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Christopher D. Green
York University, Toronto, Ontario
Jacksonian Re-evolution: ger. Jackson'sche Wiederentwicklung; Fr. réévolution Jacksonienne; Ital. reintegrazione di Jackson. The principle, ascribed to Hughlings Jackson, that the order of the recovery of the mental functions after severe injury or disease is the reverse of that of their loss, and the same as that of their original normal development or acquisition.
Literature: H. JACKSON, J. Ment. Sci., Oct., 1888, 352; PICK, Arch.
f. Psychiat., xxii, 1891, 756; BALDWIN, Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race,
chap. xiii. § 4, 4 (from the German translation of which, p. 370, the equivalent
is taken). (J.M.B.)
Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich. (1743-1819.)
Educated for commercial life at Frankfort and Geneva; engaged in business
for seven years, 1763-70; councillor of finance for Jülich and Berg;
called to Munich, 1804, as a member of the Academy of Science; president
of this Academy, 1807-13. See FAITH PHILOSOPHY.
James-Lange Theory. The 'peripheral' or 'effect theory of the relation of emotion to its so-called expression. Named from Wm. James and K. Lange. Cf. EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION (also for literary citations).
The theory has become the starting-point of discussion of emotion. Anticipations
of it have been attributed to Bastian (Brain as an Organ of Mind, 1880),
to Maudsley (Physiol. and Pathol. of Mind, 1867), to Lotze,
and to Descartes. Cf. Stumpf, Zeitsch. f. Psychol., xxi,
1899, 47. (J.M.B.)
Janet, Paul. (1823-99.) Born at Paris and
educated at the École Normale, Paris. He was professor of philosophy,
first at Bourges (1845), then at Strassburg (1848), later at Paris, in
the Lycée Louis-le-Grand (1857), and the Sorbonne (1864). In 1864
he was elected member of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. He
was, in the main, eclectic, a disciple of Cousin.
Jansenism: Ger. Jansenismus; Fr. Jansénisme; Ital. Giansenismo. The system of Cornelius Jansen, the distinctive feature of which is its reassertion, in an extreme form, of the Augustinian doctrine of human inability; to wit, that Adam's fall has totally destroyed man's power to do good, and that his salvation must be the work of sovereign and irresistible grace.
Jansenism was condemned by the Roman Catholic Church, which holds the more moderate doctrine of St. Thomas. By Protestants, to whom Thomism savours of semi-Pelagianism, it has been generally looked on as a reaction toward a sounder faith. Its appearance was the occasion of a long and bitter controversy, the Port Royalists, Arnauld and Pascal, making the cause of Jansenism their own, while the Jesuits championed the orthodox view of the Romish Church. Jansenism as an organized movement was finally suppressed and the doctrine condemned as a heresy.
Literature: DUMAS, Hist. des cinq Propositions; ST. BEUVE, Port Royal
(Paris); BOURIER, La Vérité sur les Arnaulds (1877); RAPIN, Hist.
du Jansénisme. (A.T.O)
Jave, Yahweh, Jehovah [Heb.]: Ger. Jehovah; Fr. Jéhovah, Jaweh; Ital. Jeova. The title applied to Deity in the Hebrew Scriptures when the intent is to represent the one self-existent and immutable God as entering into progressive moral relation with men, and especially with the Jewish people.
Of the two appellations of the Deity used in Hebrew Scripture, Elohim and Jehovah, the former is generally used of God in his unethical relation to nature, while the latter expresses a personal and moral relationship with men. The root conception of Jehovah includes a synthesis of being and manifestation, and, as employed in the Old Testament, represents the Being who not only creates man, but makes a revelation of himself to him. Jehovah is not purely transcendent and unsearchable, but comes into loving, intelligible relations with humanity. The germ of the LOGOS (q.v.) is already in the conception of Jehovah.
Literature: HENGSTENBERG, Authen. of the Pentateuch; ALDIS WRIGHT, Smith's
Bible Dict., sub verbo; THOLUCK, Literarischer Anz. (1832); BALLANTINE, Import
of the Name Jehovah, Bib. Repository, iii. (A.T.O.)
Jealousy (1) and (2) Envy [OF. jalous, and Lat. invidere, to grudge, through Fr.]: Ger. (1) Eifersucht, (2) Neid; Fr. (1) jalousie, (2) envie; Ital. (1) gelosia, (2) invidia. (1) Jealousy is envy (as below) with the added factors that the individual one envies is thought of as sustaining and profiting by a relation to a third individual which properly belongs to oneself; there is an added consciousness of personal injury.
This is what is known as the higher or reflective form of jealousy, in which the grounds for the emotional state are conscious to the individual. A simpler form, sometimes called 'organic' jealousy, is that seen in action which duplicates the expression of reflective jealousy without consciousness of its conditions, i.e. a reaction fitted to convey to an onlooker the impression that the individual is jealous.
(2) Envy is the emotion aroused by the presentation of enjoyment on the part of another under conditions considered desirable for oneself.
