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Gabler, Georg Andreas. (1786-1853.) A German
philosopher who, in 1835, succeeded Hegel at Berlin. He belongs, with Göschel,
Hinrichs, Schaller, and others, to the so-called 'right' or orthodox wing
of the Hegelian school. His best known work was expository of Hegel.
Galen (Galenus), Claudius. (130 to cir. 210
A.D.) An eminent Greek physician and philosopher. Born at Pergamus, Mysia,
he studied both the Platonic and Peripatetic systems of philosophy. Satyrus
instructed him in anatomy. He travelled extensively while young to perfect
his education. About 165 A. D. he moved to Rome, and became very celebrated
as a surgeon and practising physician, attending the family of Marcus Aurelius.
He returned to Pergamus, but probably visited Rome three or four times
afterwards. He wrote in philosophy, logic, and medicine. Many, probably
most, of his works are lost. He was the one medical authority for thirteen
centuries, and his services to logic and philosophy were also great.
Gallicanism [Lat. Gallia, Gaul, France]: Ger. Gallikanismus; Fr. Gallicanisme; Ital. Gallicanismo. The name given to the nationalizing, independent spirit that so long characterized the Roman Catholic Church in France.
It originated with Irenaeus so early as the 3rd century, and continued for generations, with various vicissitudes, till, under Louis IX (1226-70), the Church in France came to possess peculiar constitutional and ecclesiastical immunities with respect to Papal jurisdiction. The people were protected from the Church in civil affairs; the elections of bishops were to be made by the chapter and clergy of a diocese; and the Church in France had the right to call a council of its own membership. This naturally gave rise to many struggles with Rome, but the disputes usually ended in favour of the French. After the Revolution, the Ultramontane or Roman party gradually gained the upper hand.
Literature: F. HUET, Le Gallicanisme; DUPIN, Les Libertés
de l'Église Gallicane; DE MAISTRE, Du Pape; LAMMENAIS, De la Religion
dans ses Rapports avec l'Ordre politique. (R.M.W.)
Galluppi (or Galupi), Pasquale.
(1770-1846.) An Italian philosopher, born in Tropea, Calabria. In 1831
he became professor of logic and metaphysics in the University at Naples,
and later a member of the Institute of France. He wrote on logical and
metaphysical themes; and died in Naples.
Galton's Law (of ancestral inheritance): no foreign equivalents in use. The law formulated by F. Galton to the effect that the distribution among his ancestors of what an individual inherits is as follows: the parents contribute, on the average, together 1/2, the grandparents together 1/4, the great-grandparents together 1/8, &c. 'It may be popularly stated thus: each group of ancestry of the same grade contributes to the heritage of the average offspring double the quantity of the group of the grade above it' (Pearson).
The force of each individual's contribution to successive generations
is seen to diminish rapidly when we remember that there are two parents,
four grandparents, eight great-grandparents, &c. If we give Galton's
we see that a person contributes only 1/64 to his great-grandchild's heredity. This serves to illustrate another principle which is also associated with Galton's name: that of REGRESSION (q.v.). For it shows that single individuals of marked characters -- called in extreme cases 'sports' -- have little permanent influence in changing the stock. The ordinary individuals, representing the average or mean of the species, neutralize the hereditary force of the sport in succeeding generations.H = 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + . . . , &c.,
or H = (1/4) 2 + (1/16) 4 + (1/64) 8 + . . . , &c.,
This law has been confirmed by Galton, in the case of Bassett hounds (Proc. Roy. Soc., London, 1xi. 401, read June 3, 1897; see also Nature, July 8, 1897), and by Pearson, also in studies of statistical data. An abstract of Pearson's paper (Proc. Roy. Soc., meeting of Jan. 27, 1898) by himself is printed in Science (Mar. 11, 1898), from which the following quotation is made: --
'When the writer of the present paper wrote his memoir on heredity, in 1895 (Philos. Trans., c1xxxvii. A, 253), the only available material was contained in Mr. Francis Galton's Natural Inheritance, and in the data and measurements in Mr. Galton's hands, which he at once placed, with his usual generosity, at the writer's disposal. The very suggestive theory of heredity developed in the Natural Inheritance has two main features: (a) a theory of regression, which states the average proportion of any character which will be inherited under any degree of relationship. This theory was very simple: if the average of the sons of any parent had w of the parent's deviation from the average parent, then the average grandson would have w2 of the deviation, and so on. Collateral heredity was also determined, and for two brothers was found equal to 2w. Mr. Galton's value of w was 1/3.
'(b) A law of ancestral heredity. According to this law the two parents contribute 1/4, the four grandparents 1/8, the eight great-grandparents 1/16, and so on, of the total heritage of the average offspring. Mr. Galton, in 1889 (Natural Inheritance, 136), considered this law to rest on a somewhat slender basis.
'In the Philosophical Transactions memoir of 1895 the writer started from the general theory of multiple correlation, and supposed the coefficient of heredity to be a quantity which had to be determined by observation for each pair of relatives and for each character. Mr. Galton's own data, when treated by the fuller mathematical theory developed in that memoir, seemed to demonstrate that fraternal could not possibly be twice filial inheritance. But if heredity be looked upon as a quantity to be determined by observation for each organ and each grade of kinship, e.g. if there be no numerical relationship between direct and collateral heredity, then Mr. Galton's law of ancestral heredity must fall to the ground. Accordingly the writer, in 1895, discarded (b) and endeavoured to develop (a) on the general basis of multiple correlation.
'The recent publication of Mr. Galton's remarkable paper on ancestral heredity in Bassett hounds has, however, led the writer to reconsider (b). If the law be true, then for every organ and for every grade of kinship the amount of heredity is numerically determinable. The solution of the problem of heredity is thrown back upon the solution of an infinite series of linear equations. Their solution gives results which seem to the writer in good agreement with all we at present know about the influence of heredity in various degrees of kinship. For example, fraternal is no longer twice filial regression, but has a value (0.3881) well in accordance with the writer's 1895 calculations on Mr. Galton's data. In short, if we discard Mr. Galton's relations between the regressions for various grades of kinship, and start solely from his law of ancestral heredity, the whole theory of heredity becomes simple, luminous, and well in accordance with such quantitative measurements as have so far been made. That it confutes one or two purely hypothetical and semi-metaphysical theories is no disadvantage.
'It is possible, and the writer believes desirable, to somewhat generalize the law of ancestral heredity. Modifying Mr. Galton's definition of midparent, a conception is formed of the mid-sth parent, a sort of mean of the ancestry in the sth generation, and the contribution of this mid-sth parent to the offspring is assumed to have a constant ratio to that of the mid- (s + 1)th parent, whatever be the value of s. With this simple law the whole of heredity is found to depend upon a single constant g, termed the coefficient of heredity. g may vary from organ to organ and from race to race. It may itself be subject to selection, if heredity be not looked upon as a priori given and antecedent to any evolution by natural selection. In Mr. Galton's statement of the law, g = 1. This may really be the case, but it is not necessary to the theory, and it is not required by any facts as yet observed.
'Given this simple law of ancestral heredity, there flow from it the following results: --
'(1) The values of all the correlation and regression coefficients between any pair of relations, i.e. heredity between any grade of individual kinship. The chief of these are actually calculated in the paper [of which this is an abstract].
'(2) The values of the stability that results from any long or short process of selective breeding, and the variability of the breed so established. A coefficient of stability is introduced in the paper and discussed at some length . . .
'(3) The law of cross heredity, i.e. the degree of relationship between two different organs in kindred. It is shown that the coefficient of cross heredity for any pair of organs in any grade of kindred is equal to the product of the coefficient of direct heredity in that grade into the coefficient of organic correlation.
'(4) That simple panmixia without active reversal of natural selection does not lead to degeneration.
'It may be of interest to add that since the law of ancestral heredity allows for the variability of each individual ancestor from the ancestral type, giving that variability its share in the heritage of the offspring, it is inconsistent with Weismann's theory of the germ-plasma. It does not, of course, answer one way or the other the question as to the inheritance of acquired characters.
'To sum up, then, it seems to the present writer that Galton's law of ancestral heredity leads to, what has not hitherto existed, a rounded and comprehensive theory of heredity. It describes with surprising closeness all facts so far quantitatively determined, and opens up a wide range of conclusions which await testing by fresh data. Should those data be in agreement with its predictions, then the law of ancestral heredity will in the future play as large a part in the theory of evolution as the law of gravitation has played in planetary theory. It is the quantitative basis on which Darwinism, the evolution of species by natural selection combined with heredity, will then be placed; and at one stroke it will clear away a veritable jungle of semi-metaphysical speculations and hypotheses, and this for the simple reason that it is based upon quantitative observations and not on verbal subtleties. It will be difficult, perhaps, to make people realize that there is a science of heredity, simple and consistent, in existence; yet even at the present time it is the number of observers and experimenters, rather than the science, which needs to be strengthened.'
The law is illustrated in the accompanying figure given by Galton in Nature, Jan. 27, 1898, and taken by him from the Horseman (Chicago), Dec. 28, 1897; it was devised by A. J. Meston to illustrate Galton's law. Galton's article is quoted at some length.
'It should be borne in mind that "heritage" has a more limited meaning than "nature," or the sum of the inborn qualities. Heritage is confined to that which is inherited, while nature also includes those individual variations that are due to other causes than heredity, and which act before birth. Now individual variation in a race that is stable must have a destructive as well as a constructive effect. Consequently its effects balance one another in average results, and disappear from a law which deals only with these.' Cf. VARIATION (statistical treatment of).
