (ibid. 92). Mid-parent: 'an ideal [supposed] person of composite sex whose stature [e.g.] is halfway between the stature of the father and the transmuted stature of the mother' (ibid. 87; transmuted meaning increased by the amount requisite to make female comparable with male stature, ibid. 56). Mid-error: probable error (ibid. 58); cf. ERRORS OF OBSERVATION. (J.M.B.)

Mid-parent: see MID-.

Middle Term (and Middle) [trans. of terminus medius, medium, used by Boethius to translate Aristotle's o mesoV oroV, to meson]: Ger. Mittelbegriff; Fr. terme moyen; Ital. mezzo termine, termine medio. The adjective mesoV is applied in Greek to a third object additional to two others, when the idea of intervening can hardly be detected. It is, therefore, perhaps needless to seek further for Aristotle's intention in calling that term, by the consideration of which two others are illatively brought into one proposition as its subject and predicate, the middle term, or middle. It is the most important factor of Aristotle's theory of reasoning.

The same word means little more than third in the phrase 'principle of excluded middle,' which is, indeed, often called principium exclusi tertii. See LAWS OF THOUGHT. On the other hand, something which partakes of each of two disparate natures, and renders them capable of influencing one another, is called a tertium quid (Aristotle's h trith ousia). (C.S.P., C.L.F.)

Migraine or Megrim [Gr. hmikrania, half-headed]: Ger. Migräne; Fr. migraine; Ital. emicrania. A severe headache, almost invariably confined to one side of the head (hence also termed hemicrania), and accompanied by the symptoms described below. The tendency to migraine, which is popularly known as 'sick-headache,' is often inherited.

It is most apt to appear in youth, and ordinarily diminishes or disappears towards middle life. In many cases the attack is preceded by a premonitory period, in which disordered sensations occur, such as dizziness, restlessness, or peculiar visual disturbances. See the figures 1-3, drawn from his own symptoms by Baldwin (Science, May 4, 1900), who thinks the progress of the stigmate indicates the development of the disturbance in the optical centres or connecting-fibres. The attacks are irregularly periodic, and may be induced by overwork, worry, indigestion, eye-strain, and other causes. The typical symptoms begin with a dull headache, which tends to increase, becomes burning, boring, or piercing, and overpowering in intensity, with continued visual symptoms -- such as floating spectres, 'fortification' patterns (as in the figures) -- vaso-motor and digestive disturbances, and vomiting. With absolute repose the symptoms, which may last from several hours to several days, gradually subside. Migraine is regarded as a significant symptom in the delineations of nervous instability when it occurs in connection with serious nervous and mental disorders. It is a functional central disturbance, but several views are entertained as to its exact seat.

Miletus (school of). Comprises the philosophers of Miletus, THALES, ANAXIMANDER, ANAXIMENES. See these names; and cf. PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY. (J.M.B.)

Milieu [Fr.]. ENVIRONMENT (q.v., also for equivalents in other languages).

Used as a biological term by Lamarck (Philos. Zool., 1809, ii. 4 ff.) and by Comte (Syst. de politique positive, vi. 574) who expanded the meaning by the phrase milieu intellectuel, and applied in sociology by Taine. Cf. Barth, Philos. d. Gesch. als Sociol, i. 33. (J.M.B.- F.H.G.)

Mill, James. (1773-1836.) Born at Logie Pert, Forfarshire, Scotland. Educated at Edinburgh, he was licensed to preach in the Church of Scotland, 1798, but soon abandoned the ministry. Tutor in the family of Sir John Stuart. Moved to London, 1800, and became an author. Held an important position in the office of the East India Company. He is called the founder of English ASSOCIATIONISM (q.v.), through his work, An Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind.

Mill, John Stuart. (1806-73.) Born in London. Son of JAMES MILL (q.v.), who directed his education. The year 1820 was spent mostly in the south of France. Studied law with John Austin, a disciple of Bentham. Entered the service of the East India Company in 1823, and remained connected with it until 1856. He was the chief conductor of the Westminster Review, 1835-40. Member of Parliament, 1865. His life after 1856 was chiefly directed to literary pursuits. Member of the Académie des Sciences Morales, and noted for his contributions to logic (see INDUCTION) and ETHICS (q.v.); see also UTILITARIANISM. On James and J.S. Mill, a late work is Stephen, The English Utilitarians, i, ii.

Millenarianism Lat. mille, thousand, + annus, year]: Ger. Lehre von dem tausendjährigen Reich; Fr. doctrine du millénium; Ital. dottrina dei millenarii. The doctrine of the personal reign of Jesus Christ upon earth, under which the powers of evil are to be restrained and the principles of Christianity to become completely and universally prevalent.

The germ of the doctrine is found in the Messianic hope, which prefigured a golden age of temporal as well as spiritual prosperity. The first coming of Christ only partially realized this hope. Hence the expectation, nourished by some of the sayings of Jesus, and especially by the prophecy of John in the Apocalypse, of a second advent at some time in the future, and the re-presentation, under very dramatic circumstances, of a régime under which Christianity should completely triumph. The time of its consummation and the period of its continuance are confessedly indefinite.

Literature: A. HARNACK Encyc. Brit., art. Millennium; SCHÜRER, Lehrb. d. neutestamentlichen Zeit-Gesch. (1881), §§ 28, 29; CARRODI, Krit. Gesch. d. Chiliasmus. (A.T.O.)

Millennium [Lat. mille, thousand, + annus, year]: Ger. Millennium; Fr. règne millénaire; Ital. (il) Millennio. A supposed period either before or after the second coming or advent of Christ, sometimes limited to one thousand years, during which the kingdom of God will be established on earth. Cf. CHILIASM. (J.M.B.)

Mmns Philosophy: see ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (India).

Mimetism [Gr. mimhoiV, imitation]: Ger. (1) Nachahmung (imitation). nachahmend (mimetic), (2) Nachäffung, Mimik; Fr. mimétisme; Ital. (1) mimetismo, (2) mimesi. (1) Those forms of (mimetic) RESEMBLANCE (q.v.) and of IMITATION (q.v.) in which that which is resembled (the 'copy') is itself a factor in the production of that which resembles it, and including the imitation of a copy consciously set up as a model. This meaning is recommended as part of the scheme of connotation given in the table under RESEMBLANCE.

(2) A particular case of (1): the mimetic condition of certain patients or of minds of a low order which express themselves largely in pantomime, mimicry, more or less slavish and impulsive copying of what they see and hear. The absence of even this power (in the sense 2) gives the defect called AMIMIA (q.v.).

The term mimetism is recognized in pathology, being already established in French and Italian. Other instances are LALLING (q.v.), plastic IMITATION (q.v.) or social CONTAGION (q.v.), states of consciousness generally which are associated with what is called CIRCULAR (or repeating) REACTION (q.v.), and the 'inner imitation' of aesthetic theory (see Hirn, Origins of Art 98, who has adopted the word Mimetism). Cf. SEMBLANCE.

Another important case falling under the definition (1) is biological MIMICRY (q.v.), understood as including all the various forms of biologically produced mimetic resemblance.

For literature see the topics referred to, especially IMITATION. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Mimicry (in biology) [Gr. mimikoV]: Ger. (English term); Fr. mimétisme; Ital. mimetismo, mimesi. The term mimicry is generally used to express a resemblance, independent of affinity, between certain species inhabiting the same country -- a resemblance which appeals to the senses of other animals, especially to the sense of sight, not uncommonly to hearing, occasionally to smell and touch.

The term is often extended to include the likeness of animals to their environment for the purpose of concealment from enemies or prey (protective and aggressive, or procryptic and anticryptic resemblance). These latter extremely numerous cases of resemblances are more conveniently kept separate, although they have much in common with those included under mimicry. H. W. Bates, who was the first to offer a feasible explanation of mimicry (Linn. Soc. Trans., xxiii, 1868), used the term in its extended sense, but has not been followed by Fritz Müller, Wallace, Trimen, Meldola, Poulton, Dixey, and others who have contributed to the subject. The essential difference between mimicry and protective resemblance will appear below.

Even the definition given in the first paragraph is too wide, and includes at least four distinct kinds of resemblance, to only one of which the term mimicry in its scientific sense is strictly applicable.

