A (in logic). Symbol for the universal affirmative judgment -- All men are mortal.
Literature: notes on the origin of this and the other symbols of formal logic are to be found (sub verbis) in EISLER, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe. See also PRANTL, Gesch. d. Logik. (J.M.B.)
A=A. The logical formula for IDENTITY (q.v.) (J.M.B.)
A, Ab, or Abs; A or An. The former (A, Ab, or Abs), a prefix of Latin origin, denotes separation deviation, or departure from, as in amentia, a departure from normal mental endowment; abnormal, deviating from what is typical or normal: the latter (a or an), a prefix of Greek origin (known as a privative), denotes absence or lack or, and is equivalent to to the English un or less, as in amnesia, loss or lack of memory; anaethesia, loss or lack of sensation. (J.J.)
Abacus (logical) [from the letters A, B, C]: Ger. Rechentisch; Fr. abaque; Ital. abbaco. Mechanical arrangement, resembling the arithmetical abacus, by which may be exhibited (1) the total combinations of a number of simple logical terms with their several negatives, (2) the effect produced on such combinations by subjecting the terms involved to any restrictions or defined relations.
Term and thing are used by Jevons. See his Pure Logic and other Minor Works (1890), 80, 113 ff. 117 ff., 151. Called also LOGICAL MACHINE (q.v.) (R.A.)
Abano, Pietro d'. (Petrus de Apono, or --- Appone, or --- de Padua). (1246-1315 or 1316.) Studied at Constantinople, Padua, and Paris: settled at Padua, where he practised astrology and alchemy, after methods of Averroës, and medicine, after methods of the Arabs. Denounced as a sorcerer, possessor of the philosopher's stone, &c., by the clergy, he received a death sentence from the Inquisition, but dies a natural death at Padua.
Abbadie, Jacques. (1657-1727.) Scholar and divine. Received degree of D.D. at the age of seventeen. Pastor of the French Church at Berlin: accompanied Marshal Schomberg to England in 1688: minister of the French church in the Savoy, London: having received episcopal ordination, he was made dean of Killaloe, Ireland, by King William. Best known for his religious treatises.
Abdalatif, or Abd-el-Latif, or Abd-ul-Lateef. (1162-1231.) An Arabian historian and physician. He wrote on Egypt.
Abélard, or Abailard, Pierre. (1079-1142.) French philosopher and dialectician. Studied dialectics under the Nominalist Roscellinus and under the Realist William of Champeaux, theology under Anslem of Laon. Taught in Paris chiefly. He varied little from NOMINALISM (q.v.), being one of the founders of SCHOLASTICISM (q.v.).
Abercrombie, John. (1780-1844). Practised medicine in Edinburgh. Writer on moral and intellectual philosophy.
Abercromby, David. (Latter half of 17th century.) Scottish metaphysician, who wrote on the practice of medicine, on the pulse, on theological and philosophical themes, &c.
Aberration (chromatic) [Lat. aberrare, to wander, to deviate]: Ger. chromatische Aberration; Fr. aberation chromatique; Ital. aberrazione cromatica. A result of the different degrees of refraction which lights of different wave-lengths experience in traversing a lens. It is possibly of psychological importance, as influencing the perception of distance. See VISION, and SPACE (perception of).
Literature: HELMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optik (2nd ed.), 156; SANFORD, Course in Exper. Psychol., expt. 109 (E.B.T)
Aberration (mental): Ger. Geistesstörung, Irrsinn; Fr. aberation mentale, aliénation; Ital. aberrazione mentale. A term of somewhat indefinite scope denoting a more or less serious departure from normal soundness of mind also used to indicate any form of mental disorder or insanity. (J.J.)
Ability and Inability (in theology) [Lat. a+habilis, expert]: Ger. Fähigkeit, Unfähigkeit; Fr. capacité, incapacité; Ital. abilità, inabilità. These terms designate the sinner's power, or want of it, to do what is good in the sight of God. 'Man by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so, as a natural man, being altogether adverse to that of good, he is not able by his own strength to convert himself; or to prepare himself thereunto' (Westminster Confession). The problem has close connection with the dogma of original Sin.
