Classics in the History of Psychology

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Definitions Ce - Cn

Posted April 2000

Celarent: see MOOD (in logic).

Celibacy [Lat. caelebs, single]: Ger. Cölibat, Ehelosigheit; Fr. célibat; Ital. celibato. Voluntary renunciation of marriage.

In general usage celibacy still retains its original Latin meaning; but in practice, owing to historical occurrences, it has come to be specially associated with the priests of the Roman Catholic Church.

Celibacy is conceived to be purer than the married state. This idea is very ancient, and, so far as Christianity is concerned, is doubtless connected with the dogma of the Fall. Had Adam not fallen, Paradise might have been peopled by a pure race propagated in some 'non-carnal' way. In I Cor. vii. 38 the superior sanctity of the single state is indicated; and so early as Ignatius and Polycarp the same idea had currency, while voluntary vows of virginity were common among ascetics. By the 5th century marriage was not permitted to priests after ordination. The Latin Church, in contradistinction to the Greek, went much further than this. And ecclesiastical politicians, like Hildebrand (Gregory VII), perceiving the value of priestly celibacy to the Church organization, succeeded ultimately in making it obligatory. The Council of Trent maintained the rule, and it still remains one of the principal points of difference between the Roman and the Reformed churches. It is worthy of note that investigators who view life from a normal standpoint (sociologists, physiologists, philosophers) condemn the practice; those who break life up into separable parts (mystics and priests) favour the usage. While celibacy strengthens ecclesiastical organizations, it works irreparable wrong upon individuals, especially upon women; such at least is the record of history. Its central idea is essentially ascetic, and it must be estimated ethically as such. Cf. ASCETICISM.

Literature: KLITSCHE, Gesch. d. Cölibats Der Cölibat; LEA, Sacerdotal Celibacy in the Christian Church; LAURIN, Der Coelibat d. Geistlichen. (R.M.W.)

Cell [Lat. cella]: Ger. Zelle; Fr. cellule; Ital. cellula. (1) In biology: the fundamental unit of structure of organized bodies; as Virchow defined it, 'the elementary vital unit.'

A cell typically consists of cell-wall or membrane and protoplasmic contents, composed of nucleus, protoplasm proper, or cytoplasm, and often nucleolus and centrosome. These latter may be absent, and the membrane is lacking from many animal cells. Sometimes vacuoles and other structures living (Plastids) and lifeless are present. Cf. the figure. See CELL THEORY, AMITOSIS, and MITOSIS. (C.F.H.)

(2) In neurology: by nerve-cell (Schäfer) is meant the whole unit of structure of the nervous system, i.e. the cell-body, the portion containing the nucleus (perikaryon of Foster and Sherrington), and all the processes which grow out from it; protoplasmic processes or DENDRITES (q.v.), and axis-cylinder processes or NEURITES (q.v.) or axones. Equivalent to NEURONE (q.v.) of European writers. (C.F.H.-H.H.)

Cell-division: see MITOSIS and AMITOSIS.

Cell Theory: Ger. Zellenlehre; Fr. théorie cellulaire; Ita. teoria cellulare. The doctrine that all organisms are composed either of individual cells (unicellular organisms) or of a compound aggregate of cells (the higher plants and animals) with certain cell-products; and that every cell, no matter how differentiated in structure or function, is derived from a pre-existing cell.

Some of the stages of the cell theory are, in briefest possible outline, as follows: -- (1) Observation by Malpighi and Grew, at the end of the 17th century, that under low powers of the microscope, plant structure appeared as (a) small spaces with firm walls and filled with fluid ('cells'), and (b) long tubes. (2) Proof by Treviranus (1808) that the tubes develop from cells, arranged end to end, by the breaking down of their partition walls. (3) The discovery of nuclei by Brown (Trans. Linn. Soc. London, 1833, in orchids), extended by Schleiden (Müller's Archiv, 1838, 137, plants generally). (4) The application by Schwann (Mikrosk. Untersuchungen, 1839), utilizing the observations of Henle and others, of the results reached in the microscopic study of plants to the analysis of animal tissues. So far, though the nucleus had been recognized, the cell-wall was regarded as an essential feature. Meanwhile the study of the structure and movements of protoplasm, begun by Bonaventura Corti (1772), led up to (5) the recognition by von Mohl (1846) and Remak (1852) of this living substance as the essential constituent of the cell in both plants and animals. (6) The proof by de Bary and Max Schultze (1859-61) that the protoplasm of animal cells and plant cells is of similar nature. (7) The conception, developed for plants by von Mohl (1846) and Nägeli and for animals set forth by Virchow (1858) in his general law omnis cellula e cellulâ, that cells are genetically connected by an uninterrupted series of cell-divisions. (8) The discovery by Schneider (1873) of complex and orderly changes in the nucleus during cell-division, termed karyokinesis (Schleicher, 1878) or mitosis (Flemming, 1879). Cf. FERTILIZATION, HEREDITY, MITOSIS. (C.LL.M.)

Literature: O. HERTWIG, The Cell (Eng. trans. by Campbell, 1895); E. B. WILSON, The Cell in Devel. and Inheritance (1896), and the literature there quoted; C. O. WHITMAN, The Inadequacy of the Cell Theory, J. of Morphol., viii. (1893); A. SEDGWICK, On the Inadequacy of the Cellular Theory of Development, Quart, J. Microsc. Sci., xxxvii. (1894); M. VERWORN, Gen. Physiol. (Eng trans., 1899). (C.LL.M.- E.S.G.)

Cellifugal [Lat. cella, cell, + fugere, to flee]: Ger. cellulifugal. Fr. cellulifuge; Ital. cellulifugo. Passing in a direction away from a cell.

Said of a nervous impulse with reference to the cells from which the conducting axis cylinders arise. Opposed to cellipetal. There is usually an obvious morphological difference between the cellifugal and the cellipetal processes of a nerve-cell. Cf. NEUROCYTE. (H.H.)

Cellipetal: see CELLIFUGAL.

Cenogenesis: see PALINGENESIS.

Cenogenetic Characters: see BIOGENETIC LAW.

Central [Lat. centrum, a centre]: Ger. central; Fr. central; Ital. centrale. Pertaining to nervous centres or cells, as contrasted with peripheral, which means pertaining to nerve-courses or end-organs. (J.M.B.)

Centre [Lat. centrum]: Ger. Centrum; Fr. centre; Ital. centro. A collection of nerve-cells which act together for the performance of some more or less definite function.

Such are the various cortical centres, the respiratory centre of the medulla, the reflex centres of the medulla and cord, the various visceral centres of the sympathetic plexuses, &c. (H.H.)

Centre of Mass or Gravity: Ger. Schwerpunkt, Massenmittelpunkt; Fr. centre de masse, de gavité; Ital. centro di gravità ('Centre of mass' is the more correct term, though the other is more familiar.) A point in a body or system of bodies such that, if the body or system were suspended by that point, it would be balanced in all positions when acted on by gravity. (S.N.)

Centre of Rotation: Ger. Drehpunkt (des Auges); Fr. centre de rotation (de l'oeil); Ital. centro di rotazione (del globo oculare). The point at which the sagittal, frontal, and vertical axes of the eye intersect at right angles.

Literature: HELMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optik (2nd ed.), 614, 656. SANFORD, Course in Exper. Psychol., 119. (E.B.T.)

Centrifugal Force and Centripetal Force [Lat. centrum, centre, + fugere, to flee from; and centrum + petere, to move toward, to seek]: Ger. Fliehkraft oder Centrifugalkraft, und Centripetalkraft; Fr. force centrifuge et centripète; Ital. forza centrifuga e centripeta. Centripetal force is any force drawing a body toward a centre of motion, as the planets are drawn toward the sun; familiarly, a force continually deflecting the motion of a body, so that it shall move in a closed curve around a centre. The most familiar example of the force is seen in the case of a sling. The tendency of a body being always to continue its motion in a straight line, a force is required to keep the stone in the sling moving around in a circle. This force is exerted by the string of the sling.

Centrifugal force is, properly speaking, only the reaction of a body to a centripetal force. In the case of the sling, the latter is the pull of the holder's hand upon the string, while the former is the pull of the string upon the hand. In the case of a flywheel the centripetal force is exerted by the spokes to keep the parts of the rim in place, while the centrifugal force is a corresponding pull of the rim upon the spokes. The forces in question increase as the square of the angular velocity; and if the latter becomes so rapid that the spokes are not strong enough to keep the rim in its place, they break, and the rim flies to pieces. In this case the pieces of the rim fly off in the direction in which they were moving at the moment of rupture, and not radially from the centre, as is commonly thought. So, in the case of the sling, if H is the position of the hand, and S that of the stone at the moment of release, then both the centrifugal and the centripetal forces cease at this moment, and the stone flies off in the direction of the tangent SP. (S.N.)

Centrosome [Gr. kentron, centre, + swma, body]: Ger. Centrosoma; Fr. centrosome, sphère attractive (in botany); Ital. centrosoma. That specialized part of a cell which is regarded as the active centre in the process of division.

The term was proposed by Boveri (1887). The centrosome is now regarded by many observers as an essential and relatively permanent feature of the cell. It generally lies outside but near the nucleus. In its passive condition it is a minute speck in the cell; but in its active phase it becomes the centre of an 'attraction sphere,' with radiating fibres, constituting the aster (Fol, 1877). Along these fibres the split CHROMOSOMES (q.v.) travel in cell-division to the opposite poles of the achromatic spindle. The question of its existence in the higher plants (angiosperms) is still under discussion.

Literature: TH. BOVERI, Ueber die Befruchtung der Eier von Ascaris megalocephala, Sitzber. Ges. Morph. Phys. (München, 1887); E. B. WILSON, The Cell in Devel. and Inheritance (1896). (C.LL.M.- E.S.G.)

Cephalic Index: see INDEX.

Cerebral Vesicles: Ger. Hirnbläschen; Fr. vésicules cérébrales; Ital. vescicole cerebrali. Embryonic expansions of the medullary tube giving rise to the several major divisions of the brain. See BRAIN (Embryology).

They form the embryonic structures, from which arise the fore-, mid-, and hind-brain. Though the ventricles are derived from the cavities of the vesicles they do not correspond to them in number or form. (H.H.)

Cerinthus. Probably lived during the reign of Trajan, 98-117 (Eusebius). Founder of one of the heretical sects, called Cerinthians. Irenaeus regards him as a consistent Gnostic, stating that St. John wrote his gospel to weaken the influence of the sect.

Certainty (logical) [Lat. certus, sure, through Fr. certain]: Ger. Gewissheit; Fr. certitude; Ital. certezza. Complete CERTITUDE (q.v.) with reference to a logical assertion or judgment.

It keeps in view (1) the content of the assertion made, and (2) the attitude of the asserting mind. In both cases certainty attaches to the feature of objective validity. An assertion is certain when its content is taken to be such that it must be asserted by all intelligences, i.e. when its truth is taken to be assured by universally valid grounds. Logical certainty thus names only the representation of the universal or common character of certainty, that which does not depend on the special kind of content involved.

Historically, the problem may be said to begin in those discussions which preceded Aristotle's definite statement of the distinction between mediate and immediate truths (see Anal. Post., i). From that time onwards the problem has been (1) to determine the nature of the assumed immediate truths in such a manner as to make the objective value claimed for them conceivable; (2) to clear up the relation in which mediate stands to immediate truth, and therewith, it may be said, to determine the worth of the highly metaphorical relation in which they are generally assumed to stand.

Literature: JAVARY, De la Certitude (1847); GRUNG, Das Problem der Gewissheit (1886); MILHAUD, Certitude Logique (2nd ed., 1898), and Le Rationnel (1897). (R.A.)

