Classics in the History of Psychology

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Christopher D. Green
York University, Toronto, Ontario

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Definitions Ae-Al

Aedesius. A Neo-Platonist, follower of Iamblichus. Born in Cappadocia in the time of Constantine, he became the tutor of Constantine and other famous men.

Aegidius of Colonna (Aegidius-a-Columna). (Died 1316.) Native of Rome, educated for theology under Thomas Aquinas in Paris. Became tutor to the Dauphin of France, Philippe le Bel. He was very prominent as a theologian, and wrote a philosophical work called De Regimine Principis.

Aeneas of Gaza. A follower of Plato, who lived in the latter half of the 5th century A.D. He became a Christian, and wrote Theophrastus, combining Christian and Platonic ideas.

Aenesidemus. A sceptical philosopher, born at Gnossus (or Cnossus) in Crete; supposed to have lived in the 1st century of the Christian era.

Aeon [Gr. aiwn, age]. That which exists from eternity. A term of the Gnostics denoting a subordinate or dependent deity or semi-deity, mediating -- especially in the process of creation -- between the world and the supreme Deity. Cf. the literature cited under GNOSIS. (J.M.B.)

Aepinus, John. (1499-1553) A Protestant divine, disciple of Luther, the most influential theologian in the north of Germany, and a great polemical writer.

Aesthesia [Gr. aisqhsiV, perception by the senses]: Ger. Empfindlichkeit; Fr. sensibilité; Ital. sensibilità, estesia. A synonym of sensibility. As ANAESTHESIA (q.v.) denotes the absence of the capacity to have sensation, so Aesthesia denotes its normal presence. (J.J.)

The term is also used to denote the general power and process of feeling, in opposition to kinesia, the power of movement. See Arndt, Lehrb. dPsychol., and Morselli, Semej. malat. ment., ii. (E.M.)

Aesthesiogen, Aesthesiogenic [Gr. aisqhsiV, feeling, + genhV, producing]: Ger. aesthesiogen, gefühlserregend; Fr. esthésiogène esthésiogénique; Ital. estesiogeno. (1) Having the capacity to stimulate or produce sensation; analogous in its use to DYNAMOGENIC (q.v.). (2) Specifically used, in connection with experiments upon hypnotized subjects, to denote the apparent power of certain substances -- for instance, a magnet -- to produce by mere contact or proximity peculiar forms of sensation and nervous action, such as the transference of a cataleptic attitude from one side of the body to the other. See HYPNOTISM. (J.J.)

The term dates from the researches of Bury and his school on 'metalotherapy' and aesthesiogenic processes, and has only lately and indirectly been introduced into the study of hypnotism. (P.J.)

Literature to (2): BINET AND FÉRÉ, Animal Magnetism, 125 and elsewhere; MYERS, Proc. Soc. Psych. Res. (Oct. 1886), 127, and succeeding papers; SEPPILLI and BUCCOLA, Riv. di Freniat. (1880). (J.J.)

Aesthesiometer: see LABORATORY AND APPARATUS, III, B. (c), (1), (3).

Aesthesodic [Gr. aisqhsiV, sensation, + odoV, road]: Ger. reizleitend, aesthesodisch (applied to spinal ganglia, not to cortical centres -- H.M.); Fr. (not used); Ital. estesiodico. Receptive rather than centrifugal or initiatory.

An aesthesodic centre is one which receives stimuli from a centripetal nerve, especially a cortical centre forming the central end-organ for a sensory-tract. See KINESODIC. A more inclusive term than 'sensory' in the same connections, and not implying that the stimuli necessarily participate in sensation. (H.H.)

Aesthetic and Aesthetics [Gr. aisqhtikoV, from aisqhsesqai, to perceive]: Ger. aesthetisch, Aesthetik; Fr. (l')esthétique, science du beau; Ital. estetico, l'estetica. Relating to the beautiful in the broadest sense, i.e. as including (q.v.) the SUBLIME, COMIC, TRAGIC, PATHETIC, UGLY, &c., as in the phrase Aesthetic Feeling, Aesthetic Fancy, &c. Cf. FEELING, FANCY, EMOTION, SENTIMENT (aesthetic). The aesthetic is related to the agreeable, the useful, and the morally good, in that all are experienced as values. The qualities by which it is distinguished from these are stated variously by different authorities, but there is general agreement that the value experienced in the aesthetic field is regarded as objective (as contrasted with the agreeable), shareable, intrinsic (as contrasted with the useful), and is appreciated in a contemplative as opposed to a practical attitude of consciousness (as contrasted with the moral). Aesthetics is the science of the beautiful. See BEAUTY.

I. The term was introduced by Baumgarten (Aesthetica, 1750-8) to signify the science of sensuous knowledge, supplementary and parallel to logic, the science of 'clear thinking,' or of the higher faculty, the intellect. Both sciences were regarded as rather propaedeutic to philosophy than as included within it. In the current psychology of that time the characteristic quality of sensuous knowledge was held to be its 'confused' or obscure nature. It is felt or 'sensed,' rather than known. As the peculiar excellence or goal of clear thinking, with which logic is concerned, is truth, so the end or perfection of sensuous knowledge as such was held to be beauty. Beauty was declared to be the province of aesthetic. Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), still used the word in the sense of a science of sensuous knowledge, but rejected the special turn given to the term by Baumgarten; because Kant then held that there could be no science of the beautiful in the strict sense. He accordingly gave to the term the new content of a science of the a priori principles or forms of the sensibility, viz. space and time. In the Critique of Judgment (1790), having, as he supposed, discovered a rational basis for the treatment of our judgments as to the beautiful, he discussed them under the title 'Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment,' to indicate that they are judgments as to feeling. Since Kant there has been general uniformity in usage.

II. Scope and Divisions of Modern Aesthetics. Aside from the question as to the relation of beauty to ultimate reality, which is more properly a problem of metaphysics than of aesthetics, modern aesthetics deals with two main sets of problems; A, those of aesthetic appreciation; B, those of artistic production. These of course cannot always be kept distinct . Under A may be considered (1) psychological and physiological problems, such as the origin and nature of aesthetic feeling, its relation to imagination and sensation, and the influence of association; the physiological basis and conditions of the aesthetic thrill, including the relation of the stimulus to the sensation, the mathematical relations of harmonious tones, the relation of aesthetic feeling to other pleasurable feeling, and to the vital processes; finally, the biological significance of aesthetic feeling in the development of the organism and of the race. (2) Problems arising from analysis of the form and content of objects judged beautiful, or of the nature of the aesthetic judgment and of the categories of beauty; such as the question as to the 'objective' character of beauty, that of valid art criticism, &c. Under B fall questions as to (1) the end or essential nature of art; (2) the nature of art-impulse; (3) the imagination and its relation to the execution of the idea; (4) the origin and function of the art-impulse in the development of the race; (5) the evolution of art. The two main groups of problems, A and B, are often spoken of as respectively concerning art from the 'spectator's point of view' as contrasted with art from the 'producer's point of view.'

III. Methods. The problems under A (2) are analogous to logical and ethical problems, and demand similar methods of analysis and criticism. The remaining problems are largely psychological or historical, and therefore employ the methods of those sciences. More particularly, in addition to the older method of introspection, the experimental investigation of the structure and formation of the special sense-organs and the corresponding qualities of sensation, or of the physiological basis of all pleasure and pain, and the relation of stimulus to response studied by psychophysics. The historical or genetic methods is throwing much light on the origin and development of the arts; and the attempt has been made to apply this method to the origin of aesthetic pleasures, such as the delight in colour, the pleasure of the comic, &c. For specific illustrations, see under BEAUTY V, and ART IV. The historic treatment of aesthetic problems will be found chiefly under the articles ART AND ART THEORIES, BEAUTY, CLASSIFICATION (of the fine arts), COMIC, SUBLIME, TRAGIC. See also FEELING (aesthetic), ASSOCIATION (aesthetic).

Literature: historical works are given in connection with the topics named; special monographs are also named in connection with articles on special topics. Many recent works are named in sec. V of article on BEAUTY, and sec. IV of article on ART. A selection is given here of general works, and of essays on the general subject. (1) On the general field of aesthetics: SULLY, On the Possibility of a Science of Aesthetics (essay xiii in Sensation and Intuition, 1874); and art. Aesthetics, in Encyc. Brit.; LADD, Introd. to Philos. (1890), chpa. xii; VOLKELT, Die gegenwärtigen Aufgaben der Aesthetik (vi. in Aesthetische Zeitfragen, 1895); KÜLPE, Introd. to Philos. (1895, Eng. trans.), § 10; JERUSALEM, Einleitung in die Philos. (1899), V. Absch.; MARSHALL, Aesthetic Principles (1895).

(2) Systematic and other works (a) Brief or popular works: SCHASLER, Aesthetik (1886); KNIGHT, Philos. of the Beautiful (1891-3); GAUCKLER, Le Beau et son Hist. (1873); VÉRON, Aesthetics (trans. by Armstrong, 1879); VAN DYKE, The Principles of Art (1887); SANTAYANA, The Sense of Beauty (1896); GROOS, Einleitung in die Aesthetik (1892). (b) More comprehensive works: CARRIÈRE, Die Aesthetik (3rd ed., 1885); VON HARTMANN, Aesthetik (1886-7); LAUD, Nederlandsche Aesthetika (1881); ZEISING, Aesthetische Forschungen (1855); VISCHER, Aesthetik (3 vols., 1846-57); ZIMMERMANN, Aesthetik (1858-65); KÖSTLIN, Aesthetik (1869); CHAIGNET, Les Principes de la Sci. du Beau (1860); LÉVÊQUE, La Science du Beau (2nd ed., 1872); MARSHALL, Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics (1894).