'The area of the square diagram represents the total heritage of any particular form or faculty that is bequeathed to any particular individual. It is divided into subsidiary squares bearing distinctive numbers, which severally refer to different ancestors. The size of these subsidiary squares shows the average proportion of the total heritage derived from the corresponding ancestors . . . The subject of the pedigree is numbered 1. Thenceforward, whatever be the distinctive number of an ancestor, which we will call n, the number of its sire is 2 n, and that of its dam is 2 n + 1. All male numbers in the pedigree are therefore even, and all female numbers are odd. To take an example: 2 is the sire of 1, and 3 is the dam of 1; 6 is the sire of 3, and 7 is the dam of 3. Or working backwards, 14 is a male who is mated to 15; their offspring is 7, and a female, who is mated to 6; their offspring is 3, a female, who is mated to 2; and their offspring is 1, the subject. . . . The numbered squares could be continued indefinitely. In this small diagram they cease with the fourth generation, which contributes 1/16 part to the total heritage, therefore the whole of the more distant ancestry, comprised in the blank column, contribute 1/16 also.'
Literature: GALTON, as cited; PEARSON, as cited, also other papers in
the series Contrib. to the Math. Theory of Evolution, Proc. Roy. Soc., meeting
of Feb. 17, 1898 (abst. in Science, Apr. 22, 1898), and ibid., x1vi. (1900)
140; and Grammar of Sci. (2nd ed., 1900). (J.M.B.,
Gambling [AS. gamen, play]: Ger. Glücks- (or Hazard-) spiel; Fr. jeu (de hasard); Ital. giuco (d'azzardo). Staking something of value on one alternative of an issue, the result of which cannot be foreseen or controlled; the play itself is known as 'game of chance.' See PLAY.
Gambling may be looked at both as a sport, a pastime, a recreation, and as a serious business, a passion. The distinction is important when we come to discuss the ethics of gambling. Viewed as sport, the various elements of PLAY (q.v.) are present; yet it is a question whether the staking of something of value does not interfere in all cases with the purity of the play impulse. Certainly in most cases the hope of gain and the fear of loss bring an element of reality into the situation which is opposed to the make-believe or SEMBLANCE (q.v.) of play. In so far as the play motive is pure or socially predominating, other considerations than those of the gambling itself -- e.g. the right to play -- must enter to give the indulgence ethical value.
The moral question, however, comes in as soon as we leave the play feature out; and various considerations may be advanced on either side. Negatively, it may be said that gambling is not ethically wrong: (1) because if a man takes stakes what is his own, he has the right to spend it as he please, and he has the right to take from another on the other's own terms. Furthermore, (2) it is just the form of risk which every business venture involves: the merchant buys silk hoping to sell it again before the market price falls below the figure he himself paid; this risk, however, he runs. (3) If we say his motive is not good, seeing that he hopes to make money without giving a fair equivalent either in value or in labour, this again confronts us in many other commercial situations: the unearned increment of land-value often arises from loss to some one else; 'bargains' of all kinds, notably at auctions, come from others' misfortune; taking a high rate of interest from the man whom the loan 'accommodates' is likewise getting return without equivalent. We do not ordinarily condemn a man who takes an unearned legacy. (4) If we shift the point of view and take that of society, saying that what is not of social utility is wrong, we have then to reply that it is the ethically right, not the socially useless, that is in question; and while much may be said to prove that the ethically wrong is always also socially useless, it is a very different thing to convert the proposition. This last point, however, brings us to a distinction which is most important, and on which the whole problem of the relation of social regulation and sanction to personal ethical obligation in large measure turns. To this we may return below.
On the other side it may be said -- in addition to the points replied to above -- that gambling is wrong: (1) because, and in so far as, it is serious -- a passion, not a sport -- and comes to supersede the regular forms of industry and business. But this, it is evident, is not an objection to gambling in itself, but to its excess or misuse, and consequently not an ethical objection at all. The man who gambles his time away as well as his money -- taking both from his family -- is ethically reprobate, not because he gambles, but because he is such a man; so also is he who rents a boat daily and goes fishing, catching nothing. The latter is taking risks; but we blame him for neglect, not for the form it takes -- fishing. (2) It is wrong because, and in so far as, it is in a large sense dishonest -- a point which, to the present writer, is a valid ethical objection, and the only one, to gambling. To pretend to know, to guess at an issue, to give the 'bluff' to fortune seriously -- the money or any other value staked is the warrant of its seriousness, and so is the passion of gain -- is the opposite of knowledge, of the careful estimation of evidence and probabilities, of the drawing of legitimate inferences, upon which all normal honestly acquired values rest. Action should proceed only from conviction, or from some deeper motive by which the possible inadequacy of the ground of conviction, and so the absence of conviction, must be or is justified. But in all forms of gambling it is just the point that the issue is known to be beyond calculation, the lack of knowledge is the explicit requirement of fair play; and the action proceeds upon the explicit and mutual will to gain by ignorance. In other words, the man who loses is the victim of this mutual pretence to know, and the man who gains is rewarded for it. They distribute values while doing violence to the relations upon which the values depend. They both act from negative ethical sanctions. If this type of conduct were made universal, it would work havoc with all moral conduct and social order. It is not 'will to believe,' nor 'will to deceive' -- the gambler's resolution -- but what is often taken for the former: will to ignore the whole system of values by which the moral life is regulated and held to its standards. For this reason, to gamble seriously is to rebel against moral law for a reward. For moral relationships are constituted by action which is reasonable, having motives of knowledge, grounds common to men who think; and to act from unreason, confessedly without ground adequate to the act, is to enter these relationships to destroy them.
From this last point of view we get some light upon the earlier pros and cons of the discussion. The merchant is not gambling, because he is acting on reasonable prospects of gain both in his business as a whole and on his particular ventures. So far as he does take risks on a single article, it is in the interest of his general business. The competitions of commercial life which result in loss to others are the exception to the general expectation, and show bad judgment or low capacity, or are incidental effects -- except those which result from the real gambling or design of others, such as stock gambling or manipulation. The business ventures which are gambling are those in which money is staked on a risk whose issue is not foreseen.
Again, the cases of so-called gambling which take advantage of calculation of chances and knowledge of probabilities do not fall within our definition. The law of probabilities, so far as it is exact, is a reasonable resort; and the morality of the use of it rests upon grounds foreign to those of gambling. On certain of the grounds usually given for condemning gambling, it is difficult to see how INSURANCE (q.v.) of any sort is legitimate. In having his life insured a man secures gain indirectly for his family, or directly for himself in the increased ease and free expenditure it allows him, without giving an equivalent. And, moreover, his sole motive is to secure this result. But it is not gambling, for it makes use of knowledge -- statistics and probability -- which is open to all, and which is used by the insurance companies in their calculations.
Reverting to the question of social utility, we have now the point of view, that being ethically wrong -- on the ground that it involves dishonesty -- gambling is also socially condemnable; for dishonesty of the sort described is anti-social: it is getting the profit, the value, of a system of social relationships without right to it. Yet this does not exhaust the grounds for its social condemnation; that rests besides upon the general rules of social or governmental interference with individual conduct, and these may contemplate the suppression or regulation of the socially injurious or unproductive quite apart from its ethical character.
Literature: the works on ethics which contain sections on Applied Ethics;
GROOS, Play of Man, Pt. II. i. 4 (Eng. trans.), with many references. For works
on games see PLAY. (J.M.B.)
Games: see GAMBLING, and PLAY.
Gamogenesis [Gr. gamoV,
marriage, + genesiV, origin]: Ger. geschlechtliche
Fortpflanzung; Fr. gamogenèse, reproduction sexuelle
(more often used); Ital. riproduzione sessuale. Sexual reproduction,
or that mode of reproduction which involves the union of OVUM (q.v.) and SPERMATOZOON
(q.v.), or their equivalents. A synonym is Amphigony. See FERTILIZATION, CONJUGATION,
and AGAMOGENESIS. (C.LL.M.)
Ganglioblast [Gr. gagglion, tumour, + blastoV, germ]: Ger. Gangliob'ast; Fr. névroblaste; Ital. ganglioblasto. An undifferentiated nerve cell of the spinal or extra-axial ganglia; an immature GANGLIOCYTE (q.v.).
'Aesthesioblast' has been proposed as a name for this type of embryonic cell,
but this term is sometimes ambiguous. A ganglioblast is simply a special variety
of NEUROBLAST (q.v.). (H.H.)
Gangliocyte [Gr. gagglion, tumour, + kutoV, cell]: Ger. periphere Ganglienzelle; Fr. cellule ganglionnaire; Ital. ganglioceto. One of the nerve cells of a spinal or other extra-axial GANGLION (q.v.). The term 'aesthesiocyte' has also been proposed.
The gangliocyte commonly gives rise to a neurite which passes into the central
nervous system. Thus in the spinal ganglia such fibres form the greater part
of the dorsal or sensory roots. (H.H.)
Ganglion [Gr. gagglion, a tumour]: Ger. Gangle; Fr. ganglion; Ital. ganglio. An aggregate of nerve cells or GANGLIOCYTES not contained within the central nervous system; especially the centres of origin of the sensory or centripetal nerves. See NERVOUS SYSTEM.
The use of the word 'ganglion' for cell clusters within the central nervous
system is to be condemned as inaccurate and ambiguous, as well as unnecessary.
The distinction between ganglion and plexus, when a disperse or reticular cell
cluster is meant, is arbitrary. Instead of plexus, GANGLIOPLEXUS (q.v.) may
be suggested in such cases. Cf. GANGLIOCYTE, and PLEXUS. The cells of the cerebrospinal
ganglia are unipolar; those of the sympathetic ganglia, as a rule, multipolar.
See the references given under NEUROLOGY. (H.H.)
Ganglioplexus [Gr. gagglion, tumour, + plexiV, mesh]: Ger. gangliöses Geflecht, Ganglienplexus; Fr. plexus ganglionnaire; Ital. plesso gangliare. A disperse or loosely aggregated ganglion in a meshwork of fibres (e.g. sympathetic visceral ganglia). See GANGLION, and PLEXUS.