Certitude or Certainty (psychological) [Lat. certitudo, from certus, certain]: Ger. Gewissheit; Fr. certitude; Ital. certezza. The degree of assurance felt with reference to something presented to the mind.

This term is employed to express degrees of (1) conviction or belief. It is then applied to all cases from the slight tendency to accept a proposition or fact (characterized by the transition from the phrases 'I think,' 'I fancy,' to 'I presume,' 'I begin to be convinced') up to so-called 'complete certitude.' or knowledge. Certain authorities limit certitude to the highest degrees of assurance, where the possibility of doubt is excluded (e.g. Newman, Grammar of Assent). It also applies (2) to degrees of reality-feeling or realizing-sense,' in cases which do not involve argument, doubt, or explicit belief in any sort of assertion.

Like other terms of epistemological value, certitude is often carried over from the mind to its object and made a property of the latter; we say a proposition has certitude. In logic this is legitimate as a shorthand way of saying that a proposition is fitted to arouse certitude, or has a certain degree of PROBABILITY (q.v.).

Literature: see BELIEF, and CERTAINTY (logical). (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)

Cervical Region: see NERVOUS SYSTEM.

Cesare: see MOOD (in logic)

Chain Syllogism: Ger Schlusskette, Kettenschluss; Fr. sorite; Ital. sorite. German logicians have named by cognate terms two forms of compound syllogism: (1) that in which the final syllogism has for its premises the conclusions of preceding syllogisms, Schlusskette, when the former is called Epi-syllogism, the latter Pro-syllogism; (2) when the conclusion is drawn from a series of more than two premises, SORITES (q.v.) or Kettenschluss.

Literature: UEBERWEG, Logik, §§ 124-5. (R.A.)

Chalybäus, Heinrich Moritz. (1796-1862.) A German philosopher, born and died in Saxony. In 1839 he became professor in Kiel. His best known works are on the history of modern philosophy and on ethics.

Champeaux, Guillaume de. A French philosopher, died in 1121. He taught rhetoric and logic in Paris. Abelard was first his pupil, then his rival, and afterwards his superior in fame and learning. In 1113 he became bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne.

Chance [Lat. cadere, to fall]: Ger. Zufall; Fr. chance, hazard; Ital. caso accidente. (1) An occurrence due to chance is one which has no assignable cause, and hence popularly supposed to have no cause. Chance itself was then hypostatized (the Greek tuch) as a source of uncaused events.

The theory of absolute chance, or pure accidentalism, has been given up -- only remaining as a metaphysical speculation, called TYCHISM (q.v.), in favour of the following meaning, for which the term should be reserved.

(2) A chance event is one that can be accounted for after it has happened, or predicted before it happens, by the law of PROBABILITY (q.v.). The same law provides a statement of the degree of probability, called 'the chance,' of an event's happening, on the basis of what is already known. Cf. VARIATIONS. (J.M.B.)

Change [Lat. cambire, to barter; through Fr.]: Ger. Veränderung; Fr. changement; Ital. cambiamento, mutazione. The occurrence of any difference or variation, whether any identity is involved or not. A general term which includes movement, modification, becoming, growth, &c. (R.H.S.)

The meaning of change (metabolh, mutatio) may be defined under two different heads, according as (1) a change is said to have occurred, or (2) a thing is said to have undergone a change.

(1) The occurrence of a change denotes that there exists, at some one moment of time a distinguishable thing which either did not exist at the immediately preceding moment or does not exist at the immediately succeeding moment. The term thus covers the transition (a) from the existence of nothing but time to the existence of something in time; (b) from the existence of something in time to the existence of nothing but time; (c) from the existence of something in time to the existence of something else in time, different from the first in some other respect than mere position in time.

(2) This sense is narrower than (1) in that it will not include (a) and (b), but wider in that it will include one case excluded by (c), namely, the fact (a) that what exists at two immediately successive moments, though differing in no distinguishable respect except position in time, may be said to have changed its position in time. In this sense every position in space may be said to change its position in time at every moment. This use only arises because any two things which differ from one another in no respect except that they occupy immediately successive moments of time, are said to be one thing. Thus a position in space which differs from another in no respect except its position in time, is said to be one and the same position as this other. If 'same position in space' be understood in this sense, then, further (b), if contiguous positions in space be occupied at immediately successive moments by things which differ in no distinguishable respect except their position both in time and space, these two things are also said to be one thing, and that thing is said to have changed its position in space. This change constitutes motion, and this and all following meanings are also covered by (1 c). It is recognized that motion, but not mere change of position in time, is one of the most important forms of change. But (g) a thing which merely moves is not said itself to change, in the sense of being changed; and hence we get a third meaning of change, in which it can be applied to nothing less complex than a system of moving things, whose relative positions are changed in such a way that the configuration of the system is different at one moment from what it was in the last. Such a system is said to be one thing and to change, but only on condition that each of the elements composing it is one thing in the narrower sense defined under (b). This is the simplest sense in which a thing that occupies space may be said to change in quality. (d) Further meanings of change in an extended thing are less definite, although it is to these that the term is most commonly applied. The thing can now only be defined as one thing by the condition that most of its parts, but not all, are the same in the sense defined under (b) at any two successive moments of time. In this sense, for the first time, a thing may be said to change in quantity. It changes in quantity alone if, while its figure is mathematically similar at two successive moments, some parts belong to it in the one which did not, or do not, belong to it in the other. It changes both in quantity and quality if its figure be also dissimilar at two successive moments, it being always understood that most of its parts remain the same as defined under (b). (e) A still further difficulty in the way of exact definition of change in a physical thing, is introduced, if a thing be understood to include its 'secondary qualities,' as is usually the case. It is in this sense that a change of quality is most commonly predicated of a thing; and this denotes that a thing, defined as one and the same thing under (d), besides its changes in quantity and figure, possesses also different secondary qualities at successive moments. The difference in its secondary qualities may consist either in the absence at one moment of one or more qualities present at the other, or in a difference in intensity or extension, or in both, of one or more qualities present at both moments. (x) A mental change may be defined as denoting the existence, at successive moments, of different qualities, or different quantities of the same quality, in one and the same mind; and a mind may be defined as one and the same, either, if it is self-conscious, by the feeling of the self that it is the same and that all its states belong to it, or, if it is not self-conscious, by the correlation of its states with one brain or part of a brain, defined as one under (e). (h) A thing cannot be said to undergo a change from better to worse unless it also changes in some one of the senses above enumerated, and it is most commonly said to do so when this change is a change in quality.

It is plain that all senses of change under (2) imply that an identical element of content continues to exist in the thing changed, throughout the change, since this, combined with continuity in space in the case of physical things, and with continuity in time in all cases, is necessary to constitute it one thing, i.e. to constitute its material identity. Under sense (1) no such persistence of identical content is necessarily implied.

One thing is said to change another when it contains the cause of some change which occurs in the other.

Heraclitus, who emphasized the perpetual occurrence of change under the name of becoming (gignesqai), seems to have understood the term chiefly as denoting change in one thing's secondary qualities, this one thing being supposed by him to be fire. Plato, who makes much use of the same term, seems also to have meant chiefly change in a thing's qualities; and he would seem to have excluded motion, since he ascribes this to what is real, whereas gignomena is only used by him to denote what is phenomenal. Aristotle often identifies motion and change (metabolh), distinguishing four kinds of both: (1) change in essence (kat' onsian), (2) in quality, (3) in quantity, (4) in place; but elsewhere he distinguishes them, e.g. excluding (1) from the conception of motion. Similarly, he seems sometimes to affirm and sometimes to deny that becoming (genesiV) and its correlative destruction (fqora) fall under the conception of motion. After him no noteworthy advance towards a clearer conception of the terms seems to have been made till the growth of the mechanical sciences at the Renaissance, and the consequent distinction of 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities. This distinction brought into a clearer light that between motion and change of figure on the one hand, and change in qualities other than figure on the other. Hegel appears to have used becoming to include the logical relation between one proposition and that which may be inferred from it. This use is the more appropriate in him, since he conceives the truth of some propositions to be actually absorbed in that of others, so that they cease to be true. This supposed change of things not existing in time into one another, especially of opposites into opposites, has, whether meant metaphorically or not, become a characteristic doctrine with many who are influenced by him. Similarly, they talk of the dialectic 'movement' and of the 'self-movement' of an Idea or Universal. It is generally held that change implies some persistent identical element, whether it be change of logical or existent entities; but it is not commonly distinguished whether that which is identical in the latter case must itself always exist or not.

Literature: LOTZE, Metaphysics; SIGWART, Logic; see also BIBLIOG. B, I, c. (G.E.M.)

Channing, William Ellery. (1780-1842.) An eminent American Unitarian preacher and writer. Graduated at Harvard University, 1798, and studied theology at Cambridge and Newport. Ordained in 1803.

Chaos: see COSMOS, COSMOGONY, and NATURE (philosophy of).

Character [Gr. carakthr, a letter]: Ger. Charakter; Fr. caractère; Ital. carattere. An individual mind has a character, so far as its modes of feeling, thinking, and acting show unity, consistency, and distinctive individuality. (G.F.S.-J.M.B.)

The term is applied to the mental life as a whole, but also to phases of it, as mental or moral character. Individual psychology is the science of character; important special topics being TEMPERAMENT and TYPE (see these terms). (J.M.B.)

Character (in biology). Any anatomical or functional mark by which individuals are distinguished. It is entirely a relative term, that at one time being a character which at another time is a group of characters; a source of much confusion in discussions of ACQUIRED AND CONGENITAL CHARACTERS, CORRELATION, &c. See these terms.

The much-discussed question of specific characters is that concerning the congenital marks common to the individuals of a species, and of such a distinctive sort as to serve to distinguish one SPECIES (q.v.) from others. (J.M.B.)

Characteristic: Ger. Characteristik; Fr. caractéristique; Ital. caratteristica. (1) A distinctive trait or quality, which marks or characterizes an individual as such in distinction from those qualities which he may have in common with family, race, &c.; called 'individual characteristic,' and also used adjectively. Applied also to natural objects and to races, peoples, &c., when considered as classes or unities. The substantive 'character' is preferred, however, as 'racial,' 'generic,' &c. characters. See CHARACTER (in biology). (J.M.B.)

(2) In art and aesthetic criticism: a representation which brings out clearly and truthfully the elements which are most important in the object or action, as distinguishing it from others. This has a threefold aesthetic value: (a) through the recognition of the truthfulness of the reproduction: this may be largely negative, for falsity or distortion is a source of displeasure; (b) through its satisfaction of the interest in variety (as against monotony); (c) often also the demand to be oneself, and the feeling of interest in one's own peculiar personality, are strengthened and gratified by the recognition of marked individuality in what is portrayed. For the history of the characteristic in art theories, see ART, and EXPRESSION.

The discussion of the characteristic has not always been distinguished from that of expression. Properly, however, it is only one phase of expression. It has frequently been treated as an element outside of beauty; 'Beauty is perfection of form unmodified by any predominant characteristic' (Hare). Yet it is now generally regarded as one of the important elements of aesthetic value.

Literature: BOSANQUET, Hist. of Aesth. (1892); FECHNER, Vorschule d. Aesth. (1876), chap. xxiii; KÖSTLIN, Aesth. (1869); VON HARTMANN, Aesth., ii (1887). See also under EXPRESSION, and ART. (J.H.T.)

Charity [Lat. caritas]: Ger. Charitas, Menschenliebe; Fr. charité; Ital. carità. (1) Benevolent love of others: commonly, in modern usage, it refers also (2) to the almsgiving in which that love is manifested.