The first volume of KNIGHT contains a very full bibliography of important works. Cf. also GAYLEY and SCOTT, Guide to the Literature of Aesthetics (1890), and Introd. to the Meth. and Materials of Literary Criticism (1899). See BIBLIOG. D. (J.H.T.)

Aesthetic (transcendental): see KANTIAN TERMINOLOGY, cf. also the preceding topic (1).

Aesthetic Standard: Ger. aesthetischer Massstab; Fr. règle esthétique autoritative; Ital. misura estetica. A principle or criterion of criticism, which must be presupposed if a work of art is pronounced good or bad, or if any aesthetic object is compared with another and estimated as more or less beautiful. See CRITICISM. (J.H.T.)

Aetiology [Gr. aitia, cause, + logoV, discourse]: Ger. Aetiologie; Fr. étiologie; Ital. etiologia. The theory of CAUSE (q.v.). (J.M.B.)

Mainly used in medicine, where it is the science that deals with the causes or origin of disease; the description of the factors which produce or predispose toward a certain disease or disorder. Compare, for example, what is said of the aetiology of insanity under INSANITY AND SANITY (J.J.)

Affect [Lat. ad + facere, to do]: Ger. Triebfeder, or affectiver Bewegungsreiz; Fr. motif affectif, mobile (cf. TERMINOLOGY, French); Ital. motivo affettivo. A stimulus or motive to action which is AFFECTIVE (q.v.) or felt, not presented as an end.

Suggested by Baldwin (Handb. of Psychol., Feeling and Will, 313, 319, 354). The same distinction is made by Mackensie (Manual of Ethics, 62 f.). See also Wundt, Outlines of Psychol., 714 (and the German original). The two cases indicated in the definition are those respectively of non-voluntary and voluntary action; only in the latter case is the affect a MOTIVE (q.v.). Wundt uses Triebfeder for the affective element in every Motiv, the presented or intellectual element being the Beweggrund. Judd's translation of these respectively by Impelling Force and Moving Reason (see END) is clumsy. Impelling force loses the implication of feeling altogether. The earlier English ethical term Spring of Action (Martineau) is too comprehensive, and is besides complicated by being 'lower' and 'higher.' We accordingly fall back upon affect. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Affection (1) and Affective (2): Ger. (1) elementares Gefühl, (2) Gefühls- (in comp., as Gefuhlston); Fr. (1) affection, sensibilité, (2) affectif; Ital. (1) sentimentalità, (2) affettivo. (1) The hypothetical elementary form of feeling. (2) Belonging or pertaining to feeling of all sorts. Affection is also a popular word for LOVE (q.v.) or tender feeling, with the adjective affectionate. The adjective form (meaning given under 2) was used before the substantive, notably by the French psychologists (cf. Rabier) See FEELING, EMOTION, and AFFECTION (in ethics and theology).

This usage seems best since there is no adjective formed from feeling.' The demand for the noun Affection seems to have come from those analysts who desired to avoid using the ambiguous word Feeling. The term is useful, and the same is true of CONATION (q.v.), provided one guards against the evident danger of taking them to mean real things, and of thinking that complex mental states are at all explained when stated in terms of them. Sufficient care is not always exercised in distinguishing the English affective from the German Affekt, the equivalent of emotion.

In Titchener's translation of Külpe's Outlines of Psychol., § 52, there is the complication that affection is made equivalent to Gemüths- in the term Gemüthsbewegung -- a direct confusion of what is affective with what is conative, seeing that the German Gemüthsbewegung includes both feelings and impulses. Judd seems to have Wundt's endorsement of the same rendering (trans. of Wundt's Outlines of Psychol., 109, 187, and Glossary); but it does violence to English usage. It revives the confusion of feeling and action seen in the older terms 'Active' and 'Motive Powers': as in Judd's translation (loc. cit., 168), where Gefühlslage is rendered by the same adjective ('affective state') used for Gemüthsbewegung ('affective process') and Gemüthslage (or Gemüthszustand, 'affective state') in other passages (cf. Judd, loc. cit., Glossary). Cf. TERMINOLOGY (German). (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)

Literature: HAMILTON, Lectures on Metaphysics; RABIER, Leçons de Psychol.; BIBLIOG. G, 2, e.

Affection (in ethics). (1) Any states of pronounced feeling. In English usage, the term applies both to the more permanent sentiments (Ger. Gefühle), and to passing emotional states (Ger. Affecte). The best writers distinguish it from passion, as having less vehemence, and as less distinctly, if at all, connected with a sensuous basis. (2) Sometimes it is restricted to feelings which have persons for their object. The first definition is, however, more in accord with psychological usage. See AFFECTION AND AFFECTIVE, AFFECT, and EMOTION.

St. Augustine, as quoted and adopted by Aquinas, says: 'Those mental states (motus animi) which the Greeks call paqh, and Cicero perturbationes, are by some called affectus, or affectiones by others, keeping to the literal rendering of the Greek passiones.' This equivalence of passio and affectus is still found in Descartes. There is a wider use in Spinoza, by whom the term affectus is made to cover purely rational sentiments. And this wider application is characteristic of the British moralists, in whose writings the word affection is of very frequent occurrence. Shaftesbury uses it in the widest sense as above defined. But other writers draw a distinction between affection and passion: Hutcheson, on the ground that the former does not necessarily -- whereas the latter does -- involve uneasiness; Price, because of the distinct presence of a sensuous element in passion, which also indicates greater vehemence of active tendency; while, according to Gay, passion is the 'pleasure or pain arising from the prospect of future pleasure or pain,' and affection is 'the desire consequent thereupon.' The narrower usage (2) is sanctioned by Reid, who defines affections as the 'various principles of action in man, which have persons for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature, our being well or ill affected to some person, or, at least, to some animated being.' This usage is followed by Sidgwick. A. F. Shand defines affections as feelings for, not in, an object; and says: 'The terms sentiment, interest, and affection do not seem to mark any important difference. We speak of the sentiment of justice, truth, and the moral sentiment generally, of the sentiment of friendship; but of affection for our friends rather than sentiment, and of interest in our health or business rather than either: the difference turning upon the different character of the object.'

Literature: AUGUSTINE, De Civ. Dei, ix. 4; AQUINAS, Summa Theol., II. i. Q. 22; DESCARTES, De Pass. Animae; SPINOZA, Ethica, iii. 58 ff.; HUTCHESON, Essay on the Passions, § 2; PRICE, Princ. Quest. and Difficulties of Morals, chap. iii; GAY, Dissertation prefixed to Law's transl. of King's Origin of Evil, § 3; HUME, Human Nature, I. i. 2; REID, Active Powers, Essay III, Part II. chaps. iii - v; SHAND, Mind, N.S., v. 214 ff. (W.R.S.)

Affection (in theology) [Lat. affectio]: Ger. Neigung; Fr. affection; Ital. affetto. (1) The affections (plural usually) are the sentiments of personal inclination that give rise to love. (2) The motive forces in an individual that render him consistently devoted to some one aim. The subject falls within the province of Christian ethics, and, especially in the latter aspect, involves controversial questions concerning the will.

(1) The affections, especially as they produce love to God, are natural and healthy. The extreme of mysticism, which offers devotion to the Deity as if he stood in need of it, is to be avoided. Similarly, the love which, sure of its object and satisfaction, remains thereafter quiescent, is to be condemned. The ideal lies in a unio caritatis, whereby the opposition between individual and universal is ended.

(2) To be turned to their essential uses, the affections must be enlisted for high ends. Human action is not the result merely of affections that have always held rule, or which remain fixed; it depends upon their transformation by the Christian ideal. Man is naturarally perverse and selfish, hence the need for the process of moralizing the affections or of rendering them holy; only thus can they furnish motives for correct moral action. In recent years the aspects involved in (1) have attracted greatly preponderating attention.

Literature: for (1) see the treatment of love in any systematic treatise on Christian Ethics, e.g. by DORNER; for (2), such a work as JONATHAN EDWARDS' Religious Affections. (R.M.W.)

Affective Tone or Feeling Tone: Ger. Gefühlston; Fr. élément affectif, ton émotionnel; Ital. elemento affettivo, tono sentimentale. The ingredient of feeling that attaches to a mental state of any kind. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)The term was introduced, in its German form, by Wundt, who distinguished sensation from its affective tone, supposing that every sensation has with it a certain qualitative sense-feeling. To some (Ward) it appears to be vague organic sensation accompanying special sensation. Other writers fail to find such feeling, and consider the so-called affective tone of sensation as pleasure and pain; yet others consider all feeling a state of compounded pleasure and pain (see FEELING). To them affective tone is simply the presence of pleasure and pain. It is best, on the whole, to confine affective tone -- or feeling tone -- to qualitative differences of the affective order everywhere; to leave it as a further question as to whether sensations have such affective tone; and to use the phrase HEDONIC TONE (q.v.) for the pleasure-pain colouring throughout.

Literature: WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol., chap. x; Outlines of Psychol., § 7; WARD, Encyc. Brit., art. Psychology; LADD, Psychol. Descrip. and Explan., chap. ix; Elements of Physiol. Psychol., 514 f.; BALDWIN, Handb. of Psychol., Feeling and Will, chaps. iii, iv; STOUT, Analytic Psychol., i. chap. vi. (J.M.B. - G.F.S.)

Affinity (chemical): see CHEMICAL SYNTHESIS.