(1) Visible resemblances, independent of affinity, are brought about by similarity of function. The resemblance of form between the greyhound and the racehorse, or between the carnivorous marsupial Thylacinus and a true Carnivor, such as the dog, are to be thus explained. A still more striking example is the appearance of a mole-like form as an adaptation to mole-like habits in three distinct orders of mammalia -- the Insectivora, Rodentia, and Marsupialia. Such resemblances were called by Darwin 'analogical' or 'adaptive.' Cf. CONVERGENCE (in biology), and ORGANIC SELECTION (2).

In order to fall into line with the terminology suggested for mimicry and its allies, the term syntechnic, with the noun syntechne (from oun, together, and tecnh, art, employment, profession), has been formed for the writer by Arthur Sidgwick, to express these results of functions in common.

Careful analysis of the anatomical basis of the resemblances in question will show that they are secondary, being merely an incidental result of the functions which are common to the similar forms, and thus very different from mimicry in which the resemblances are primary and have been brought about for their own sake.

(2) Visible resemblances are not only brought about by adaptation to similar dynamic conditions, but also to similar static conditions. Thus many insects resemble lichen or bark, and therefore incidentally resemble each other. Equally good examples are to be found among the distantly related caterpillars which resemble each other because of their likeness to the pine-needles or grasses on which they feed. Here, too, the resemblances between the species are secondary, being the incidental results of 'common protective or aggressive resemblance,' or, as they may be called, to follow the same terminology, syncryptic (oun, together, and kruptoV, hidden), the noun being syncrypse; together with synprocryptic and synanticryptic, according as the common resemblance to surroundings is for the purpose of defence or attack.

(3) Visible resemblances are also produced by 'common warning or synaposematic colours,' in which specially defended animals gain advantage by a common advertisement. The resemblances between butterflies believed to be nauseous was pointed out by H. W. Bates (loc. cit.); but the explanation was due to Fritz Müller (Kosmos, May, 1879, 100), who pointed out the saving of life which would result from a common appearance in the period during which youthful enemies are being educated to avoid the disaster or dangerous forms having a similar experience. This class of resemblance has much in common with mimicry, and is often called 'Müllerian mimicry.' It has also been spoken of as 'mimicry between protected species,' but it is clear that its true position is in the group of WARNING COLOURS (q.v.).

(4) Finally, we have the resemblance of a species which is not specially protected to one which gains comparative immunity from the possession of some unusual mode of defence.

In this case, the latter is called the model and the former the mimic. Mimicry thus becomes a case of 'false warning and signalling or pseudosematic colours,' and is distinguished from protective (and aggressive) resemblance, because in the latter an animal resembles something which is of no interest to its enemies (or prey), and is thus concealed; while in the former it resembles (pseudaposematic) something which its enemy positively fears or dislikes (or conversely - pseudepisematic -- which its prey positively desires or seeks), and thus becomes conspicuous. There are cases, however, in which not very conspicuous models are mimicked, as in the likeness of the dipterous insect Eristalis to the bee.

The resemblances of mimicry are superficial, but deep-rooted structural changes are often necessary in order to bring them about. Thus resemblances of habit and attitude are as characteristic of mimicry as resemblances of form. The use of the term mimicry, which sometimes implies conscious IMITATION (q.v.), has been a fruitful source of confusion. According to the theory suggested by Bates, the resemblances are due to the operation of natural selection, which preserves the variations which tend in the direction of the model and are thus mistaken for unpalatable or dangerous forms, and eliminates others. Cf. CONVERGENCE. (E.B.P.)

The following classification shows the relation of mimicry to the other uses of the colours of animals, according to Poulton: --

I. APATETIC COLOURS.

A. Cryptic colours.

1. Procryptic. Protective resemblances.
2. Anticryptic. Aggressive resemblances.

1. Pseudaposematic. Protective mimicry (Batesian).
2. Pseudepisematic. Aggressive mimicry and alluring colours.

1. Aposematic. Warning colours.
2. Synaposematic. Common warning colours in different species (Müllerian mimicry).
3. Episematic. Recognition markings.

In opposition to a theory of mimicry based on natural selection exclusively the following possibilities have been suggested: --

(1) That the similar direct action of the environment may produce similar effects on different organisms during their individual lives.

(2) That internal developmental causes may lead to similar organic products either directly (cf. ORTHOGENESIS) or indirectly.

(3) That the psychical influence of predominating types of colour and pattern may lead to a preference for these types, rendered effective in heredity through sexual selection of those organisms in which these types are developed.

(4) That there may be (a) a direct physiological response to constant mental experiences, such as sensations of colour, working in both the species in question, and giving mimetic results; or (b) direct conscious imitation in habits, &c. (e.g. in the securing of food), which produce such physiological effects. A psychological view was held by Erasmus Darwin, 1794 (Zoonomia, 297; cited by Delage).

(5) It has been held (Plateau, Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Belg., 3^e sér., xxiii. No. 2; also Delage, Structure du Protoplasma, 377) that the phenomena are simply coincidences.

In discussing the subject the following points should be borne in mind: first, that the resemblances in question are superficial; second, that they are often found in the female sex only; and third, that they are produced by organic changes, which occur in very diverse ways. (C.LL.M.- J.M.B.)

Literature: H. W. BATES, Contributions to an Insect Fauna of the Amazon Valley, Linn. Soc. Trans., xxiii; A. R. WALLACE, On the Phenomena of Variation and Geographical Distribution as illustrated by the Papilionidae of the Malayan Region, Linn. Soc. Trans., xxv; Darwinism; and Essays on Natural Selection; R. TRIMEN, On some Remarkable Mimetic Analogies among African Butterflies, Linn. Soc. Trans., xxvi; Presidential Address, Proc. Entomol. Soc. (1897); and Science, April 1, 1898; F. MÜLLER, Ituna and Thyridia -- a Remarkable Case of Mimicry in Butterflies, Kosmos, trans. in Entomol. Soc. Proc. (1879); R. MELDOLA, On Mimicry between Butterflies of Protected Genera, Ann. and Mag. Nat. Hist. (Dec., 1882); F. MOORE, A Monograph of Limnaina and Euploeina, Proc. Zool. Soc. (1883); E. B. POULTON, The Experimental Proof of the Protective Value of Colours and Markings in Insects, Proc. Zool. Soc. (1887); Natural Selection the Cause of Mimetic Resemblance, &c., J. Linn. Soc. (1898); and Colours of Animals (1890); DELAGE, Struct. du Protoplasma; and Année Biologique, i. ff. (annual résumé). (E.B.P.- J.M.B.)

Mimicry (in psychology): Ger. Mimik; Fr. mimique; Ital. mimica. The phenomena described under MIMETISM (2) (q.v.), particularly those of plastic IMITATION (q.v.). (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Mind (in philosophy) [Lat. mens]: Ger. Geist; Fr. esprit; Ital. spirito. Used in general antithesis to matter, to cover that phase of reality which does not permit of exclusive interpretation in terms of matter in motion, but allows or requires the hypothesis of something analogous to conscious process.

The older use included specifically the attributes of personal consciousness, as in the controversy on TELEOLOGY (q.v.), where 'mind in nature' really meant mind outside of nature, which showed its power, design, &c., in the creation and ordering of nature. This ascription of consciousness to mind shows itself in Leibnitz's monads, which have the power of 'presentation,' and in the development of Cartesianism, culminating in the dualism of the attributes of extension and thought of Spinoza. Spinoza's substance, however, may possibly be considered -- at least logically -- the mediating doctrine from this more anthropomorphic earlier meaning to the various later idealistic uses of the term. In recent idealism the contrast, viewed empirically, is between mechanism and mind; and the latter is anything which is left over in nature -- increased organization, teleological progress, &c. -- after mechanical explanations have exhausted themselves, and which the analogy from conscious process may be called upon to explain. These idealistic theories vary greatly the creationism which holds that mind produces but is not itself mechanism; the transcendent, immanent view which makes mind partly immanent in nature and partly apart from it; the identity view which allows full sweep to mechanical explanations but holds that nature may be reinterpreted as mind; and finally, the view of the Hegelian 'absolute' mind (Geist), which is the reconciliation and unity of 'subjective' (conscious) mind and 'objective' mind (mechanical nature). In the more immanental systems, mind -- for which thought and spirit are interchangeably used -- becomes a sort of limiting notion or explaining category, at the same time that its concrete determination in terms of consciousness is denied or not attempted. Hegel's 'thought,' Schopenhauer's 'will,' Bradley's 'sentience,' are each in its way similarly a limiting notion of some one phase of mind thus understood. Cf. SOUL, SPIRIT, and the next topic. For the various philosophers' usage see numerous citations in Eisler, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, 'Geist,' 'Seele.' (J.M.B., J.D.)