For convenience, a ganglioplexus is distinguished on the one hand from NEUROPLEXUS
(q.v.), where anastomosis of nerve trunks is alone included (e.g. brachial plexus),
and from a neuro-reticulum, which refers to anastomosis between ultimate nerve
fibrils, as in the retina (Dogiel). Cf. NEUROPILEM. (H.H.)
Gans, Eduard. (1798-1839.) Studied law in
Göttingen and in Heidelberg, where he came to know Hegel. In Berlin
he became a follower and intimate acquaintance of Hegel. In 1820 he began
teaching in Berlin, after 1825 as ordinary professor of law. He did much
for the spread of Hegel's ideas.
Garve, Christian. (1742-98.) German philosopher,
born at Breslau, and educated under A. G. Baumgarten at Frankfort, at Halle,
and at Leipzig. He was strongly influenced by Gellert, and especially by
Engel, with whom he became very intimate. In 1770 he succeeded Gellert
as professor of philosophy in Leipzig, but in 1772, on account of ill health,
resigned his chair.
Gassendi, Pierre. (1592-1655.) Philosopher,
born at Champtercier, Provence. A precocious youth, he took, for a time,
in 1612, the professorship in theology at Digne. In 1616 he became professor
of philosophy in the university at Aix. He next took priestly orders (1617),
and became canon, and then provost, of the diocese of Digne (1623). In
1645 he was made professor of mathematics in Paris. He corresponded and
enjoyed close friendship with Kepler, Descartes, Galileo, Hobbes. In some
respects his philosophy resembles Locke's.
Gastraea Theory: Ger. Gastrulatheorie; Fr. gastroea-théorie; Ital. teoria della gastrea. The theory that the ancestor of the Metazoa was a two-layered sac or gastrula, formed of an outer ectoderm and an inner endoderm, which arose by invagination, and enclosed the archenteron or primitive digestive cavity, opening to the exterior by the primitive mouth or blastopore. See GASTRULA, EMBRYO, and INVAGINATION. (E.S.G.)
First suggested by Haeckel and summarized by him in the Quart. J. of Microsc. Sci., xiv. (1874) 142 and 223, this view has been widely accepted. Compare Lankester's PLANULA THEORY (q.v.), according to which the primitive enteron originated by DELAMINATION (q.v.).
Literature: HAECKEL, Quart. J. Mircrosc. Sci. as above, and xvi. (1876)
51; LANKESTER, Ann. and Mag. Nat. Hist., May, 1873, and Quart. J. Microsc. Sci.,
Oct., 1877; F. M. BALFOUR, Compar. Embryol. (1880). (C.LL.M.)
Gastrula: see GASTRAEA THEORY (also for literature),
and cf. EMBRYO. (C.LL.M.)
Gautama or Gotama. The founder of
Buddhism; the name of Buddha as a personality. See BUDDHA, and ORIENTAL
Gemmule [Lat. gemmula, a little bud]: Ger. Knöspchen; Fr. gemmule; Ital. gemmula. (1) A term sometimes applied to embryonic stages in the development of the Sponges.
(2) The term applied by Darwin to the ultra-microscopic organic particles given
off by cells. See PANGENESIS. (C.LL.M.)
Gender [OF. gendrer, from Lat. generare, to beget]: Ger. Geschlecht; Fr. genre; Ital. genere. A grammatical classification of nouns connected either through meaning, or merely through outward form, with the distinctions of sex.
The Indo-European and the Hamitic-Semitic groups of languages are the only ones in which discrimination of gender is fully observed. Some languages discriminate in the form of their nouns between objects as inanimate and animate, e.g. the Cherokee; others between objects as rational and irrational, noble and mean, &c. In most cases such discriminations are mere traditional superfluities, serving little or no purpose in identifying the object. In modern English they have in general been omitted, except as they serve such purpose. The origin of the gender distinctions has been commonly explained, since Adelung and Grimm, as a consequence of the primitive tendency to personify natural objects. Recently the view has been urged by Brugmann and others that the distinction is originally one of grammatical form, attached to the sex-discrimination, through the accident that some words of a class, now thought of as feminine, denoted female objects. Thus it is suggested that the Indo-European gnná, lying behind, Greek gunh, &c., may have originally been abstract or collective, like other words of this ending, and have denoted 'hearing,' then 'the animal that hears.' This noun, with perhaps others of its class, may then have led the whole group over into association with the notion of female sex. This theory is at present too imperfectly developed to warrant acceptance. Whatever the origin, it is evident that in the languages employing it the discrimination is chiefly one of grammatical form. This the linguistic consciousness attests. 'Der Kopt' is no more masculine to the German than 'la tête' is feminine to the Frenchman. Language is a conventional, rather than a purely practical, body of signs, and in acquiring a language the speaker learns and accepts the gender of nouns as he does the rest of their forms. In adopting new words a language generally assigns them to the gender groups according to the form of the ending.
Literature: J. GRIMM, Deutsche Grammatik, iii. 311 ff.; K. BRUGMANN,
Das Nominalgeschlecht, Techmer's Int. Zeitsch., iv. 100 ff.; and The Nature
and Origin of Noun Genders (1897); B. I. WHEELER, Grammatical Gender, Class.
Rev., Nov. 1889, 390 ff.; and J. Germ. Philol., Oct. 1899; B. DELBRÜCK,
Vergleichende Syntax, i. 89 ff. (1893). (B.I.W.)
General Concept, Idea, or Notion: Ger. Allgemeinbegriff; Fr. notion générale; Ital. concetto (nozione) generale. The thought of certain characters as found in, or representative of, a plurality of special cases or instances. See ABSTRACT IDEA, CONCEPTION, and GENERALIZATION.
The terms general concept, general idea, and general notion refer to the same kind of psychical state from somewhat different points of view. A general concept always includes two essential and essentially distinct constituents: (1) An 'image' which may be, and very frequently is, merely a 'word'; (2) the meaning of this image which is not itself present to consciousness in the form of an image or images. The term general idea emphasizes the presence of the image. The term general notion emphasizes the presence of consciousness of meaning.
Historical discussion of the general idea has mainly turned on the nature of
the mental imagery which it involves. Verbal signs or their equivalent are generally
recognized as playing a most important part. The generic image or percept may
accompany the word or function instead of it. Ultimately the distinction between
abstract and concrete thought is not a matter of imagery: it is rather notional
(see NOTION). The controversy as to the nature of abstract ideas goes back to
the time of the scholastic dispute concerning nominalism, realism, and conceptualism.
Realism is not a psychological theory at all, as it relates to the nature of
the reality apprehended in the abstract idea. But the issue as between nominalism
and conceptualism remains one on which psychological writers have not come to
complete clearness. Berkeley stands out as a typical representative of nominalism,
holding that what we have in the mind when we conceive an abstract idea is either
merely a word or an individual image, on part of which attention is concentrated,
the rest being regarded as irrelevant. Certain modern writers hold that this
is all that exists in consciousness, but add that there are unconscious mental
modifications or physiological dispositions, which play an essential part in
the process. This view is well represented by Lipps, Ribot, and von Kries. Others,
with whom the present writer agrees, hold that unconscious dispositions are
not sufficient, but that there is in consciousness another factor which nominalism
omits. Baldwin states this in strictly motor terms, with which Royce seems to
agree (see remarks by Harvard, Rev. de Mét. et de Mor.,
iv, 1896, 690). See NOMINALISM, and REALISM. (G.F.S.-
General Consciousness: see SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS.
General Good: Ger. allgemeines Wohl; Fr. bien général; Ital. bene generale. The good of all mankind, or, in a more restricted sense, of the community referred to.
In the former sense the promotion of general good has often been taken as the ethical ideal for man's conduct, e.g. by Cumberland (De Leg. Nat., 1672), under the name 'the common good of all rationals'; sometimes, in the more restricted sense, the general good of the members of a state or community is said to be the end of statecraft in that community. In working out either of these views, it is commonly assumed that a certain amount of evil befalling some members of the community may be counterbalanced by an equal amount of good accruing to an equal number of other persons; though the precise statement and development of this position are only carried out when 'good' is interpreted as equivalent to 'happiness' (see GREATEST HAPPINESS). The question as to the nature or constituents of good is fundamental for ethics. Hedonists maintain that it is reducible to happiness in the sense of pleasure and freedom from pain. But the conception, as originally put forward in English ethics by Cumberland, involves two constituents, happiness and perfection: and various attempts have been made so to interpret the latter notion as to give a satisfactory account of the good for man. See PERFECTION, and SELF-REALIZATION.
Literature: SIDGWICK, Meth. of Eth., Bk. III. chap. xiv; GREEN, Proleg.
to Eth., Bk. III. (W.R.S.)
General Term: Ger. allgemeiner Terminus; Fr. terme général; Ital. termine generale. The verbal expression of a notion or concept; that is, of the representation of marks common to an indefinite number of individuals.
A general term may therefore be described as being the name of each and all
of a number of individuals; or, better, as being applicable to each and all
on the ground of, and with the implication of, their possessing in common definite
General (or Social) Will: Ger. Gesammtwille (Wundt), sozialer Wille (Tönnies); Fr. volonté générale (Rousseau); Ital. volontà sociale (or collettiva). Used vaguely to indicate a supposed collective will in a community or group of individuals arising from their intercourse with one another, assented to, thought not always privately endorsed, by all the individuals, and expressed or expressible through some common channel, such as the state, conventions, voting, &c.