Affirmation and Affirmative: Ger. Behauptung; Fr. affirmation; Ital. affermazione. See JUDGMENT.

A fortiori [Lat.] (the same in the other languages). With stronger reason; hence more conclusive, as applied to an argument. (J.M.B.)

After-image: Ger. Nachbild; Fr. image consécutive; Ital. immagine persistente (or consecutiva). (1) AFTER-SENSATION (q.v.). (2) After-sensation of sight. These may be classified as (a) positive and negative, according as they retain the relations of light and shade of the original stimulus or reverse them; (b) same-coloured, complementary, and variable, according as their colour-tone stands related to the stimulus colour; and (c) monocular, binocular, or transferred, according as they are set up in the stimulated eye or eyes, or in the unstimulated eye.

The negative and complementary after-image ('the' after-image of popular parlance) is explained by Fechner and Helmholtz as a phenomenon of retinal fatigue (Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, 2nd ed., 534). Hering regards it as a phenomenon of ADAPTATION (q.v.), as significant of a return to equilibrium of the antagonistic visual processes (Ebbinghaus, Psychol., 258). Positive and same-coloured after-images, resulting from brief and intensive stimulation, are explained as due to a continuation of excitation after removal of stimulus; but there are difficulties. Between primary sensation and this (positive and same-coloured) image is sometimes seen a positive and complementary after-image: the explanation is doubtful (Ebbinghaus, loc. cit., 244). See AFTER-SENSATION. The variable after-image shows the 'flight of colours' (e.g. solar after-image), which must be indicative of highly complicated excitatory processes. The transferred after-image depends apparently on the existence of a sensory reflex arc in the binocular visual apparatus (Titchener, Philos. Stud., viii. 231). Altogether, the after-image chapter is one of the least satisfactory in current visual theory. Cf. VISION; also LABORATORY AND APPARATUS (optical). (E.B.T.)

Both the 'explanations' (Helmholtz' and Hering's) are merely restatements of what a complementary or an antagonistic colour is, in the given theory -- i.e. a residum, when one colour is removed from white, or a 'reversed' colour process.

It has sometimes been supposed that after-images are due to processes of fatigue or of restitution in the visual centres of the brain, higher or lower -- not in the retina. This view is based upon the fact that an after-image is due to stimulation of one eye may, under proper conditions, sometimes seem to be seen with the other. Experiments show, however, that in such cases the after-image is really seen with the eye first stimulated; other considerations, together with Exner's experiments on retinal and optic nerve stimulation, support the retinal location (Sanford, Course in Exper. Psychol., expt. 27). (C.L.F.)

Literature: works cited above. Also VON KRIES, Zeitsch. f. Psychol., xii. 81; HERING, Pflüger's Arch., xlii. 488, xliii. 264, 329; Arch. f. Ophthal., xxxvii. 3, I; xxxviii. 2, 252; HESS, Arch. f. Ophthal., xxxvi. i. I; Pflüger's Arch., xlix. 190; FICK and GÜRBER, Arch. f. Ophthal., xxxvi. 2, 245, xxxviii. I. 118; S. BIDWELL, Proc. Roy. Soc., lvi, No. 337, 132; FRANZ, Mon. Supp. to Psychol. Rev., No. XII; and general references under VISION.

After-sensation: Ger. Nachempfindung; Fr. sensation consécutive; Ital. persistenza della sensazione. In various senses, brief stimulation of the peripheral organ results in (1) a primary sensation, (2) a short blank interval after the stimulus ceases, and (3) a secondary sensation, called after-sensation.

Literature: KÜLPE, Outlines of Psychol., § 9. Pressure: GOLDSCHEIDER, Abhandl. d. physiol. Gesell. zu Berlin (Oct. 31, 1890). Temprature: DESSOIR, Du Bois-Reymond's Arch. (1892). Tone: URBANTSCHITSCH, Pflüger's Arch., XXV. (1881). Sight: see AFTER-IMAGE. Touch: SPINDLER, Psychol. Rev., iv. 632 f.

(2) The name is also given to the continuance of sensation without pause after removal of stimulus.

Literature: Temperature: GOLDSCHEIDER, Du Bois-Reymond's Arch. (1885), Suppl.-Bd. Tone: STUMPF, Tonpsychologie, i. 213 (not admitted). Sight: 'fall' of sensation (cf. Ebbinghaus, Psychol., 241); SANFORD, Course in Exper. Psychol., expts. 11, 13, 19, 64, 124-8. (E.B.T.)

Agamogenesis [Gr. a + gamoV, marriage, and genesiV, birth]: Ger. ungeschlechtliche Fortpflanzung; Fr. agamogenèse, générationasexuée; Ital. agamogenesi, riproduzione agamica. The process of asexual multiplication (or Monogony) in animals and plants. Compare GAMOGENESIS (or Amphigony).

Four modes of agamogenesis have been distinguished: (1) Where the organism divides into two more or less similar organisms by binary FISSION (q.v.), as in the amoeba and other unicellular organisms [and occasionally in higher forms (Schizogamy of Annelids). (2) Where the organism divides into a number of minute bodies or spores, each of which can develop into the adult form (sporulation) as in plants and unicellular animals. (E.S.G.)] (3) Where buds are produced by GEMMATION (q.v.), as in many plants, and among the Coelenterata and many other, especially sessile and colonial, animals. (4) By the development of unfertilized ova (see PARTHENOGENESIS). In many animals and plants reproduction by both processes, gamogenetic and agamogenetic, prevails. Thus hydra, when the conditions are favourable, reproduces by gemmation; but under the indirect influence of cold or from insufficient nutrition, it gives rise to ova or spermatozoa. See PROTOZOA, ALTERNATION OF GENERATIONS, and PARTHFNOGENESIS (C.LL.M.)

Whether organisms can continue for an indefinite number of generations reproducing asexually, is a question which has a very important bearing on the subject of the origin and significance of sex, senility, and death. Maupas found that in the case of the Infusoria (unicellular animals) an occasional return to AMPHIMIXIX (q.v.) is necessary to prevent degeneration and eventual death. Nevertheless, there are groups of lowly organized animals and plants amongst which agamogenetic reproduction only is known to occur. See DEATH.

Literature: E. MAUPAS, Recherches expérimentales sur la multiplication des infusoires ciliés, Arch. Zool. Exp. et Gén. (1888). (E.S.G.)

Agency (in law) [Med. Lat. agentia]: Ger. Agentschaft, Agentur, Stellvertretung; Fr. procuration, agence; Ital. procura. A contractual relation, whereby one person is authorized to act for another in such a manner as to confer upon the latter new rights or impose upon him new obligations. The wife's authority to act for her husband so far as to bind him for the purchase of necessaries for her support was originally an incident of her legal relation to him, but is now treated as proceeding from his implied consent. The absence of authority may be supplied by a subsequent ratification. By some jurists agency is considered to involve a delegation of power to exercise some discretion in determining the manner of action, so that the juristic act, which is the result of the agency, is performed by the agent: in this view a mere messanger is not a true agent, for in his case the juristic act is concluded by the principal, and there is no real representation as to the latter (Sohm's Institutes of Roman Law, § 32). He for whom another is an agent is termed the principal.

Agency is a development of the law of the family, where all act in subjection to its head, and on his account. Its basis has gradually changed from that of status to that of contract. It played but a small part in Roman law, so far as it depended on contractual relations (Sohm's Institutes of Roman Law, §, 32; Phillimore's Principles and Maxims of Jurisprudence, xx). The Roman mandatarius bound himself personally as to the third party with whom he might deal for his principal, the mandator.

Literature: MOREY, Outlines of Roman Law, 370; CUF, Institutions Juridiques des Romains (1891), 649. A scholarly discussion of the history of agency in English law, by Chief Justice Holmes, of Massachusetts, will be found in the Harvard Law Review, iv. 345, v.I. (S.E.B.)

Agent [Lat. agens, acting]: Ger. wirkendes Wesen, A gent; Fr. agent; Ital. agente. That which manifests ACTIVITY (q.v.) in any of the senses given under that term. The more special meanings immediately follow. (J.M.B.)

Agent (free). One who exercises FREEDOM (q.v.). The agent is said, in general, to be free when the act is not performed under external constraint, or by mere physiological reflex. The degree to which threat of pain or deception or ignorance interferes with free agency is a disputed question (cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic., iii. I). (W.R.S. - J.M.B.)

Agent (in law) [Lat. agens]: Ger. A gent, Geschäftsführer; Fr. mandataire, gérant; Ital. agente. One authorized to act for another (who is termed his principal) in such a manner as to give the latter new rights or impose upon him new obligations.

See AGENCY. An agent is juristically identified with his principal. Qui facit per alium per se. (S.E.B.)

Agglutination (linguistic) [Lat. ad, to, + glutinare, to paste]: Ger. Agglutination; Fr. agglutination; Ital. agglutinazione. A method of formation in language, whereby a modification of meaning or of relation is given to a word through a significant element or elements attached to it or contained in it.

The method is widely applied in language, and is abundantly illustrated in English (e.g. in circlet, leaflet, ringlet, the element -let is distinctly and separately significant), and can be applied in the formation of new words, as priestlet; so -ess in goddess, baroness, authoress; so -ed in sounded, hated, 'suicided'; or ex- in ex-president, ex-convict. This, which is in English and generally in inflectional languages one of various devices used for modifying the meaning of words or fitting them to their function in the sentence, appears in a large number of languages, known as the agglutinative, and of which the Turkish, the Japanese, and the Bantu languages are typical examples, as the dominant principle of structure. Like elements are with a high degree of consistency used for like modifications, and hence the structure is in general simple and regular, making the minimum of demand upon the memory. Such languages appear to have been originally developed in adjustment to the needs of scattered populations within which intercourse was maintained at low tension. Psychologically they represent a grammatical consciousness awake to the necessity of indicating simply and unmistakably every turn of thought, and are so distinguished from the inflectional languages, but most widely and radically from the monosyllabic or isolating languages like the Chinese. (B.I.W.)