It is not possible to distinguish charity in its first and more general signification from BENEVOLENCE (q.v.). But the place given to it by Paul (1 Cor. xiii), as the highest virtue of Christian character, and its connection in his exposition with Christian faith and hope, coupled with the absence of any equivalent conception in the pagan or classical list of cardinal virtues, led to Augustine's re-interpretation of the virtues as depending on love to God and one's neighbour, and to the subsequent classifications of Aquinas and the mediaeval moralists generally. In these classifications the triad, faith, hope, and charity, were distinguished as 'theologic virtues' from the four cardinal virtues of classical tradition, and were held to be implanted in man by the supernatural grace of God. Of the three, faith was held by Aquinas to be first in order of origin, charity to be highest in order of perfection. Charity is said to be the mother and root of the other virtues, since it is through it that they attain the perfection of virtue (Summa, II. i. Q. 62). A modern Roman Catholic writer (Father Rickaby) defines charity as 'the love that we bear to ourselves and our neighbours in view of our coming from God and going to God,' and says, 'Charity differs from philanthropy in looking beyond the present life and above creatures. A materialist or atheist may possess philanthropy, but not charity' (Mor. Philos., 238-9).

The love or charity which characterized the early Christian society was from the first exhibited in provision for the poor by means of voluntary offerings. Charity, in this sense, was distinguished from mere liberality, because due to the love of man to man, in virtue of their common spiritual relationship to God and Christ. It was accordingly encouraged, and to a large extent organized, by the Church. The uncertain benefits of indiscriminate almsgiving, and its frequent evil effects on the recipients, have led to various systematic attempts at the organization of charity (partly in connection with the Church, partly by extra-ecclesiastical organizations) -- these efforts being directed towards combating the causes of pauperism instead of merely mitigating its results.

The use of the term charity for favourable judgment upon the motives and character of others is connected with Paul's encomium upon it as 'thinking no evil.' This usage is as much justified by the original meaning of the term as the special signification of almsgiving.

Literature: LECKY, Hist. of European Morals, iv; T. MACKAY, The State and Charity (1898). (W.R.S.)

Charm [Lat. carmen, song]: Ger. (1) Zauber, (2) bezaubern; Fr. (1) charme; (2) charmer; Ital. (1) incanto, (2) incantare. (1) Noun: an object, saying, or formula, supposed to have peculiar virtue, and hence looked upon with veneration. Sometimes the influence is regarded as purely intrinsic to the object, as in certain verbal formulae, and at other times it is regarded as more or less derivative from connection with something else, usually a person.

(2) Verb: to exercise a peculiar or fascinating influence.

Usage (1) has been current in discussions of primitive religion (see FETICH, AMULET, IDOL) and superstition. Usage (2) is largely employed in descriptions of so-called FASCINATION, TRANCE, and HYPNOSIS, and in the practice of MAGIC (see these terms and the literature cited under them). (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)

Charron, Pierre. (1541-1603.) An eminent French preacher and philosophical writer, follower of Montaigne, whose expressions he tried to systematize. He was born, and died, in Paris. His most famous treatise is On Wisdom.

Charter [Lat. charta]: Ger. Freibrief; Fr. charte, lettres patentes; Ital. patente. A written grant made by public authority, conferring or securing rights; as the Great Charter, Magna Charta.

Formerly used for any written evidence of things done between man and man (Cowell's Interpreter, in verbo). (S.E.B.)

Chastity [Lat. castus, pure]: Ger. Keuschheit; Fr. chasteté; Ital. castità. Purity of life in sexual relations.

As a virtue of character, chastity is closely related to, or is a special case of, temperance. Its connection with respect for the marriage-bond is obvious; but the latter is more dependent on the law and custom of particular times and communities, and belongs accordingly, as Sidgwick remarks, to the virtue of order rather than to that of purity. The exact nature of chastity has been discussed in great detail by some Roman Catholic moralists, largely in the interest of the Confessional. A short discussion is given by Sidgwick, Meth. of Eth., III. xi. 7. (W.R.S.)

Chemical Synthesis: Ger. chemische Synthese; Fr. synthèse chimique; Ital. sintesi chimica. The union of chemical elements according to what is variously known as 'Dalton's law,' 'law of atomic weight,' 'law of chemical affinity,' &c.

Dalton's law, according to Armstrong (Encyc. Brit., 9th ed., art. Chemistry), assumed 'the ultimate particles of matter to be incapable of further division; atoms, possessing definite weights, the ratios of which could be denoted by numbers, the ratio of an atom of hydrogen being taken as unity. . . . Those which unite have affinity.' (J.M.B.)

Child Psychology: Ger. Psychologie des Kindes; Fr. psychologie de l'enfant; Ital. psicologia della fanciullezza (or del bambino). That department of PSYCHOLOGY (q.v.) which investigates the mind of the child.

Literature: L. N. WILSON, Bibliog. of Child-Study (also in Pedag. Sem., 1898; an alphabetical list of authors, with journals and works of reference, and classified subject-index); PREYER, The Mind of the Child (Die Seele des Kindes, 4th ed.); WARNER, The Study of Children; MOORE, Mental Development of a Child, Mo. Supp. iii to the Psychol. Rev.; OPPENHEIM, The Devel. of the Child; TRACY, The Devel. of the Child; SHINN, Notes on the Devel. of a Child SULLY, Studies of Childhood; COMPAYRÉ, Intellectual and Moral Devel. of the Child; ZIEHEN, Ideenassociation des Kindes (1899); BALDWIN, Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race, and Social and Eth. Interpret.; L. FERRI, Studio sullo Sviluppo mentale di un Bambino (1890); P. LOMBROSO, Psicol. del Bambino (1894); A. GARBINI, Colour-sense of Children, in Arch. per Antropol., XXIV. i. 72, ii. 193; HOLDEN and BOSSE, Arch. of Ophthal., xxix, 1900, No. 3. (J.M.B.- E.M.)

Chiliasm [Gr. ciliaV, a thousand]: Ger. Chiliasmus; Fr. chiliasme (millénium); Ital. chiliasmo. The name applied to the apocalyptic ideas with regard to Christ's second coming, which flourished in the early Christian communities. The title is hardly accurate, because it refers to but one of the apocalyptic doctrines, viz. that the duration of the kingdom of Christ upon earth will be one thousand years (cf. MONTANISM).

The early years of Christianity were marked by deep unrest, spread over the civilized world. Incident to this were the semi-spiritual, semi-material ideals that a new and better state of things was soon destined to be realized on earth. These conceptions, though first crystallized in the late Jewish apocalyptic literature, were so characteristic of the times that they formed an integral part of the Christian consciousness. They were not dogmas, because dogma had not then appeared; they were naïve, or unsystematized, expectations. In short, they formed the mystic element which is always inseparably bound up with every great religious movement. Such writers as Papias, Irenaeus, the Montanists, Tertullian, Barnabas, and Justin Martyr gave expression to them; and so long as Christianity was struggling to gain a foothold they remained integral to its teaching. Although the Apocalypse of John -- which is the classical Christian source for this expectation -- is sharply differentiated from similar Jewish writings, sub-apostolic Christian writers adopted Jewish ideas on the subject without hesitation. As Christianity grew in power, Chiliasm waned correspondingly, and, after the Montanist controversy (165-220), it came to be viewed less and less as an essential element in the traditions of the Church. Augustine gave Chiliasm its death-blow by identifying the anticipated New Jerusalem with the Christian Church -- which is already the City of God upon earth. The apocalyptic conceptions thus failed to find place in the formulated dogmas of the ecclesiastical organization; but when spiritual movements have reasserted themselves within the bosom of Christianity, Chiliastic tendencies have often reappeared, as e.g. in Joachim of Floris, and the pre-Reformation mystics; in the Anabaptism of the 15th and 16th centuries; and in various forms of Pietism till the present time.

Literature: CORRODI, Krit. Gesch. d. Chiliasmus; VOLK, Der Chiliasmus; SPENER, Die Hoffnung besserer Zeit; SCHÜRER, Hist. of the Jewish People in the Time of Christ (Eng. trans.); HILGENFELD, Die jüdische Apokalyptik; AUBERLEN, Daniel u. d. Offenbarung Johannis; HÖLEMANN, Die Stellung St. Pauli z. d. Frage ü d. Wiederkunft Christi; HELLWAG, in the Theol. Jahrb. (Baur), 1848; JOËL, Blicke in d. Religionsgesch. zu Anfang d. 2. christl. Jahrhunderts; CUNNINGHAM, The Second Coming of Christ; RENAN, L'Antéchrist; DORNER, Person of Christ (Eng. trans.), i. 408 f.; BRIGGS, Pre-millenarianism. (R.M.W.)

China (religion in): see ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (China).

Chiromancy (or Chei-) [Gr. ceir, hand, + manteia, divination]: Ger. Chiromantik; Fr. chiromancie; Ital. chiromanzia. A system of interpretation of the lines, lineaments, prominences, and general characteristics of the hand, with the usual purpose of reading therefrom the personal characteristics of the individual, or his fortunes and experiences in the future.

As an actual science or practice it merits little or no recognition in this work. It is interesting historically as a phase in the antecedents of modern science (such as alchemy or phrenology), and also anthropologically as a form of belief, or an attempt to read the future by the symbolic interpretation of accidental details (cf. DIVINATION, and MAGIC), akin in motive though not in practice to other forms of divination.

Literature: typical works which attempt a modern revival or restoration of this practice, usually under the term Palmistry, are E. H. ALLEN, Science of the Hand (1889, with bibliog.); H. FRITH, Pract. Palmistry (1895); EASTER HENDERSON, Guide to Palmistry (1894); A. R. CRAIG, Science of Modern Palmistry (1884); H. GERMAIN, Pract. Palmistry (1897). (J.J.)

Choice [Fr. choix]: Ger. Wahl; Fr. choix; Ital. scelta. The volition to perform an act, issuing out of comparison of this act with other alternative acts, or with the state of remaining inactive. See MOTIVE, and VOLITION. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)

This view represents choice as in all cases a function of some deliberation, and as always directed toward a conceived end. The question as between choice of means and choice of end (immediate and remote ends respectively) is really that of the determination of the end; seeing that if the means do not enter as part of the chosen end, a new act of choice follows for the adoption of means, and it then becomes end in its turn. The interesting case in which the chosen end is really a compromise to secure the relative satisfaction of a desire represented in the alternatives, but not directly realizable, has been covered by the distinction between 'potential' and 'final' choice; the former attaching to the larger whole of desire, and the latter to the compromise-end adopted to advance it. Most choices are thus final elements, or means, in a larger system of desire. (J.M.B.)

An ethical choice is a voluntary decision between two alternatives which are contrasted as morally good and bad, or relatively better and worse. (W.R.S.- J.M.B.)

Literature: see the general works on psychology, and BIBLIOG. G, 2, w. (J.M.B.)

Chord [Gr. cordh, the string of a musical instrument]: Ger. Klang, Zusammenklang, Accord; Fr. accord; Ital. accordo. A harmonic, consonant or dissonant, combination of two or more simple, or more often compound, tones. A consonant chord is termed a concord, a dissonant chord a discord.

Literature: HELMHOLTZ, Sensations of Tone, 211; STUMPF, Tonpsychologie, ii. (E.B.T.)

Chorea [Gr. coreia, dance]: Ger. Veitstanz; Fr. chorée, danse de Saint-Guy; Ital. corea. Functional disturbance of the motor centres resulting in spasmodic involuntary movements which persist for a longer or shorter time, but are interrupted by sleep (St. Vitus's dance).

The cause of the disease is unknown, though it is suggestively associated with rheumatism. It occurs chiefly in ill-nourished female children, and the prognosis is not necessarily unfavourable. (H.H.)