Various attempts have been made to give exact psychological or metaphysical definition to the general will, distinguishing it from the individual's will, the 'will of all,' &c., but they all represent more or less personal points of view. The beginning of the discussion, and also the term, are to be found in Rousseau (cf. SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS). Tönnies makes a further distinction between the general will of a society or Gesellschaft, and that of a COMPANY (q.v.) or Gemeinschaft, calling the latter 'race-will' (Wesenwille). He thus finds a genetic opposition between the race-will resting on Trieb (instinctive Handlung) and the social or general will resting on intelligent choice (Willkürhandlung). So far as this is sound, as the present writer holds it to be (so also Wundt, Logik, II. ii. 600), it forbids the use of the term 'will' for both the two forms. Wundt justifies the use of the term in the interests of a theory of will which includes impulse, i.e. makes will synonymous with conation. This is more than questionable psychologically; and if conation is to be used at all, this is its fair opportunity. We then have two forms of general or common conation (Gesammtstreben): (1) the 'common impulse' of the company (e.g. of animals, crowds, &c.), with the German equivalent Gesammttrieb; and (2) general, social, or common will, with the equivalent Gesammtwille. Wundt would seem to be right in saying that the opposition between the two forms is that of higher and lower in evolution, and in pointing out that social impulse and instinct are always present as well in higher social organization, and essential to it (loc. cit., 600n.). Cf. also Barth, Geschichtsphilos. als Soziol., i. 382, who follows Tönnies.
The distinction to the effect that the individual pursues a general plan of action, while society only attains bit by bit without such a plan, seems to be valid.
Literature: ROUSSEAU, Contrat Social; BOSANQUET, Philos. Theory of the
State (1899); NOVIKOW, Conscience et Volonté sociales (1899); TÖNNIES,
Philosophical Terminology, Mind, N. S., No. 31 (July, 1899); and Gemeinschaft
u. Gesell. (1887); WUNDT, Logik, II. ii. chap. iv. § 4 a; BALDWIN, Social
and Eth. Interpret., chaps. xii, xiii; BARTH, as cited; also many of the references
cited under SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)
Generalization [Lat. generalis, from genus, kind]: Ger. Verallgemeinerung; Fr. généralisation; Ital. facoltà (operazione) di generalizzare. The act of recognizing a likeness of nature where it has not been recognized before, involving either the formation of a new GENERAL CONCEPT (q.v.) or the extension of an old one to cover a new class of instances. See also CONCEPTION.
All generalization involves abstraction; to generalize is to recognize likeness which had been previously masked by differences; to recognize the likeness is also therefore to recognize these differences as irrelevant, and to disregard them from the point of view of the general conception. Such recognition is abstraction.
Sigwart distinguishes between two kinds of generality. The first kind is 'merely numerical,' and comprehends like instances which are 'not conceptually distinguishable, but only separate in space and time': the proposition that oxygen and hydrogen combine to form water is given as an illustration. See EXTENSION (logical). The second kind of generality is that of a genus, to which are subordinated specific instances: this is illustrated by the proposition that 'all the elements combine chemically in certain proportions.' Sigwart apparently proposes to limit the term 'generalization' to the formation or extension of the second kind of general concept.
Literature: the textbooks of psychology and logic (e.g. SIGWART). (G.F.S.-
Generation (spontaneous): Ger. Zeugung;
Fr. génération; Ital. generazione. See Abiogenesis,
Generation of God. A phrase which refers to the relation of origination subsisting between God and Christ -- directly or through the medium of the Logos -- whereby the latter is the 'Son of God.'
Out of this question the christological conclusions of the 4th century grew, and were embodied in dogmas. The problem appears clearly with Justin Martyr, the first dogmatic theologian of Christianity, who was doubtless moved to systematic consideration of the matter by contemporary GNOSTICISM (q.v.) and DOCETISM (q.v.). Justin transferred the generation of Christ from God to the Logos. From all time the Logos was able to become man, and, by the will of God, did become human in Christ. Thus in Christ humanity was united with Deity. The discussion was taken up later by Origen and others, and thence passed over into the controversy over ARIANISM (q.v.). In its beginnings it is of interest as showing how Christianity early felt the pressure of Gnostic modes of thought and found it necessary to express itself by aid of Gnostic conceptions.
Literature: DORNER, The Devel. of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ
(Eng. trans.), Div. I. i. 274 f., ii. 209 f., 270 f.; HARNACK Hist. of Dogma
(Eng. trans.), ii. 220 f. (R.M.W.)
Generic [Lat. genus, kind]: Ger. generisch Fr. générique; Ital. generico. Generic applies to differences which distinguish species belonging to different genera, as e.g. isosceles triangle is specifically different from equilateral triangle, and generically different from a square; or to the points of agreement by possession of which numbers of distinct species would be referred to one and the same genus, as e.g. the mental life of a man and an ant might be said to be specifically different and generically alike.
In recent logical treatments, e.g. that of Lotze and Bosanquet, generic has
been used as the designation of a judgment in which the predicate is asserted
of the subject universally, but as attaching to or incompatible with the constitutive
marks of the subject, therefore without explicit qualification of the subject,
as e.g. man is falliable, rational, mortal, or the like. (R.A.)
Generic Image: Ger. Gemeinbild (not Vorstellung, which is given as the equivalent of Idea): Fr. image composée; Ital. immagine composita. A mental IMAGE (q.v.) possessing a distinct and salient centre or core corresponding to the common characters of a class, together with a vague and inconstant margin corresponding to the variable characters of the individuals composing the class.
The generic image is supposed to originate in the repeated presentation of like contents in varying combinations. An analogy is usually drawn from what is called 'composite photography.' The following description of the process is given by Huxley: -- 'When several complex impressions which are more or less different from one another -- let us say that out of ten impressions in each, six are the same in all, and four are different from the rest -- are successively presented to the mind, it is easy to see what must happen. The repetition of the six similar impressions will strengthen the six corresponding elements of the complex idea, which will therefore acquire greater vividness, while the four differing impressions of each will not only acquire no greater strength than they had at first, but in accordance with the law of association, they will all tend to appear at once, and will thus neutralize one another.'
Such an account of the genesis of the generic image is essentially defective, for it fails to bring out the part played by selective interest in emphasizing certain features of experience to the neglect of others. But it is noteworthy that those writers who have laid most stress on the importance of the generic image agree in this view of it as a merely passive product of the play of external impressions, e.g. Herbart, Beneke, and Galton. Herbart and Beneke do not use the term 'generic image' (Gemeinbild), but they describe what is meant by it with entire clearness and distinctness. Some writers (including those named above) have simply identified the generic image with the rudimentary conception, and have thought that in accounting for its origin they have accounted for the origin of conceptual thinking. But this view is rejected by most competent psychologists. A conception cannot be quite identified with an image of any kind. All depends on the meaning of the image, the representative value which it has for thought. On the other hand, it is usually held that the generic image plays a more or less important part in the genesis of concepts of a low order of generality. Though not in itself a conception, it is supposed to supply a kind of material peculiarly adapted to function as a vehicle of conceptual thinking. No doubt this is so to some extent, but the importance of the generic image, even from this point of view, has been frequently exaggerated.
Literature: psychological textbooks in general; HERBART, Psychol. als.
Wiss., &c., §§ 120-3; BENEKE, Logik, § 38 ff., and Psychol.
Skizzen, ii. 158 ff.; WAITZ, Lehrb. d. Psychol., 518 ff.; VOLKMANN, Psychologie,
ii. 243, 247; HUXLEY, Hume, 94 ff.; GALTON, Inquiries into Human Faculty, Appendix
on Generic Images; STOUT, Analytic Psychol., 179 ff., 183 ff., 196. (G.F.S.,
Generosity [Lat. generosus, from genus, race]: Ger. Edelsinn; Fr. générosité; Ital. generosità. The disposition shown either in the favourable estimate of the good qualities of others, or in the bestowal of goods or favours upon others with more or less self-denial.
It is nearly equivalent to liberality, but indicates a more intense form of
the same disposition and involves self-denial. Thus Adam Smith (Mor.
Sent., Pt. IV. chap. ii) distinguishes generosity from humanity: 'Humanity
consists merely in the exquisite fellow-feeling which the spectator entertains
with the sentiments of the persons principally concerned . . . The most humane
actions require no self-denial . . . But it is otherwise with generosity. We
never are generous except when in some respect we prefer some other person to
ourselves, and sacrifice some great and important interest of our own to an
equal interest of a friend or a superior.' (W.R.S.-
Genesis (1) and Genetic (2) [Gr. genesiV]: Ger. (1) Genese or Ursprung and (2) genetisch; Fr. (1) genèse or origine and (2) génétique; Ital. (1) genesi, (2) genetico. (1) Original production. (2) Pertaining to, exhibiting, exemplifying or dealing with genesis. Cf. ORIGIN versus NATURE.
As contrasted with origin, genesis has come to be the scientific term for the exhaustive statement of the essential factors and conditions in the production of phenomenal changes and complex products generally. It has the further advantage of supplying an adjective which may be used both actively and passively. Genetic science is science which deals with problems of origin and development; and the problems with which it deals are also described as genetic. Again, the forces at work to produce a result are described as genetic, as well as the results which these forces produce. In compounds, however, for the active sense 'genic' is more properly used, and genetic for the passive. In German the case is about the same, Ursprung being used as synonymous with Genese (as origin is with genesis in English); but as there is no adjective form from that stem to use both actively and passively, genetisch comes to supply the lack. So also with origine and genèse in French.
The problems and data for SCIENCE (q.v.) are often divided into two great headings, quantitative and genetic, either of which, however, may be either descriptive or explanatory (employing exact measurement). The ideal of science is to secure both quantitative and genetic statements of all phenomena.
Literature: see under EVOLUTION; also RITCHIE, Darwin and Hegel; ROYCE,
Religious Aspect of Philos.; BALDWIN, The Origin of a Thing and its Nature,
Psychol. Rev., ii. (1895) 551. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)
Genetic Method (in education): Ger. genetische
Methode; Fr. méthode génétique; Ital. metodo
genetico. The explanation of things, for purposes of instruction, according
to their genesis, or manner of coming into being. See METHOD (in education).
Genetic Psychology: Ger. genetische Psychologie; Fr. psychologie génétique; Ital. psicologia genetica, psicogenia. Psychology in so far as it concerns itself with questions of mental evolution, development, and growth.