Agglutination (in psychology). A term used by the early associationists for cases of close or 'adhesive' association of ideas. Also by Wundt for the simplest form of apperceptive combination (Verbindung). Its use is not recommended). (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Aggregate [Lat. ad + grex, flock]: Ger. Aggregat, Zusammen (for Herbart's use, see COMPLEX); Fr. agrégat; Ital. aggregato. (1) A collection of individuals considered as aggregated or loosely gathered together (see AGGREGATION). (2) In psychology, an Aggregate Idea or Concept is a general idea of a class or group taken collectively rather than abstractly. In the aggregate or collective idea the multiplicity of separate units is held before the mind. Cf. GENERAL AND ABSTRACT IDEA. and NOTION.

Judd (trans. of Wundt's Outlines of Psychol., Glossary and 260), following Titchener (ibid. 260 note), uses Aggregate Idea to render Wundt's Gesammtvorstellung, an alternative expression being Idea of Imagination, an apperceptive compound which is distinguished from Fusion and Association by being voluntary and selective. The English word Concept would seem to render this meaning sufficiently well, provided we do not follow Wundt (loc. cit.) in using its equivalent (Begriff) for a special case of Gesammtvorstellung. The aggregate idea is a GENERAL (see that term for the foreign equivalents) that is the idea of an aggregate, not an idea that is itself 'aggregated or complex.' For this latter we have the terms Composite and Complex, which may be used (cf. Titchener's recommendation, Amer. J. of Psychol., vii. 82) for the intellectual framework of the Concept as covered by Gesammtvorstellung. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Aggregation (in sociology): Ger. Aggregat (1) Haufen (2); Fr. agrégat, agrégation; Ital. aggregazione. (1) A collection of beings taken together, considered as a unit or as made up of units. See UNIT (social).

It is a general term for the different cases often designated by the term ASSOCIATION (social) (q.v.). It is recommended that aggregation and (social) GROUP (q.v.) take the place of 'social association,' for reasons given under Association (social), in sociology (the point of view of the onlooker); and that CO-OPERATION (q.v.) be used in the same general way for all sorts of Aggregation and of Groups when looked at from the point of view of the actor in the group. We should then have Aggregation (general) determined in different Groups (special), as Family, Church, Commercial, &c., in sociology, and Co-operation determined as Instinctive, Spontaneous, Intelligent, &c., in social psychology.

Literature: see SOCIOLOGY, and SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

(2) A term of demography or of statistics of population, meaning a grouping of individuals in one place or territory.

Hobbes (De Corpore Politico), Pt. II. chap. ii. § 1) uses the phrase 'a multitude considered as an aggregate.' Genetic and congregate aggregation are terms introduced by Giddings (Princ. of Sociol., 1896), with the following meanings: genetic aggregation = a grouping of kindred by common descent; congregate aggregation = a grouping by immigration of either unrelated or related individuals. (F.H.G.)

Agnoiology [Gr. agnoia, ignorance, + logoV, discourse]. The theory of human ignorance, its extent, limits, and conditions; a term used by Ferrier (Instit. of Met., 48) to indicate a discipline between epistemology and ontology. (R.H.S.)

Agnosticism [Lat. a + gnoscere, to know]: Ger. Agnosticismus, Agnosie, Fr. agnosticisme; Ital. agnosticismo. The class of philosophical or scientific theories which recognize an intrinsically UNKNOWABLE (q.v.).

The term is due to Huxley, with whom, and many other scientific men (cf. Du Bois-Reymond, Ueber d. Grenzen d. Naturerkenntniss), it means rather a habit of mind which considers metaphysics futile. In philosophy it has been applied especially to Spencer and the Positivists (see POSITIVISM), to Kant (see KANTIANISM), and to those (e.g., Hamilton, Bradley) who draw agnostic conclusions from the doctrine of the RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE (q.v.).

Literature: see UNKNOWABLE, POSITIVISM, EPISTEMOLOGY; especially KANT, 'Transcendental Dialectic,' in Critique of Pure Reason; HUXLEY, Collected Essays, i, and 'Hume'. SPENCER, First Principles; STERLING, Textbook to Kant; WARD, Naturalism and Agnosticism; BIBLIOG. E, 2, a. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Agnosticism (in theology). A word primarily descriptive of any theory which denies that it is possible for man to acquire knowledge about God.

While theologians almost unanimously unite in opposing agnosticism, they have not been unaffected by cognate tendencies. The problem, 'How far can a finite being know the absolute Being?' invariably raises difficulties that often lead to conclusions of a partially agnostic character. These difficulties are inseparable from the manner in which theology states the problem. (1) As against the doctrine of 'traditionalism,' which holds that man needs the aid of a supernatural revelation to arrive at a knowledge of the being of God, the Roman Catholic Church authoritatively teaches that 'by the natural light of human reason' the fact of God's existence can certainly be ascertained. But, on the other hand, as against the theory of 'ontologism' -- that man is able of himself to know God directly, and that all knowledge is nothing more than a mode of this knowledge of deity -- it upholds a modified agnosticism. In condemning the tendencies to pantheism, which are alleged to be traceable in such a writer as, say, Rosmini, it was necessary to declare that from nature man does not obtain any insight into the essence of God's being. The direct perception of the nature of God is reserved for the blessed in another life. Here God can be known only 'reflected in a mirror.' While, then, man can know that God is by an effort of mere reason, he cannot know what God essentially is. (2) Christian theism is also partially agnostic. It holds that man has knowledge of God, but denies that God is one with the universe. It therefore infers that the absolute Being transcends the universe, and that human knowledge of him, while always progressing, can never be complete. (3) Mansel furnishes the classical instance of agnosticism in theology. His conception is that, while man must believe in the infinity of God, he is unable to comprehend it. Faith and knowledge are necessarily divorced. For, as knowledge always attaches predicates in order to obtain definiteness, and as predicates limit, there cannot be any real knowledge of the infinite existence in which, nevertheless, man must believe. (4) The most recent form of agnosticism in theology is to be found in the teaching of A. Ritschl and some of his school. It reposes upon a specialized theory of knowledge, derived partly from one interpretation of Kant and partly from Lotze, according to which man knows only phenomena. As God is not a phenomenon, he is not known by man. Theology therefore deals not with the causa efficiens, but with the causa finalis. That is to say, it treats of God not as a being, but as an 'attractive ideal' which, by impressing a man subjectively with its value for him, leads him to adopt it. God is thus unknowable in himself -- even in divine revelation it would seem; man is aware of him only in so far as appreciative of the value of his nature (which is love) for the purposes of moral and religious elevation. (R.M.W.)

Literature: see BIBLIOG. E, 2, g, a.

Agoraphobia [Gr. agora, market-place, + fobia, fear]: Ger. Platzfurcht, Platzangst; Fr. agoraphobie, topophobie; Ital. agorafobia. A morbid uneasiness or fear in crossing open places. The term Platzfurcht or Agoraphobia is due to Westphal. The symptom is one of a group of excessive fears (see PHOBIA) characteristic of states of nervous debility or of persons with nervous diathesis. It is also symptomatic of mental degeneration and of neurasthenia. Open spaces, parks, squares, and the like are avoided. When it is necessary to cross them the patient follows the surrounding houses or trees or clings to a companion. There is no vertigo, but the legs feel weak, the heart palpitates; there may be coldness or numbness and profuse sweating. The patient may realize the groundlessness of the fear, but none the less feels alarm and apprehension. At times it cannot be overcome, and momentarily inhibits action (cf. ABOULIA). (J.J.)

Literature: H. SAURY, Étude clinique sur la folie héréditaire (1886); BENEDIKT, Allg. Wien. med. Zeit., xl; WESTPHAL, Arch. f Psychiat. u. Nervenh. (1872); KAAN, Der neurasthenische Angstaffekt; Jahrb. f. Psychiat. u. Neurol., xi. 149; SUCKLING, Amer. J. Med. Sci., xcix. 476-83; LEGRAND DU SAULLE,  Étude clinique sur la peur des espaces (1878); DECHAMBRE, Dict. Encyc. des Sci. Méd. (sub verbo); CORDES, Arch. f Psychiat. u. Nervenh. (1872); DUHAUT, Considérations sur l'agoraphobie (1879); M. DE GRAIN, Délire chez les dégénérés (1886); V. MAGNAN, Leçons sur les délires (1897). (L.M. - J.M.B.)

Agraphia [Gr. a + grafein, write]: Ger Agraphie; Fr. agraphie; Ital. agrafia. The loss or impairment of the power to express oneself by written symbols. It is one of a group of the diseases of language (Aphasia) with intricate and important relations to the growth and decay of other speech functions, treated under the article SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS (q.v., also for Literature). (J.J.)

Agreeableness and Disagreeableness: see PAIN AND PLEASURE, and PLEASANTNESS AND UNPLEASANTNESS.

Agreement [O.F. agrement]: Ger. (1) Uebereinstimmung, (2) Gleichheit, (3) Uebereinstimmung, Consistenz; Fr. (1) convenance, (2) similitude, (3) compatibilité; Ital. (1) concordanza, (2), (3) accordo. (1) Concord, harmony; (2) similarity, likeness, or sameness; analogy, or connectedness of meaning in case of ideas; (3) logical consistency in case of judgments.