Analyses of these states have usually set out from an earlier analysis of sympathy, involving the placing of self in some way in the mind or 'in the shoes' of the person sympathized with. They are thought to involve the double reflection; (a) that the self is represented in the other, and (b) that the experience thus attributed to the self is not one's own. Another view makes the 'other' an identical content with the self, fitted to excite the same attitudes as in sympathy, but prevented from doing so by the actual difference between the fancied and the real experience; jealousy and envy are emotions of this conflict. See further under SYMPATHY. The lower, organic, or instinctive jealousy, like the same form of sympathy, is exhibited by the animals, and is accounted for, like the other organic emotions, by the laws of utility and survival; this type of reaction being of use in prompting the animal to secure the gain which another is getting. It is very difficult to assign to the animal consciousness the elements involved, and yet the reaction may be the characteristic one of jealousy, as well as that of mere envy.
Jealousy is further characterized by the direction it takes to reach the object; it may wreak itself on either of the individuals in the relation which excites the jealousy. The injured husband punishes the intruder and also upbraids the wife. His emotion leads him, however, to exaggerated suspicion and ill-treatment of the latter. In envy the object is simply the one individual envied considered as being in a fortunate and enviable case. Covetousness is another name for envy.
Literature: see references under EMOTION, COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY, and
(especially) SYMPATHY. Special treatment may be found in ADAM SMITH, Theory
of the Moral Sentiments; SPINOZA, Ethics, Pt. V. prop. 50 ff.; BAIN, Emotions
and Will; BALDWIN, Social and Eth. Interpret., sect. 146. (J.M.B.-
Jehovah: see JAVE.
Jerome, Sophronius Eusebius Hieronymus, Saint.
340-cir. 420 A.D.) His careful education was completed in Rome. He travelled
in Gaul, journeyed into the East (373), and retired (374) into the desert
of Chalcis, where he spent four years in ascetic practices and in study.
Ordained a presbyter by Bishop Paulinus of Antioch, he went to Constantinople
(380) to hear Gregory Nazianzen. In 382 he returned to Rome, whence in
386 a wealthy noble woman, Paula, followed him into Palestine and built
in Bethlehem four convents, three for nuns and one for monks. Over the
latter she placed Jerome, and he remained there until his death. His translation
of the Bible into Latin was his greatest work.
Jesuitism: Ger. Jesuitismus; Fr. jésuitisme; Ital. Gesuitismo. The system of the Jesuits, a society of the Roman Catholic Church, called also the Society of Jesus, instituted for the propagation and defence of the Romish faith, and noted for the perfection of its organization and discipline and the devotion of its members to the ends of the society.
The Society of Jesus was founded in 1540 by Ignatius Loyola for the express purpose of defending Catholicism against the inroads of the Reformation. In this it was eminently successful, and for over a century was the most powerful agent of Roman Catholic propaganda. Whether justly or not, it fell under the suspicion of unscrupulous ambition and laxity in practical morals. The term Jesuitism has become a synonym in the popular mind for supple diplomacy and an accommodating conscience which substitutes the standard of permissibility for that of right and obligation.
Literature: F. SUAREZ, De Religione Societatis Jesu; F. J. BUSS, Die
Gesch. d. Gesell. Jesu (1883); RAVIGNAN, De l'Existence et l'Instinct des Jésuites
(7th ed., Paris, 1855-83; Eng. trans., London, 1844). (A.T.O.)
Jesus [Lat. Iesus; Gr. IhsouV; Heb. Yeshua, or Yoshua, Yeheshua, the salvation of Jehovah]: Ger. Jesus; Fr. Jésus; Ital. Gesù. The Saviour of the Christian Church, called the Christ. The four Gospels are accounts of his life. (J.M.B.)
The teaching of Jesus, as distinguished from the history of his life and from
the doctrine of his work and of his person, has its source in his dominating
consciousness of his Divine Sonship. Speaking out of this consciousness, he
seeks to lead men to realize the same essential relationship. >From this point
of view the highest virtue is filial obedience to the will of a Heavenly Father.
The supreme principle of living is love, which binds men first and supremely
to God and secondly to one another as brethren. Out of this springs brotherly
love, peace, gentleness, and a forgiving spirit. The great practical law of
life is that of self-devoted service, in which the private individual life is
lost in the larger life of the community. The last judgment, the resurrection,
and the life beyond the grave were also important elements of his personal teaching.
Cf. the special topics of Christian theology. (A.T.O.)
Jevons, William Stanley. (1835-82.) English
logician and political economist. Educated at University College, London.
Held an appointment in the royal Mint at Sydney, Australia, 1854-9; became
fellow of University College, 1864; and in 1866 professor of logic, mental
and moral philosophy, and Cobden lecturer on political economy in Owens
College, Manchester. Moved to London, 1876, and was drowned in 1882.
Jewish Philosophy and Religion: see JUDAISM.
John of Salisbury. (cir. 1115-80.) Born in
southern England, he left his native land in 1136, and went to Paris and
to Chartres to study. He returned in 1148 with Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury,
and lived as the latter's secretary, continuing in the office under Theobald's
successor, Thomas à Becket, until 1163. From 1163 to 1170 he spent
in the abbey of St.-Rémy, near Rheims, occupied with literary pursuits.
After a few years in England he became bishop of Chartres, where he died.
See SCHOLASTICISM, I.
Joint Cost: Ger. gemeinsame Kosten; Fr. frais non répartis; Ital. spese non ripartite. Expense attaching to the production of a number of articles collectively, and not naturally assignable to one rather than to the other.