The terms development and evolution suggest the two great departments of genetic
psychology: the development of the individual mind, and the evolution of the
mind in the history of the animal series and of man. For the former CHILD (or
infant) PSYCHOLOGY (q.v.) is used. In the latter there are again two departments,
as just indicated: mental evolution in the animals and man, treated by RACE
PSYCHOLOGY, and its differential forms in the human species, treated by FOLK
PSYCHOLOGY: see these terms, also for literature; and see PSYCHOLOGY. (J.M.B.)
Genetic Selection: see REPRODUCTIVE (or
Genius [Lat. genius, the tutelar spirit of a place]: Ger. Genius, Genie; Fr. génie; Ital. genio. A person whose mental or moral capacity or achievements are of extraordinarily high quality or value. As applied to the endowment or capacity which makes such a person successful as contrasted with the man, we have the distinction between Genius and Genie in the German. The generality of the term genius has been such, that various writers have proposed the most varying definitions of the distinguishing marks of the genius' endowment. (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)
There is great lack in English of an adjective corresponding to the French génial; the form 'genial' might be made technical; as genial idea, an idea of genius.
Genius refers to mental superiority in an unusual degree, and usually implies innate originality and individuality. Passing by the literary discussions of the nature of genius, and the appearance of men of genius, the scientific interest in recent years may be said to have been chiefly concerned with (1) the determination of a working conception of genius; (2) the investigation of the prominent characteristics of great men; (3) the hereditary character of unusual mental powers; (4) the possible relations between genius and insanity or degeneration.
(1) That the distribution of human faculty fairly well follows the laws of the general distribution of VARIATIONS (q.v.) has been shown by Galton, who thus develops the conception of genius or greatness as the few outlying members of an orderly series, the number in the group diminishing according to determined laws, as the degree of eminence or divergence from the average increases. This conception is useful in many ways, and is particularly helpful in the investigation of heredity. (2) The natural history of great men; what they derive from nature, and what from nurture, what influences favour and what hinder their growth; their possible peculiarities of physique, their precocity, their physiological and psychological characteristics -- these and similar problems have been rediscussed in the light of recent science. While no conclusions of general validity can be readily cited, the scope of the literature suggests the aims and direction of such study. (3) The hereditary transmission of mental endowment has intrinsic interest, and is also of great importance in the formulation of general conceptions of heredity. Galton has conclusively exhibited the hereditary nature of greatness in the groups which he has studied, not only in general, but also in considerable detail. (4) The view that genius is an abnormal, as well as an unusual, phenomenon is an old one, and has been revived in connection with recent studies of morbid psychology (Moreau de Tours), and of degeneration (Lombroso). The general statement may be ventured that the special liability of men of unusual endowments to nervous and mental disorders has been fairly well established, but that the conception of any identity of nature between the phenomena that constitute insanity and genius is not proved. The point of greatest strain and achievement is naturally near to the danger line of accident and disaster. (J.J.)
Lombroso has revived the doctrine of Moreau de Tours, who had united, in 1859, the ideas of the French alienists, Lélut, Morel, and others, in his work La Psychologie morbide dans ses Rapports avec la Philosophie et l'Histoire. The revival of Moreau's theory by Lombroso and his pupils (e.g. Antonini, Patrizi, Sergi, Cognetti, &c.) consists in ingrafting the concept of the neurosis peculiar to genius upon the doctrine of degeneration held by Morel. Lombroso believes that genius is an epileptoid variety of degeneration, and bases his opinion upon certain characters (stigmates) of the men of genius. Max Nordau in his book, Degeneration (Eng. trans.), applied this doctrine as a method of criticism in modern arts and poetry. Against Lombroso and his exaggerated deductions in pathological and social psychology, Morselli, Venturi, and others have come forward, who think genius is a progressive or evolutionary variation of the human (and every other living) type, either general or partial. Morselli thinks genius consistent with some degeneration, since a profitable variation of intellect, sentiment, or will is capable of developing together with some degenerative characters. The Lombrosian view of the epilepsy of the genius is vigorously opposed as a useless appendage to what is otherwise a definite clinical conception. (E.M.)
A much discussed question is the relation of the great man -- the genius, especially the greatest man -- to the general course of history and to social evolution. On the one hand, the 'great-man theory' of history holds that the genius is himself not a product of the social movement, but a phenomenon -- a variation or other positively new influence -- which sets the direction of the historical and social movement subsequent to him. On this view history is a series of smaller movements, each carrying out the impulse given it by some great character. Opposed to this is the view that the great man is himself an index of the social movement anterior to him -- he is a result of the deeper moving forces from which history issues. He is, therefore, only relatively, not absolutely, the centre of new influences: the indication rather than the initiator of social change. Besides these opposed views, each extreme, more moderate opinion recognizes the importance of the genius, but does not make him an unaccountable prodigy. It attempts to reach a philosophy of the social movements as a whole, which, while recognizing the implicit forces which produce the genius, still allows place for great variations and their influence; not admitting either that the environment is altogether the cause of Cleopatra, or that the course of the world's political history would have been different -- to quote Pascal's famous saying -- if Cleopatra's nose had been shorter! Cf. Comte, Cours de Philos. positive, ed. Littré (3rd ed., 1869), iv; and for a judicious discussion of this question, with citation of literature, see Barth, Philos. d. Gesch. als Sociol., i. 200 f. Statistical inquiries into the inheritance of unusual talent have been made by Galton (Natural Inheritance, 1889), and into the nature and distribution of men of genius by Odin (Genèse des grands hommes, 1895). (J.M.B.)
Literature: GALTON, Hereditary Genius, and English Men of Science (1874);
JOLY, Psychol. des grands hommes (1893); WEISE, Allg. Theorie des Genies; RADESTOCK,
Genie u. Wahnsinn (1889); SCHOPENHAUER, World as Will and Idea, i. Bk. III.
§ 36, and ii. chap. xxxi; HIRSCH, Genius and Degeneration (1897) (contains
full literary references); MOREAU (de Tours), La Psychol. morbide dans ses Rapports
avec l'Hist. (1856); SPENCER, Study of Sociol.; JAMES, The Will to Believe,
216 ff.; LOMBROSO, L'Uomo di Genio (6th ed.), Genio e Follia, and The Man of
Genius (1894); BRENTANO, Psychol. des Genies; MALLOCK, Aristocracy and Progress;
NORDAU, Degeneration; ALLEN and FISKE, Atlantic Mo., x1vii. 75 and 351; BALDWIN,
Social and Eth. Interpret.; MORSELLI, Genio e Nevrosi (1892), and Riv. di Filos.
Scient., passim; ALPH. DE CANDOLLE, Hist. des Sciences et des Savants
(1873); NISBET, The Insanity of Genius (1891); TÜRCK, Der geniale Mensch
(1897); ODIN, as above. (J.J.- J.M.B.-
Genu [Lat. genu, knee]: Ger. Knie;
Fr. genou; Ital. ginocchio. See BRAIN (glossary).
Genus (in biology): see CLASSIFICATION (in
Genus (in logic) [Lat. genus, birth]: Ger. Genus; Fr. genre; Ital. genere. A class which contains within its extension, or is divisible into, smaller classes, called relatively species.
The significance of the term has always shared the ambiguity which is discernible in classification. Genera have been distinguished partly by reason of the obvious differences in the larger types of natural forms, partly by reference to the relatively arbitrary process of arranging in accordance with selected marks. The first or empirical factor is predominant in the popular sense of the term, and in much of the Aristotelian and Scholastic logic; the second has been insisted on in the more strictly formal logic. The divergence of the two views makes itself manifest at the limits of classification, at the conception of a summum genus and an infima species, which tend on the one view to be regarded as having a place in rerum natura, while on the other they are but ideal boundaries to an arbitrary process. (R.A.)
One of the Aristotelian rules of DIVISION (q.v.) in logic is that the differences
of different genera are different, that is to say, cross-divisions are not to
be made. This rule is signally violated in the modern classifications of chemistry,
mathematics, and logic itself; but in biology, owing to the common origin of
species, the classification is hierarchical, as Aristotle required. Cf. PREDICABLES
Geometrical Mean: see MEAN AND MEDIAN.
Geometry [Gr. gewmetpia, measurement of the earth]: Ger. Geometrie; Fr. géométrie; Ital. geometria. The science of the relations growing out of extension in space, abstraction being made of all properties but those pertaining to space itself.
Its subject-matter is formed of ideal bodies, having mobility, rigidity, and
extension, but no other properties of matter. The property of extension may
be ideally limited to one or two dimensions, or reduced to no dimensions, as
in the case of a point. Such bodies are in imagination moved about as if real,
and the science is constructed by pure reasoning about their necessary properties.
Cf. SPACE. (S.N.)
George, Leopold. (1811-73.) Born in Berlin,
he became Privatdocent there, and then professor of philosophy at Greifswald,
where he died. He attempted to synthesize the philosophical principles
of Hegel and Schleiermacher. His Metaphysics and Psychology
are his chief works. These were followed, much later, by Logic as a
Theory of Knowledge.
Geotropism: see TROPISM.
Gérando, Joseph Marie de: see DÉGÉRANDO.
Germ [Lat. germen, a bud]: Ger. Keim;
Fr. germe; Ital. germe. A word sometimes used for the organism
in an early embryonic stage, or for the rudimentary beginnings of an organ.
Now generally restricted to use in composition, e.g. germ-cell (see OVUM), GERMPLASM
(q.v.), germ-layer (see EPIBLAST, and HYPOBLAST). (C.LL.M.)
Germinal Selection: Ger. Germinalselektion; Fr. sélection germinale; Ital. selezione germinale. The outcome of intra-germinal competition or 'struggle for existence,' as the result of which certain DETERMINANTS (q.v.) flourish rather than others. Cf. INTRASELECTION.