The Pelagians hold the view of 'plenary ability'; the Arminians, that of 'gracious ability'; and the school of Edwards, that of 'natural ability.'
Literature: HAGENBACH, Hist. of Doctrine. ii. 214 f.; A.H. STRONG, System. Theol., 342 f. (R.M.W.)
Abiogebesis: see BIOGENESIS.
Ablaut [Ger. ab, off, denoting substitution, + laut, a sound]. A German term in general scientific use to denote those variations of vowel in IndoEuropean roots, suffixes, and endings, which are solely dependent upon phonetic conditions in the mother-speech. Its best English equivalent is 'vowel-gradation.'
The phenomena of ablaut first noted and classified in connection with the historical study of Teutonic grammar, e.g. sing, sang, sung, were in the early days of linguistic science conceived of as developed to serve the purpose of the differentiated meanings; but the later perception that they are simple inheritances from the mother-speech disconnected from any phonetic conditions active or discernible in the separate languages, and further, that the same variations appear in suffixes and endings as in roots; that, e.g.precor : procus in Lat. is the same thing as legw: logoV in Greek, singen : gesang in Ger., and that feromen: jerete is the same thing as 'ippoV: 'ippe, and as leloipa: leipw, determined the present view that ablaut is a purely phonetic phenomenon, and that its variations have been merely utilized by language; as notably, owing to decay of endings, in the Teutonic languages, for the distinguishing of meanings. See UMLAUT. (B.I.W.)
Abnormal [Lat. ab+norma, rule]:
Ger. Anorm, unregelmässig; Fr. anormal; Ital. anormale.
Distinctly deviating from a more is or less precisely determined norm, standard,
or type. (J.J.)
Abnormal Psychology: Ger. pathologische Pschologie; Psychologie der Geistesstörungen; Fr. psychologie des anormaux, psychologie pathologique; Ital. psicologia morbosa (or patologica). That division of psychology which treats of such mental processes and manifestations as deviate in various ways and to a more or less serious extent from what is regarded as normal or usual. It is desirable to give to this term a wide significance, making it one of the large divisions of PSYCHOLOGY (q.v.), including the study of all that is irregular or unusual in mental phenomena. It would thus embrace the study of the various forms of illusions and hallucinations; of the phenomena of trance, hypnotism, automatism, and allied states; of the psychic effects of drugs or intoxicants and of diseased bodily conditions; of the impairment of the faculties in old age; of the unusual mental manifestations of individuals or classes under the dominance of special or extreme emotions (fright, panic, psychic epidemics); of real or alleged manifestations purporting to transcend the ordinary laws and limitations of human intelligence (possession, telepathic phenomena), as well as of the more specific types of lack of development, irregular development, or loss or impairment of faculty, constituting the various forms of mental disorder or insanity. This last division is commonly known as MENTAL PATHOLOGY (q. v.) or Psychopathology. See also PSYCHIATRY.
Literature: see the several topics referred to, and BIBLIOG. G, 1, g. (J.J.)
Aborigines [Lat. ab+origio, origin]: Ger. Urbewohner; Fr. aborigènes; Ital. aborigeni. Primitive inhabitants of the earliest known period. (J.J.)
Aboulia [Gr. a+boulh, will]: Ger. Abulie, Willenlosigkeit (-schwäche); Fr. aboulie; Ital. abulia. Loss or lack of the power to exercise will. The defect appears in a variety of forms, which are discussed in the article WILL (defects of). (J.J.)
Abscissa: see CURVE.
Absent-mindedness: Ger. Zerstreutheit; Fr. distraction, absence; Ital. distrazione.
(1) A condition of inattention to certain parts of the conscious field resulting from positive attention to other parts. (J.M.B. - G.F.S.)