Christ [Gr. cristoV, anointed; o XristoV, the Anointed -- a translation of the Hebrew 'Messiah']: Ger. Christus; Fr. Christ; Ital. Cristo. Originally not the name of a person, as is so often supposed, but of an office, that of Deliverer. Jesus of Nazareth came to be identified with the completely successful fulfilment of this office so soon after his death -- perhaps during his life -- that the office came to be wrapped up in the Person, as it never was in regard to Buddha. Cf. CHRISTOLOGY, INCARNATION, KENOSIS, TRINITY.

Stripping off later theological accretions, there seems to be little or no doubt that this identification was already an accomplished fact with the first generation of Christians. It reposed upon three considerations -- crystallized propositions had not been formulated then: (1) The divinity, (2) the death, (3) the exaltation, of Jesus. To the earliest Christians the divinity of Jesus was synonymous with his fulfilment of the Messianic office as verified by his conception of the divine revelation, and by the fact that he stood in a unique relation to God. His death was a necessary incident in his Messianic work, for it opened the gate to that new kingdom of God, in which man would be delivered from sin for ever. His exaltation was the indispensable prelude to his return in glory at no distant period. Other beliefs about Christ belong to the realm of theology rather than of history, and fall properly under CHRISTOLOGY (q.v.). At the same time, several essential features of the earliest beliefs about Christ contain the germs of those which were to follow. In so far as they are Messianic, they differ from Jewish expectations in being non-political and of a spiritual, even eschatological, nature. The expectation of the second coming of Messiah is entirely non-Jewish, and affords the basis for the doctrine of the kingdom of God. Further, and in strong contrast with what might be anticipated in a Jewish environment, there is evidence for the very early use of the Trinitarian formula.

Literature: this is enormous. See arts. in Encyc. Brit. and Herzog's Real-Encyc., also in WEISS, Bib. Theol. of New Testament (Eng. trans.). Later works are HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma, i (Eng. trans.); SCHÜRER, The Jewish People (Eng. trans.), and Die Predigt Jesu in ihrem Verhältniss z. A. T. u. z. Judenthum; BALDENSPERGER, Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu im Licht d. messianischen Hoffungen s. Zeit; WENDT, Die Lehre Jesu (Eng. trans. of ii); WEIZSÄCKER, Apostolic Age (Eng. trans.); BOUSSET, Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz z. Judenthum; BEYSCHLAG, Bib. Theol. of the New Testament (Eng. trans.); GUNKEL, in Theol. Lit. -zeit. (1893); C. HOLTZMANN, in Zeitsch. f. Theol. u. Kirche, i. 367 f. On the early presence of the Trinitarian formula see RESCH, Aussercanonische Paralleltexte z. d. Evangelien, ii. Heft (Paralleltexte z. Matthaeus u. Marcus). (R.M.W.)

Christian Consciousness: Ger. christliches Bewusstsein; Fr. conscience chrétienne; Ital. coscienza cristiana. A variant on the Hegelian phrase 'universal consciousness,' meaning, technically, consciousness of Christian doctrine -- in the sense of the Christian point of view -- as diffused among men, and this with special reference to its unitary movement. The Christian consciousness is the Ethos, or self-determining expression, of Christendom.

Literature: BRACE, Gesta Christi; SCHMIDT, The Social Results of Early Christianity (Eng. trans.). Cf. ETHICS (Christian). (R.M.W.)

Christian Science: see FAITH-CURE.

Christianity [Lat. Christianus, partisan of Christus]: Ger. Christenthum; Fr. Christianisme; Ital. Cristianesimo. The name of the religion founded by Jesus Christ.

Although based upon the entire career of Jesus, and issuing from his Person, Christianity involved other elements even at the outset, and in the course of history it absorbed and assimilated several movements originally quite alien. On analysis, the constituent parts may be stated as follows: (1) Jesus Christ, in his life, death, and abiding personal influence. (2) The Jewish environment of Jesus and the earliest Christians -- with special reference to the Old Testament conceptions of God, Man, the Messiah, and to the Jewish Law. On a broad survey of the history of Christianity, it may be said that, whenever personal religion and personal conviction of sin have predominated, or when a reaction against dogmatic theology and the domination of ecclesiastical organization has taken place, a tendency to emphasize the Jewish factor of personal relation to God, or to return to God's revelation of himself in Jesus, or to cling to both of these, has manifested itself. (3) Greek, Graeco-Jewish, and Neo-Platonic philosophy. During periods of theological controversy, especially controversy concerning the person of Christ (cf. CHRISTOLOGY), or concerning God's relation to the world and man, this element has commonly exercised sway. (4) Roman polity. The Latin, Greek, and Anglican Churches are organizations modelled upon the Roman empire. In pre-Reformation history the influence of the Roman or quasi-political element determined the external organization of the Church, and furnished an ideal, the realization of which was expected to result in the erection of the kingdom of God upon earth. (5) The peculiar national consciousness, or racial tendency, of the various people who came to be Christianized. This has expressed itself mainly by evincing strong affinity for one or other of the elements already noted; e.g. Latins and Celts for the Roman element; Teutons for the Jewish element; mystics -- who appeared chiefly among the Teutonic stock -- for the Greek element, which allows free play for personal and intellectual preferences. At the present time a new movement is in progress, particularly among the peoples of the Teutonic stock. They are deserting the individualism which has characterized them since the Reformation, and are beginning to emphasize the social side of Christianity -- which, in the course of history, has been associated with the Roman element -- yet without using the Roman polity, and drawing for motive force, not so much upon ecclesiastical organization, as upon the conviction of personal relation to Jesus, and the necessity for living his life here and now.

Literature: see CHRIST, CHRISTOLOGY; GORE (editor), Lux Mundi; E. CAIRD, Evolution of Religion; JULIA WEDGWOOD, The Moral Ideal; O. PFLEIDERER, Philos. and Devel. of Religion; ULLMANN, Reformers before the Reformation (Eng. trans.); WENLEY, Preparation for Christianity (an elementary outline). (R.M.W.)

Christology [Gr. criotoV, anointed, + logoV, discourse]: Ger. Christologie; Fr. Christologie; Ital. Cristologia. The name given to the various doctrines, for the most part systematic or theologico-philosophical, concerning the Person of Christ. The subject is dominated by the problems which necessarily arise in connection with the coexistence of two natures in a single personality.

Christology in the strict sense cannot be said to have existed till after the formulation of the doctrine of Christ's exaltation to the right hand of God. And, notwithstanding its general harmoniousness, the teaching of the New Testament on the subject implies important questions not yet capable of clear statement, and therefore still unanswerable. They are connected chiefly with the part played in the minds of the earliest disciples and of the New Testament writers by the Jewish conception of Messiah. At the same time, it is undeniable that, if taken for what they bear on the face of them, the New Testament declarations, particularly those of the Pauline epistles, contain the suggestions, and even the formulated propositions, which later writers have no more than elaborated from different points of view and with additional aids.

After the 1st century Christology follows certain lines of development, which can be traced with sufficient clearness, notwithstanding the extraordinary clash of opinions prior to the great Councils of the Church.

(1) The period prior to the Arian controversy, say 100-325 A. D. Leading theories of this stage are: (a) EBIONISM (q.v.); a Jewish theory, exclusively humanitarian in doctrine, and denying the Virgin birth, and, therefore, the Incarnation. (b) GNOSTICISM (q.v.); a pagan and theosophical theory, characterized by evaporation of the human element in Christ's nature, which was treated as a phantasm; hence the name DOCETISM (q.v.) often applied to this doctrine. Variations of the theory are to be found in the speculations of the Basilidians, to whom Christ became divine at the moment of baptism; and of the Valentinians, who viewed the Virgin merely as Christ's means of entrance into the world. (c) The Alogi and the followers of Artemon, who are essentially Unitarians, or who at the most admit no more than the energizing of a divine principle or power in Christ. (d) The Patripassions of the Western and the Sabellians of the Eastern Roman world. The former merged the divinity of Christ in God by teaching that the 'same God is at once Father and Son,' a view which led to the inference that God himself had been crucified. The Sabellians taught a triple aspect theory; Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are modes in which the original divine substance is manifested. The characteristic result is a denial of Christ's personality, and this is summed up in the theory of Paul of Samosata, which leads to a sharp distinction between the Logos and the man Jesus. In all these schemes the influence of Greek, particularly Neo-Platonic, speculations operated powerfully. (e) The same may be said of the Christological speculations of the Apostolic Fathers: Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Dionysius. Of these Origen is the most important. Although he holds the eternal generation of the Son from the substance of the Father, he is affected by Docetism, and also by the tendency to subordinate Christ to God. Although he is the first to employ the term 'God-man,' there can be no doubt that the problems -- even the 'heresies' -- raised by the Arian controversy lie embedded in his teaching. Cf. PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

(2) The Christology which resulted in the Nicene Symbol, 325-81 A. D. The principal theory of this period is that associated with the name of Arius, who held the precense of both natures in Christ. Christ, although he existed before the world, was created at a definite time by a specific act of God's will. Consequently he must be subordinate to God, and of a different substance or essence. The semi-Arians, while denying unity of essence, and not going so far as to inculcate the Arian HETERO-OUSIA (q.v.), proposed the doctrine of similarity of substance, a theory that at least possessed the advantage of adaptability. The orthodox Christology, formulated in opposition to these 'heresies,' is summed up in the Nicene Creed, which teaches that Christ is begotten, not made, and that he is of one substance with the Father.

(3) The Christology which resulted in the Symbol of Chalcedon, 381-451 A. D. The issues of the Arian controversy retained vitality for years, and new departures from the conciliar dogmas emerged. These are chiefly: (a) APOLLINARIANISM (q.v.), which taught that, while Christ possessed a human body, he had no rational soul, the place of this being occupied by the Logos. Not being truly human, his whole redemptive work was held by this teaching to be vitiated. (b) NESTORIANISM (q.v.), by which the two natures are placed side by side in external juxtaposition, and without vital intercommunion. This has proved one of the most persistent views. (c) EUTYCHIANISM (q.v.), according to which the human nature is submerged or completely informed and transformed by the divine. The fully elaborated Christology of the Church was formulated by the Council of Chalcedon in opposition to these 'heretical' views; and, as this creed is not so well known, it may be worth while to quote the essential part: 'We all with one voice confess our Lord Jesus Christ one and the same Son, the same perfect in Godhead, the same perfect in Manhood, very God and very Man, the same consisting of a reasonable soul and a body, of one substance with the Father as touching the Godhead, the same of one substance with us as touching the Manhood, like us in all things, sin except; begotten of the Father before the worlds as touching the Godhead, the same in these last days, for us and our salvation, born of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, as touching the Manhood one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, to be acknowledged of two natures, without confusion, without conversion, without division, never to be separated; the distinction of natures being in no wise done away because of the union, but rather the characteristic property of each nature being preserved, and concurring into one person and one substance; not as if Christ were parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and only-begotten God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ.'

(4) Christology till the Third Council of Constantinople, 689 A. D. (a) The Monophysitic 'heresy' in the Eastern Church. This was a recrudescence of Eutychianism. Christ has but one nature in which the human element is a contingent quality of the divine. The watchword of the MONOPHYSITES (q.v.) -- God has been crucified -- led to their being called also Theopaschites. This Christology still obtains to-day in some of the smaller Christian Churches, notably the Abyssinian and Armenian. (b) MONOTHELITISM (q.v.), in which the controversy shifted from Neo-Platonic to semi-psychological ground. The Monothelites maintained that, as Christ is one person, so he must have but one will; this, as against the doctrine of the Church, that he has two co-operating wills -- a human and a divine. The Third Council of Constantinople reaffirmed the formula of Chalcedon, and added a supplementary article 'preaching two natural wills and two natural operations.' From this time till the Reformation Christology practically stood fast on conciliar foundations; and it is worthy of note that the conciliar deliverances constitute the official Christology to-day in all the main branches of Christendom. A factual incarnation; two natures, supernaturally joined in one person, and this for the execution of a definite aim, otherwise impracticable; these sum up the teaching.