Mind (in psychology) [Lat. mens]: Ger. Seele; Fr. esprit; Ital. mente. The individual's conscious process, together with the dispositions and predispositions which condition it. It is thus the individual's consciousness, with its capabilities; its capabilities including all faculties, powers, capacities, aptitudes, and dispositions, acquired and innate. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)

The necessity of including both clauses of the definition is seen in the fact that the subjective and objective determinations of mind do not run entirely parallel. Subjectively, we have everything conscious, and nothing else matters; objectively, we have to ask whether all the phenomena which seem to afford evidence of mind, by resembling the performances of consciousness, really do involve consciousness. The objective question, Is consciousness coextensive with mind? is often answered in the negative; and it is forcing its way into the psychological theories in the form of the hypothesis of unconscious mental modifications, dispositions, &c. Mind looked at objectively must include phenomena which are present when consciousness is present; but there may be a deeper aspect of intelligence, feeling, or will (each has been held) than that form which shows itself in individual consciousness. The definition should at any rate leave open the discussion of this possibility, together with the possible recognition of those factors, themselves not in personal consciousness, without which, however, the flow of consciousness would not be what it is.

For the relation of mind to SOUL and SPIRIT, the definitions given under those topics may be compared with this one. Mind has become the psychological word for the phenomenally presented or immediately given series of changes occurring in consciousness and in time. Soul has come to be limited to a mental substance in some way existing as a permanent unity behind the phenomena of mind. Spirit is largely confined to theological writers, who use it either as synonymous with soul or attempt a distinction according to which spirit is a sort of second soul which is the bearer of the higher ideal, intuitive, ethical, and religious faculties or functions. For the usage in the foreign languages cf. PNEUMA, PSYCHE, SOUL, and SPIRIT, and see TERMINOLOGY, German, 'Geist,' and French, 'Âme'; and for classical usage (Lat. mens, anima, spiritus; and Gr. yuch, nouV, pneuma) consult the respective indices in Vol. ii. For more philosophical usages see MIND (in philosophy), and SPIRIT.

Literature: see the general treatises on PSYCHOLOGY and EPISTEMOLOGY, and the titles in BIBLIOG. G, 2, o. (J.M.B.)

Mind and Body: Ger. Körper und Geist; Fr. le corps et l'esprit; Ital. corpo e spirito. The phrase used currently to indicate the problem of the sort of reality which is to be attributed to mind and body respectively in relation to each other.

Every philosophical theory finds itself face to face with this question; and certain of the profoundest solutions date back to Greek thought (Anaxagoras' theory of the nouV -- see NOUS -- and the view of Aristotle as given under MATTER AND FORM, and as involved in the distinction between dunamiV and energeia -- see POWER). The various theories now current reflect essentially different ways of approaching the question, and their presuppositions are so different that it is only with respect to their conclusions that they can be compared with one another. There is, first of all, the class of dualistic theories -- holding to the assumption of two real forms of existence, mind and body, and asking how and to what extent these two real existences can stand in relation to each other. These theories may be divided into the epistemological and the genetic, the former finding its basis in a dualism of knowledge of mind and body respectively, and the latter in the actual distinction of the two as formulated in the history of culture, and in the naïve progress of the individual's mental development. Under the former head we have the influxus physicus or CAUSE THEORY (q.v.), psychophysical PARALLELISM (q.v.), the theories of PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY (q.v.), and OCCASIONALISM (q.v.). Genetic theories, on the other hand, hold either to a dualism which is necessary in the evolution of human thought, and for this and other reasons also valid, or make this dualism a matter merely of naïve thinking, necessary for a practical view of the world, but open to criticism. Here we find the discussions of INTROJECTION (q.v.), EJECTION (q.v.), &c., -- attempts to trace the rise and progress of the antithesis between mind and body.

The second great class, the monistic theories, are, for the most part, philosophical, resulting in their turn either from a refutation of dualism in epistemology, or a transcending of the genetic dualism of naïve thought. Under the former we have the idealistic theories generally, including those of spiritual MONISM (q.v.), PANPSYCHISM (q.v.), and MIND-DUST (q.v.); the materialistic theories, including the EPIPHENOMENON (q.v.) and AUTOMATON (q.v.) theories (see AUTOMATIC AND AUTOMATISM), and the DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY (q.v.), which, while agnostic in its attitude towards the monistic principle, nevertheless denies dualism in principle.

The logical alternatives of the case are not exhausted, however, as between dualism of body and mind, on the one hand, and monism of body or mind on the other hand; that is, it is not necessary logically to hold that we must believe either that consciousness modifies the brain processes and so violates the law of conservation of energy -- giving two interacting realities -- or that consciousness is an epiphenomenon and the psychophysical individual an automaton. This reduction of the possible views to two is unnecessary and illogical. In speaking of the antecedents of a voluntary movement -- the case whose interpretation brings up the whole question -- we have to consider the entire group of phenomenal events which are always there when voluntary movement takes place; and among the phenomena really there, the conscious state called volition is really there. To say that the same movement could take place without this state of consciousness is to say that a lesser group of phenomenal antecedents occurs in some cases and a larger group in other cases of the same event. Why not go to the other extreme, and say that the brain is not necessary to voluntary movement, since volition could bring about the movement without using the nervous processes to do it with? In his posthumous book on Mind, Matter, and Monism, Romanes brings out this inadequacy of the automaton view, using the figure of an electro-magnet, which attracts iron-filings only when it is magnetized by the current of electricity. Whatever the electricity be, the magnet is a magnet only when it attracts iron-filings; to say that is might do as much without the electricity would be to deny that it is a magnet; and the proof is found simply in the fact that it does not attract iron-filings when the current is not there. So the brain is not a brain when consciousness is not there; it could not produce voluntary movement because, as a matter of fact, it simply does not. So consciousness does not, on the other hand, produce movement without a brain.

The whole difficulty seems to lie in the inadequate analysis which limits the cause to the physical changes preceding the movement. Such a conception as physical causation cannot be applied beyond the sphere of things in which it has become the explaining principle -- i.e. in the objective, external world of things. The moment we ask questions concerning a group of phenomena which include more than these things, that moment we are liable to some new statement of the law of change in the group as a whole. Such a statement is the third alternative in this case additional to dualism of mind and body and monism of either.

The other extreme is represented by those writers who think that the revision of the law of causation can be made in the sphere of objective phenomenal action represented by the brain; and so claim that there is a violation of the principle of conservation of energy in a voluntary movement, an actual efficiency of some kind in consciousness itself for producing physical effects -- the dualistic view. This is as illegitimate as the other. It seems to deny the results of all objective empirical science, and so to sweep away on one side the statements of law on which the higher interpretation of the group of phenomena as a whole must be based. And it does it in favour of an equally empirical statement of law on the other side. It is not easy to see how any result for the more complex system of events can be reached if we deny the only principles which we have in the partial groups. To do so is to attempt to interpret the objective in terms of the subjective factor in the entire group; and we reach by so doing a result which is just as partial as that which the epiphenomenon theory reaches in its mechanical explanation. Lotze made this mistake, but his hesitations on the subject showed that he appreciated the difficulty. The claim of these writers that the mechanical view of causation cannot be used as an adequate explaining principle of the whole personality of man seems good; but for reasons of much the same kind, it seems equally true that as long as we are talking of events of the external kind, i.e. of brain processes, we cannot deny what we know of these events as such, and give such knowledge no place in our final interpretation.

As to the interpretation of the single line to the right, it may always remain the problem that it now is. The best we can do is to get points of view regarding it; and the main progress of philosophy seems to be in getting an adequate sense of the conditions of the problem itself. From the more humble side of psychology, the growth of consciousness itself may teach us how the problem comes to be set in the form of seemingly irreconcilable antinomies, and this it is the merit of the genetic theories to have recognized. The person grows both in body and mind, and this growth has to have two sides -- the side facing towards the past, the 'retrospective reference,' which embodies all determinations already made, and the side facing the future, the 'prospective reference' of growth, and of the consciousness of growth which anticipates further determination. The positive sciences have by their very nature to face backward, to look retrospectively, to be 'descriptive' -- these give the lower of our parallel lines. The moral sciences, so called, on the other hand, deal with judgments, appreciations, organizations, expectations, and so represent the other, the 'prospective' mental attitude and its corresponding aspects of reality. This gives character largely to the upper one of our parallel lines. But to get a construction of the third line, the one to the right, is to ask for both these points of view at once; to stand at both ends of the line -- at a point where description takes the place of prophecy, and where reality has nothing further to add to thought.