This is a popular term applicable to states of mental preoccupation of all sorts, whether from DISTRACTION (q.v.) or from absorption in or concentration upon a train of thought. The popular emphasis is placed on the incongruities of action, speech, &c., which result in the view of the onlooker. See ATTENTION. (J.M.B.)
(2) Abnormal. A more habitual condition of abstraction or preoccupation.
It is characterized by inattention to one's surroundings and a forgetfulness
of or failure to realize what would ordinarily easily and naturally enter the
field of consciousness. If we regard as the normal attitude of the attention
one in which a limited group of perceptions occupies the focus of consciousness
while at the same time a wide penumbra of outlying perceptions is less definitely
present, and in which the transition is easy from one focal group to another,
then we may describe the condition of absent-mindedness as characterized by
a very sharp concentration of the attention upon a narrow area, the penumbra
of perceptions fading away, and the transition from one to another of the several
components of the stream of consciousness becoming difficult and uncertain.
This deviation from the normal distribution of the attention is familiar as
a transitory experience; but in some individuals, or again as a mark of senescence,
becomes more or less habitual and characteristic. It is then more or less abnormal.
The condition is probably allied to such states as DISTRACTION (q.v.) and ECSTASY
(q.v.), as well as to states of vagueness of consciousness, such as reverie,
'brown-study,' and the like. See ATTENTION (defects of). (J.J.)
Absolute and The Absolute [Lat. ab + solvere, to loose]: Ger. absolut, das Absolute; Fr. (l') absolu; Ital. (l') assoluto. That which is not relative is Absolute; and the ultimate principle of explanation of the universe is The Absolute.
This meaning is the common element in the various uses of Absolute as an adjective, covering the narrower connotations of 'not dependent,' 'unconditioned,' 'necessary'; e.g. absolute (perfect, immediate) knowledge or truth; absolute (independent) existence; absolute (undetermined) freedom; absolute (not relative) validity; absolute (ultimate) categories; absolute (inherent) necessity; absolute position (the positing of what is not relative); absolute spirit (see MIND, in philosophy); absolute (noumenal) space, time, ego (see KANTIAN TERMINOLOGY); absolute (inherent, unconditional) value.
The Absolute, as a substantive, has three great connotations in the philosophical systems; it is an ultimate principle (1) as all-comprehensive, i.e. including all possible distinctions, the universal; and (2) as immediate, i.e. escaping all possible definition or distinction; for this necessarily implies negation. This latter connotation covers the absolute as noumenal (or unknowable to those who consider knowledge a relation in which the object, as constituted, is ipso facto phenomenal). (3) As world-ground: first cause, primum movens, natura naturans, i.e. relatively absolute. In modern philosophy NEO-HEGELIANISM or absolute IDEALISM and PANTHEISM represent (1); KANTIANISM and AGNOSTICISM represent (2); epistemological REALISM, MATERIALISM, SPIRITUALISM, and THEISM represent (3).
Besides the principal discussions under RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE, INFINITE, and PHENOMENON, see the other topics printed in large type above. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)
The Absolute in sense (1) is independently real; having a reality not imparted or otherwise conditioned by other reality. It is accordingly that which is entirely of itself, and as such (in the view of the metaphysical monists who chiefly use the term) it must comprise all reality; for if there were any reality external to it, the two would stand in mutual relations conditioning both. It follows that there is only one thing in the world, all apparently distinct things being parts or aspects without an independent reality. Thus the Absolute is simply the universe, with the added connotation that its principle of being is necessarily but one.
The Absolute has figured both in idealistic and in realistic systems. In the former it is necessarily psychic in nature; in some of them it is conceived as a cosmic consciousness in which human and brute, and whatever other consciousness may exist, are embraced as parts. Personality is sometimes asserted of it, sometimes expressly denied. This 'Absolute Spirit' is conceived as transcending time, that is (according to one conception), as including within itself all the streams of temporal experience in the myriad minds of the world, not in one moment (for the serial procession of moments is present as such), but in unity of consciousness, in a single experience. The idealistic Absolute plays its most notable rôle in the theories of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and attains with the last named its greatest elaboration. Still the sum of things, its connotation is gradually enriched by the process of logical or 'dialectical' development based on Hegel's conception of the concrete and organic character of universals. The Absolute in this process takes to itself predicate after predicate until it appears as embodying the perfect harmony of the objective world with reason and of reason with itself.