Suggested by Weismann (Monist, vi. No. 2, Jan. 1896, also Ueber Germinalselektion, 1896) as a supplementary hypothesis, in his scheme of hereditary transmission, to account for the hypertrophy and atrophy of some organs or structures, and for the appearance of variations in certain directions. He unwarrantably admits the position that variations appear 'when and where they are wanted,' and so seem to be DETERMINATE (q.v.); but by this hypothesis he is able to claim that natural selection has already been at work upon the germinal determinants. (C.LL.M.- J.M.B.)
The hypothesis of germinal selection is generally considered one of the most important recent suggestions looking to the supplementing of natural selection without resort to the Lamarckian FACTORS OF EVOLUTION (q.v.). It is the last possible application of the notion of struggle for existence, carrying that conception beyond the struggle of individuals and the struggle of parts to the struggle of germs in the single organism. It provides a purely hypothetical way of securing lines of determinate evolution.
Literature: THOMSON, The Problem of Life; CONN, The Method of Evolution;
GROOS, The Play of Man (Eng. trans.), 373; and (more technical) DELAGE, Année
biologique, 1 ff., Index; WEISMANN, as cited above. (J.M.B.)
Germinal Vesicle: Ger. Keimbläschen; Fr. vésicule germinative; Ital. vescicola germinativa. The nucleus of the ovum before the formation of the polar bodies.
The germinal vesicle was described by Purkinje in 1825, the germinal spot (nucleolus)
by Wagner in 1836. The terms are now falling into disuse. See F. M. Balfour,
Compar. Embryol. (C.LL.M.)
Germination (in botany) [Lat. germen,
a bud]: Ger. Keimen; Fr. germination; Ital. germinazione.
The resumption of the active processes of growth by seeds and spores after a
time of quiescence or suspended animation. (E.S.G.)
Germ-plasm: Ger. Keimplasma; Fr. plasma
germinatif; Ital. germiplasma, plasma germinativo. The substance
which forms the physical basis of heredity. Employed by Weismann (The Germ-Plasm,
1893). Probably identical with IDIOPLASM (q.v.). Cf. SOMA. (C.LL.M.)
Gerson, Jean Charlier de. (1363-1429.) Born
at Gerson, died at Lyons. A French theologian. In 1377 he entered the College
of Navarra in Paris, and d'Ailly and Henry of Oyta taught him logic and
theology. In 1397 he was made dean of Bourges; after 1401, pastor of St.
Jean en Grève in Paris. He lectured on mysticism in 1404, and wrote
a work on the subject in 1407. His denunciation of the murderer of the
duke of Orleans necessitated his leaving Paris (1419) and remaining several
years in Germany. His numerous works were among the first printed books.
He is supposed by some to be the author of the Imitation of Christ.
His work on the Consolations of Theology is also well known.
Gersonides. (cir. 1288-1344.) Born in
Bagnol. Languedoc. A follower of Maimonides. He studied Aristotle in the
works of Averroës, and was familiar with the Bible and Talmud. He
sought to show, as his master had begun to do, the agreement of Aristotle
with the Bible, believing that the latter touches all fields of knowledge.
He differed from Averroës in asserting personal immortality. He exercised
great influence over Spinoza, as did also Maimonides.
Gestation (period of) [Lat. gestare, to carry]: Ger. Tragzeit, Dauer der Schwangerschaft; Fr. gestation; Ital. gestazione, gravidanza. The time which elapses between the conception and the birth of the young mammal.
The following are the periods of gestation in some of the commoner mammals, in days: elephant 593, giraffe 440, mare 330, cow 286, man 280, red deer 245, hippopotamus 234, monkey (cebus) 150, pig 120, dog 63, cat 56, kangaroo 38. Attempts have been made to find a definite relation between the average length of life and the period of gestation.
Literature: R. OWEN, Compar. Anat. and Physiol. of the Vertebrates;
F. LATASTE, Des variations de durée de la gestation chez les mammifères,
C. R. Soc. de Biol., Paris, 9e sér., iii. 21-162 (1891). (C.LL.M.)
Gesture Language [Med. Lat. gestura, a mode of action, from Lat. gestus, an act]: Ger. Gebärdensprache; Fr. langage de gestes; Ital. linguaggio mimico. The conventionalized use of mien and gesture for the expression of thoughts and feelings.
The facial movements and the gestures which to a greater or less extent accompany vocal speech, enforcing or supplementing it, and which notably play an important part in the expression of mood among, for instance, the peoples of Southern Europe -- Greeks, Neapolitans, Sicilians, Portuguese -- are closely allied in their psychological conditions to the phenomena of speech. The interpretation of such gestures as are handed down in the art of ancient peoples may be regarded as an auxiliary to hermeneutics. See K. Sittl, Die Gebärden d. Griechen u. Römer; A. Baumeister, Geberdensprache in d. Kunst, Denkmäler, i. 586 ff. Among scattered tribes of savages the language of gesture, based in part on reflex movements, in part on directly significant movements, often becomes a conventional system, serving the purpose of communication without aid from vocal speech.
Literature: G. MALLERY, First Ann. Rep. Bureau of Ethnol. (Washington), 1879-80, and Sign Language, Techmer's Int. Zeitsch., i. 193 ff. (1884); CH. DARWIN, Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (1872). (B.I.W.)
The artificial gesture language of the deaf shows the operation of such a system
constructed from alphabetical elements. (J.M.B.)
Geulincx (or Geulinks), Arnold.
(1625-69.) Cartesian philosopher, educated at the University of Louvain,
where he later lectured. Moved to Leyden, and became a Protestant. See
CARTESIANISM, and OCCASIONALISM.
Ghost [Sansk. ghas, spirit]: Ger. (1) Gespenst; Fr. (1) spectre, fantôme; Ital. (1) ombra, anima. (1) An application, usually of the sort taken to be a disembodied spirit, but applied also to any sort of apparent manifestation from a spirit world.
(2) An early word for SPIRIT (q.v.). (J.M.B.)
Ghost Theory. A name often given to Herbert Spencer's theory of the origin of religion.
The 'ghost theory' is affirmed in many places in Spencer's Principles of Sociology, where the evidence is also adduced. A brief statement of it in his own words is as follows: -- 'While primitive men, regarding themselves as at the mercy of surrounding ghosts, try to defend themselves by the aid of the exorcist and the sorcerer, who deal with ghosts antagonistically, there is simultaneously adopted a contrary behaviour towards ghosts -- a propitiation of them. . . . Out of this motive and these observances come all forms of worship. Awe of the ghost makes sacred the sheltering structure for the tomb, and this grows into the temple, while the tomb itself becomes the altar. From provisions placed for the dead, now habitually and now at fixed intervals, arise religious oblations, ordinary and extraordinary, daily and at festivals. Immolations and mutilations at the grave pass into sacrifices and offerings of blood at the altar of a deity. Abstinence from food for the benefit of the ghost develops into fasting as a pious practice; and journeys to the grave with gifts become pilgrimages to the shrine. Praises of the dead and prayers to them grow into religious praises and prayers. And so every holy rite is derived from a funeral rite' (Princ. of Sociol., i. 416-7, 3rd ed.). Spencer's theory has been subjected to much criticism, not only by professional theologians, but by the first authorities on primitive man and culture. On the whole, the balance is against it, at least in the form in which he has stated the theory. It may be apposite to add that the problem of the origin of religion is really a philosophical and psychological one. See RELIGION (evolution of, and psychology of).
Literature: a large literature has grown up on this subject; the following
works represent various points of view: KELLOGG, Genesis and Growth of Religion;
KING, The Supernatural, its Origin, Nature, and Evolution; LIPPERT, Der Seelencult
in seinen Beziehungen z. althebräischen Religion; Die Religionen d. europ.
Culturvölker; and Christenthum, Volksglaube u. Volksbrauch; MAX MÜLLER,
Gifford Lectures (4 vols.), and Hibbert Lectures; TIELE, Elements of the Science
of Religion, i. 68 f., ii. 208 f.; RAUWENHOFF, Wijsbegeerte v. d. Godsdienst;
v. SIEBECK, Lehrb. d. Religionsphilos.; the more literary works of ANDREW LANG
contain many incidental suggestions; DE WETTE, Vorlesungen ü. d. Religion,
184 f. Cf. ANCESTOR WORSHIP, ANIMISM, MAGIC, and RELIGION (various topics).
Gilbert de la Porrée (Gilbertus
Porretanus). (1070-1154.) A French theologian and scholastic philosopher.
Educated under Bernard of Chartres, he taught in Chartres, Paris, and Poitiers.
He became bishop of Poitiers in 1142. Celebrated as a dialectician, he
was suspected and twice arraigned before the council by Bernard of Clairvaux
and the pope.
Gioberti, Vincenzo. (1801-52.) An Italian
patriot and philosopher. In 1817 he obtained a position in the ecclesiastical
household of the king of Sardinia, and devoted himself to the study of
the Bible, of church history, and the classic literature of Italy. Doctor
of divinity in 1823, he took sacerdotal orders, 1825. In this year he became
professor of theology at Turin, where he had graduated. In 1834 he became
chaplain to the king, Charles Albert. Accused of favouring the liberal
party, he left Turin and resided in Brussels, where he taught in a private
institution, and wrote books. He returned to Turin in 1848, and was warmly
welcomed. He became successively president of the Chamber of Deputies,
minister of public instruction, and president of the council. He resigned,
however, in 1849, and, moving to Paris, died there.
Given [AS. gifan]: Ger. (das) Gegebene; Fr. (la) donnée; Ital. (il) dato. One of the hypotheses of a problem; used also in the Latin form datum (of which it is a translation). In Greek mathematics, the corresponding word was also extended to whatever is determined in certain specified ways by a given hypothesis. The plural data is loosely applied to any unquestioned knowledge upon which a judgment is based, and in particular to our percepts, in the phrase 'data of experience.'
The English adjective, given, has an exceedingly convenient use to indicate
that that which its noun denotes must be understood as specified (in the verification
of what is said) previously to the specification of something mentioned before.