Thus it is impossible to tell the respective costs of freight and passenger service on a railroad, because many of the items of expense apply to the road as a whole, and not to any special part of the railroad service.
Mill called attention to the difficulty of applying the adjustment of value to cost of production in certain cases of this kind, especially in the matter of by-products, where a concern established for the supply of one article, like gas, finds itself in a position to sell another, like coke. But the difficulty is far more widespread than Mill assumes. It applies not merely to the apportionment of expenses among different articles simultaneously produced, but among varying quantities of the same article.
The supply of different commodities produced under these conditions is known as a joint supply; such products are sometimes known as joint products. A somewhat difficult transfer of the same conception from the phenomena of production to those of consumption leads to a conception of joint demand.
Literature: MARSHALL, Princ. of Econ., Bk. V. (A.T.H.)
Joint-sensation: Ger. Gelenkempfindung:
Fr. sensation articulaire; Ital. sensibilità articolare
(or delle giunture). Sensation from the joints. See ARTICULAR SENSATION.
Josephus, Flavius. (37-cir. 103 A.D.)
Born and educated in a noble family at Jerusalem, he passed through the
schools of three Jewish sects, spent three years in a desert with the hermit
Banus, and adopted the views of the Pharisees. He was sent on a diplomatic
errand to Rome in 63 A.D., and commanded in Galilee during the Jewish revolution.
Becoming a captive in the Roman army, he ingratiated himself in the royal
families, and returned to Rome with Titus after the destruction of Jerusalem
to spend the remainder of his life.
Jouffroy, Théodore Simon. (1796-1842.)
Born at Pontets, and educated partly by his uncle at the college of Pontarlier,
and partly at the college of Dijon. He was taken into the École
Normale, Paris, in 1814, where Victor Cousin instructed him in philosophy.
In 1817 he became doctor of philosophy and instructor in philosophy at
the École Normale. The government closed the latter in 1822, but
he continued to lecture in his own dwelling. In 1832 he opened a course
of lectures on 'natural right,' and in 1833 became a member of the Académie
for the class of moral and political sciences. On account of illness he
spent the winter of 1835-6 at Pisa, and in 1838, on returning to Paris,
exchanged his position for that of university librarian, made vacant by
the death of Laromiguière.
Joy [Lat. gaudere, through Fr.]: Ger. Freude; Fr. joie; Ital. gioja. A pleasurable emotional state accompanying consciousness of gain or advantage of any sort to oneself or another.
Joy is the contrary emotion to GRIEF (q.v.). The nature of such pairs of contrary emotions is explained under HOPE AND DESPAIR. The expressions of joy are also antithetic to those of grief: expansive, as opposed to depressive, vaso-motor and muscular effects show themselves in attitudes and movements exhibiting, like those of grief, little practical adjustment, such as clapping of hands, jumping up and down, social demonstrativeness, and laughter.
Literature: see EMOTION, and BIBLIOG. G, 2, k. (J.M.B.,
Judaism [Lat. Iudaismus]: Ger. Judenthum; Fr. Judaïsme; Ital. Giudaismo. The religious system of the Jews, founded on the law of Moses and enjoining the exclusive worship of Jehovah as the one and only true God, together with their religious and ethical philosophy. Cf. CABALA.
Judaism is the oldest of the three great monotheistic religions of the world. The creed of ancient Judaism is to be found in the Old Testament, and includes Messianic hope as one of its essential features. The creed of modern orthodox Judaism was drawn up by the celebrated Moses Maimonides in the 11th century, and includes the doctrines of the Messianic hope and belief in the resurrection of the body. Modern Judaism is divided into two branches, the conservative or orthodox and the reformed. The latter have expunged from their creed the Messianic hope and the dogma of the resurrection, while maintaining the immortality of the soul and the perfectibility of human nature. An ultra-liberal wing has practically eliminated the religious feature from Judaism, and aims to turn it into a purely ethical cult.
Literature: CASSEL, Lehrb. d. jüdischen Gesch. u. Literatur; JOST,
Gesch. d. Judenthums. (A.T.O.)
Judge (in law): see JUDICIAL.
Judgment [Lat. iudex, judge]: Ger. Urtheilskraft, Urtheil; Fr. jugement; Ital. giudizio. The mental function and act of assertion or predication; applied also to the resulting assertion or predication. Cf. BELIEF, and PROPOSITION.
The definition is necessarily broad, since controversies about judgment are now in the air. Logic had the field until recent times and defined judgment in terms of verbal or some other sort of predication expressed in propositions. This did not do justice to judgment as a mental act whereby the assertion is reached. The act or attitude of judgment is not exhausted psychologically in the formulated content of predication. This is in brief the motive of the newer way of looking at judgment, in which Brentano was a pioneer, and in which both logicians and psychologists have recently done much work. Brentano finds the judging function an original form of mental determination over and above presentation or apprehension of content. This assimilates judgment as a mental act to belief, defined by J. S. Mill as an irreducible form of acceptance of a content. (Windelband has suggested that the German term Beurtheilung be used for judging in Brentano's sense. Cf. Eisler, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, 'Beurtheilung.')