In the British realistic speculation of Hamilton and Herbert Spencer the term
has been used in other senses. It has sometimes been taken as implying freedom
from all relation -- sense (2) above -- even the internal relation of the parts
to the whole, or to each other; and sometimes in its proper sense as implying
only freedom from external and necessary relation, i.e. independence. Hamilton,
in defining the Absolute (Discussions, 14), dismisses one sense of the
word and gives a second, as follows: 'Absolutum means finished,
perfected, completed; in which sense the Absolute will be what
is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect, complete, total, and thus
corresponds to toolon and toteleion
of Aristotle. In this acceptation -- and it is that which for myself
I exclusively use -- the Absolute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory
of, the Infinite.' With Hamilton's follower, Mansel (Limits of Religious
Thought), we find: 'By the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by
itself, having no necessary relation to any other being.' A definition compatible,
as Mansel intends, with infinity in the thing defined, and consistent with the
meaning (3) given above. Herbert Spencer writes (First Principles, 38):
'Thus the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total; including
within itself all power, and transcending all law. Or, to use the established
word, it must be absolute.' Among recent thinkers in which various mediating
positions are combined with these great tendencies respectively may be mentioned
in chronological order Lotze (3), Brandley (2), and Royce (1). See BIBLIOG.
B, 2, a. (R.H.S. - J.M.B.)
Absolute Ethics: see RELATIVE
AND ABSOLUTE ETHICS.
Absolution [Lat. absolutio, from absolvere, to loose from]: Ger. Absolution or Lossprechung; Fr. absolution; Ital. assoluzione. The name commonly given to the phrase, 'I absolve thee from thy sins,' pronounced by a priest upon a penitent who has confessed. It is regarded as a judicial act. The Roman Catholic sacrement of Penance requires the payment of a debt of temporal punishment for sin. This takes the form of pious works, and used to be discharged partly by public penances. The essential points to be noted are that a priest alone can give absolution, and that he is able to do so only after confession.
Literature: S. J. HUNTER, Outlines of Dogmatic Theol., iii. 297 f.;
JEROME, Op., xi. 499; BASIL, Op., ii. 492; BINTERIM, Denkwürdigkeiten,
i. I, 3; KLEE, Die Beichte; SIEMERS, Die Sacrament Beichte. (R.M.W.)
Absolutism (aesthetic): Ger. aesthetischer Absolutismus; Fr. absolutisme esthétique; Ital. assolutismo estetico. The doctrine that beauty is something objective and absolute, i.e. not relative to the observer, and hence that there is a fixed absolute standard of criticism.
The theory appears first as a part of Plato's system of idealism (see PLATONISM),
in which it is held that any aesthetic criticism or comparison of individual
beautiful things presupposes some standard of absolute beauty. It has in general
been maintained by intuitionists in philosophy, and attacked by those who consider
beauty merely a kind of pleasure, and hence dependent on the individual's organization.
The absolutist would explain differences in individual judgment, by the fact
that individuals may differ in their capacity to discover and appreciate. An
intermediate position is that of Kant, that beauty is subjective, but that the
judgment 'this is beautiful' is always made as if an objective standard
existed. See BEAUTY. Begg, The Development of Taste (1887), and Marshall,
Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics (1894), represent the two
opposed standpoints. (J.H.T.)
Absolutism (political): Ger. Absolutismus;
Fr. absolutisme; Ital. assolutismo. The absolute or unlimited
rule, usually of one man; virtually equivalent to DESPOTISM (q.v.). (F.C.M.)