Thus, 'Some woman is adored by any given man,' is said to avoid all possibility
of understanding the statement as 'Some woman is adored by every man.' (C.S.P.)
Gland [Lat. glans, an acorn]: Ger. Drüse; Fr. glande; Ital. glandula. A secreting organ or part; an agglomeration of grandular epithelial cells, arranged in a great variety of ways, viz. in tubes -- tubular glands, simple and compound; in sacs -- 'acinous,' 'racemose,' or 'saccular,' simple and compound; ductless glands. Cf. INTERNAL SECRETION.
Originally applied to oval bodies on the course of the lymphatics, and these
are still referred to under the name 'lymphatic glands' (Quain, &c.). The
tendency, however, is to restrict the term to collections of true secreting
cells. As to 'lymph-glands. -- It is a misnomer to call these structures glands,
for they produce no secretion. A better term is lymph-nodes.' Cf. Dunham, Histology
(1898), 114. See LYMPH. (C.F.H.)
Gnosiology [Gr. gnwsiV,
knowledge, + logoV, discourse]: Ger. Gnosiologie,
Erkenntnisslehre; Fr. gnosiologie (suggested -- TH.F.); Ital.
gnoseologia. The science of knowledge, its origin, process, and validity.
Cf. EPISTEMOLOGY, meaning (2), for which gnosiology is recommended, epistemology
being used for the broader inquiry given under meaning (1) of that topic. (J.M.B.)
Gnosis, Gnostic, Gnosticism [Gr. gnwsiV, knowledge]: Ger. Gnosis, gnostisch, Gnosticismus; Fr. gnose, gnostique, gnosticisme; Ital. gnosi, gnostico, Gnosticismo. The philosophico-religious doctrine of a widely diffused sect or sects of (heretical) Christians in the 2nd and 3rd centuries of our era was called Gnosticism, the sect Gnostics, and the principle of their teaching Gnosis.
The Gnostics professed to advance beyond mere faith (pistiV) and to reach a knowledge (gnwoiV) concerning religious and philosophico-religious questions. In so doing, they sought to combine specifically Christian principles with elements of Jewish and heathen doctrine. The result was a mixture or amalgam of Christian, Jewish, Hellenic (especially Neo-Platonic), and oriental (Persian) conceptions. Among the chief speculative problems to which the Gnostics directed their attention were the nature of the Deity and his relation to the world (emanation doctrine), creation, matter, the nature and origin of evil, &c. Their method was imaginative rather than logical; their doctrine was mythological to a large degree, and differed widely with the various leaders and parties. They were looked upon as heretics by the Church, and their opinions condemned in favour of the growing Catholic dogma.
Literature: F. C. BAUR, Die christliche Gnosis (1835); LIPSIUS, Gnosticismus
(reprinted, 1860, from Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopädie, i. 71); SCHAFF,
Hist. of the Christ. Church, and Ante-Nicene Christianity, chap. x. §§
115-36; UEBERWEGHEINZE, Gesch. d. Philos. (8th ed., 1898), ii. § 7. See
also PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY (2). (A.C.A.Jr.)
Goclenius, Rudolf. (1547-1628.) Born
at Corbach; studied (1568-70) philosophy and theology at Marburg and Wittenberg,
and became Privatdocent in philosophy at Wittenberg in 1571. In 1575 he
became rector of the Paedagogium at Cassel; in 1581 professor of physics
at Marburg; and in 1589 professor of logic, ethics, and mathematics at
the same place.
God: see the following topics: also THEISM,
and the several topics RELIGION.
God (idea of) [AS. God]: Ger. Idee Gottes; Fr. idée de Dieu; Ital. idea di Dio. The notion of Deity or Supreme Being which is formed in the human consciousness, and which includes conceptions of the nature, essential attributes, and relations of this Being.
The question of the idea of God is both psychological and ontological, and involves considerations of origin, nature, and validity. The theories of origin may be classified (1) in relation to consciousness, as derivative and original; (2) in relation to the mode of apprehension, as empirical or intuitional. Theories of nature are as numerous as the forms of theistic belief, and include MONOTHEISM, polytheism, PANTHEISM, HENOTHEISM, DEISM; see these terms, and especially THEISM, and RELIGION (psychology of). Theories of validity may be classified under the heads of subjective and objective; the former, while asserting various degrees of subjective validity for the idea, deny its objective authority. The objective theories affirm the objective validity of the idea. On this basis the Anselmian and other ontological arguments for the existence of God are founded.
Literature: PFLEIDERER, Philos. of Religion; LEPSIUS, Philos. u. Religion
(1885); McCOSH, The Intuitions of the Mind; HARRIS, Philos. Basis of Theism.
See THEISM. (A.T.O.)
God (in theology). The conception and being of God are usually treated in two ways from the theological standpoint. (1) Historically: (a) the Old Testament doctrine of God; (b) the New Testament doctrine of God. (2) Systematically: (a) in his own proper nature, involving mainly the analysis of the ATTRIBUTES (q.v.) of God, and all the problems necessarily connected therewith; (b) God's revelation of himself, involving his relation to the universe and especially to man; (c) proceeding from the last, and closely connected with questions of revelation, the aspects of God, or more exactly, problems connected with distinctions within the Godhead (see GODHEAD, and TRINITY). The problems occurring under (2, a and b) obviously involve underlying philosophical principles, apart from which no progress can be made, and apart from attention to which no consistent conclusions can be reached.
Literature: for (1 a), DAVIDSON, art. on the O. T. Teaching about
God, in Hastings' Dict. of the Bible, with the literature there cited; (1 b),
SANDAY, ibid., art. on the N. T. Teaching about God, with the literature there
cited; any good work on N. T. Theology, e.g. WEISS (Eng. trans.), BEYSCHLAG
(Eng. trans.); (2 a), see under ATTRIBUTES (of God); (2 b), see
CHRISTOLOGY; and good History of Christian Doctrine, e.g. BAUR (Ger.), HAGENBACH
(Eng. trans.), SHEDD (Eng.); ULRICI, Gott u. d. Natur; FLINT, Theism; PFLEIDERER,
Philos. of Religion (Eng. trans.), iii. 237 f.; (2 c), HEGEL, Philos.
of Religion (Eng. trans.), ii. 25 f.; BAUR, Die christl. Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkeit
u. Menschwerdung Gottes; MEIER, Die Lehre v. d. Trinität in ihrer historischen
Godhead [AS. God + hád, office, dignity]: Ger. Gottheit; Fr. divinité; Ital. divinità. The name usually given by theologians to the completed conception of God as triune; the three Persons as one God constitute the Godhead.
As the Athanasian Creed says: 'But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one: the Glory equal, the Majesty co-eternal. Such as the Father is, such is the Son: and such is the Holy Ghost . . . And yet they are not three Gods: but one God.' Accordingly, the term Godhead may be used also to indicate the essential divinity not only of God, but of Christ and of the Holy Spirit. As the same Creed says, in another place: 'Equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead: and inferior to the Father, as touching his Manhood.' See ATTRIBUTES (of God), CHRISTOLOGY, GOD, and TRINITY.
Literature: GRATRY, A Guide to the Knowledge of God (Eng. trans.), ii;
STEENSTRA, The Being of God as Trinity in Unity. (R.M.W.)
Goetae [Gr. gohV, a wizard, sorcerer]. A name given to wandering Jewish magicians, thaumaturgists, or exorcists who flourished throughout the Roman empire during the early days of Christianity, and lived on the credulity of the masses.
Simon Magus may be mentioned as perhaps the most important representative of the class. Jesus may have referred to them (Matt. xxiv. 11, 24-8; Mark xiii. 22; John vi. 23, 24), and Paul was familiar with them (see Acts viii. 9 f., xiii. 6 f.).
Literature: JOSEPHUS, Ant. of Jews, viii. 2, 5; ORIGEN, Cont. Cel.,
i; EWALD, Hist. of Israel (Eng. trans.), vii. 179, 317, 391, viii. 89, 123;
ZELLER, Acts of the Apostles (Eng. trans.), i. 250 f.; SCHOLZ, Götzendienst
u. Zauberwesen bei d. Hebräern. (R.M.W.)
Golden Rule: Ger. goldene Regel; Fr. règle d'or; Ital. regola d'or. The name given to the Gospel precept: 'Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them' (Matt. vii. 12; Luke vi. 31).
This rule has often been adopted as expressing the sum of social morality.
The negative side of the same precept is sometimes given as its equivalent.
Thus Hobbes summarizes the fundamental moral laws in the command: 'Do not that
to another which thou wouldst not have done to thyself.' And he identifies this
with the golden rule, from which, however, it differs in not enjoining active
beneficence, and requiring only abstinence from evil. See Sidgwick, Hist.
of Eng. Eth. (3rd ed.), 167. (W.R.S.)
Golden Section: Ger. goldener Schnitt; Fr. section d'or; Ital. sezione aurea. That division of a magnitude in which the smaller portion is to the larger, as the larger portion is to the whole.
Derived primarily on the mathematical side from the division of a line into extreme and mean ratio, but applied more widely to a similar relation between the dimensions of surfaces, e.g. the two adjacent sides of a rectangle and the sum of these sides, the parts of the human figure, &c. The relation involved has also been applied in explanation of musical harmony, the relation between the vibration rates of the various tones concerned being supposed to illustrate it. The supposed aesthetic value of the relation has been referred to its embodiment of a just proportion, expressing mediation between complete equality (1:1) and complete inequality (1:2). This value has been shown to be subject to numerous modifications. The most agreeable forms among parallelograms are the apparent squares and figures whose sides conform to the relations of the golden section. In the case of a line, whether horizontal or perpendicular, the golden section, although very agreeable, is not aesthetically the most satisfactory division.