Consequently, the problem now before psychologists is not that of the recognition of judgment as an operation over and above that of presentation, but the analysis of the general state of psychological acceptance in its various forms, with view of its elements and primary roots. Is judgment identical with belief? If not, in what way is assertion with predication, or possibly without explicit predication, something added to acceptance? Does the determination of belief carry with it also the assertion of what is believed? Or is assertion not at all necessary to the predication of judgment? What are the different kinds of judgment (hypothetical? categorical? existential? disjunctive?), and how are they accounted for on the basis of the psychological theory reached by analysis? Cf. PROPOSITION. These questions indicate that, in the newer way of looking at judgment, psychologists are finding it difficult to define belief and judgment without overlapping; and if a real distinction is to be made between these two terms, the only line of demarcation seems to be in the act of assertion and the manner of it, with or without predication, as distinct from the acceptance of belief.
Another older and logical way of looking at judgment made the explicit relation of one term to another -- that is, as involving 'acts of comparison' (Hamilton) or explicit predication -- necessary to it, as in the verbal categorical judgment. The analysis, however, of psychologists shows that no such trait can be universally maintained. The existential, ejaculatory, impersonal forms of assertion do not lend themselves to this treatment except by verbal abstraction and supplementation, in which the psychological state loses its purity. Moreover, the more primitive forms of judgment do not deal with two presentations or ideas, but with one. In fact some hold (e.g. the writer) that all sorts of judgment can be constructed as re-determinations of the content of conception through a progressive series of changes. Cf. ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS.
The need of analysis is seen in the conflicting views of judgment, logical and psychological, now current. The current divergence of view is shown by the comparison of Erdmann's Logik and Hillebrand's Die neuern Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse. Hillebrand accepts Brentano's view of judgment and develops it in its logical bearings. This view seems to be psychological in two of its factors. (1) It emphasizes an aspect of existential judgments which is not covered by the ordinary predicative theory; namely, if existence is a predicate in the ordinary attributal sense, it must have a notional content of its own -- it must be itself a content, an earlier presentative experience -- an error which Kant refuted once for all in his criticisms of the ontological proof for the existence of God. But the formal logicians (i.e. Erdmann) reply: if existence is not a predicate, the distinction between presentation and judgment is subverted. This last is unanswerable, but it leaves unrelieved the acute strain between the psychological and logical views of the existential, pointed out by Brentano. (2) The Brentano-Hillebrand view does justice for the first time to the 'unitary' or 'conceptual' meaning of judgment and syllogism; a point of view from which the formal strictly predicative or 'two-membered' doctrine of judgment is seen at a great disadvantage. When I say 'The dog is fierce,' my content is a single object, fierce dog -- this much certainly, whether or no we go over to the existential view which says 'The fierce dog is' is equivalent to the original statement (cf. Baldwin, Handb. of Psychol., i. 285, 301). Indeed, Brentano seems to go over to the existential view, thus saving himself from the criticisms to which his doctrine is open, at the same time that he has cut himself off from a predicative theory by his unitary view of the judgment content.
Yet it is curious to note how the logical progressus of doctrine may be reversed. Erdmann holds the predicative theory, yet maintains the unitary view properly belonging to the existential theory. This he does by upholding what may be called the 'declarative' as opposed to the synthetic function of judgment (Logik, i. 205, 261). For this there is much to be said. As the present writer has said (loc. cit., i. 283, 285): 'The essential feature of judgment is this, that it sets forth, in a conscious contemplative way, the actual stage of the thought movement.' Erdmann holds (loc. cit., i. 262) that it is always expressed in a proposition. But how easy it would be to reverse this chain of argument, and to say that because there is this declaration of relationship between parts of the objective whole which is the content of judgment, there must have been originally more than one content, and that, therefore, judgment, as a synthetic thing, precedes presentation and renders it possible.
The view of judgment which is desiderated, therefore, should have the following features: first, it should find some way of holding that existence is a true predicate and yet not an attributal content; second, that the content of judgment is a single concept; third, that reference to existence accompanies all judgment; and fourth, that judgment is declarative of results already reached in conception. The first and third of these four points are essential, if the existential and predicative theories of judgment are to find common ground.
On the first point -- the nature of the existence predicate -- introspection seems to throw light. Reality is at first simply presence, sensation, presentation; we have here the fundamental phase of affective consciousness, reality-feeling. There is no judgment at all, because there is no occasion for assertion. There is no acceptance of reality as such, because there is no category into which to put it. But now let experience come in like a flood, let pleasures of gratification be succeeded by pains of want, let impulse seek its end, finding it here and losing it there; and amid the contradictions and reiterations, the storm and stress of the accommodation of life to the world, a few great relief-points begin to stand out in consciousness. They recur, they satisfy, they stand together, they can be found when wanted. They are not new as objects of apprehension; they are the same objectives as before. But somehow, after we have gratified our appetites by them, and have sought and found them, again and again, standing firm together, while other objectives have shifted, faded, and disappeared -- then the mental part of us which envelops them becomes different. Our affective consciousness now assumes the colouring which we call belief; that sense of acceptance, assurance, and confirmation which succeeds doubt and perplexity. This is feeling; a feeling of the methodical way in which certain objectives manoeuvre in consciousness, in contrast with the unmethodical way in which other objectives manoeuvre; the feeling of a reality-coefficient.