Locke (Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, chap. i) defines knowledge as 'the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas.' He then names four sorts of 'agreement or disagreement': (1) identity, or diversity; (2) relation; (3) coexistence; (4) real existence. The first is the particular relation between two ideas, which makes them called the same or not the same. The second refers to abstract relations which exist between ideas such as are still not identical; e.g. the relation of equality or inequality between two different quantities. The third has to do with the relation in concrete substances, between their various qualities; e.g. fusibility and yellowness coexist in gold. The fourth refers to the agreement or disagreement of any idea 'with real existence,' e.g. one may affirm God is. This view of the conception of agreement, and of its relation to judgment and to knowledge, was later much discussed.

Literature: FRASER'S edition of Locke's Essay, ii. 120 (with references). (J.R.)

Agreement (legal): see CONTRACT.

Agreement (method of): Ger. Methode der Uebereinstimmung; Fr. méthode de concordance; Ital. metodo di concordanza. The process of using a number of instances of constant conjunction amid differences as basis for inference to a real connection, most commonly of cause and effect. The rule defining the kind of conjunction required is expressed in Mill's enunciation thus: 'If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all these instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.'

The Method of Agreement is substantially that inculcated by F. Bacon as 'comparentia ad intellectum instantiarum quae in eadem natura conveniunt per materias licet dissimillimas' (Nov. Org. ii. 11). Modern logic recognizes more fully than Bacon did the characteristic imperfection of the method due to the possibility of PLURALITY OF CAUSES (q.v.), and more fully than Mill did the practical difficulties involved in application of the method to unanalysed experience. The method as a test or criterion of the sufficiency of evidence is pre-eminently but not exclusively applicable to data of observation.

Literature: BACON, Nov. Org.; J.S. MILL, Logic; VENN, Empirical Logic, chap. xvii; BRADLEY, Princ. of Logic, Bk. II. Pt. II. chap. iii; HOBHOUSE, Theory of Knowledge, Pt. II. chap. xv. (R.A.)

Agricultural Stage: Ger. Kulturstufe der Ackerbauer; Fr. état agricole; Ital. stato agricolo. That stage of economic development in which agriculture is of the greatest relative importance, when the pastoral or nomadic stage is over, and manufactures and commerce are still restricted. (F.C.M.)

Grosse (Die Formen der Familie) distinguishes a 'lower' from a 'higher' agricultural stage. (K.G.)

Agrippa, Henry Cornelius, of Nettesheim. (1486-1535.) A German physician, philosopher, and astrologer. Lectured in theology in Cologne and elsewhere, and practised medicine in France.

Ahrens, Heinrich. (1808-74.) Educated in Göttingen, he fled to Paris, and there lectured on the history of German philosophy. He was professor of philosophy in Brussels (1834), of law and political economy at Graz (1850), and of practical philosophy and political science in Leipzig (1859). Wrote on law and politics.

Ahrimân. The principle of evil in Persian philosophy. See ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Persian). (J.M.B.)

d'Ailly (or Ailli), Pierre. (1350-cir. 1420.) A French churchman and reformer. Chancellor of the university of Paris after 1389; archbishop of Cambray after 1395; cardinal after 1411. He presided at the trial of John Huss before the Council of Constance. He exposed and condemned the abuses and impurities of the Church.

Aim [Lat. aestimare, to estimate]: Ger. Ziel; Fr. fin, but; Ital. scopo. A more remote or general project in voluntary action. Synonymous most nearly with PURPOSE (q.v.), and having a less exact meaning than the terms END and MOTIVE (cf. those terms). (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Aim (in education): Ger. Ziel; Fr. but; Ital. fine. A stage in Herbartian METHOD (in education; q.v.); the end to be attained in a given exercise.

It is thought to conduce greatly to successful instruction if the end, or aim, towards which it moves is brought clearly to the consciousness of the pupil. That the aim may be both clear and important, Herbartian writers urge that the subject-matter of instruction should be so grouped that each subdivision may be considered a unit, or whole, for method. The aim for each unit, or method-whole, is simply the leading purpose for teaching it. Thus, in introducing a lesson upon the motions of the earth, the teacher may say: 'We have found that the earth is a great ball suspended in space; let us see whether it is at rest or in motion.' See METHOD-WHOLE.

Literature: McMURRY, The Method of the Recitation, 98-109. (C.DE G.)

Akinesis [Gr. a + kinhsiV, motion]: Ger. Bewegungslosigkeit; Fr. paralysie, parésie; Ital. acinesi. See PARALYSIS.

Alalia and Dyslalia [Gr. alaloV, from a + lalein, to talk]: Ger. Alalie; Fr. alalie; Ital. alalia. (1) Partial or complete loss of the power to articulate, or imperfect articulation, due usually to paralysis of one or other of the groups of muscles (lips, tongue, larynx) used in speaking. Similarly, dyslalia is used to refer to faulty articulation, or, which is better, complete loss of that power (Séglas, Troubles du Language), which defect, when confined to a few special sounds, is termed mogilalia, and which, when the sound uttered is different from the one intended, may be termed paralalia. In these cases the defect is called peripheral, although the cause of it (paralysis) may be in the centres below the cortex. The difficulties in pronouncing r, th, s, &c., peculiar to individuals or races, are cases of mogilalia, and these in turn have been given special names, according to the letter involved -- rhotacism, &c. These terms are used and illustrated by Kussmaul (Störungen der Sprache, chap. xxxv) and Morselli (Semej. malat. ment., ii), but have not been generally adopted by other writers. Such normal difficulties of pronunciation are purely peritheral. (2) Loss of the elements of speech due to cerebral disease; i.e. a central defect. This is less usual and less desirable. See distinctions given under SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS. (J.J.)

Alanus (or Alan), Johann. (1565-1631.) A Danish professor of philosophy, and author of philosophical works.

Albertists: followers of ALBERTUS MAGNUS (q.v.). See also THOMISTS, and PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

Albertus Magnus. (1193-1280.) Sometimes called Albert von Bollstädt, 'Doctor Universalis.' One of the most learned men of the Middle Ages. He introduced the complete system of Aristotle to his age by a loose reproduction of Arabic versions and commentaries. Lectured at Cologne and in Paris, Thomas Aquinas being one of his pupils. He was a Dominican and became bishop, but found the office uncongenial and resigned.

Albo, Joseph (or José). (died 1428.) A Jewish scholar, disputant, and polemical writer, who continued the work of Maimonides. He considered the existence of God, the law of Moses, and the future life the fundamental dogmas of JUDAISM (q.v.).

Alcoholism [Arab. al-koh'l]: Ger. Alkoholismus; Fr. alcoolisme; Ital. alcoolismo. A moribd condition with marked physiological and psychological symptoms, brought about by excessive indulgence in alcoholic liquors.

The effects of alcohol vary considerably according to the duration, manner, and degree of imbibition, and the predisposition and general condition of the individual. The term Acute Alcoholism is reserved for a very distinctive group of symptoms which occurs at times after an excessive debauch, at times as an incident in the development of chronic alcoholism, and at times in predisposed patients as the consequence of severe mental or physical strain. This condition is also known as delirium tremens. Chronic Alcoholism is a condition resulting from the effects of the abuse of alcohol taken for a long period. Drunkenness is a transitory condition resulting from an excessive dose of alcohol; its synonyms are Inebriation or Intoxication. DIPSOMANIA (q.v.) is strictly an intermittent, irresistible craving for liquor, being a defect of inhibition similar in nature to other manias, but is often used as synonymous with drunkenness or alcoholism, as dipsomaniac is used for drunkard.

The morbid symptoms of alcoholism present a wide variation. The hereditary predisposition is a most important aetiological factor which influences as well the nature of the symptoms. Alcoholic poisoning seems to attack the region of least resistance, and, though slow and insidious in its onset, is certain to undermine the vigour of the nervous system. The nervous disorders pass, as the disease proceeds, from the periphery to the centre, appearing first as sensory and motor derangement, and later besieging the intellectual and moral faculties. The sensory troubles appear as pseudo-sensations in the extremities, itching, creeping, or pricking; at times hyperaesthesia, but more usually a progressive loss of sensibility occurs. The eyes lose their visual acuteness, and are prone to pseudo-sensations. Of the motor disorders, which likewise proceed from periphery to centre, the most salient symtpom is a tremor, at first slight and occasional, then more marked and constant. Such tremors are exaggerated under nervous strain or effort, appear in the articulation, and frequently lead to more serious motor neuroses (spasms, cramps, convulsions, and paralyses). The intellectual disorders are usually described as falling into two periods, the second period exhibiting the typical picture of insanity (mania and dementia), while the first reveals the effects of a less serious but comprehensive intellectual decline. The excitability of the nervous centres leads to violent outbursts of anger, irritability, suspiciousness, or recklessness. Moral sensibilities are blunted, and the general plane of mental life gradually declines. The final stages of alcoholic dementia present complete decay of all the mental faculties, with pronounced stammering, tremor, and paralysis (see DEMENTIA).