The division of a line into extreme and mean ratio was accomplished by Euclid. The aesthetic value of the relation involved was first developed by Zeising, who gave it the widest application throughout the range of the beautiful in nature and in art. He saw in it the concrete embodiment of an ultimate aesthetic principle, i.e. the combination of a complete diversity in an harmonious unity. Fechner investigated experimentally the application of the principle to various simple geometrical forms, and found it subject to sundry modifications. Helwig, Witmer, and others have made further experiments, and have also discussed the theoretical bearings of the principle.
Literature: ZEISING, Neue Lehre von den Proportionen des menschlichen
Körpers (1854), and Aesthetische Forschungen (1855); FECHNER, Zur experimentalen
Aesthetik (1871), and Vorschule d. Aesthetik (1876); WITMER, Philos. Stud.,
ix; HELWIG, Theorie des Schönen (1897). (J.R.A.)
Good [AS. god]: Ger. Gut; Fr. bien (preferred), bon; Ital. bene. Possessing WORTH (q.v.) of some sort. (W.R.S.- J.M.B.)
Anything which satisfies a desire has worth in that respect, and is called good for that purpose. At the same time, this same thing may yet be in other respects, and on the whole, bad. In a fuller, ethical sense the term 'good' is applied only to that whose worth cannot be thus inverted or changed, i.e. is intrinsic, sometimes with the distinctive adverb 'morally good.' Hence the assertion of Kant that the only unconditional good is a good will.
Good as a substantive means a thing possessing worth. An old classification,
adopted by Aristotle, divides goods into external goods, goods of the body,
and goods of the soul -- from which the inquiry starts into the true human good;
and this inquiry constitutes ethical science. Cf. Class, Ideale u. Güter
Goodness (ethical): Ger. das Gute; Fr. bonté; Ital. bontà. The possession of intrinsic worth.
The term has the same vagueness as GOOD (q.v.). Hence the distinction drawn by Shaftesbury (Inquiry, Bk. I. § 3), who says that goodness depends only on the affections, and may belong to any sensible creature; whereas 'virtue or merit' belongs to man only, since it implies the reflex or moral sense which makes the conception or worth and honesty an object of his affection.
Goodness is also used as an abstract expression for that which is morally highest,
or of greatest worth -- the GOOD, or the SUMMUM BONUM (q.v.). In this sense
goodness or the-good-in-itself (auto agaqon) is used
in Plato's Republic to express the ultimate ground, not only of moral
activity, but of all reality. It is thus raised from a purely human to a universal
Goods: Ger. Güter; Fr. biens; Ital. merci. The elements that constitute wealth; objects capable of satisfying human desire.
It is a moot point whether immaterial wealth should be characterized as goods;
and it is also doubtful whether non-transferable objects should be included
under the term. Marshall adopts a very wide interpretation, including at once
things external and internal, material and personal, transferable and non-transferable.
But it seems questionable policy to depart so widely from current usage. (A.T.H.)
Gorgias, of Leontini. A Greek orator and
sophist, a contemporary of Socrates and of Empedocles, who is sometimes
said to have been his teacher. The influence of Zeno upon him was supreme.
See PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY (Sophists).
Göschel, Carl Friedrich. (1781-1861.)
German philosopher, follower of Hegel; a jurist. Educated at Bonn, he was
for some time counsellor of the provincial court in Naumburg; after 1845
first president of the Consistory for Saxony. Died in Naumburg. He sought
to demonstrate the harmony of Hegel's philosophy with Christianity.
Gospel [AS. God, God, + spell, a narrative]: Ger. Evangelium; Fr. évangile; Ital. evangelo, vangelo. The term is used in three senses: (1) The most general -- good news of any kind; (2) that in which it is commonly employed throughout Christendom -- the good news of redemption through the mediation of Jesus Christ; (3) by analogy from (2), the distinctive -- possibly new -- teaching peculiar to a man or school.
Gospels is the collective term used to denote the writings of the four Evangelists -- Matthew, Mark, Luke, John. For obvious reasons, these writings have received closest attention from Christian and anti-Christian writers for centuries. Here it is possible only to indicate, and this with the utmost generality, the views of them generally entertained to-day. Every one recognizes that the writings attributed to Matthew, Mark, and Luke agree among themselves in very striking ways -- hence their ordinary name the Synoptic Gospels, that is, the Gospels which 'see together'; similarly all agree that these Gospels differ in the most marked way from the writing attributed to John, often called the 'spiritual Gospel.' Hence two distinct problems have arisen -- the synoptic problem, and the problem of the Fourth Gospel. Many would doubtless admit that, at the present time, the former is more completely understood, and is further on the way towards satisfactory solution than the latter. (1) After Eichhorn (1794), Gieseler (1818), Schleiermacher (1818), and Credner (1836) had initiated modern criticism by formulating the DOCUMENTARY HYPOTHESIS (q.v.), the greatest desideratum for a fuller elucidation of the synoptic problem was a more thorough examination of the relation between Matthew and Luke on the one hand, and Mark on the other. This was undertaken by Weiss and Wilke simultaneously (1838). They suggested that Mark came first in the order of time; that its writer presented more precisely than his companions an original document, accessible to all three; and that the writers of Matthew and Luke used a second document, on not employed by the writer of Mark, and known as the Logia of Matthew. With the exception of the adherents of the TÜBINGEN SCHOOL (q.v.), New Testament critics have in the main followed these lines of Weiss and Wilke till the present time. The view now generally approved, though with differences in detail, upon which it is impossible to enlarge here, is that the three synoptic writers all used an existing (earlier) source which is most faithfully presented by the writer of Mark; that the writers of Matthew and Luke used a second early source (consisting of Logia or sayings), excerpts from which constitute the main differences between their Gospels and that attributed to Mark; that possibly, though here there is dispute, the writer of Luke had these Logia before him in a collection which contrasted with that used by the writer of Matthew. As to dates: there is least evidence regarding Matthew, which possibly falls within the 1st century. Mark, too, cannot be dated with any certainty, and probably could not have been written before A. D. 68. Having regard to the evidence which the Pauline writings throw on the subject, Luke cannot well have been written after A. D. 80.
(2) The problem of the Fourth Gospel is admitted to be exceedingly difficult, even if on no other account than that it is not a historical document in the same sense as the synoptics. This obviously introduces sources of much perplexity. There are those who altogether deny its historical character, and point out the impossibility that John could have had a part in its authorship. Others, on the contrary, sharply contend for both these positions. It seems certain that this Gospel was well known by A. D. 185, and it seems problematical that it was quoted by Basilides in A. D. 125. It is practically certain that its author was a Jew. Little more, of a definite character, can be said. After all that has been done and written, one is forced to agree with Harnack, that 'the origin of the Johannine writings is, from the standpoint of a history of literature and dogma, the most marvelous enigma which the early history of Christianity presents' (Hist. of Dogma, i. 96, 97). The problem of the relation between the Logos, as used by the writer of John, and the Jewish-Alexandrian conception -- the point where the entire discussion touches philosophy most closely -- must, like the whole Johannine question, be regarded as still sub iudice.
Literature: REUSS, Hist. of the N. T. (Eng. trans.); HOLTZMANN, Einleitung
in d. N. T.; WEIZSÄCKER, Untersuch. ü. d. evang. Gesch.; WENDT, Die
Lehre Jesu (Eng. trans. of 2nd part); P. EWALD, Das Hauptproblem d. Evangelienfrage;
KEIM, Jesus of Nazara (Eng. trans.), i; DAVIDSON, Introd. to the N. T.; the
most handy summary in English (from an advanced standpoint) is CARPENTER, The
First Three Gospels. For Fourth Gospel: WATKINS, Bampton Lects.; SCHENKEL, Characterbild
Jesu; THOMA, Die Genesis d. Johan. Evangel.; BEYSCHLAG, N. T. Theol. (Eng. trans.),
i. 216 f.; WEISS, Life of Christ (Eng. trans.); SANDAY, in the Expositor (1891-2);
HARNACK, in Zeitsch. f. Theol. u. Kriche, ii. 189 f.; WEIZSÄCKER, Apostolic
Age (Eng. trans.), ii. 206 f. (R.M.W.)
Government (divine): Ger. göttliche Regierung; Fr. gouvernement divin; Ital. governo divino. (1) The name given to that view of God's relation to the world which is immediately deducible from his attribute of omnipotence.
(2) The term is also applied to the moral order of the world as indicated under THEODICY.
Because omnipotent, God governs the universe according to his will, that is, in conformity with his nature. That is the positive side. The negative appears in the fact that this conception of the universe (as cosmos) excludes, on the one hand, a mere determining fate and, on the other, mere blind chance. In dogmatic theology this idea of government refers rather to nature than to man, the relationship of the Deity to humanity being expressed more eminently in the scheme of salvation. See ATTRIBUTES (of God), GOD, GODHEAD, and THEODICY.
Literature: McCOSH, Method of Divine Government; FLÜGEL, Das Wunder
u. d. Erkennbarkeit Gottes; DE MARGERIE, Théodicée; Herzog's Real-Encyc.,
art. Théodicée; LOTZE, Microcosmus (Eng. trans.); ORR, Christian
View of God and the World; PFLEIDERER, Philos. of Religion (Eng. trans.), iv.
20 f.; REUSCH, Nature and the Bible (Eng. trans.). See also the citations under
RELIGION (philosophy of), THEODICY, and in BIBLIOG. E, i, b. (R.M.W.)
Government (political). The ruling or directing or a community as a whole, and as organized into a STATE (q.v.).
The discussion of government, and forms of government, is at least as old as
Greek philosophy. The distinction of state from society is vital here: a society
with a common government is a state; a state without government would be a mere
society. It is not essential that the ruling or directing power should be sovereign
(in Austin's sense). It is not sovereign in subject communities (Mysore, Basutoland);
but the two qualities are usually combined. See also ARISTOCRACY, DEMOCRACY,
and STATE (philosophy of). (J.B.)