This third alternative is, accordingly, to think psychophysical change in a category under which both mechanical processes and ideal changes -- the realization of ends and values --are present at once. And the problem becomes that of the interpretation of the world in general; how can a mechanical system be also teleological? -- the issue of philosophy in which all the others are pooled, and on the general solution of which that of this problem must depend.

A question which is much discussed concerns the actual physiological process correlated with consciousness -- that of the 'physical basis of consciousness' -- but with little more than speculative results. Cf. the textbooks of psychology.

Literature: see the topics cited. Recent discussions are STUMPF, Pres. Address, Dritter int. Congr. f. Psychol. (1897), 3; WENTSCHER, Physische u. psychische Kausalität (1896); BERGMANN, Seele u. Leib, Arch. f. syst. Philos., iv. (1898) 401, and v. 25; REHMKE, Aussenwelt u. Innenwelt (1898); SCHWARZ, Verhältniss v. Leib u. Seele (1897); BUSSE, Zeitsch. f. Philos. u. phil. Kr., cxiv. (1899) 1; RICKERT, in Sigwart-Abhandlungen (1900); discussion by JAMES, LADD, BALDWIN, in Psychol. Rev., iii (1896). (J.M.B.)

Mind Cure: Ger. Psychotherapie; Fr. guérison par la foi (no exact equivalent -- TH.F.); Ital. cura psichica (or morale). A variety of systems, appearing in different ages, heralded under diverse auspices, and practised in adherence to special forms and theories, which have in common the element of curing disease mainly by mental influence.

Terminology in this field is embarrassing in its abundance and misleading in its special connotations. Three lines of interest may be distinguished with reference to this large subject. (1) The first relates to the proper interpretations of actual cures or relief effected by the influence of the mind on the body, and to the practical utilization of such influence in the scientific treatment of disease. This division of the subject is considered under the term PSYCHOTHERAPEUTICS (q.v.). (2) The historical and anthropological interest is centred in the accounts of cures by mental methods in past eras and among primitive peoples. At all times and in all stages of medical knowledge the cure of disease has not been wholly by physical means, but an appeal has been made to the patient's mental co-operation, either directly or more usually indirectly, by rites and ceremonies, by charms and mystic procedures, by exorcism and religious appeals and prayers, by pilgrimages to place of special sanctity or renown. A very important part of the life of primitive peoples is concerned with such practices; but their specific consideration would require an extensive treatment. The history of cures by the action of mind or faith is likewise a long one, and includes such diverse practices as the cure by the king's touch, the healing touch of divinely gifted persons, the action of charms and amulets, the efficacy of shrines and relics, of exorcism, prayers, and religious devotion, the elaborate procedures of mesmerism in its several forms (see HYPNOTISM), and 'electric tractors,' electro-biology, and an endless series of devices, cures, and systems. What is common to these various methods is that their success depends largely upon the judiciously excited belief and co-operation of the patient.

Literature, to (2): MAX BARTELS, Med. d. Naturvölker (1893); TYLOR, Primitive Culture; ELWORTHY, Evil Eye (1895); REGNAULT, La Sorcellerie (1897); ANDREW D. WHITE, Hist. of Warfare of Sci. with Theol. See also the references under FOLK-LORE, DEMONOMANIA, and MAGIC.

(3) To be specially classified are the systems which are established upon the doctrine that mental treatment is the sole or main factor in the cure of bodily ills. Such systems are mainly of recent origin and are known by various names: 'mind cure, ' 'faith cure,' 'mental healing,' 'Christian science,' 'metaphysical healing,' &c. 'Christian science,' due to Mrs. Mary B. Eddy (see her book Science and Health, 1866-1900), has probably achieved the widest fame. Some of these systems are based upon strained interpretations of the world of matter; they teach the unreality of disease, the divine origin of health, the neglect of bodily symptoms as unreal, and the like. Ignoring or misinterpreting, as they do, the tenets of physiology and psychology, such systems must be pronounced essentially unscientific; and the practices which arise from them are liable to lead to serious injury. On the other hand, the importance of utilizing in a judicious and properly subordinated form the element which such systems set forth in an exaggerated and perverted fashion is being more generally recognized by the medical practitioner. Kant's Von der Macht des Gemüths contains early suggestions. Cf. PSYCHOTHERAPEUTICS.

Literature: FERNALD, Pop. Sci. Mo., xxxiv, 798; PURRINGTON, Christ. Sci. (1900); BUCKLEY, Christ. Sci. and other Superstitions (1899); GODDARD, Effects of Mind on Body, Amer. J. of Psychol., x. 431; JASTROW, 'The Modern Occult,' in Fact and Fable in Psychol. (1900). (J.J.)

Mind-dust Theory: Ger. Theorie der psychischen Atomen; Fr. théorie des atomes mentaux; Ital. teoria degl' elementi psichici, atomismo psichico. The COMPOSITION THEORY (q.v.) of mind in the form which holds that there are particles or atoms ('dust') of mind everywhere in nature, accompanying material atoms, and on suitable occasions forming the 'stuff' of conscious mind as postulated by the MIND-STUFF THEORY (q.v.). It may be called 'psychological atomism' in contrast with the psychic or mental atomism of the composition theory. For a recent statement, see Münsterberg, Psychol. Rev., vii, 1900, 1.

L1. Morgan has postulated what he calls 'metakinesis,' something higher than 'kinesis' (matter in motion), as analogous in the inorganic world to consciousness in the organic.

Literature: see under MIND-STUFF THEORY, and COMPOSITION THEORY; especially SPENCER, Princ. of Psychol., i. §§ 179, 195; JAMES, Princ. of Psychol., chap. vi (with many citations); also ROMANES, Mind, Matter, and Monism LL. MORGAN, Nature, x1iv. 319; KARL PEARSON, Grammar of Sci., 2nd ed., chap. ix; ARDIGÒ, L'Unità della Coscienza; UEBERWEG-HEINZE, Hist. of Philos., III. ii. 419. (J.M.B.)

Mind Reading: see MUSCLE READING, and TELEPATHY.

Mind-stuff Theory: Ger. Theorie des psychischen Stoffes (or der Seelenzellen, Haeckel); Fr. théorie de la matière mentale (no exact equivalent -- TH.F.); Ital. teoria della materia psichica (or mente-sostanza). The COMPOSITION THEORY (q.v.) of mind combined with a further speculation: it is assumed that the ultimate units which enter into the composition of mental states constitute also what appears to us as matter. The elements of mind-stuff are thus a form of psychical MONAD (q.v.).

Literature: the phrase Mind-stuff Theory was first used by W. K. CLIFFORD in Mind (O.S.), iii. 57. The best reference is JAMES, Princ. of Psychol., i. 159, who cites (with many others) G. T. FECHNER, Psychophysik, ii. chap. x1v; H. TAINE, On Intelligence, Bk. III; E. HAECKEL, Zellseelen u. Seelenzellen, in Gesammelte pop. Vorträge (1st ed.), 143; J. SOURY, art. Hylozoismus, in Kosmos, 5. Jahrg., H. 10, 241; WHITTAKER, Mind (O.S.), vi. 498 (historical); MORTON PRINCE, The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism (1885); A. RIEHL, Der philosophische Kriticismus, ii., Theil 2, II. Abschnitt, 2. Cap. (1887); ROYCE, Mind (O.S.), vi. 376. See also COMPOSITION THEORY. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)

Minimum divisible [Lat.]. The quantity which, the result of successive division, is itself indivisible. See DIVISIBILITY. (J.M.B.)

Minimum (or Minimal) Sensation: see LIMITS OF SENSATION.

Minor [Lat. minor, the lesser]: Ger. Moll; Fr. mineur; Ital. minore. One of the two fundamental scales or keys of modern music characterized by the presence of the minor third above the fundamental.