Absorption (in education) [Lat. ab + sorbere, to suck in]: Ger. Vertiefung; Fr. absorption; Ital. assorbimento. The complete occupation of the attention with an object of knowledge.
According to Herbart, the twofold process of culture is that of mental absorption and its removal through reflection. He calls absorption and reflection the inspiration and expiration of the soul. In the former the mind loses itself momentarily in the contemplation of new experiences; it forgets its normal order of thought through its absorption in what is novel, strange, or wonderful. Absorption is followed by reflection, which is a conscious process of APPERCEPTION (q.v.): the new experience takes its place henceforth as a mental possession. The comprehension of these two processes is of the utmost importance to the art of instruction. The Hegelian equivalent of absorption is SELF-ESTRANGEMENT (q.v.).
Literature: HERBART, Sci. of Educ. (trans. by Filkin), 123; DE GARMO,
Essentials of Method, 40-42, and Herbart and the Herbartians; ROSENKRANZ, Philos.
of Educ., 27. (C.De G.)
Abstract (term, &c.): Ger. abstrackt, abgezogen; Fr. abstrait; Ital. astratto. Abstract is a relative designation, probably implying throughout its various uses, (a) the isolation of an aspect, quality, or relation from the whole in which it is directly apprehended, and (b) the employment of the isolated factor as the subject of an assertion, and therefore the assignment of it of a certain measure of independent, substantive existence. The second feature is prominent in the grammatical distinction of abstract from concrete terms.
The treatment of abstract terms begins with Aristotle, who contrasts the processes afairesiV and prosqesiV, and takes his examples mainly from the contrast between mathematics and physics. In Aristotle, also, appears the general mark of abstraction, as departure from the immediate data of sense. Modern formal logic has tended to view the function of abstracting as a subordinate though necessary part of the process of GENERALIZATION (q.v.). The sounder view, psychologically, which rejects the distinction of kind between sense-apprehension and thought, cannot admit that there is only one group of notions or terms, entitled to claim for itself the designation abstract.
Literature: works on logic; MEINONG, Hume-Studien (1877-8); MEINONG-HÖFLER,
Logik, 21 ff.; HUSSERL, in Philos. Monatshefte, xxx. 159 ff. (R.A.)
Abstract Idea: Ger. abstrakte Vorstellung; Fr. idée abstraite; Ital. idea astratta. When that view of an object which is gained by way of ABSTRACTION (q.v.) is regarded as a permanent possession of the mind, it is called an abstract idea. (G.F.S. - J.M.B.)
In a GENERAL IDEA (q.v.), like characters are apprehended as repeated or capable of repetition, in a plurality of distinct instances. But the like nature thus repeated has itself an internal constitution, which may be considered without reference to its particularization in a plurality of special cases. So considered, it forms an abstract universal, and the mode of thought by which it is apprehended is called an abstract idea or abstract conception. See CONCEPTION.
Man is a general concept or idea; humanity is an abstract concept or idea. Humanity consists in a group of characters found in each and every man. When we consider this group of characters per se, without reference to its repetition in a plurality of particular cases, we obtain the abstract idea of humanity. The general idea of course involves abstraction, inasmuch as the general nature is distinguished from its particular embodiments; but the abstract idea depends on a further abstraction performed upon the general idea. In this further abstraction the fact of generality is disregarded, and only the group of characters which possesses the generality is attended to. The object of an abstract concept is a universal, and a universal belonging to a general concept. But the universal is not the unity of particular instances or examples: it is rather the unity of the characters or attributes belonging to each instance or example.
In the language of logic the abstract concept is the connotation of a general term considered apart from its denotation. Mill defines an abstract name as a 'name which stands for an attribute of a thing.' Thus 'white is a name of a thing, or rather of things; whiteness is the name of a quality or attribute of those things. Man is a name of many things; humanity is a name of an attribute of those things.' He protests against the practice of 'applying the expression abstract name to all names which are the results of abstraction or generalization, and consequently to all general names, instead of confining it to the names of attributes.' (G.F.S., J.M.B.)