Acute alcoholism (delirium tremens) is the sharp outbreak of a predisposed nervous system under the influence of alcoholic poisoning, and is in many cases an exacerbation of a chronic condition. The attack is generally foreshadowed in a prodromic period marked by cerebral exaltation, rapid flow of ideas, excitement, excessive sensitiveness, fear, irritability, and the like; and sensory illusions, fantastic and persistent, and regularly increasing at night, render the sleep of the sufferer a protracted nightmare of gruesome scenes and fearful catastrophes. The delirium itself is the culmination of the prodromic symptoms, the illusions passing into more constant and varied hallucinations; the patient, no longer a spectator but an actor in the fancied horrors, becomes the victim of numberless fears and torturing sensations, particularly affecting sight and touch. In drunkeness likewise there are two periods -- one of excitement and the other of depression. A lively imagination, exuberance of spirits, loquacity, lack of reserve, are characteristic of the first stage, while in the ensuing stage are observed confusion of thought, difficulty in speech and in the finer motor-co-ordinations, vertigo, sense-illusions. This is followed by a period of deep sleep -- a recuperative period of heaviness and stupor gradually leading to the normal condition. The condition, like other forms of alcoholic poisoning, varies considerably with the individual and the nature of the dose. The study of alcoholism has an importance beyond its medical and psychological interest. It has contributed to much of the degradation of individuals and races, and the regulation of its use has been for generations one of the most important sociological problems. The tendency to this excess has passed into our heredity, and is recognized as one of the significant marks of a degenerate diathesis.

Literature: LEGRAIN, articles Alcoholism, Chronic Alcoholism, Delirium Tremens, in Tuke's Dict. of Psychol. Med.; BONHOEFFER, Der Geisteszustand des Alcoholdelirienten, Wernicke's Psychiatrie, App. 6 (1898); C.F. HODGE, Experiments on the Physiology of Alcohol, Pop. Sci. Mo. (1897), 1. 594-603, 769-812. An extensive bibliography of alcoholism has been compiled by J. S. BILLINGS (1894). (J.J.)

Also V. MAGNAN, Recherches sur les Centres Nerveux, 1e série (1876), 2e série (1893); Leçons Cliniques sur les Maladies Mentales (1893); De l'Alcoolisme (1874); Des diverses formes de Délire alcoolique et de leur Traitement; DECHAMBRE, Dict. Encyc. des Sci. Méd. (sub verbo); J. DEJERINE, De l'Hérédité dans les Maladies du Système Nerveux (1886); M. LEGRAIN, Hérédité et Alcoolisme (1889). (L.M.)

Also HUSS, Alkoholismus; E. FAZIO, L'Ubriachezza (1878-92); ZERBOGLIO, Alcoolismo (1896). (E.M.)

Alcott, Amos Bronson. (1799-1888.) American transcendental philosopher; contributed to The Dial, and published works on a wide range of speculative and practical themes.

Alcuin (or Alkuin), Flaccus Albinus Alcinus. (cir. 735-804.) An English churchman, 'the most learned man of his age.' He became (782) member of the court of Charlemagne, with whom he sustained an intimate friendship until his death. Assisted the king in founding and maintaining schools, was head of the court school, and was made (796) abbot of St. Martins at Tours.

d'Alembert, Jean le Rond. (1717-83.) A French geometer and philosopher: educated in the Mazarin College, his favorite study being geometry. He wrote on dynamics, fluids, and a number of important literary and philosophical themes. With Diderot, he was one of the ENCYCLOPEDISTS (q.v.).

Alexander, Archibald. (1772-1851.) President of Hampden-Sidney College; pastor in the Presbyterian Church; professor in the Theological Seminary of Princeton. He was noted as a pulpit orator and as a writer on theology and the evidences of Christianity.

Alexander, James Waddell. (1804-59.) Son of Archibald Alexander, educated in Princeton College and Seminary. Pastor, editor of The Presbyterian (1830-3); professor of rhetoric and belles-lettres at Princeton (1833-44); pastor, New York (1844-9 and 1851-9); professor of church history and government in Princeton Theological Seminary (1849-51).

Alexander, Joseph Addison. (1809-1860.) Son of Archibald Alexander, educated at Princeton. Distinguished for oriental learning, he became professor of biblical criticism and ecclesiastical history in Princeton Theological Seminary (1833), and professor of biblical and ecclisiastical history after 1852.

Alexander of Aphrodisias. A teacher of the Peripatetic philosophy at Athens in the end of the 2nd and beginning of the 3rd centuries A.D. Wrote commentaries on the works of Aristotle, which were translated by the Arabians, and published later in the Aldine edition of Aristotle's works (1495-8) and, in part, in more recent times.

Alexander of Hales. (died 1245.) Named "Doctor Irrefragabilis' and also 'Fons Vitae': a celebrated English theologian of the 13th century. Trained in the monastary of Hales he relinquished an archdeaconry to study in Paris, where he received the doctor's degree and became famous as a teacher of philosophy and theology. Among his pupils was Bonaventura (but not Duns Scotus or Thomas Aquinas, as he has asserted). Entered the order of Monorite Friars. His most famous book, Summa Theologiae, is based on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.

Alexandrian School: Ger. Alexandrinische Schule; Fr. école d'Alexandrie; Ital. scuola alessandrina. The phrase has been used in two distinct senses -- a literary and a philosophico-theological. In the former sense, with which we need not deal here, it is applied to the literary tendencies dominant during the age of the Ptolemies (322-30 B.C.) In its philosophico-theological usage it indicates that junction between Eastern and Western thought which took place at Alexandria and produced a new series of doctrines which mark an entire school. Although these tendencies may be traced as far back as 280 B.C., it is convenient to date the floreat of the school from 30 B.C. to 529 A.D.

East and West met and commingled at Alexandria. The operative ideas of the civilizations, cultures, and religions of Rome, Greece, Palestine, and the further East found themselves in juxtaposition. Hence arose a new problem, developed partly by occidental thought, partly by oriental aspiration. Religion and philosophy became inextricably mixed, and the resultant doctrines consequently belong to neither sphere proper, but are rather witnesses to an attempt at combining both. These efforts naturally came from two sides. On the one hand, the Jews tried to accommodate their faith to the results of Western culture, in which Greek elements predominated. On the other hand, thinkers whose main impulse came from Greek philosophy attempted to accommodate their doctrine to the distinctively religious problems which the eastern nations had brought with them. From whichever side the consequences be viewed, they are to be characterized as theosophical rather than purely philosophical, purely religious, or purely theological.

(1) The beginnings of the movement are almost entirely lost in obscurity. Some profess to find traces of it so early as the Septuagint (280 B.C.), but it is usual to date the first overt traces from Aristobulus (160 B.C.). The Jewish line culminated in Philo (fl. 40 A.D.), who accepts Greek metaphysical ideas and, by the method of allegorical interpretation, finds their justification in the Hebrew Scriptures. Philo's system falls into three main portions: (a) The existence and nature of God. (b) God's relation to the world, embodying the very important and influential doctrine of the Logos. This doctrine is Philo's most distinctive contribution to the history of thought, and is a determining element in the teaching of the school in all its branches. (c) Man's life in the light of his own and of God's nature. Philo's significance is to be sought rather in what he attempted than in what he accomplished, and the same may be said of the Jewish Alexandrians as a whole. These thinkers are significant phenomena, not permanent figures.

(2) In the more strictly philosophical line the doctrine of the Alexandrian school goes by the name Neo-Platonism. Here, once more, great obscurity prevails regarding the earlier history. It may be said generally that the Neo-Platonists are deflected from philosophy proper by their adoption of the contemporary religious and apocalyptic longings of mankind, and by their tacit agreement to view these theosophical movements as originating the problems which it was most essential for philosophy to solve. Consequently, their interpretation of the universe and of life is not unbiased, but is conducted in the interest of the great question of salvation from this present evil world. Philosophically viewed, the school is eminently eclectic. Although relying upon Plato for its first principles, and especially for its dualism, it agrees with the post-Aristotelian sceptics in its contempt for knowledge; with the Stoics in its manifold tendencies towards pantheism, and in its regard for an ascetic morality; it bears traces too of the influence of Aritotle, especially in some aspects of its statement of the problem of the relation of God to the world. According to generally accepted opinion the school was founded by Ammonius Saccas (fl. 200 A.D.). His doctrines well illustrate the general scheme of its teaching. The human soul forms the central subject of investigation. Its pure origin, its falling away, and the means of its return to its first estate constitute the principal subjects discussed. The entire attitude is mystical. That is to say, the beginning lies in a transcendent sphere, and there the end is to be found also. Man must needs get beyond experience, and this by exceptional means. By cultivating freedom from the trammels of sense, a man may at length achieve a condition of ecstasy in which he will become one with God. With Plotinus Neo-Platonism attains its highest development and, very specially, its clearest and least irrational teaching. Porphyry (fl. 280 A.D.) was Plotinus' greatest pupil, and he always remained a pupil. He departed from the theoretical severity of the master and emphasized the practical element more, with a view to combating the rising power of Christianity. After him the theosophical interest predominates, as in Iamblichus, Sopater, Maximus, and many others. The members of the school became religious teachers charged with a mission on behalf of Paganism against Christianity. After the death of Julian the Apostate (363 A.D.), the power of the church gradually increased, and that of Pagan theosophy waned correspondingly. Alexandria and Rome ceased to be the head quarters, and Greek thought found its last refuge in the old home, Athens. Plutarch (fl. 425 A.D.) and Proclus (fl. 470 A.D.) are the most distinguished representatives of this branch. Naturally, under the changed conditions, the general aspect of the school was once more altered. Its scholars tend to emphasize accurate historical knowledge of previous systems, and, on the basis of this, they try to resystematize the entire body of Greek thought, relying at the same time upon Plotinus for the general framework. With Plotinus dialectic comes to occupy a prominent position again. Neo-Platonism may be said to end with Damascius, who was head of the Athenian school when it was closed, by order of Justinian, in 529 A.D. Boethius is the last eminent thinker to be affected by it.