Expressed in 'whole tones,' it runs: Harmonic form: 1, 1-2, 1, 1, 1-2, 1 and 1-2, 1-2. Melodic form, ascending: 1, 1-2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1-2; descending, 1, 1, 1-2, 1, 1, 1-2, 1. Cf. Helmholtz, Sensations of Tone (Eng. trans.), 274, 288; Cummings, Rudiments of Music, 47. For minor intervals, &c., see MAJOR. (E.B.T.)

Minor (in logic): see MAJOR AND MINOR.

Minucius Felix: see PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY (4).

Mirabaud, Jean-Baptiste de. (1674-1760.) Born in Paris and intended for the army, he became the friend of La Fontaine, and was won over to the study of literature. He became a member of the Oratory, and soon afterwards secretary of the duchess of Orleans and the instructor of her daughter. A translation of Tasso's Jerusalem Delivered secured for him entrance into the Academy, and in 1742 he became its perpetual secretary.

Miracle [Lat. miraculum, a wonder]: Ger. Wunder; Fr. miracle; Ital. miracolo. An event which, on account of its unusual character, is assumed to be beyond the recognized powers of nature and man, and therefore the product or manifestation of supernatural agency, of which it also serves as a sign and witness.

The miracle is a part of the system of supernaturalism, and stands or falls with it. Assuming the possibility of a miracle, the questions of fact and of definition remain. Believers in supernatural religion accept the fact, and are only interested in the question of the true conception of a miracle. The early and mediaeval theologians agree in conceiving the miraculous as being above but not contrary to nature. The question entered on a new phase when Hume defined a miracle as a violation of nature, and asserted the impossibility of substantiating its actual occurrence. The modern discussion has proceeded largely in view of Hume's destructive criticism. The miracle as a part of the Christian scheme is held to be an attestation of the supernatural claims of Christianity, though opinions differ as to its evidential value. Early designations of the miracle were wonder (shmeion) and prodigy.

Literature: HUME, Essays, ii; R. WARDLAW, Miracles (N. Y., 1853); BUSHNELL, Nature and the Supernatural; BADEN POWELL, The Order of Nature (London, 1859); J. McCOSH, The Supernatural in relation to the Natural (London, 1862); J. KÖSTLIN, De Miraculorum quae Christus, &c. (1860); G. P. FISHER, Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief (1883). (A.T.O.)

Mirror Writing: Ger. Spiegelschrift; Fr. écriture en miroir; Ital. scrittura a specchio. Reversed handwriting as seen when ordinary writing is held before a mirror; it, in turn, becomes legible, as ordinary writing, when seen in a mirror. It may be produced by pressing clean blotting-paper on heavy writing when the ink is still wet.

Mirror writing is sometimes produced by young children whose writing is still forming; seen fragmentarily in the reversal, and even the up-or-down-turning, of single letters, figures, &c., and in the writing with the left hand of many adults who write normally with the right hand. A simple test is: starting with both hands together before the body, trace one's autograph naturally with each index-finger in mid-air. In many cases of right-handed persons the left hand then inscribes mirror writing more naturally than correct writing, performing movements symmetrical with those of the right hand, rather than analogous to them; that is, moving away from the right hand rather than following it.

Mirror writing furnishes an important problem to theorists on HANDWRITING (q.v.). It is probably due in children to the incomplete association of the series of hand-movement sensations with the control series of visual sensations. In some the hand unaccustomed to writing reproduces the muscular series to which the other hand is accustomed (symmetrical accompanying movement); this is in persons who think of writing mainly in terms of the muscular sensation series. Others, who do not produce mirror writing, think on the contrary of the visual form of the words, and so reproduce that, giving a correct imitation of the other hand (analogous accompanying movements).

Literature: see HANDWRITING, GRAPHOLOGY, and Agraphia under SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS. (J.M.B.)

Misdemeanour (in law) [OF. mesdemener]: Ger. Vergehen, Uebelverhalten; Fr. délit, and for petty offences contravention (Code Pénal, 1); Ital. contravvenzione. A crime less than a felony; a minor offence. 'In common usage the word "crimes" is made to denote such offences as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while smaller faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised under the gentler name of "misdemeanours" only' (Blackstone's Commentaries, iv. 4). (S.E.B.)

Misology {Gr. misein, to hate, + logoV, reason]: Ger. Misologie; Fr. misologie; Ital. misologia. Hatred and despair of reason. Sometimes applied to intellectual PESSIMISM (q.v.). (J.M.B.)

Missing Link: the immediate ancestor of man. See ANTHROPOID, ad fin.

Mitosis [Gr. mitoV, a thread]: Ger. Mitose; Fr. mitose; Ital. mitosi. The indirect mode of nuclear division, to which the term karyokinesis is also applied.

The chromatin of the nucleus forms a thread, which breaks up into a number of separate CHROMOSOMES (q.v.); these become split each into two halves, which travel to the opposite poles of the achromatic spindle (amphiaster), where they become reconstituted into the two daughter nuclei. Mitosis is the ordinary mode of nuclear division, and is found, with but little variation, in the cell division of the Protozoa and Metazoa, and of plants also. Cf. CELL THEORY (also for literature), AMITOSIS, and NUCLEUS. (E.S.G.)

Mixed [Lat. mixtum, from miscere, to mix]: Ger. vermischt; Fr. composé; Ital. misto. (1) Mixed proof: a proof which is partly analytic, partly synthetic.

(2) Mixed mode: a mode compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, put together to make one complex one (Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II. chap. xii. § 5). See MODE.

(3) Mixed power: a power at once active and passive, because the principle of change is in itself. (C.S.P.)

Mixture (linguistic): Ger. Mischung; Fr. mélange; Ital. mescolanza, miscela. Applied to the results of the borrowing from one language to another of words or other speech-elements.

Languages influence each other through individuals speaking two or more languages. Words of one language are fitted into the sentence framework of another. An inflectional or formative element cannot be 'borrowed,' i.e. become a loan-element, unless enough words containing it are borrowed to fix such element as an independent existence in the consciousness of the speech-community. In bilingual communities it is noticed that the tendency is for a single sentence-mould to suffice for two languages. This tendency to use a single mould of syntax with various vocabularies has brought about the 'modernizing' of the syntax of all European languages. (B.I.W.)

Mnemonic Verses and Words (in logic). Aids to memory in logic, of the sort described under MNEMONICS (q.v.). (J.M.B.)

1. Instrumenta novem sunt, guttur, lingua, palatum. Quattuor et dentes, et duo labra simul.

The following mnemonic verses are contained in the Summulae Logicales of Petrus Hispanus, but were older, perhaps very much older.

2. 'Quae?' ca. vel hyp., 'Qualis?' ne. vel aff., u. 'Quanta?' univ. par. in. velsing. [What is the substance of a proposition? categorical or hypothetical. What is its quality? negative or affirmative. What is its quantity? universal, particular, indefinite, or singular.]

3. Simpliciter Fc, convertitur v, per acci, st per contra: sic fit conversio tota. Asserit, negat , sd universaliter ambae; Asserit , negat, sed particulariter ambo.

[E and I are converted simply; E and A, per accidens; A and O, per contrapositionem.]

4. Prae, contradic.; post, contra.; prae postque, subalter.
Non omnis, quidam non; omnis non, quasi nullus;
Non nullus, quidam; sed 'nullus non' valet 'omnis';
Non aliquis, nullus; 'non quidam non' valet 'omnis';
Non alter, neuter; 'neuter non' praestat 'uterque.'

[Non placed before omnis or nullus gives the contradictory proposition; placed after, the contrary; both before and after, the subalternate.]

5. Primus, mbms; dntl que, secundus;
Tertius, llc; Prpr, reliquus.
Destruit  totum, sd  confn mat utrumque;
Destruit dictum, destruit  que modum.
Omne necessrit; impossibl, quasi nullus;
Possibl, quidam; quidam non, possbile non.
dictum negat,  que modum, nihil , sed  totum.

[The first syllable of each of the four vocables Amabmus, Edentli, Illice, Purpura, is for the possible mode; the second for the contingent; the third for the impossible; the fourth for the necessary. The vowel a signifies that both mode and 'dictum' are to be taken assertorically; e, that the dictum is to be denied; i, that the mode is to be denied; u, that both mode and dictum are to be denied. Each word refers to a line or order of equipollent modal forms.]