This, then, is the primary meaning of belief in reality or existence. It is the sense of the confirmed presence of an objective, as satisfying the demands of conscious life. But so far, belief is not judgment, and existence is not an idea. But as soon as such an objective is labelled as real, is pictured with this coefficient, then the declarative, assertive phase of consciousness arises, and the 'S is' is born -- a true predicative judgment. What was before the feeling-envelope, so to speak, of the presentation, is now itself presented as part of the content. Hillebrand seems to be right in saying that the idea of existence does not arise before, but in and through, the existential judgment.
In the predicate of the existential, therefore, what we assert is not content over and above the subject S, but the feeling-category in which the S-content is enveloped in consciousness: the way consciousness feels in consequence of the presence of this particular content in it. This is, in the writer's view, the true explanation of the existential. It is a judgment, because in its declarative function it renders in intelligible form the endorsement which distinguishes belief from simple presentation. But the predicate is only a sign of this endorsement, not an added objective element.
The other desideratum of the theory is now clearly in sight, i.e. the presence always of an existence-value in judgment. As experience broadens, our reality-coefficients are so well established as categories of feeling-consciousness, that each presented content has its familiar envelope of belief, its endorsement in kind -- so familiar and natural that it is not formally asserted at all. And the new marks which accrue to a content in conception come to be declared in the ordinary 'two-membered' form of judgment, all inside of a tacit (felt) reality-coefficient. The is of 'The man is white' is, therefore, very different from the is of 'There is a white man.' The former is merely the sign of conceptual synthesis: the judgment might be true on any 'world of reality,' e.g. of Adam Bede. The existence value of the judgment is simply the environment of feeling which an accepted proposition carries, with no indication of any particular kind of existence. But in the true existential -- 'There is a white man' -- the feeling factor is taken up as a quasi-logical predicate, and the coefficient of external reality is declared. The is now expresses the conscious ratification and declaration of belief.
The employment of the belief criterion as a norm of classification of judgments (see Venn, Empirical Logic, 243; Baldwin, loc. cit., 1st ed., i. 293) is fruitful in further confirmation of this general result. If we look at the belief-attitude of the mind in cases of assertion, we find two clear truths not brought out by the ordinary division of the logics. First, the disjunctive judgment is seen to be a categorical form of expression. The disjunctive form of the predicate P or P' means that the same belief-feeling accompanies either of two or more declarations concerning the subject S. It expresses the belief-value of the concept S so far as constructive experience of it (i.e. the evidence) is of value for belief. With more evidence the parity of P and P', as claimants upon belief, disappears, and the judgment takes the regular categorical form. Second, the hypothetical judgment lies, with reference to belief, midway between the ordinary categorical and the existential. We may approach it from either extreme. For example, the judgment 'If a is b, c is d,' means that the same degree of reality, or belief-feeling, accompanies the conceptual synthesis ab on the one hand, and the synthesis cd on the other hand. But it does not determine the particular coefficient of reality belonging to either ab or cd. Or we may approach the hypothetical from the side of the existential, getting the hypothetical judgment of existence, 'If ab exists, so does cd.' In this case, not only does the belief-feeling envelop both ab and cd, as before, but, further, the particular coefficient of reality attaching in common to them both is now expressed. This last form of judgment is, therefore, from our present point of view, the richest and most notable. In it we catch both belief as felt coefficient, and existence as asserted predicate (i.e. the reality-coefficient itself made the P of predication).
The above account, it will be seen, suggests an explanation also of the negative existential judgment -- a point of great difficulty to Herbart, Brentano, and Hillebrand -- by saving the predicative force of the existence sign. Yet by the negation in this judgment, as now explained, no element of content is cut off from S; what is denied is belief in a positive coefficient of reality, or, as Erdmann (loc. cit., i. 349 ff.) and Sigwart say, it is the rejection of an attempted positive judgment of existence.
The element of belief which accompanies all judgment, described above as felt recognition of a reality-coefficient, gives us the line of connection between formal and material logic. The judgments A, E, I, O cannot be purely formal, nor can the syllogisms constructed from them; for every S and P in each one of them has its belief-value -- its reality-coefficient -- and every actual case of inference means the development of concepts subject to the limitations of thought in that particular sphere of reality. The truth of every conclusion rests upon the presupposition -- from the supplying of which the hypothetical syllogism arises, just as the hypothetical judgment arises from the supplying of the ground of belief in the categorical judgment -- that the two premises have the same kind of reality. The syllogism A is B -- B is C / A is C, to be valid, really requires belief that the proposition 'If A is B and B is C, then A is C,' applies to the particular elements of content in question. Without this presupposition, securing the same coefficient to both premises, the conclusion would be false; as for example: -- All men who have died will rise again. The man Romeo died. The man Romeo will rise again. The 'man Romeo' and the 'all men' have different coefficients of reality -- different material reference -- and the conclusion is invalid.
Additional questions are: the relation of judgment to language and to other forms of mental symbolism (see Erdmann, Logik, i. 23, 224, 234; and cf. LANGUAGE FUNCTION); the social or 'communication' element in judgment; the interpretation of the 'material' reference of judgment (another way of asking as to the presence of belief); the interpretation of negative judgment (does it implicate belief to the same extent as the affirmative judgment?).