(5) Christology of Protestanism. Seeing that the Reformation was much more an ecclesiastico-political than a doctrinal change, Christology remained unaltered in essentials. Nevertheless, the new freedom and the spirit of the age let loose inquiry. (a) On the whole, Lutheran Christology exhibits some tendencies divergent from those of the Reformed Churches. The former lead to the emphasis of the divine nature of Christ rather than the human; the latter tend to separation of the two natures. The problem of the relation between the divine and the human element in Christ was thus raised once more, and a fresh discussion of the COMMUNICATIO IDIOMATUM (q.v.) took place. (b) Early in the 17th century the famous Kenosis versus Krypsis controversy arose between the theologians of Giessen and Tübingen, and with this Protestant Christology, strictly so called, may be said to close. This discussion related essentially to Christ's use of his divine powers during this period of his HUMILIATION (q.v.). Both schools agreed in attributing the possession of these powers to him. The Giessen Kenotists held that he abstained from exercising them. The Tübingen Kryptics urged that he employed them secretly. Although it had little influence at the time, this controversy, especially on the Kenotic side, still exists.

(6) Recent and contemporary Christology. In the 19th century Christology has been profoundly affected by philosophical considerations, and particularly by the Great German systems of the Kantian school. (a) Kant himself, so far as he retained elements of the 18th century rationalism, favoured a Unitarian standpoint, according to which Christ's divinity is an effect, not a precondition, of his life. (b) According to the Hegelian teaching, the divine and the human are different, not in kind, but only in degree; and therefore Christ differs in degree from other men; there is a greater fullness of the divine in him. (c) Schleiermacher, who approached the problem from the theological rather than the philosophical side, still retains humanitarian tendencies derived from the philosophical theologians, but finds in Christ's sinlessness a peculiar manifestation of deity, one not to be found in any other human being. (d) The most enlivening view of the middle of the 19th century was that of Richard Rothe, who departed from the formula of Chalcedon, and emphasized, as against Christ's two natures, his ethical personality. Christ came to be God by his life, passion, and death. This doctrine is, on the whole, possibly the most consonant with modern speculative thought. In the United States, Horace Bushnell adopted a view not very dissimilar. (e) More recently the Kenotic theory has had many representatives, of whom Delitzsch, Kahnis, Martensen, Lange, Godet, and Howard Crosby are the best known. The essential features of this Christology lie in the abandonment of the double will theory, approved by the Third Constantinople Council, and the substitution of a single will. Christ is held to have given up his divine attributes in the period between birth and resurrection. In other words, the human nature communicates its attributes to the divine; as to the precise extent of this communication there is, of course, much divergence of opinion between the various Kenotists. (f) Dorner, who, like some of the Calvinists, has criticized the Kenotists severely, promulgates the idea of a progressive divinization of Christ, a conception which several of the Christocentric theologians accept. Christ became more and more divine as his humanity expanded, for only as his humanity grew could he be the vehicle of the Logos. For the last few years attention has been directed more to the investigation of the historical circumstances of Christ's life than to systematic theorizing about his nature. This is consonant with certain dominant theological tendencies, especially those formulated by the school of Ritschl.

Literature: see CHRIST. The authoritative work for the whole subject is DORNER, Doctrine of the Person of Christ (Eng. trans.). WEIZSÄCKER, Apostolic Age (Eng. trans.); BEYSCHLAG, Christ. d. N. T., and New Testament Theol. (Eng. trans.); F. C. BAUR, Die christl. Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkeit u. Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtl. Entwickelung; HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.); NITZSCH, Dogmengeschichte; SCHNECKENBURGER, Zur kirchlichen Christol.; H. SCHULTZ, Die Lehre v. d. Gottheit Christi; art. Kenotiker u. Kryptiker in Herzog's Real-Encyc.; KANT, Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason (Eng. trans.); A. COQUEREL, Christologie; MARTINEAU, Seat of Authority in Religion; BIEDERMANN, Christl. Dogmatik; MATHESON, Aids to the Study of German Theology (for Hegelian view of Trinity); SCHLEIERMACHER, Der christl. Glaube; R. ROTHE, Dogmatik; DELITZSCH, Bib. Psychol. (Eng. trans.); MARTENSEN, Christl. Dogmatik; BRUCE, The Humiliation of Christ; F. J. HALL, The Kenotic Theory. For a recent destructive view of the early history see BRANDT, Die evangelische Gesch. u. d. Ursprung d. Christenthums; contra see SWETE, The Apostles' Creed; FAIRBAIRN, Christ in Modern Theol.; and in the Expositor, 1895 (with special reference to philosophy of religion); and his forthcoming work. The Person of Christ and Philos. of Religion; POWELL, The Principle of the Incarnation. (R.M.W.)

Christophany [Gr. o XristoV, the anointed, + fainein, to appear]: Ger. Christophania; Fr. Christophanie; Ital. Apparizioni di Cristo. The name given to the appearances of Christ to men after the Resurrection.

Setting faith aside, the narratives of the Gospel writers and of Paul raise two problems: (1) What are the historical facts now ascertainable? (2) Were the appearances of a perfectly natural or physical character, or were they in marked ways abnormal or spiritual?

(1) The evidence warrants these historical conclusions: (a) As Schenkel points out, Christ appeared only to his faithful followers, none of his persecutors saw him. (b) Devoted disciples were persuaded that he had appeared to them soon after the Crucifixion. (c) The precise order of these incidents and their exact number cannot now be known historically. (d) The incidents connected with the recorded manifestations show that Christ appeared in his 'heavenly,' not in his 'earthly' body. (e) The manifestation to Paul was 'heavenly.' These conclusions lead to the following: --

(2) The Christophanies do not require, but, on the contrary, tend to exclude a conception of the Resurrection as a physical reanimation of the fleshly body. In a word, history cannot help faith to a bodily Christophany.

No doubt, the question may be considered from the standpoint of system rather than of history. In this case the problem may be put thus: Were the appearances subjective hallucinations, as Strauss, Renan, and Holsten hold; or were they objectively real, as Ewald, Weisse, and Hanne contend? But a decision as between these views would seem to involve an appeal to history.

Literature: HASE, Gesch. Jesu; the Lives of Jesus, by STRAUSS, NEANDER, SCHENKEL (all Eng. trans.), WITTICHEN, EWALD, PRESSENSÉ; MILLIGAN, The Resurrection; KEIM, Jesus of Nazareth, vi (Eng. trans.); v. HOFMANN, Die Lehre v. d. Person Christi; HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma, i. 85 n. (Eng. trans.); WEIZSÄCKER, Apostolic Age, i. 7 f. (Eng. trans.). (R.M.W.)

Chroma [Gr. crwma, colour]: Ger. (1) Vorzeichen; (2) Halbton, halber Ton; (3) Achtel; Fr. (1) signe de dièse (de bémol, flat; de bécarre, sharp), (2) demi-ton, (3) croche; Ital. (1) croma (diesis, sharp; bemolle, flat), (2) semituono, (3) croma. (1) The sign  (  or  )  which denotes the raising or lowering of a note by a musical semitone. (2) A semitone. (3) An eighth note or quaver (more usually spelled croma). Cf. Stainer and Barrett, Dict. of Musical Terms, 22. (E.B.T.)

Chromaesthesia: [crwma, colour, + aisqhsiV, perception]: Ger. Chromaesthesie; Fr. chromesthésie, audition, colorée; Ital. cromestesia. A vivid association of colours with words, letters, sounds, &c.

These colours are thought of, or even seen, in space, when the letters are seen or the sounds heard. It forms one important instance of SYNAESTHESIA (q.v.). (J.J.)

Chromatic Aberration: see ABERRATION.

Chromatics [Gr. crwmatikoV, relating to colour]: Ger. (1) Farbenlehre, (2) chromatische Tonlehre; Fr. chromatique; Ital. cromatica. (1) The science of colour. The term should properly be limited to colour as a function of light, but it is often applied to colour-sensation effects. Cf. VISION. (J.M.B.)

(2) Scales or series of notes including the black keys of the piano, or sharps and flats on the staff; they run in the scale of twelve semitones. Cf. Parry, art. Chromatic, in Grove's Dict. of Music and Musicians, i. 355 (1879). (E.B.T.)

Chromatopseudopsis [Gr. crwma, colour, + yendhV, false, + oyiV, vision]: Ger. Chromatopseudopsis; Fr. achromatopsie; Ital. cromatopseudopsia. Abnormal colour perception; COLOUR-BLINDNESS (q.v.). (J.J.)

Chromatopsia [Gr. crwma, colour, + oyiV, vision]: Ger. Chromatopsie; Fr. sensation anormale de couleur; Ital. cromatopsia. An abnormal colour sensation; such as the yellow appearance of objects after a dose of santonin; also called Chromopsia, Chroöpsia. See VISION (defects of). (J.J.)

Chromatoscope: see LABORATORY AND APPARATUS, B, (a), (3).

Chromosome [Gr. crwma, colour, + swma, body]: Ger. Schleifen; Fr. chromosome (preferred), bâtonnet; Ital. cromosoma. One of the deeply staining bodies in the nucleus of the cell during the process of division.

The term was first used by Waldeyer in 1888. The chromosomes are of special interest as the biological units which, as observation shows, play an important part in the division of cells, and especially in FERTILIZATION (q.v.) and the changes which follow thereon. They originate from the nuclear network of the cell, and vary in number from 2 to 168. Every species of animal and plant has a fixed number; in all organisms which arise by sexual reproduction the number is even; and in the majority of observed cases, in the cells which unite in fertilization, the number of chromosomes is one-half that which is characteristic of the tissue-cells of the species. In division they split longitudinally, half of each passing into each of the two daughter nuclei. In the later stages of the development of ova and spermatozoa they in some cases give rise to tetrads and dyads. (C.LL.M.)

Literature: VAN BENEDEN, Recherches sur la maturation de l'oeuf, Arch. de Biol., iv (1883); E. B. WILSON, The Cell in Devel. and Inheritance (1896); M. FLEMMING, Beiträge zur Kenntniss der Zelle, Arch. f. mikr. Anat. (1879-82). (C.LL.M.-E.S.G.)

Chronic (1), and Acute (2) [Gr. cronikoV, relating to time; Lat. acutus, sharp]: Ger. (1) chronisch, (2) akut; Fr. (1) chronique, (2) aigu; Ital. (1) cronico, (2) acuto. These terms are used in reference to diseases to distinguish those which are of long duration, slow progress, and gradual onset, from those which appear somewhat suddenly, progress rapidly, and continue for only a brief time.

No definite period applicable to all cases can be assigned to differentiate the one from the other, but in many cases the differentiation is easily made (compare the distinctions between chronic and acute mania under MANIA). The term subacute is used to refer to diseases intermediate in character between the chronic and the acute, and is more akin to the latter. Acute is also used with reference to symptoms, such as pain, of an extreme and pronounced character. (J.J.)

Chronometry (mental): see MEASUREMENT, and REACTION TIME.

Chronoscope, Chronograph, and Chronometer: see LABORATORY AND APPARATUS, III, C (1).

Chrysalis [Gr. crnsoV, gold]: Ger. Puppe, Goldpuppe; Fr. chrysalide; Ital. ninfa, crisalide. A term introduced by Lamarck for the complete or obtected pupa of flies, butterflies, and moths; so called from the golden glance on the pupae of many species of butterflies. The term was used by Aristotle.