(3) Owing to the historical circumstances in which they found themselves, rather than to the influence of Neo-Platonism as a formal system, some Christian thinkers were profoundly swayed by ideas characteristic of the Alexandrian school. Of these T. Flavius Clemens (fl. 200 A.D.) and Origen (fl. 240 A.D.) were the most distinguished. Clemens was a pupil of Pantaenus, the first great teacher of this branch -- the catechetical -- of the school; he was also a convert from Paganism to Christianity. His main importance in the history of thought lies in his perception of the value of philosophy to religion, which had become obscured, or even lost, during the conflict of the Church with the Gnostics. Coming so early as he did, he was unable to realize the full significance of the problems that turned upon an alliance between Christianity and Greek thought, while his lack of system gave an air of accommodating syncretism to his doctrines. He attempted to combine purity of life (as against some Gnostics) with freedom of thought (as against Church tendencies). The former takes from Christian conceptions, the latter from Greek. Origen is the great systematizer and scholar of the theological line of the school. In his combination of the Christian religion with Greek philosophy, the practical tendency of the former counteracts the mystical implications of the latter. He has his theory of the universe and his rule of life, like the Neo-Platonists, but he founds them on the Scriptures, and by his peculiar interpretations contrives to bring about harmony. Hence his theory of one teaching for the people and another for those 'who are able to bear it.' The whole truth is too high and difficult for the masses. He evinces marvellous skill in harmonizing the varied elements, so much so that, at a later time, opposing theological factions agreed in appealing to him, and with equal show of reason. The best example of this skill is to be found in his treatment of the Logos. Origen had no successor of equal intellectual rank, though Athanasius must have known something of current speculation. At the end of the 4th century the philosophical writings of Synesius of Ptolemais show how close might still be the bond between Christianity and Neo-Platonism.

The value of the work done by Clemens, and especially by Origen, is often underestimated. They save Christianity from the extremes of fanaticism and superstition, due to early apocalyptic ideas, and strove, by inculcating the Fatherhood of God, to unify the conception of the revelation in Christ with the older notion of a revelation in nature. In this connection, the continuation of their work by Augustine deserves close attention.

The comparatively recent researches and contentions of A. Ritschl, and particularly of A. Harnack and his co-workers, have renewed interest in these problems by showing their great importance for the history of the development of dogma in the Christian Church.

Literature: (1) GFRÖRER, Philo u. d. Alex. Theosophie; DÄHNE, Darstellung d. jüd. -alex. Religionsphilos.; ZELLER, Philos. d. Griechen, iii. 2; HEINZE, D. Lehre vom Logos; DRUMMOND, Philo-Judaeus. (2) ZELLER, op. cit.; HEINZE, op. cit.; UEBERWEG, Hist. of Philos., i; VACHEROT, Hist. de l'école d'Alexandrie. (3) AUGUSTINE, Confessions, vii. 9-21; any good Church History, e.g. NEANDER, F. C. BAUR; HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma; VOGT, Neuplatonismus u. Christenthum; KEIM, Aus d. Urchristenthum; KEIM, Augustinus; REDEPENNING, Origenes; PATRICK, Apology of Origen; A. RITSCHL, Theol. u. Met.; BIGG, Christian Platonists of Alexandria; HATCH, Hibbert Lectures; the new editions of Early Christian Literature (especially Origen) by HARNACK and his associates. See PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY, V. (R.M.W.)

Alexia [Gr. a + legein, to read]: Ger. Alexie; Fr. alexie; Ital. alessia. Loss or impairment of the power to read; i.e. to understand the meaning of the visual symbols expressed in printed or written words. It forms one of a group of the diseases of speech with intimate and important relations to other defects. See SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS. Forms of alexia are termed word-blindness, text-blindness; and it is related to, though not synonymous with, mental or mind-blindness, called also PSYCHIC BLINDNESS (q.v.). (J.J.)

Alexinus of Elis. Lived in the 4th century B.C. A logician, follower of Eubulides, who attacked Aristotle and Zeno the Stoic.

Alfarabi or Alfarabie (Lat. Alfarabius). Died 950 A.D. A distinguished Arabian scholar and philosopher who lived in Damascus. He is said to have known seventy languages; and wrote treatises on the sciences and on Aristotle.

Al-Gazzali or Al-Ghazzali. (1058-1111.) Moslem theologian and philosopher. A prolific writer, who taught in Nishapoor and Bagdad. Lived in Syria, and travelled (or visited) in Egypt.

Algedonic Aesthetics [Gr. algoV, pain, + hdonh, pleasure]: Ger. algedonische Aesthetik, Gefühlsaesthetik; Fr. esthétique algédonique; Ital. estetica. Aesthetics considered as a special branch of the science of hedonics, or, more broadly, of the science of pleasure and pain. The term was suggested by Marshall, in Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics (1894), chap. vi. (J.H.T.)

Algesia [Gr. algein, to have pain]: Ger. Schmerzempfindlichkeit; Fr. algésie; Ital. algesia. The capacity for having pain. As ANALGESIA (q.v.) expresses the absence of the sense of pain, algesia expresses its normal presence; it is also used (Tuke) as a synonym of HYPERAESTHESIA (q.v.). See PLEASURE AND PAIN (also for Literature). (J.J.)

Algometer or Algesimeter: see LABORATORY AND APPARATUS, III. B, (c). (C.)

Algorism (and, erroneously, Algorithm). The Arabic or decimal system of numeration, and hence arithmetic; so called from the name of the Arabian writer on Algebra, whose work, in translation, introduced the decimal system into Europe early in the 9th century. Cf. Murray's Eng. Dict., sub verbo. (J.M.B.)

Alienist (1), Alienism (2), Aleination (3) [Lat. alienus, belonging to another, estranged]: Ger. Irrenarzt (1), Psychiatrie (2), Geistesstörung (3); Fr. aliéniste (1), psychiatrie (2), aliénation (3); Ital. alienista (1), psichiatria (2), alienazione mentale (3). A medical specialist in the study and treatment of mental diseases. Alienism is the name for such study, while Alienation is a generic name for the various forms of insanity or mental derangement. (J.J.)

Alison, Archibald. (1757-1839.) A Scottish writer, best known for his Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste.

Alkindi, Abu Yusuf (also Alchendius). Lived in the first half of the 10th century, and died after 961. The most encyclopedic writer among the Arabs. He wrote on nearly every science and every branch of philosophy, and was one of the earliest translators and commentators on Aristotle. He represented the first philosophic revolt against Mohammedanism.

All [AS. all, alle]: Ger. All; Fr. tout; Ital. tutto. (1) As noun, a name for the whole universe, 'The all.' Also, in general, for the whole of anything. (2) As adjective, with distributive force, the characteristic adjective prefixed to the plural form of the subject of any universal affirmative judgment; and equivalent to 'every' followed by the singular of the same subject: e.g. 'All men are mortal.' (3) As collective adjective, the sign that a number of objects are regarded as forming a single collective individual: e.g. 'All the angles of a triangle taken together are equal to two right angles.'

The use of to pan as a philosophical term for the universe dates back to the Phythagoreans and Plato. See, for Plato's usage, Timaeus, 28c., and elsewhere. The universal judgment, with its character as the judgment which affirms the predicate of every member of the subject class, was distinguished as one of the forms of judgment by Aristotle. Modern logic and Epistemology, ever since the discussion of the categories of Allheit by Kant, have been concerned with a discussion of the grounds upon which any universal judgment could be founded; and a distinction has grown up between the adjective 'all' when used with reference to a numerable class or collection of individuals found in experience, and when used with reference to every member of an ideally defined class whose representatives may be infinitely numerous. Cf. Sigwart, Logik, Bk. I. § 27. See also INDUCTION, UNIVERSAL, and JUDGMENT. (J.R.)

Allaesthesia [Gr. alloV, belonging to another, elsewhere, + aisqhsiV, feeling]: Ger. Allaesthesie; Fr. allesthésie; Ital. allestesia, eterestesia. See ALLOCHIRIA.

Allamand, Jean Nicolas Sebastian. (1713-87.) Swiss philosopher and naturalist. Professor of philosophy, and later of natural history, at Leyden.

Allegiance [L. Lat. ligius, duty of a tenant]: Ger. Unterthanenpflicht, Fehdepflicht; Fr. allégeance; Ital. fedeltà, sudditanza. The obligation due from a subject to a sovereign. Also, the sense of such obligation. Extended to denote obligation of any inferior to any superior, or the sense of it. Cf. FEALTY, LOYALTY. It may be (1) 'natural and perpetual' as of a citizen, or (2) local and temporary as of a mere resident (Wharton, Law Lexicon (1892)). (J.B.)

Allochiria or Allocheiria [Gr. alloV, elsewhere, + ceir, hand]: Ger. Allochirie; Fr. allochirie; Ital. allochiria. A disorder of tactile sensibility of central origin (see Janet, Nervoses et idées fixes) in which a touch on one side of the body is felt and located on the opposite side. Also termed allaesthesia. (J.J.)

Alogia [Gr. a + logoV, reason]: Ger. Alogie; Fr. alogie; Ital. alogia. Inability to speak due to intellectual defect; i.e. a disorder in the formation of thought whereby speech is not acquired or becomes impossible. It is therefore not properly an aphasic but a mental difficulty. See SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS. (J.J.)

Séglas, Troubles du Language (1892), suggests Dyslogia. (J.M.B.)