Literature: logical: see under PROPOSITION, and BELIEF, and in BIBLIOG.
C, 2, r (especially the works of MILL, VENN, SIGWART, ERDMANN, WUNDT,
BOSANQUET). Psychological: HAMILTON, Metaphysics, lect. xxxvii; the larger Psychologies
of BRENTANO, STOUT, JAMES, LADD, JODL, VOLKMANN, BALDWIN also in Mind, 1892,
403, from which quotations are made above); HILLEBRAND, Die neu. Theor. der
kat. Schlüsse; JERUSALEM, Die Urtheilsfunktion; MACLENNAN, The Impersonal
Judgment; ORMOND, The Negative in Logic, Psychol. Rev., iv. (1897) 231. (J.M.B.)
Judgment (in law) [from Lat. iudicare,
through Fr.]: Ger. Gericht; Fr. judgment; Ital. giudicato
(passato in . . . ). The judicial determination of a matter in litigation.
It may extend only to the determination of a matter coming up for decision in
the course of a lawsuit, before its conclusion, and is then an interlocutory
judgment, as distinguished from a final judgment. On a jury trial the verdict
of the jury precedes the judgment, and is the ground of it. (S.E.B.)
Judgment (in logic): see PROPOSITION.
Judgment (last): Ger. jüngstes
Gericht; Fr. jugement dernier; Ital. giudizio finale (or universale),
l'ultimo giudizio. In Christian theology, the great day of final award,
following the general resurrection, in which the destiny of the righteous and
the wicked shall be finally determined. See ESCHATOLOGY (also for literature).
Judgment of Taste. Aesthetic appreciation;
and expression sometimes used as the English equivalent of Kant's Urtheilskraft
and of the earlier cognito sensitiva of Baumgarten's Aesthetica.
Cf. HIRN, Origins of Art (1900), I. See AESTHETICS, and TASTE; and cf.
Judicial (in law) [Lat. iudicialis]: Ger. juristisch, gerichtlich; Fr. judiciaire; Ital. giudiziario. That which pertains to a court of justice in the exercise of its proper functions.
An opinion of a court volunteered upon a matter not properly before it for decision would be extra-judicial. Quasi-judicial powers are exercised by administrative tribunals, such as boards of railroad commissioners or of city aldermen when disposing of a proceeding for the removal of an officer for cause. Judicial notice: the notice taken by judges, without proof, in the disposition of a cause, of the existence of facts of universal knowledge (e.g. the day of the week or month, the name of the chief magistrate, the intoxicating qualities of brandy, or the explosive character of gunpowder).
'Judicial notice takes the place of proof, and is of equal force. As a means
of establishing facts, it is therefore superior to evidence. In its appropriate
field it displaces evidence, since, as it stands for proof, it fulfils the object
which evidence is designed to fulfil, and makes evidence unnecessary. The true
conception of what is judicially known is that of something which is not, or
rather need not, unless the tribunal wishes it, be the subject of either evidence
or argument -- something which is already in the court's possession, or at any
rate is so accessible that there is no occasion to use any means to make the
court aware of it. If, in regard to any subject of judicial notice, the court
should permit documents to be referred to or testimony introduced, it would
not be, in any proper sense, the admission of evidence, but simply a resort
to a convenient means of refreshing the memory, or making the trier aware of
that of which everybody ought to be aware' (State v. Main, 69 Connecticut
Reports, 123, 136; Thayer's Cases on Evidence, 20; Brown v. Piper,
91 United States Reports, 43). (S.E.B.)
Judicial Notice: see JUDICIAL.
Jural [Lat. ius, right]: Ger. rechtlich; Fr. juridique; Ital. giuridico. Pertaining to right, as distinguished from that which pertains to law or to morals.
'The jural sphere includes only external actions. . . . The moral comprehends
the jural' (Woosley, Polit. Sci., i. 17, 14). It relates 'to such
right actions (or abstinences) as are required to satisfy the rightful claims
of others' (cf. Sidgwick, Hist. of Eth., chap. i. 9). The word
jural was coined by Lieber in his Political Ethics. (S.E.B.)
Jurisdiction (in law) [Lat. iurisdictio]: Ger. Jurisdiction, Rechtssprechung; Fr. juridiction; Ital. giurisdizione. (1) In respect to a state: the territory over which its laws are in force, namely, that under its flag. Treaties may concede an extra-territorial jurisdiction, as do those of China with the Western powers. (2) In respect to a court: (a) the extent of its power to adjudicate; (b) the territory over which its process can run.
Original jurisdiction is that over a cause from the time it is first instituted,
as distinguished from appellate jurisdiction, which attaches only upon proceedings
in the nature of an appeal from a court in which the action has been previously
Jurisprudence [Lat. iurisprudentia, from ius, law, + prudentia, knowledge]: Ger. Jurisprudenz; Fr. jurisprudence; Ital. giurisprudenza; (1) Law viewed as a science. (2) The system of laws in force in a particular state.
Holland defines it as 'the formal science of positive law' (Jurisprudence, chap. i. 12). 'Iurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia; iusti atque iniusti scientia' (Inst. of Just., i. I, De iustitia et iure, I). Modern jurisprudence is viewed mainly from its human side. See COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE.