Literature: PACKARD, Textbook of Entomol.; SCUDDER, Butterflies of New England; KIRBY and SPENCE, Entomol.; D. SHARP, Cambridge Nat. Hist., Insects, Pts. I, II (1895-9). (C.S.M.-E.B.P.)

Chrysippus. (cir. 280-207 B.C.) Born in Cilicia and died at Athens. A Greek follower of Cleanthes, the Stoic. He is said to have died laughing at seeing an ass eating his own supper of figs.

Chubb, Thomas. (1679-1747.) An English glove-maker and tallow-chandler, who taught himself with remarkable success, and wrote several valuable works from a deistic point of view.

Church [Gr. to kuriakon, the Lord's House]: Ger. Kirche; Fr. église; Ital. Chiesa. Church has several meanings. (1) The root-meaning: a place of worship, a building. (2) A local congregation. (3) An organization of local congregations, either territorial (like the Presbyterian Church of the South in the United States); or national (like the Church of Scotland); or imperial (like the Anglican Church); or international (like the Roman Catholic Church). (4) The ideal church, or church universal; the church to whose members, whether in ecclesiastical connection or not, the saying 'theirs is the kingdom of heaven' may be applied.

For philosophy of religion, the principal subject of interest is the relation of the church, in this last sense, to the KINGDOM OF GOD (q.v.).

Literature: SOHM, Kirchenrecht; the Church Histories of NEANDER, BAUR, THIERSCH, and MÖLLER (all in Eng. trans.); HORT, Christian Ecclesia; McGIFFERT, Apostolic Age; HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.); PFLEIDERER, Philos. of Religion, iii. chap. iv. (Eng. trans.). For the recent Ritschlian view of the kingdom of God, see A. RITSCHL, Die christl. Lehre v. d. Rechtfertigung u. Versöhnung; KAFTAN, Truth of the Christian Religion (Eng. trans.); J. WEISS, Die Predigt Jesu v. Reiche Gottes; H. H. WENDT, The Teaching of Jesus (Eng. trans.); WAGENER, A. Ritschl's Idee d. Reiches Gottes im Lichte d. Gesch.; GARVIE, The Ritschlian Theol. (R.M.W.)

Church and State: Ger. Kirche und Staat; Fr. l'église et l'état; Ita. Chiesa e Stato. The relation between a state and the church, or churches, to which its people belong.

Until modern times, some kind of religious establishment has been deemed an essential part of the constitution of every sovereign state. The constitution of the United States forbids such an establishment for the United States, but not for the states. Connecticut retained one until 1818.

That the United States are to be regarded as a Christian nation, see Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 United States Reports, 437, 471. The Church of England is not a corporation by itself, but a part of the government of England; its Thirty-Nine Articles of faith having for its adherents the authority of law, and the civil courts having the ultimate decision of cases of ecclesiastical discipline for heresy.

Literature: MONTESQUIEU, Esprit des Lois, iii., Liv. 24 and 25; W. E. GLADSTONE, The State in its Relations with the Church (1838-41), and The Irish Church (1869). (S.E.B.)

Church Philosophy (Roman Catholic): see ST. THOMAS (philosophy of).

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. (106-43 B.C.) A distinguished orator, statesman, and philosopher of Rome, born at Arpinum, and murdered near Formiae, in Italy. He was liberally educated, studying Greek under Archias, the poet. He took deep interest in Greek literature and philosophy. About 90 B.C. he began the study of law under Mucius Scaevola. After travelling through Asia Minor, he returned to Rome in 77 B.C., in restored health. In 75 B.C. he became quaestor and was assigned to Sicily; in 69, aedile; in 66, praetor; in 63, consul with C. Antonius; in 62 he declined the governorship of a province and returned to the senate as a private individual; in 58 he went into exile, and his elegant house on the Palatine Hill was burned by Clodius; in 55 he was restored by the senate and people, being received with every demonstration of popular favour; in 52 he acted as proconsul of Cilicia and Pisidia for one year. He joined the army of Pompey against Caesar, but was kindly treated afterwards by Caesar at Rome.

Cicero approved the assassination of Caesar and denounced Mark Antony. The republican cause was lost in the coalition of Octavius with Antony and Lepidus. Cicero was proscribed, and killed by soldiers of Octavius.

Circular [Lat. circulus, a circle]: Ger. circulär, kreisförmig; Fr. circulaire; Ital. circolare. Used in certain connections in neurology and pathology to mean self-sustaining or self-repeating: e.g. 'circular process,' as respiration; 'circular reaction,' one whose muscular movement is itself a stimulus, through sight or another sense, to its own repetition; 'circular insanity.'

The theory of the 'circular reaction' has been developed in connection with IMITATION (q.v.).

Literature: PFLÜGER, Teleol. Mechanik d. leben. Natur, in Pflüger's Arch., XV (1877); BALDWIN, Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race, chap. ii; GROOS, The Play of Animals (Eng. trans.), Index. (J.M.B.)

Circulating Capital: Ger. flüssiges Kapital; Fr. capitaux circulants; Ital. capitale circolante. (1) 'That portion of stock employed with a view to profit which does not yield such profit till it is parted with' (Malthus). (2) 'That which fulfils the whole of its office in the production in which it is engaged by a single use' (Mill). In general, subsistence and materials, as distinct from tools and buildings.

Malthus, following Adam Smith, defined circulating capital by its private relations to the owner. Mill, following Ricardo, defined it by its relations to the technique of production. The latter method is now in general use. Cf. FIXED CAPITAL. (A.T.H.)

Circulation: Ger. Geldumlauf; Fr. circulation; Ital. circolazione. (1) The total amount of means of exchange circulating from hand to hand -- coin and notes, but not cheques -- better known as CURRENCY (q.v.). (2) The total volume of transactions effected directly or indirectly by the use of money in a given period.

The development of the second and more important meaning is due to Newcomb. Economic quantities, says Newcomb (Principles of Political Economy), are of two kinds: funds and flows. A fund is a quantity or value pure and simple; a flow is so many dollars per hour, day, or year. The volume of the currency is a fund; the monetary circulation is a flow. If V represents the volume of currency, R the rapidity of its movements (i.e. the average number of times a dollar changes hands in the course of a year), and F the year's flow of currency, or monetary circulation, then F = V x R. Newcomb further points out that this flow of money from buyers to sellers is compensated by an equivalent flow of goods from sellers to buyers, which he calls the industrial circulation, and draws important consequences from the necessary equality of the two. (A.T.H.)

Circulus in Probando [Lat.]: Ger. Cirkelbeweis; Fr. (Lat. form), cercle vicieux; Ital. circolo vizioso. Otherwise called circular reasoning, or argumentin a circle; a form of the Fallacy of Petitio Principii, generally exhibited in a chain of consecutive reasonings, and consisting in the use as a premise of either the final conclusion to be established or of a proposition which is logically dependent for justification on that conclusion.

Literature: WHATELY, Logic, Bk. III. § 13; MILL, Logic, Bk. V. chap. vii. § 2. (R.A.)

Cistercian: Ger. Cisterzienser; Fr. Cistercien; Ital. Cistercensi. One of the monastic orders; founded by St. Bernard at Citeaux, in Burgundy, in 1098.

The Cistercian order is important in the history of SCHOLASTICISM (q.v.) and MYSTICISM (q.v.), on account of St. Bernard's connection with it. It becomes prominent again in the later history of thought, because Port Royal was one of its offshots.

Literature: DE BURGEN, Annales Cisterscienses; NEWMAN, Hist. of the Cistercian Order; JANAUSCHEK, Origines Cistercienses. See JANSENISM, MYSTICISM, SCHOLASTICISM. (R.M.W.)

Citizen [ME. citezein, from Lat. civitas, a state]: Ger. Bürger; Fr. citoyen; Ital. borghese, cittadino. Originally any person enjoying municipal rights in a city; subsequently used to signify (1) a mere inhabitant of a city, or (2) a person enjoying political rights in a sovereign STATE (q.v.) (F.C.M.)

Civil (in law) [Lat. civilis]: Ger. bürgerlich; Fr. civil; Ital. civile. (1) Pertaining to the state. (2) Pertaining to the ordinary dealings of a state with its citizens, as distinguished from its dealings with them as to military, naval, criminal, or ecclesiastical affairs. (3) Pertaining to a state with respect to its citizens, as distinguished from its relations to foreign powers; as in civil war. Civil death, death in the eye of the law; terminating a man's existence, so far as the recognition and protection of the state is concerned, in the relation of the citizen. It may result from a sentence to imprisonment for life, or from taking perpetual monastic vows, under the laws of some states. (S.E.B.)

Civil Law: Ger. Civilrecht, bürgerliches Recht, Römisches Recht; Fr. droit civil; Ital. diritto civile. (1) The law of a particular state. (2) That part of the law of a particular state pertaining to civil affairs. (3) The law of ancient Rome (see CODE). (4) The law of modern Europe built upon the Roman civil law, as distinguished from that based on local customary law.

'Quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est, vocaturque ius civile' (Just., Instit., I. ii. I). (S.E.B.)

Clairvoyance: Ger. Hellsichtigkeit, Hellsehkunst, to see across: Fr. clairvoyance, lucidité; Ital. chiaroveggenza. The alleged ability, by use of a peculiar faculty, to see things not normally visible at all, or things at a great distance.

Belief in this or in similar powers has existed from ancient times (cf. MAGIC), but has become specially prominent in several connections. Of modern instances may be mentioned (1) its connection with the doctrine revived by the successors of Mesmer, early in the present century, that persons in the mesmeric state, called somnambules, were able to see the internal structure of diseased organs and thus prescribe remedies. The doctrine was soon extended to the ability to read with closed eyes, to see events happening at a distance, and the like. In this connection it was taken up (2) by modern phrenology, and especially by modern spiritualism, mediums frequently claiming clairvoyant power. It may also be mentioned that as a conjuring performance (second-sight), clairvoyance depends upon the rapid and skilful interpretation of an ingenious system of signals. When submitted to rigid scientific tests, no evidence of the reality of such a power is obtainable. A similar alleged power, in which the ear is the medium, is termed clairaudience. The further history of clairvoyance may be traced in the histories of spiritualism, hypnotism, and mesmerism, and the older forms of divination. (J.J.)

Literature: OCHOROWICZ, De la suggestion mentale (1887, Eng. trans.); A. LANG, Cock Lane and Common Sense, and The Making of Religion; the Proc. Soc. Psych. Res., vii. 30, 356 ff., and Ann. d. Sci. Psych., i. ff. (L.M.)

Clan [Gael. clann, offspring, family, stock]: Ger. Sippe (Stamm, given in dictionaries as equivalent to clan, is inaccurate); Fr. clan; Ital. clan. A body of kindred larger than a household and smaller than a tribe, and recognizing relationship is one line of descent -- through the father or through the mother, but never through both.

Largely through the influences of J. W. Powell and the Reports of the U. S. Bureau of Ethnology, the word 'clan,' which originally, in English usage, meant specifically the kinship organizations of the Scotch Highlanders, has by general consent been adopted in ethnology and sociology as the generic name for all kinship organizations, metronymic or patronymic -- special names for special examples of which are the Greek genoV, the Roman gens, the Arabic hayy, the Irish sept, and the North American (Algonkin) otem (totem). (F.H.G.)

Clanberg, Johann. (1622-65.) A German Cartesian, born in Westphalia, and educated at Gröningen under Andreae, and at Leyden under Raey. He taught at Herborn and Duisburg. In one of his works he defends his master against Revius and Lentulus. He anticipates in his writings some of the later developed doctrines of the Cartesian school.

Clang [Gr. klaggh]: Ger. Klang; Fr. son; Ital. suono. (1) The simple clang is often identified with the simple TONE (q.v.). Strictly, the term designates a musical note or compound tone; the complex of fundamental tone and overtones.