6. Tertus est quarto semper contrarius ordo.
Sit tibi linea subcontraria prima secundae.
Tertius est primo contradictorius ordo.
Pugnat cum quarto contradicend secundus.
Prima subest quartae vice particularis habens se.
Hanc habet ad seriem se lege secunda sequentem.

[The relation of 'Sortem impossible est currere' and 'Sortem necesse est currere' is that of contraries; they cannot be true at once. The relation 'Sortem possibile est currere' and 'Sortem possible est non currere' is that of subcontraries; they cannot be false at once. The relation of 'Sortem possibile est currere' and 'Sortem impossibile est currere' is that of contradictories. The relation of 'Sortem possibile est non currere' and 'Sortem necesse est currere,' is likewise that of contradictories. 'Sortem possibile est currere' follows from 'Sortem necesse est currere,' as does 'Sortem possibile est non currere' from 'Sortem impossibile est currere.']

7. Sub. prae. prima, secund prae. bis, tertia sub. bis.

[The first figure contains the middle term as subject and predicate; the second, the middle as predicated twice; the third, the middle twice as subject.]

8. Brbr, Clrnt, Dr, Fr, Brlpton,
Clnts, Dbts, Fpsm, Frssmrum.
Csr, Cmstrs, Fstn, Brk, Drpti,
Flptn, Dsms, Dts, Bkrd, Frson.

[These are original names of the syllogistic moods, which there is no sufficient reason for abandoning. The direct moods of the first figure are recognizable by their containing no sign of conversion, s, p, or k; the indirect moods (or moods of the fourth figure) by their having those signs attached either to the third vowel or to the first two. In the second figure, one of the signs s, p is attached to the first vowel, or to the second and third, or k is attached to the second. In the names of the moods of the third figure, s or p is attached to the second vowel, or to the first and third, or k to the first. There are also names for syllogism with weakened conclusions or strengthened premises, as well as for indirect moods of the first figure considered as belonging to a fourth. But the above rules will enable a reader to identify them. Thus, Bramantip can be nothing but Baralipton; while Barbari is Barbara with a weakened conclusion. Camenes can be nothing but Celantes; Dimaris nothing but Dabitis; Fesapo nothing but Fapesmo; Fresison nothing but Frisesomorum. A writer who introduces an m into the name of a mood containing an s or p only after its third vowel, or who omits m from the name of a mood having s or p after the first and second vowels, uses the fourth figure.]

9. Simpliciter vult s, verti p ver per acci. M vult transponi, k per impossbile duci.

Servat maiorem variatque secunda minorem;

Tertia maiorem variat servatque minorem.

[s, in the name of a mood, shows that the proposition denoted by the preceding vowel is, in a preferred mode of reduction, to be converted simply; p, that it is to be converted per accidens; m shows that the premises are to be transposed; k, that the preferred reduction is by reduction of the contradictory of the conclusion to an absurdity, this contradictory of the conclusion being, in the second figure, put in place of the minor premise (the major being retained), and in the third figure in the place of the major (the minor being retained).]

A great number of other memorial words and verses have been proposed by logicians. (C.S.P.)

Mnemonics [Gr. mnhmonikoV, pertaining to memory]: Ger. Mnemonik, Gedächtnisskunst; Fr. mnémotechnie; Ital. mnemonica, mnemotecnica. Mnemonics or memoria technica is the art of memory, a code of rules for remembering. 'The method consists usually in a framework learned mechanically, of which the mind is supposed to remain in permanent and secure possession. Then, whatever is to be remembered is deliberately associated by some fanciful analogy or connection with some part of this framework, and this connection thenceforward helps its recall' (James, Princ. of Psychol., i. 668). (E.B.T.)

Mob [abb. of Lat. mobilis, mobile]: Ger. Pöbel; Fr. populace, foule; Ital. plebaglia. See CROWD. A 'rabble,' the most disreputable sort of mob, is designated in Ger. by Gesindel, in Fr. by canaille, and in Ital. by marmaglia. (J.M.B., E.M.)

Mobility [Lat. mobilis]: Ger. Beweglichkeit; Fr. mobilité; Ital. mobilità. That property of matter by virtue of which it may change its position in space unless impeded by other matter. (S.N.)

Modalism (in theology) [Lat. modus, manner]: Ger. Modalismus; Fr. modalisme; Ital. modalismo. The doctrine that the divine nature is unitary in both substance and personality, and that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit represent simply three different modes of temporal manifestation. See SABELLIANISM. (A.T.O.)

Modality [Lat. modus; see MODE]: Ger. Modalität; Fr. modalité; Ital. modalità. There is no agreement among logicians as to what modality consists in; but it is the logical qualification of a proposition or its copula, or the corresponding qualification of a fact or its form, in the ways expressed by the modes possibile, impossibile, contingens, necessarium.

Any qualification of a predication is a mode; and Hamilton says (Lects. on Logic, xiv) that 'all logicians' call any proposition affected by a mode a modal proposition. This, however, is going much too far; for not only has the term usually been restricted in practice, from the age of Abelard, when it first appeared, until now, to propositions qualified by the four modes 'possible,' 'impossible,' 'necessary,' and 'contingent,' with only occasional extension to any others, but positive testimonies to that effect might be cited in abundance.

The simplest account of modality is the scholastic, according to which the necessary (or impossible) proposition is a sort of universal proposition; the possible (or contingent, in the sense of not necessary) proposition, a sort of particular proposition. That is, to assert 'A must be true' is to assert not only that A is true, but that all propositions analogous to A are true; and to assert 'A may be true' is to assert only that some proposition analogous to A is true. If it be asked what is here meant by analogous propositions, the answer is -- all those of a certain class which the conveniences of reasoning establish. Or we may say the propositions which in some conceivable state of ignorance would be indistinguishable from A. Error is to be put out of the question; only ignorance is to be considered. This ignorance will consist in its subject being unable to reject certain potentially hypothetical states of the universe, each absolutely determinate in every respect, but all of which are, in fact, false. The aggregate of these unrejected falsities constitute the 'range of possibility,' or better, 'of ignorance.' Were there no ignorance, this aggregate would be reduced to zero. The state of knowledge supposed is, in necessary propositions, usually fictitious, in possible propositions more often the actual state of the speaker. The necessary proposition asserts that, in the assumed state of knowledge, there is no case in the whole range of ignorance in which the proposition is false. In this sense it may be said that an impossibility underlies every necessity. The possible proposition asserts that there is a case in which it is true.

Various subtleties are encountered in the study of modality. Thus, when the thinker's own state of knowledge is the one whose range of ignorance is in question, the judgments 'A is true' and 'A must be true' are not logically equivalent, the latter asserting a fact which the former does not assert, although the fact of its assertion affords direct and conclusive evidence of its truth. The two are analogous to 'A is true' and 'A is true, and I say so'; which are readily shown not to be logically equivalent by denying each, when we get 'A is false' and 'If A is true, I do not say so.'

In the necessary particular proposition and the possible universal proposition there is sometimes a distinction between the 'composite' and 'divided' senses. 'Some S must be P,' taken in the composite sense, means that there is no case, in the whole range of ignorance, where some S or other is not P; but taken in the divided sense, it means that there is some S which same S remains P throughout the whole range of ignorance. So 'Whatever S there may be may be P,' taken in the composite sense, means that there is, in the range of ignorance, some hypothetic state of things (or it may be the unidentifiable true state, though this can hardly be the only such case) in which there either is no S, or every S there is is P; while in the divided sense, it means that there is no S at all in any hypothetic state but what is some hypothetic state or other is P. When there is any such distinction, the divided sense asserts more than the composite in necessary particular propositions, and less in possible universal. But in most cases the individuals do not remain identifiable throughout the range of possibility, when the distinction falls to the ground. It never applies to necessary universal propositions or to possible particular propositions.

Some logicians say that 'S may be P' is not a proposition at all, for it asserts nothing. But if it asserted nothing, no state of facts could falsify it, and consequently the denial of it would be absurd. Now let S be 'some self-contradictory proposition,' and let P be 'true.' Then the possible proposition is 'Some self-contradictory proposition may be true,' and its denial is 'No self-contradictory proposition can be true,' which can hardly be pronounced absurd. It is true that those logicians usually take the form 'S may be P' in the copulative sense 'S may be P, and S may not be P,' but this only makes it assert more, not less. The possible proposition, then, is a proposition. It not only must be admitted among logical forms, if they are to be adequate to represent all the facts of logic, but it plays a particularly important part in the theory of science. See SCIENTIFIC METHOD. At the same time, according to the view of modality now under consideration, necessary and possible propositions are equipollent with certain assertory propositions; so that they do not differ from assertory propositions as universal and particular propositions differ from one another, but rather somewhat as hypothetical (i.e. conditional, copulative, and disjunctive), categorical, and relative propositions differ from one another -- perhaps not quite so much.