Alphabet [Gr. alfa + bhta, the first two letters]: Ger. Alphabet; Fr. alphabet; Ital. alfabeto. A set of symbols used for writing a given language by a more or less exact indication of its sounds. The term is sometimes also used loosely in application to symbols that denote things, not sounds. Thus the Chinese characters, which are partly ideographic, partly phonetic, are called the Chinese alphabet.

This term, formed from the names of the first two Greek letters, alpha and beta, after the manner of our a, bee, cee, originally denoted the series of letters by which the Greek language was written, and was then extended, first to the various types of the Greek alphabet in use throughout Europe, secondly to like sets of symbols of non-Greek origin. The alphabets of Eastern Europe in the domain of the Orthodox Greek Church are modifications of the Cyrillic alphabet, itself based upon the Greek writing of the 9th century A.D. Those of Western Europe, including our own, are essentially the Roman form of the Greek. The Romans received not the common Ionian form of the Greek alphabet, but the Chalcidian, in which the 3rd letter was , not , the 12th , not , the 20th , not , the 23rd , not , and in which the 6th letter  and koppa, were in use, and  had the value ks, not ch. It gave  the value of k, using  but little, gave  the value of f instead of w, created , a modification of , in the value of g, and gave it the place of disused zeta, and finally in the Augustan age introduced the Ionian upsilon, with value ü, and the zeta, and set them at the end of the alphabet. The letter J is a modern differentiation out of I established in usage in the 17th century A.D., and the letter W represents the attempt, in the earlier use of the Roman alphabet among Germanic peoples, to indicate the consonantal u (= w) by doubling the Roman V. Neither the number nor the order of the symbols is adjusted to phonetic considerations, but both are dependent on tradition with slight makeshift alterations. The order remains essentially that of the Phoenician alphabet, in which it was apparently originally rational, being in part at least determined by the names given the letters from their fancied resemblance to natural objects; thus, groups were formed like aleph (= ox), beth (= house), gimel (= camel), daleth (= door), i.e. A, B, C, D; or mem (= water), nun (= fish), i.e. M, N; or ayin'o' (= eye), pe (= mouth), i.e. O, P; or koph (= head, rear), resh (= head, side), shin (= tooth), i.e. Q, R. S. Groups like B, C (g), D, and M, N, L, on the other hand, point towards phonetic arrangement. The Phoenician standard order was continued in the Greek and Roman alphabets, meaningless as it was for them, merely on account of the use of the letters as numeral signs. The Greek names of the letters also were meaningless echoes of their Semitic originals. The Phoenician alphabet, like the earlier Hebrew writing, had no means of indicating vowels. Its symbols were evidently developed from ideographs, and these from hieroglyphs, presumably the Egyptian. The common order of development is the sound-sign from the syllable-sign, the syllable-sign from the word-sign, the word-sign from the picture of an object. The Sanskrit alphabet offers an example of a series of symbols carefully, almost scientifically adjusted to the phonetic material, and arranged in a phonetic order.

Literature: TAYLOR, The Alphabet, 2 vols. (1883, ed. 1899); BALLHORN, Alphabete der orientalischen und occidentalischen Sprachen (12th ed., 1880); LARFELD, Müller's Handbuch d. Altertumswiss. i. 494 ff.; SCHLOTTMANN, Riehm's Handwörterb., s.v. Schrift; BERGER, Hist. de l'écriture dans l'antiquité (1891). (B.I.W.)

Alphabet Method (in education). A synthetic method of teaching reading, by the construction of syllables and words from the letters of the alphabet.

This was formerly the usual method of teaching pupils to read, as it must ever remain the ultimate one. Modern teachers, however, introduce the subject by presenting at first a limited number of words as s [sic] wholes. These are learned as such, only afterwards to be analysed in order to arrive at the ultimate units, the letters. These are then used in the old way to build up words. See METHOD (in education). (C.DE G.)

Alter [Lat. alter, other]: Ger. der Andere; Fr. autrui; Ital. l'altro. An individual's thought of another self as such. (J.M.B. - G.F.S.)

The term is generally used as correlative with Ego (q.v.), and emphasizes the distinction, seen in the term ALTRUISM (q.v.), between 'self and other,' within the individual's consciousness. In social psychology the alter is the social other as the self at the moment apprehends him. It is accordingly a shifting content growing with the growth of the ego, whatever theory may be held as to the method of this growth. See also SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

Literature: see under EGO, and SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. (J.M.B. - G.F.S.)

Alternating Insanity: Ger. circuläres Irresein; Fr. folie circulaire, folie à double forme; Ital. pazzia circolare. A form of insanity characterized by periods or cycles of radical emotional and intellectual variation, as the change from exaltation (mania) to depression (melancholia). See RECURRENT INSANITY.

Literature: art. Circular Insanity, in Tuke's Dict. of Psychol. Med. (J.J.)

Also V. MAGNAN, Recherches sur les centres nerveux, 2e série (1893); Leçons cliniques sur les maladies mentales (1893); KRAEPELIN, Psychiatrie. (L.M.)

Alternation of Generations [Ger. Generationswechsel; Fr. alternance de générations; Ital. generazione alternante. The alternation of gamogenetic and agamogenetic repreduction in the life history of certain animals and plants. See GAMOGENESIS, AGAMOGENESIS, PARTHENOGENESIS, and METAGENESIS. First discovered among animals by Chamisso in the Salpidæ and supported by Sars in Aurelia. Ably treated by Streenstrup and Leuckart.

Balfour says: 'It would perhaps be convenient to classify the cases of alternations of sexual and gemmiparous generations under the term metagenesis, and to employ the term heterogamy for the cases of alternation of sexual and parthenogenetic generations.' -- Work cited below, p. 13. (C.LL.M.)

Botanists generally restrict the term to designate the regular alternation of dissimilar spore-forming and sexual generations. Amongst Protozoa are found cases of (perhaps irregular) alternation of spore-forming and sexual generations; amongst Protozoa and Annelids, alternation of generations produced sexually and by fission; amongst Coelenterates, Platyhelminths (Flat-worms and Flukes) Ascidians, &c., alternation of generations produced by budding and sexually; amongst Arthropods are found cases of heterogamy. Finally, some worms show examples of more or less regularly alternating unisexual and hermaphrodite generations; for instance, among the Ostracoda (Cypris) a varying number of parthenogenetic generations are interpolated between the sexual generations, among the Cladocera (Daphnia) parthenogenetic generations occur in spring and summer, sexual generations in the cold weather only. (E.S.G.)

Literature: for the phenomena among different groups of plants see BAYLEY BALFOUR, art. Botany, in Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.), iv. 159. For animals see HUXLEY, Invertebrated Animals, 33; CLAUS, Zoology, i. 123; and F. M. BALFOUR, Compar. Embryol., i., Introd.; ALB. DE CHAMISSO, De animalibus quibusdam, see Fac. i. De Salpa Berolini (1819); J.J.S. STREENSTRUP, Ueber den Generationswechsel, übersetzt von C. Thonenzen (1842); LEUCKART, Ueber Metamorphose, ungeschlechtliche Vermehrung, Generationswechsel (1851). For recent treatment in animals see L. C. MIALL, Address to Section D (Zoology), Brit. Assoc., Toronto meeting (1897); and in plants, D. H. SCOTT'S address to Section K (Botany), Brit. Assoc., Liverpool meeting (1896); and F.O. BOWER, Address to Section K, Brit. Assoc., Bristol meeting (1898); A. WEISMANN, Germ-Plasm (1893).

Althusen, Johann (or Althusius, Johannes). (1556-1638.) A Dutch jurist who advocated the doctrine that supreme power is the right of the people.

Altruism (in psychology) [Lat. alter, other, through the Fr. autrui]: Ger. Altruismus; Fr. altruisme; Ital. altruismo. Attitudes or dispositions having as their conscious end the advantage of an ALTER (q.v.) or other self are termed altruistic, and constitute altruism.

This definition follows that of alter, and defines the term in contrast with EGOISM (q.v.). Altruism and egoism are correlative terms representing an opposition within self-consciousness, which arises only when the two sorts of attitude are sumbitted to some degree of reflection. It is opposed to the usage which applies either of those words (1) to spontaneous or unreflective action, which to the onlooker appears generous or selfish, but does not represent an opposition in the consciousness of the actor, and (2) to instinctive or merely biological phenomena of gregariousness and collective ill or welfare.

Literature: see the general works under ETHICS, and SOCIOLOGY; many of the textbooks of psychology, and BIBLIOG. F. 2, a. (J.M.B.)

Altruism (in ethics). Interest in others for their own sake. More precisely, the term is used for the ethical theory according to which the moral end of conduct is the good of others, however conceived.

The tendencies to action which have the interest of others as their direct object are called 'altruistic'; and, logically, they should be called altruistic whether it is the good or the evil of others to which they tend. But in practical usage, it is only the tendencies to the good of others that are called altruistic. Altruistic are distinguished from egoistic tendencies, which have self-interest as their direct object. The use of the word is due to Comte, who maintained that 'the chief problem of our existence is to subordinate as far as possible egoism to altruism,' in accordance with his fundamental precept, vivre pour autrui. It was adopted by H. Spencer, who discusses the opposition between egoism and altruism. Disinterested (or benevolent) and self-regarding are the corresponding terms with older moralists.

Literature: COMTE, Système de politique positive, i. Introd., chap. iii., ii. chap. ii; SPENCER, Princ. of Eth., Part I, Data, xi-xiv; the general works under ETHICS. (W.R.S. - H.S.)