(2) A compound clang is a mixture of simple clangs, i.e. a record or a discord.

(3) Both these uses are to be distinguished from the popular use, which restricts the word 'clang' to the metallic clangs of cymbals, trumpet, &c. (E.B.T.)

Although the substitution of the term clang is favoured by E.B.T. and C.L.F., the other psychologists of the DICTIONARY favour keeping the established term tone (simple and compound), the term compound tone being equivalent to clang as defined above. If the term clang is to be both 'simple' and 'compound,' there seems to be no gain in substituting it for simple and compound tone. It is just as easy to say compound tone as simple clang, when a musical note of tone and overtones is meant. The text of this work therefore follows the established usage. (J.M.B., E.C.S., J.McK.C., G.F.S., J.J.)

Clarke, Samuel. (1675-1729.) An English theologian and philosopher, born at Norwich and educated at Cambridge. Delivered the Boyle Lectures in 1704 and 1705. In 1706 he became chaplain to Queen Anne, and in 1709 rector of St. James', Westminster, London. In correspondence with Leibnitz he defended the Newtonian philosophy.

Class [Lat. classis]: Ger. Klass; Fr. classe; Ital. classe. The indefinite number of individual objects or cases characterized by the possession by each of a certain quantum of definite marks. The class, for logical purposes, is a wider and more arbitrary notion than the class as recognized in special scientific researches. (R.A.)

Class (social): Ger. (sociale) Klasse; Fr. classe (sociale); Ital. (1) classe (sociale), (2) ceto (medio, &c.). (1) A group distinguished from other groups by personal or social differences of a permanent sort, which produce variations in social intercourse; e.g. the criminal class, the working, leisure, professional, &c., classes. This meaning alone has value for social science, as it does not stop with mere logical classification, but indicates actual social results following upon the differences.

(2) Social distinctions of higher and lower, the differences between classes being those of colour, birth, wealth, education, or other quality, which is recognized as socially desirable, as in the expressions 'class distinctions,' 'classes and masses,' and as is seen in the classes produced by CASTE (q.v.). (J.M.B.)

Classic and Classicism: see STYLE, and ROMANTICISM.

Classification [Lat. classis, class, + facere, to make]: Ger. Klassification; Fr. classification; Ital. classificazione. The process of arranging the objects of some province of experience into kinds or groups, characterized by the possession of common marks.

As ordinarily defined, it involves more than logical DIVISION (q.v.), the rules of which furnish the minimal conditions of the process. In addition, classification takes into account (1) either the specific purpose of the arrangement, or (2) the natural conjunctions of marks which are of most importance. In either case, the aim of classification is to render possible the greatest number of general propositions regarding the objects, and so to facilitate the complete and systematic survey of them. The ideal of a classification that is not determined by special, human ends, as e.g. in classification of occupations in a census return, is to copy in its systematic arrangement the real order of interdependence in the things themselves. What is called 'artificial,' as opposed to natural classification, differs in degree only, not in kind.

Literature: MILL, Logic, Bk. IV. chaps. vii, viii; VENN, Empirical Logic, chap. xxx; JEVONS, Princ. of Sci., chap. xxx. (R.A.)

Classification (in biology): Ger. Taxonomie; Fr. taxonomie; Ital. biotassi. That branch of biological study which deals with the arrangement of living beings into groups. The term Taxonomy is also used. (C.LL.M.- J.M.B.)

The aim of modern classification is to group living organisms according to their phylogenetic affinities. A number of species having certain characters in common, presumably derived from an ancestral form, are grouped together into a genus; similarly, genera are grouped into families, families into orders, orders into classes, and classes into phyla. Each phylum represents one of the main branches of the animal or vegetable kingdom. The distinctive differences between these various groups (generic, family, ordinal characters, &c.) are of increasing magnitude; but according to evolutionary doctrine, they are all of essentially the same nature, and due to the accumulation of what were originally individual differences. Cf. SPECIES, and VARIETY. (E.C.S.)

Literature: an able account of the systems of classification of animals from Aristotle, through Linnaeus, to modern times is given by E. RAY LANKESTER in the 9th ed. of the Encyc. Brit., xxiv. 804 ff, further developed in the Adv. of Sci. (1890). See also AGASSIZ, Essay on Classification; HUXLEY, art. Animal Kingdom, in Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.), ii; KÖRNER, Die logischen Grundlagen d. System. d. Organismen (1883, with the references there given to works in biological science). For botanical classification see J. REYNOLDS GREEN, Manual of Botany (based on that of BENTLEY), 1896. (C.LL.M.)

Classification (in education). The simplest form of generalization; the grouping of objects according to common characteristics. See FORMAL STEPS, ABSTRACTION, and METHOD (in education). (C.DE.G.)

Classification (of the fine arts). A grouping or division of the fine arts.

Attempted on various principles. The more important are: (1) End, giving a division into free and dependent, or non-serviceable and serviceable (Aristotle). This, however, groups under the second class, not merely the 'fine art' architecture, but also most of the minor and industrial arts. (2) Form, according as the arts are those of space or of time, or appeal to eye or ear. This gives (a) arts of repose, or 'shaping,' formative (bildende) arts, and (b) arts of motion, or speaking (redende) arts (Lessing, Schasler, et al.). To (a) are usually assigned architecture, sculpture, painting; to (b) music, the mimic dance or acting, and poetry. Or a triple division gives (a) arts of the resting eye (same as above); (b) of ear only (music, poetry); (c) of motion in space appealing to eye, or to eye and ear (mimic dance, acted drama, &c.; Hartmann). (3) Relation of material employed to the ideal expressed, giving the ascending series: architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry. (4) Historic development, involving also the relation of content to material, giving (a) symbolic, (b) classic, and (c) romantic, whose respective characteristic arts are (a) architecture, (b) sculpture, (c) painting, music, and poetry (Hegel). (5) Relation to nature, giving imitative (painting, sculpture, epic. drama, mimic dance) and non-imitative (lyric, most music, architecture). Similar to this is Gurney's division into 'presentative' (music, architecture) and 'representative' (sculpture, painting, poetry), whereas Spencer by the same terms indicates a division into arts appealing (a) mainly to sensation and perception, and (b) to the imagination (literature). (6) Psychological motive or origin. Viewing the arts as derived from expression through cry or gesture gives a grouping like that of (2) above (Véron). A derivation from instincts of (a) imitation, (b) decoration, (c) self-exhibition, gives (a) imitative arts as under (5) above; (b) decorative (architecture, landscape gardening, many minor arts); (c) self-exhibiting (lyric, poetry, bodily decoration, the dance, as arousing or appealing to sexual or martial emotions, &c.; Gross). Some (Lange, Baldwin) would combine (b) and (c); others add still further instincts, as that of 'monument making' (Brown).

Aristotle's conception of 'imitation' (see ART AND ART THEORIES) as the essential characteristic of art excluded architecture from the list of arts whose function is to minister to enjoyment (as contrasted with the useful arts). The imitative arts (viz. poetry, music, the dance, sculpture, and painting) he characterizes as imitating (i.e. representing) either actions or character and feelings. As further principles of division, he mentions: (a) means (as colour, the voice, measure, rhythm, harmony); (b) objects represented (as superior or inferior persons in tragedy or comedy; (c) manner (as narration, &c.). Lessing, starting from the distinction of arts employing coexisting materials from those employing successive tones, distinguished the province of painting and formative art from that of poetry. Kant, using the principle of expression which is accomplished by man through word, mien or gesture, and tone, divides the arts into (a) arts of speech, viz. rhetoric and poetry; (b) formative arts, subdivided into arts of sensible truth (sculpture and architecture) and arts on sensible illusion (painting and landscape gardening); (c) arts of the play of sensations (music) and the art of colour. Herder made a genetic series, viz. building, gardening, dress, manly exercises and contests, language -- corresponding to the progress of civilization. Schiller distinguishes the fine arts (arts of taste or intelligence) from the 'moving' or 'touching' (ührenden) arts (arts of the heart and sentiment), but does not assign the specific arts under these heads.

Schelling set up a 'real' and an 'ideal' series of arts. He regarded music as the 'most real' and painting as the 'most ideal' of the first series, and sculptures as the unity of these; while to the 'ideal series' belong the lyric, the epic, and the unity of these, viz. the drama.

Schleiermacher made three classes: (a) accompanying arts (the mimic dance, music); (b) formative arts; (c) poetry. Weisse took music, formative art, and poetry, and subdivided each into three. Hegel attempts to find a basis for the division into arts of form, sound, and speech, by referring these to eye, ear, and sensuous representation; but lays more stress on the division into symbolic, classic, and romantic art, in which the ideal of beauty is respectively 'striven for, attained, and transcended.' Herbart separates arts 'which display themselves on all sides,' viz architecture, sculpture, church music, and classic poetry, from those which 'present something in half-obscure light,' viz. landscape gardening, painting, entertaining music, romantic poetry. Schopenhauer grades the arts according to the kinds of ideas which are objectified. The lowest grade objectifies only ideas belonging to inorganic nature, i.e. weight, rigidity, &c., giving architecture as its chief art. Ideas of vegetative nature give landscape gardening and landscape painting. Ideas of higher grades give successively painting of still life, historical painting, sculpture, and poetry. Music, as being 'the copy or expression, not of the ideas, but of the will itself,' is assigned a unique position as 'telling of essence, not of shadows.' Vischer's classification is similar to the first of Hegel's.

Schasler uses the antithesis between rest and motion as his principle of division, regarding it as fundamental to the other antitheses of 'material and form.'

Hartmann has an elaborate scheme based on several principles. Aside from certain lower activities not properly art, though anticipations of it, he distinguishes (a) unfree, and (b) simple and complex free arts. Both the unfree and the simple free arts are next subdivided as belonging either to perception or reproductive fancy, and those of perception again into those of the resting eye, of the ear alone, and of motion apprehended by the eye, or by eye and ear. This gives: (a) as unfree arts of the resting eye, architecture and other constructive arts (gardening and cosmetic); as unfree arts of the eye in motion, games, gymnastics, social dance, &c.; and as unfree arts of reproductive fancy, or speech, eloquence in all its forms. (b) The simple free arts of perception: (1) of space (sculpture and painting); (2) of time (instrumental music, songs without words); (3) space-time arts (various kinds of mimic dance, acting, &c.). Poetry is the simple free art of reproductive imagination, but numerous subdivisions are made. Finally, binary, ternary, and quaternary combinations give the complex arts, such as the ballet, opera, &c.

Other writers attempt a classification based on psychological motives, like (6) above, of which the threefold division is that given by Groos, carrying out his classifications of plays. Lange offers a division into (a) arts on a purely instinctive basis growing out of movement and building plays and self-decoration, viz. dance, lyric music, architecture, ornamentation; (b) arts on the basis of conscious semblance or 'make-believe,' growing out of make-believe and imitative plays, viz. acting, the drama, epic, sculpture, painting.

In France Lévêque adopted the series given under (3) above, adding eloquence as a sixth, though not in the strict sense a fine art. Véron groups the six arts as under (2) and (3) above, deriving the two groups from the two modes of expression, cry and gesture, the production of sounds and of forms. All arts are thus differentiations of spoken or written (sign) language, the one group characterized by motion and rhythm, the other by order and proportion.