According to this view, logically necessary and possible propositions relate to what might be known, without any knowledge whatever of the universe of discourse, but only with a perfectly distinct understanding of the meanings of words; geometrically necessary and possible propositions, to what a knowledge of the properties of space does or does not exclude; physical necessity, to what a knowledge of certain principles of physics does or does not exclude, &c. But when we say that of two collections one most be correspondentially greater than the other, but each cannot be correspondentially greater than the other, it has not been shown how this kind of necessity can be explained on the above principles.

The earliest theory of modality is Aristotle's, whose philosophy, indeed, consists mainly in a theory of modality. The student of Aristotle usually begins with the Categories; and the first thing that strikes him is the author's unconsciousness of any distinction between grammar and metaphysics, between modes of signifying and modes of being. When he comes to the metaphysical books, he finds that this is not so much an oversight as an assumed axiom; and that the whole philosophy regards the existing universe as a performance which has taken its rise from an antecedent ability. It is only in special cases that Aristotle distinguishes between a possibility and an ability, between a necessity and a constraint. In this, he is perhaps nearer the truth than the system of equipollencies set forth above.

Kant seems to have been the first to throw any light upon the subject. To the old distinction between logical and real possibility and necessity, he applied two new pairs of terms, analytic and synthetic, and subjective and objective. The following definitions (where every word is studied) certainly advanced the subject greatly: --

'1. Was mit den formalen Bedingungen der Erfahrung (der Anschauung und den Begriffen nach) übereinkommt, ist möglich.

'2. Was mit den materialen Bedingungen der Erfahrung (der Empfindung) zusammenhängt, ist wirklich.

'3. Dessen Zusammenhang mit dem Wirklichen nach allgemeinen Bedingungen der Erfahrung bestimmt ist, ist (existirt) nothwendig' (Krit. d. reinen Vernunft, 1st ed., 219).

Kant holds that all the general metaphysical conceptions applicable to experience are capable of being represented as in a diagram, by means of the image of time. Such diagrams he calls 'schemata.' The schema of the possible he makes to be the figure of anything at any instant. The schema of necessity is the figure of anything lasting through all time (ibid., 144, 145). He further states (ibid., 74, footnote; Jäsche's Logik, Einl. ix, and elsewhere) that the possible proposition is merely conceived but not judged, and is a work of the apprehension (Verstand); that the assertory proposition is judged, and is, so far, a work of the judgment; and that the necessary proposition is represented as determined by law, and is thus the work of the reason (Vernunft). He maintains that his deduction of the categories shows that, and how, the conceptions originally applicable to propositions can be extended to modes of being -- constitutively, to being having reference to possible experience; regulatively, to being beyond the possibility of experience.

Hegel considers the syllogism to be the fundamental form of real being. He does not, however, undertake to work over, in the light of this idea, in any fundamental way, what is ordinarily called logic, but which, from his point of view, becomes merely subjective logic. He simply accepts Kant's table of functions of judgment, which is one of the most ill-considered performances in the whole history of philosophy. Consequently, what Hegel says upon this subject must not be considered as necessarily representing the legitimate outcome of his general position. His followers have been incompetent to do more. Rosenkranz (Wissenschaft d. logischen Idee) makes modality to represent the superseding of the form of the judgment and to be the preparation for that of the syllogism. In the Encyclopädie, Hegel's last statement, §§ 178-80, we are given to understand that the judgment of the Begriff has for its contents the totality (or, say, conformity to an ideal). In the first instance, the subject is singular, and the predicate is the reflection of the particular object upon the universal. That is, this or that object forced upon us by experience is judged to conform to something in the realm of ideas. But when this is doubted, since the subject does not, in itself, involve any such reference to the ideal world, we have the 'possible' judgment, or judgment of doubt. But when the subject is referred to its genus, we get the apodictic judgment. But Hegel had already developed the ideas of possibility and necessity in the objective logic as categories of Wesen. In the Encyclopädie the development is somewhat as follows: Wirklichkeit is that whose mode of being consists in self-manifestation. As identity in general (the identity of Sein and Existenz) it is, in the first instance, possibility. That is to say, apparently, bare possibility, any fancy projected and regarded in the aspect of a fact. It is possible, for example, that the present Sultan may become the next Pope. But in the second movement arise the conceptions of the Zufällig, Aeusserlichkeit, and 'condition.' The Zufällig is that which is recognized as merely possible: 'A may be, but A may not be'; but it is also described by Hegel as that which has the Grund, or antecedent of its being, in something other than itself. The Aeusserlichkeit seems to be the having a being outside the ground of its being -- an idea assimilated to caprice. That which such Aeusserlichkeit supposes outside of itself, as the antecedent of its being, is the presupposed condition. The third movement gives, in the first instance, 'real possibility.' In this we find the conceptions of 'fact' (Sache), 'activity' (Thätigkeit), and 'necessity.'

Lotze and Trendelenburg represent the first struggles of German thought to rise from Hegelianism. The most remarkable characteristic of Lotze's thought is, that he not only sees no urgency for unity of conception in philosophy, but holds that such unity would inevitably involve a falsity. He represents a judgment as a means of apprehending becoming, in opposition to the concept, which apprehends being; but he says that the business of the judgment is to supply the cement for building up concepts. Accordingly, he has no doctrine of modality as a whole, but merely considers three cases, between which he traces no relation. Necessity may arise either out of the universal analytic judgment, the conditional judgment, or the disjunctive judgment. By the 'judgment' is meant the meaning of a proposition. Lotze finds that the meaning of the analytical judgment is illogical, since it identifies contraries. However, the meaning of this meaning is justified by its not meaning to mean that the terms are identical, but only that the objects denoted by those terms are identical. The analytic proposition is, therefore, admissible, because it is practically meant to mean a particular proposition, that is, one in which the predicate is asserted of all the particulars. And the justification of the proposition, whose use was to be to connect elements of terms, is that, meant not as it is meant, but as it is meant to be meant, these elements are identical and do not need to be connected. In this way Lotze vindicates the necessity of the analytical categorical proposition. Coming next to conditionals, by thought of the same order, he finds that, assuming that the universe of real, intelligible objects is 'coherent,' we may be justified in asserting that the introduction of a condition X into a subject S gives rise to a predicate P as an analytical necessity; and for this purpose, when it is once accomplished, it does not matter whether the ladder of the assumption of coherence remains or is taken away. Lotze treats the disjunctive proposition last, as if it were of a higher order, following Hegel in this respect. But what was excusable for Hegel is less so for Lotze, since he himself had signalized the significance of impersonal propositions, such as 'it rains,' 'it thunders,' 'it lightens,' whose only subject is the universe. Now, if there is any difference between 'If it lightens, it thunders,' and 'Either it does not lighten or it thunders,' it is that the latter considers the actual state of things alone, and the former a whole range of other possibilities. However, Lotze considers last the propositional form 'S is P₁ or P₂ or P₃.' Properly, this is not a disjunctive proposition, but only a proposition with a disjunctive predicate. Lotze considers it a peculiar form, because it cannot be represented by an Euler's diagram, which is simply a blunder. The necessity to which it gives rise must, therefore, either be the same as the conditional necessity, or else differ from it merely by greater simplicity. For other sound objections to Lotze's theory see Lange, Logische Studien, ii.

Trendelenburg (Logische Untersuch., xiii) maintains that possibility and necessity can only be defined in terms of the antecedent (Grund), though me might, perhaps, object to the translation of Grund by so purely formal a word as 'antecedent,' notwithstanding its harmony with Aristotle. If all conditions are recognized, and the fact is understood from its entire Grund, so that thought quite permeates being -- a sort of phrase which Trendelenburg always seeks -- there is 'necessity.' If, on the other hand, only some conditions are recognized, but what is wanting in Grund is made up in thought, there is 'possibility.' In itself, an egg is nothing but an egg, but for thought it may become a bird. Trendelenburg will, therefore, neither admit, with Kant, that modality is originally a mere question of the attitude of the mind, nor with Hegel, whom he criticizes acutely, that it is originally objective.