Literature: BENTHAM, Mor. and Legisl., ii. chap. xvii. § 2; SIDGWICK,
Outlines of the Hist. of Eth., 8, 95; POLLOCK, First Book of Jurisprudence;
AMOS, Sci. of Law, and System. View of the Sci. of Jurisprudence; AUSTIN, Lects.
on Jurisprudence; POST, Bausteine f. eine allg. Rechtswissenschaft; RATTO, Sociol.
e Filosofia del Diritoo, chap. v (1894). (S.E.B.)
Jurist [L.L. iurista, a lawyer, through
Fr.]: Ger. Jurist, Rechtsgelehrter; Fr. juriste; Ital.
giurista. One who has shown himself to have a scientific knowledge and
comprehension of the principles of law. (S.E.B.)
Juristic: see ACT (in law).
Just (or Least) Noticeable (or
DIFFERENCE (least noticeable).
Justice [Lat. iustitia]: Ger. Gerechtigkeit; Fr. justice; Ital. giustizia. (1) Psychological and social: (a) the recognition and observance of the requirements incidental to social status and of those prescribed by custom; together with (b) the enforcement of such recognition and observances upon others personally, or by means of an institution common to all. (J.M.B.)
(2) Ethical: the habit of voluntary activity, or virtue, which consists in due regard for the ethical rights of others. Cf. RIGHT (ethical).
Injustice is used for the positive failure of either factor in (1), or for the lack of (2).
A history of the views of moralists concerning justice would be almost a history of ethics. In Plato's ideal state justice is made to consist in the perfect harmony of the whole, which is brought about by each part doing its own work and abstaining from interference with its neighbours: so that the nature of justice in detail depends upon the due assignment of function to each factor in the social organism. Aristotle's analysis proceeds upon an examination of the actual social order. To him are due the important distinctions: (a) between 'universal justice,' which consists in regard for the laws or social requirements generally, and is therefore equivalent to complete virtue; and 'particular justice,' a special virtue, the fundamental characteristic of which is a certain regard for equality. The use of the term for Aristotle's 'universal justice' is now obsolete in English. (b) Within the special virtue, between 'distributive' and 'corrective' justice -- the latter coming into operation only when a defect in the original distribution requires to be righted. The weight of this view therefore falls upon the doctrine of distributive justice, where the guiding idea of equality is necessarily transformed into a proportion according to merit. Subsequent attempts to define justice have been largely influenced by Aristotle's analysis. Either the actual social order and the 'normal expectations' it produces are accepted as the final arbiter or 'rights,' or these are held to be determined by regard to some ideal -- commonly either to the ideal of 'equality' (as in modern socialist writers) or to that of 'liberty' (Kant, Spencer, &c.).
The impulsive basis of justice seems to lie in the feeling of revenge (described by Bacon as a 'wild justice'), which becomes moralized when the intention of the agent and his individual responsibility are recognized. When private revenge is superseded by the organized force of the community, the infliction of punishment has to be preceded by proof of injury, that is to say, of infringement of the rights of another. In the determination and maintenance of these rights consists social justice, while the just man is one in whom respect for such rights has become a habit of will.
Of recent discussions of justice, one of the most notable is that of Sidgwick, in which stress is laid on the distinction between 'conservative justice' (or respect for 'normal expectations') and 'ideal justice,' which may be described as respect for the rights involved in the ideal of social manhood, however that ideal may be determined. (W.R.S.)
The conception of justice is correlative with those of LAW and RIGHT (q.v.), and the evolution of the three concepts seems to have proceeded pari passu. Social justice and right, like the unformulated requirements described by the words 'status' and 'custom,' on which they depend, are relative terms, lying at one extreme, as purely legal justice and right lie at the other. The social sense of justice seems to come first both in race development and in the child. Apart from the conditions of its rise and from its ultimate relation to ethical and legal justice, it is the fundamental category of objective social organization and development. Two essential psychological elements seem to be present at every stage of its growth: (1) the recognition of a personal situation through which individuals are involved in a set of relationships inter se acknowledged by them; (2) the limitation of this situation not only by the recognition inter se of the members of the group which it involves, but also by the equally positive recognition of the foreignness to the group-situation of other individuals, who constitute other groups or exist in more or less independence. Justice to the king is very different in its requirements from justice to the slave, although both are outside my group, and hence outside the requirements of justice to my coequals. Justice, then, is psychologically a function of social organization everywhere, whose essential character is that its development and relationships are recognized more or less adequately by the individuals whom it concerns. It is this psychological relativity which has often made political and social use of the idea of justice mistaken and disastrous. Absolute and abstract standards of justice have been aimed at -- ethical right reacting upon the rights of status. The social justice of communities of low development cannot embody the ideas of social or ethical right of higher communities, nor devise the legal procedure to interpret and enforce them.
The second (b) element of social justice -- the enforcement of the recognition and observance of social requirements -- is altogether subordinate to the other, psychologically: it is a sort of demand for the correction of outraged justice rather than an intrinsic element in justice. Yet it is a utilitarian factor of the first importance. For it is in this that the embodiment of justice in law appears to have its root; for legal justice, apart from its merely interpretative function, means essentially enforcement, whether by prevention or by punishment, and enforcement is necessary for the persistence of social order. 'Criminal justice and law (Strafrecht), born of a very primitive impulse, revenge, is the oldest of all forms of justice. We shall see, as Durkheim has rightly indicated, that primitive people have perhaps only criminal justice, and that civil justice is a later growth' (Barth, Die Philos. d. Gesch. als Sociol., i. 86).