English writers have given little attention to classifications of the arts. Spencer suggests a division, on the basis of the nature of the states of consciousness involved, into presentative arts (appealing to sensation and perception chiefly) and representative art -- the latter term reserved for literature of the imagination. Gurney uses the same terms 'presentative' and 'representative' for his main division, but gives to 'representative' the meaning 'imitative,' and classes music and architecture under the first; sculpture, painting, and poetry under the second. Further distinguishing marks are specified under the heads of subject-matter, material, and form. Colvin (in Encyc. Brit., art. Fine Arts) considers each of the above divisions (1), (2), and (5) as useful for certain purposes. G. Baldwin Brown, while dealing only with 'arts of form,' traces them to a greater number of psychological springs than others, and emphasizes especially their festal origin. J. Mark Baldwin would correlate the decorative and imitative arts respectively with the self-exhibiting and imitative instincts, giving the same division as Lange.

Literature: SCHASLER, Syst. d. Künste, (2nd ed., 1884), and more fully in Krit. Gesch. d. Aesth. (1872); VON HARTMANN, chapter on Die Eintheilung d. Künste, in Bk. II. Pt. I of his Aesthetik (1886); BOSANQUET, Hist. of Aesth. (1892); KNIGHT, Philos. of the Beautiful (1891-3); COLVIN, in Encyc. Brit., art. Fine Arts; GURNEY, The Power of Sound (1880); GROSSE, Die Anfänge d. Kunst (1894, Eng. trans. 1897); GROOS, The Play of Animals (1896, Eng. trans. 1898); LANGE, in Zeitsch. f. Psychol., xiv. 242; BALDWIN BROWN, The Fine Arts (1891); BALDWIN, Social and Eth. Interpret. (1897). (J.H.T.)

Classification (of the mental functions). Distinction of the fundamental constituents of every concrete state of consciousness. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)

Aristotle distinguishes between intellection and conation (nouV and orexiV) as ultimate mental functions. This dual division is retained by psychological writers up to the time of Tetens and Mendelssohn. With these writers a threefold division begins -- cognition, feeling, and conation or will. Feeling is here used in the sense of affective consciousness (cf. Tetens, Ueber die menschliche Natur, i. Versuch X. § 625, published 1777). The new classification was adopted by Kant. It has been prevalent ever since, and is very generally current at the present time. It was first clearly expounded and defined in English by Hamilton.

Of late there has been a tendency to revert to a dual division, but the functions regarded as ultimate are cognition and feeling, not cognition and conation. Brentano brings feeling under conation, thus going back to Aristotelian point of view. But he adds as another ultimate function judgment or belief. He proposes, as a principle of division, the different modes in which consciousness may refer to an object, as being pleased with it, desiring it, remembering it. He urges that if we do not formulate the problem in this manner, we are compelled to treat as ultimate all contents of consciousness which have an unanalysable specific quality, and that it is an endless and useless task to enumerate and distinguish elements which are ultimate in this sense. But this difficulty seems to be met by treating as ultimate only those general modes which are necessary to constitute and every concrete conscious state. At the same time it seems to the present writer that Brentano's method of formulating the problem supplies by far the most convenient starting-point for the psychologist. The drawback is that in it there is no allowance for the possibility of conscious experience without objective reference.

Literature: besides the authors mentioned, see textbooks generally; also JAMES WARD, art. Psychology, Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.), xx. 39-44; J. SULLY, The Human Mind, ii. Appendix I; STOUT, Analytic Psychol., i. Bk. I: HÖFFDING, Psychology, chap. iv; FOUILLÉE, La psychol. des idées-forces, Introd.; LOTZE, Microcosmus (3rd ed.), i. Bk. II. chap. ii. §§ 1-5. For history see BRENTANO, Psychologie, Bk. II. chap. v; HAMILTON, Metaphysics, Lects. XI and XX; DROBISCH, Psychologie, §§ 123-38. (G.F.S.)

Classification (of the sciences). The systematic arrangement of the various branches of knowledge or of positive science (cf. SCIENCE) in order to fix their definitions, determine their boundaries, bring to light their interrelations, and ascertain how much of the task of science has been accomplished and what remains to be done. The value of such a classification depends not merely on the encyclopaedic or didactic uses to which a survey of the sciences may be put, but also on its utility as an instrument of intellectual progress. Cf. PHILOSOPHY, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, MORAL SCIENCES, ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIAL SCIENCES, PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

The most celebrated classifications of the sciences proposed in modern times have been those suggested by Bacon, Comte, and Spencer. Bacon adopted a subjective principle of division, the psychological analysis of the intellectual faculties concerned in the various sciences: history, natural and civil, the latter including ecclesiastical and literary history, 'has reference' to the memory; poesy, 'feigned history or fables,' to the imagination; philosophy, divine, natural, human, to the reason. Divinity or revealed theology is other than divine philosophy or natural theology, and superior to it. The Baconian scheme was utilized in the preparation of the French Encyclopaedia (see also ENCYCLOPAEDISTS). Comte, on the other hand, followed the objective method of classification 'from the study of the things to be classified' in view of their 'real affinity and natural connections.' After excluding theology and metaphysics, he divides the positive sciences into two classes, abstract and concrete. According to the decreasing simplicity and generality of the phenomena to which they relate, the former arrange themselves in the following order of dependence: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology or biology (of which psychology is a branch), and sociology. This, in Comte's view, is also the order in which the sciences have developed historically, and expresses their relative positions in the scale of 'positive' character. Spencer denies the possibility of arranging the sciences in serial order to represent either their logical or their historical dependence, and substitutes for the Comtean 'hierarchy' a classification of his own. Using the terms abstract and concrete in a different sense from Comte, he makes three principal divisions: abstract science, 'which treats of the forms in which phenomena are known to us,' and includes logic and mathematics; abstract-concrete science, 'which treats of the phenomena themselves in their elements,' as mechanics, physics, chemistry, &c.; concrete science, 'which treats of the phenomena themselves in their totalities,' astronomy, geology, biology, psychology, sociology, &c. The issue between Comte and Spencer, and the subject at large, have been discussed further by Littré, J. S. Mill, Bain, Fiske, and others.

Literature: BACON, Adv. of Learning, ii, and De Augmentis Scientiarum, ii-ix; J. D'ALEMBERT, Encyc., Discours préliminaire; A. COMTE, Cours de Philos. Positive, i. 1-2; H. SPENCER, Essays on the Genesis of Science and the Classification of the Sciences (3rd ed., 1871); E. LITTRÉ, Auguste Comte et la Philos. Positive, ii. 6; J. S. MILL, Auguste Comte and Positivism, 32 ff.; A. BAIN, Logic, i. App. A; C. W. SHIELDS, Philos. Ultima, ii. 52-79; J. FISKE, Cosmic Philosophy. (A.C.A.Jr.)

Cleanthes. A Stoic philosopher, born in Assos, Asia Minor (cir. 300 B.C.). He moved to Athens and became the pupil of Zeno, at whose death he became head of the Stoic school. A hymn to Jupiter has survived, out of numerous works. Chrysippus was his pupil and successor.

Clear and Distinct (and Clearness and Distinctness) [Lat. clarus et distinctus]: Ger. klar und deutlich; Fr. clair et distinct; Ital. chiaro e distinto. The Cartesian test of truth; criticized and developed by Leibnitz. Cf. TESTS OF TRUTH. (A.C.A.Jr.)

Clearing-up: see ENLIGHTENMENT.

Clearness (in education) [OE. cler, cleer, clear]: Ger. Klarheit; Fr. clarté; Ital. chiarezza. That stage of method in which the mind of the pupil apprehends the presented facts with clearness of mental vision; the first formal step in method according to Herbart's terminology. See ABSORPTION, and METHOD (in education).

Literature: HERBART, Sci. of Educ. (trans. by Falkin), 126. (C.DE.G.)

Cleavage [OE. cleofan]: Ger. Eintheilung, Furchung; Fr. segmentation; Ital. segmentazione. (1) Of the ovum. The process of segmentation or cell-division, by which the single cell from which multicellular animals and plants are developed becomes divided into an aggregate of cells, generally termed blastomeres.

First definitely described in the case of the frog's ovum by Prévost and Dumas (1824); observed even earlier, its true meaning was not clearly perceived till twenty years later by Bergmann, Kölliker, and others. The nature of the cleavage or segmentation of the ovum depends upon the amount of food-yolk present. Where there is little or none (alecithal), and the small amount present is equally distributed (homolecithal), the cleavage is total (holoblastic segmentation); where there is much and unequally distributed (heterolecithal, telolecithal), the cleavage is partial and usually affects only a patch of protoplasm, the blastodermic area (meroblastic segmentation); where it is centrally disposed (centrolecithal), and the formative protoplasm is arranged around the whole surface, cleavage affects the surface layer (peripheral segmentation).

(2) Of the mesoderm or mesoblast. The process by which the mid layer of many animals splits so as to give rise to the body-cavity or coelom of the schizocoel type. Cf. COELOM.

First clearly established by Remak (1850-4).

Literature: ALLEN THOMSON, art. Embryology, Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.). For other works see EMBRYOLOGY. (C.LL.M.- E.S.G.)

Clement of Alexandria, Titus Flavius. (cir. 150-cir. 213.) An eminent Father in the Patristic Church, born probably in Athens. He studied various pagan thinkers, and became the disciple of Pantaenus, the Christian philosopher in Alexandria. Clement succeeded him as head of the catechetical school. Origen was one of his pupils. Ordained presbyter in 202 A.D., he retired to Palestine. See ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL, and PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

Cleptomania (also Kl- [Gr. klepten, to steal, + mania, madness]: Ger. Stehlsuckt; Fr. monomanie du vol, cleptomanie; Ital. cleptomania, impulsoal furto. An irresistible impulse or morbid tendency to steal.

It was formerly regarded as a separate form of monomania or insanity in which the tendency to steal was the marked characteristic. It is now viewed as one of a series of morbid impulses appearing both in persons of apparent normal health but frequently of neurotic temperament, and also as a symptom in cases of mental defect and disease. Cases of persons, particularly women, of good social position and without any real motives for theft, yielding to the impulse to appropriate small and often useless articles, frequently occur, and are difficult to explain as criminal or insane. Their elucidation in special cases can only be gained in the light of a detailed personal history; that in many cases such actions are the result of distinctly morbid conditions cannot be questioned. The impulse to steal and appropriate also manifests itself in idiocy and imbecility, in epilepsy, and in the initial stages of general paralysis, in which cases the theft is often performed automatically and as if to satisfy an inborn instinct. A special tendency to this defect in pregnant women has been noted.

This form of impulse obviously has important legal relations, and is conspicuous in discussions of moral insanity and responsibility. The tendency to look upon criminals largely as persons of unsound mental constitution brings with it the view that professional thieves are to a greater or less extent subject to impulses which may be properly spoken of in many instances as cleptomaniacal. (J.J.)

Literature: BUCKNILL and TUKE, Psychol. Med. (1873); TAYLOR, Med. Jurisprudence (1894); CLEVENGER, Med. Jurisprudence (2 vols., 1898); SHATTUCK, Atlantic Med. Weekly (1896), vi. 401; V. MAGNAN, Leçons cliniques sur les Maladies mentales (1893), and Recherches sur les Centres nerveux (2e série); H. SAURY, Étude clinique sur la Folie héréditaire; LEGRAIN, Délire de dégénérés. (J.J.- L.M.)

Clifford, William Kingdon. (1845-79.) An English mathematician, born in Exeter, and educated at King's College, London, and at Trinity College, Cambridge. He was professor of mathematics and mechanics in University College, London.

Clonus and Clonic [Gr. klonoV, a violent, confused motion]: Ger. Zuckkrampf (klonisch); Fr. spasme or convulsion clonique; Ital. convulsione clonica, clono. Alternating contractions and relaxations of muscles, not so rapid as in trembling or shivering. See ANKLE CLONUS, a spasmodic contraction of the muscles of the calf (5-7 per second).

Opposed to TONUS (q.v.) and tonic, which apply to short, sharp contractions. (C.F.H.)