Sigwart, who holds that logical questions must ultimately be decided by immediate feeling, and that the usages of the German language are the best evidence of what that feeling is, denies that the possible proposition is a proposition at all, because it asserts nothing. He forgets that if a proposition asserts nothing, the denial of it must be absurd, since it must exclude every possibility. Now, the denial of 'I do not know but that A may be true' is 'I know A is not true,' which is hardly absurd. Sigwart, it is true, in accordance with usages of speech, takes 'A may be true' in what the old logicians called the sensus usualis, that is, for the copulative proposition 'A may be true, and further A may be not true.' But this does not make it assert less, but more, than the technical form. In regard to the necessary proposition, Sigwart, following his guide, the usages of speech, finds that 'A must be true,' asserts less than 'A is true,' so that from the latter the former follows, but not at all the latter from the former. This may be true for the usages of German speech, just as such phrases as 'beyond every shadow of doubt,' 'out of all question,' and the like, in our vernacular commonly betray the fact that there is somebody who not only doubts and questions, but flatly denies, the proposition to which they are attached. Bradley accepts the sensational discovery of Sigwart.

Lange (loc. cit.) thinks the matter is put in the clearest light by the logical diagrams usually attributed to Euler, but really going back to Vives. 'We, therefore, here again see,' he says, 'how spatial intuition, just as in geometry, verifies (begründet) a priority and necessity.' (C.S.P.)

Mode [Lat. modus, manner]: Ger. Modus; Fr. mode; Ital. modo. In general, the manner of the existence of a thing. It is equivalent in the generic sense to the terms attribute, quality, state, all of which have substance as their correlative. But the term mode specially emphasizes the aspect of mutability or variability in things, that is, the change from one state to another. Although a substance, therefore, must exist in some mode, any individual mode is regarded as accidental. In consequence of this emphasis upon the aspect of variability, a differentiation arises between the term attribute, as signifying the permanent and essential qualities of a substance, and mode, as signifying its more variable qualities or the varying forms in which the fundamental attributes express themselves.

This is the sense of the term mode in the Cartesian system, where it first acquires philosophical prominence. 'We have understood by modes,' says Descartes (Principia Philos., i. proposition 56), 'the same as what we elsewhere designate attributes or qualities. But when we consider substance as affected or varied by them, we use the term modes.' Besides God, to whom the term substance, in the sense of self-subsistent, is alone strictly applicable, there are for Descartes only two summa genera of things (or created substances), namely, minds or thinking things, and material or extended things. And of every substance, according to proposition 53, there is one principal property which constitutes its nature or essence, and upon which all the others depend. 'Thus extension constitutes the nature of corporeal substance, and is called par excellence its attribute, while the attribute of thought constitutes similarly the essence of thinking substance. For everything else that can be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is only some mode of an extended thing, as all the properties we discover in mind (such as imagination, sensation, or will) are only diverse modes of thinking.' Modes are thus modifications of the one fundamental attribute of substance. This is the distinction of substance, attribute, and mode which furnishes the framework of Spinoza's system, in which the substantiality of the res extensae and the res cogitantes disappears, individual minds becoming modes of the divine attribute of thought, and individual bodies modes of the divine attribute of extension.

Locke gave the term currency in English philosophy by his division of complex ideas into 'modes, substances, and relations.' Modes are 'such complex ideas which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of, substances.' Locke apologizes for using the word in a technical sense. Modes are then divided into simple and mixed. Simple modes are 'only variations or different combinations of the same simple idea, as a dozen or score, which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together.' Mixed modes contain 'a combination of several ideas of several kinds, e.g. beauty, theft' (Essay II, 12. 3-5). (A.S.P.P.)

Literature: EISLER, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, 'Modus'; HÖFFDING, Hist. of Mod. Philos. (and other Histories), Index. (J.M.B.)

Mode (in logic) [Lat. modus, trans. of Gk. tropoV]. See MODALITY.

Model [Lat. modulus, dim. of modus, measure]: Ger. Modell, Vorschrift; Fr. modèle; Ital. modello. (1) In psychology: something held up for conscious IMITATION (q.v.).

It is recommended that this term be in all cases employed for the matter set up for purposes of imitation (the usage of Taine, Tarde, Royce), the term COPY (q.v.) being used in the wider sense given it under that topic. The word 'example' is used in the four languages, especially with an ethical reference, for cases in which the model is explicitly chosen and pursued.

(2) In biology: see MIMICRY (4).

Literature: see IMITATION, and MIMICRY. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Moderation. Sometimes used to render the Greek swfrosunh. See TEMPERANCE. (J.M.B.)

Modesty [Lat. modestus, moderate]: Ger. (1) Bescheidenheit; Fr. (1) modestie; Ital. (1) modestia. (1) The form of timidity or shyness due to reflective self-consciousness.

(2) A popular term for general lowliness of mind.

The demarcation of modesty off from the other forms of SHYNESS (q.v.) is difficult, especially in view of the confusions of popular usage. There is often an element, both in the conscious state and in the physical reaction of modesty, due to the particular exciting object, which may, at the same time, excite SHAME or COYNESS (see those terms); as, for example, when modesty is excited by physical indelicacy, which also produces shame. Indeed, it is seldom that reflective emotion such as this is not complicated with special feelings and attitudes toward the object.

Literature: see SHYNESS. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Modification (in biology) [Lat. modificatio]: Ger. (individuell erworbene); Abänderung (Wundt); Fr; modification; Ital. modificazione. A structural change wrought during the individual's lifetime (or acquired), in contradistinction from variation, which is of germinal origin (or congenital).

The term was used sometimes, but not consistently, in this sense by Darwin. In the Darwinian phrase 'descent with modifications' the ambiguity is evident as between what is congenital and what acquired.

The distinction indicated in the definition has been rendered necessary by the discussion as to the inheritance of acquired characters. Modifications are acquired by the individual; whether they can be transferred to the germinal substance and thus become hereditary as variations is the problem under discussion. See ACQUIRED CHARACTERS, and HEREDITY. Organisms capable of extensive modification are termed plastic; and this PLASTICITY (q.v.) may be subject to selection. The term ACCOMMODATION (q.v.) is reserved by some writers for the moulding of behaviour to environing circumstances on the part of organisms, referring to function rather than to structure. On the hypothesis of ORGANIC SELECTION (q.v.) modifications of structure may serve to foster COINCIDENT VARIATIONS (q.v.) of like nature, and accommodations of behaviour may thus set the direction of congenital variation, and so of evolution under the action of natural selection.

Literature: LLOYD MORGAN, Habit and Instinct; J. MARK BALDWIN, A New Factor in Evolution, Amer. Natural., June-July, 1896; HEADLEY, The Problems of Evolution (1901). (C.LL.M.- J.M.B.)

Modification and Variation (mental). The same distinction between these terms is recommended as that given under MODIFICATION (in biology). Cf. VARIATION. (J.M.B.)

Modulus [Lat. modus, a mode]. (1) Proposed by Schröder (Ger. Modul; Fr. not in use; Ital. modulo, suggested -- E.M.) for the four relative terms upon which the logic of dual RELATIVES (q.v.) hinges; namely, 'Not,' 'Same as,' Excluded from a universe containing,' and 'With, or within a universe containing.'

These terms were first called by Peirce the 'definite dual relatives of second intention'; he now think it might be well to term these the four 'cardinals,' or four cardinal dual relatives.

Literature: PEIRCE, in Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University, 191, and Amer. J. Math., iii. 47; SCHRÖDER, Algebra d. Logik, iii. 117.

(2) See ERRORS OF OBSERVATION. (C.S.P.)

Modus ponens and Modus tollens [Lat.]. Two ways of reasoning from a conditional proposition or consequence. The modus ponens from the consequence and the antecedent infers the consequent; the modus tollens from the consequence and the falsity of the consequent infers the falsity of the antecedent, thus:

Modus Ponens. If A is true, C is true; A is true;  C is true.
Modus Tollens. If A is true, C is true; C is false;  A is false.

A third way of reasoning, namely, from the truth of the antecedent and falsity of the consequent to the falsity of the consequence, is generally overlooked. See HYPOTHETICAL (syllogism). (C.S.P.)