On the other hand, in the fact of enforcement, both social and legal justice differ from ethical, which is essentially a matter of internal personal sanction. Ethical justice is not enforced by law -- except so far as ethical precepts are embodied socially and legally. This enforcement aspect it is which appears to be reinforced, or anticipated, by the emotional states and impulses of revenge and desire to punish, with their correlative notions of guilt and retribution. When private revenge came to be recognized as a social right, it was positively restricted and limited, the demands of social and ethical justice being united with it, as in the regulations respecting the cities of refuge among the Hebrews. This recognition, as socially valid, of a spontaneous personal sanction, attaching to what were relatively acts of injustice, may have radically advanced or even initiated the development of justice in its legal form. And the reflective forms of the analogous emotions and impulses, springing up when persons were recognized as in a system of relationships -- as described above -- would create an essentially similar demand for the legal embodiment of justice; a state of things illustrated in other emotions, of which a lower organic phase develops, without changing its methods of expression or its social form of embodiment, into a higher reflective phase.
The relation of ethical to social justice is one of subordination. Social justice may or may not be ethical according as the organization in which it is found is or is not of individuals having the ideals of self and conduct which developed ethical standards embody.
The actual tracing of the idea of justice and its embodiment in institutions is nothing less than the history of law, in all its aspects, in sociology, and the history of social, ethical, and religious sanctions in social psychology. Cf. the various topics RIGHT (especially philosophy of), PUNISHMENT, and SANCTION. (J.M.B.- H.S.)
Literature: titles given under the topics named (especially ROUSSEAU, ADAM SMITH, HEGEL, GREEN). Recent works are IHERING, Zweck im Recht (3rd ed., 1899); BOSANQUET, Philos. Theory of the State. For the psychology, see titles under SOCIAL ORGANIZATION; also PLATO, Rep., iv; ARISTOTLE, Eth., v; KANT, Rechtslehre (trans. by W. Hastie, Kant's Philos. of Law, 1887); SIDGWICK, Meth. of Eth., iii; SPENCER, Princ. of Eth., Pt. V ('Justice'); ARDIGO, Sociologia, in Opere filos., iv (1886). (W.R.S.- J.M.B.)
(3) In law: the right application of the rules of law to the decision of a matter in controversy. 'Legal justice aims at realizing moral justice within its range, and its strength largely consists in the general feeling that this is so' (Pollock, Jurisprudence, chap. ii. 31).
'Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens' (Inst. of Just., i. I, De iustitia et iure, I). Cf. RIGHT (in law). (S.E.B.)
(4) In theology: an attribute of God in the sphere of his relation to his sentient and rational creatures, by virtue of which he as legislator wills equal laws, and as judge makes awards that are equal and proportionate to merit or demerit. See (also for literature) ATTRIBUTES (of God).
This attribute is to be distinguished from the righteousness of God, which
it presupposes as the source of the distinction between equity and inequity;
also from the divine holiness, which it presupposes as the source of the distinction
between merit and demerit. It is objective in its reference, and is distinguishable
into the two species legislative and judicial. Justice is contrasted with love,
which wills good rather than equity, and with mercy, which awards favour without
regard to merit or demerit. The relations of justice and mercy to sin and redemption
supply a central problem in the Christian doctrine of the atonement. (A.T.O.)
Justification: see SANCTION.
Justification (in law) [Lat. iustificatio]:
Ger. Rechtfertigung; Fr. justification; Ital. giustificazione.
(1) Establishing a defence to an action, which, while admitting that the act
charged was done, shows that it was done in the exercise of a lawful right.
(2) Proof that one offered as a surety is able to satisfy the obligation which
he proposes to assume. (S.E.B.)
Justification (in theology). The method by which, in the Christian doctrine of redemption, the sinner passes out of the state of guilt and condemnation into that of righteousness and peace with God.
Justification is to be distinguished from conversion, which it presupposes; from remission, which is its negative aspect; from imputation, which is a means to it; and from sanctification, which is rather its end and completion. Historically, the most important distinction has arisen between the evangelical Protestant and the Roman Catholic doctrines of justification; the former conceiving it as forensic and putative, conditioned by faith in the believer, and by virtue of which he is counted, not actually made, righteous; the latter as a process, conditioned by good works on the part of the believer, by virtue of which the merit of Christ is not simply imputed, but communicated, and in which the believer is actually made righteous. Some of the more philosophical or recent theologians tend to conceive justification as the generation of a new personality grounded in Christ.
Literature: see THEOLOGY. (A.T.O.)
Justin Martyr, or Flavius Justinus.
105 - cir. 165 A.D.) An early Christian apologist. Studied philosophy in
Asia Minor, Greece, and Egypt. About 132 he abandoned philosophic systems
and embraced Christianity. Nothing is known of his life. He suffered martyrdom
in Rome. His writings are among the most important of the Christian literature
of the 2nd century. See PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY (4).