Literature: BERKELEY, Princ. of Human Knowledge, Introd., §§
6-25, 97-100; HUME, Treatise on Human Nature, § 7; RIBOT, L'évolution
des idées générales; VON KRIES, Ueber die Nature gewisser
mit den psychischen Vorgängen verknüpfter Gehirnzustände, Zeitsch.
f. Psychol. u. Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane, viii. S. I; and Zur Psychologie des
Urteils, Vtljsch. f. wiss. Philos., xxiii. Heft I, S. 7; JAMES, Princ. of Psychol.,
i. 468, 508, ii. 48; WARD, art. Psychology, in Encyc. Brit., xx. 75-6; STOUT,
Analytic Psychol., i. 78-91; BALDWIN, Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race,
chap. xi, with quotation from Royce, 330. See BIBLIOG. C, 2, a, and systematic
works on psychology. (G.F.S.)
Abstraction [Lat. ab + trahere, to draw]: Ger. Abstraktion; Fr. abstraction; Ital. astrazione. Concentration of attention on those parts or characters of an object which are treated as relevant to the special interest of the moment, and its consequent withdrawal from those which are irrelevant.
Sometimes those characters which are specially attended to are said to be abstracted, viz. separated from the whole to which they belong. But so far as this language is accurate at all it applies to all selective interests. It is essential to abstraction to be prepared to recognize and disregard the irrelevant, and what is recognized as irrelevant is ipso facto abstracted from.
The interest on which abstraction depends must be of a certain kind.
Something being initially presented as part of a given context, abstraction
occurs only when the interest of thought lies in following out its relations,
not within, but outside this context. To this end its relations within
the given context must be as far as possible ignored; and when they obtrude
themselves, they must be recognized as irrelevant, and for that reason
disregarded. Such a process may demand more or less strenuous effort or
'resistant concentration' (Sully). A child may attend predominantly to
the 'lustre of sunlit water' simply because it is the most impressive item
within the context of its sense experience at the moment. In this case
there is no process of abstraction. But
abstraction is present in a well-marked form when a psychologist attends to the lustre of the water, because he is interested in analysing the perception of lustre in general, whatever may be the particular circumstances of its occurrence.
Abstraction is to be distinguished from analysis. The governing interest
in analysis lies in discerning partial constituents within a given complex.
The governing interest in abstraction lies in relating the partial constituents
of a complex to partial constituents
of other complexes. (G.F.S., J.M.B.)
Genetically, abstraction seems to be an adaptive function. The vague
'general' with which the child may be thought to start out in his treatment
of an object is found to lead him into difficulties -- notably in cases
in which he adopts a word from his social fellows and applies it too widely,
by the broad inclusion of similars. He is forced to adapt himself to differences,
and this is genetically, no doubt, the beginning of abstraction. So in
the case given above, when the child finds that the lustre of the water
disappears so soon as he changes his position, the process of abstracting
lustre has begun. He does not intentionally seek for a given quality in
similar objects; that would require the abstract idea before-hand ready-made.
On the contrary, he acts upon his concrete perception or image, and finds
differences compelling him to drop out inconsistent details, which then
become in so far irrelevant to his future use of the idea. This growth
in intention at the expense of extension gradually results in the relative
isolation of this or that mark or quality, according to the exigencies of this or that interest from moment to moment. It has
been called a sort of 'erosion' or wearing down. When the mental habit of comparison and logical analysis has been acquired,
this process is less important, giving way to deliberate exclusion and inclusion of marks. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)
Literature: A. MEINONG, Vtljsch. f. wiss. Philos. (1888), 329 ff.; general
works on psychology. (G.F.S. - J.M.B.)
Absurd (in logic): Ger. sinnlos;
Fr. absurde; Ital. assurdo. See FALLACY, and REDUCTIO AD
Academy and New Academy
[Gr. AkademoV, proper name]: Ger. Akademie;
Fr. académie; Ital. accademia. See SCHOOLS OF GREECE,
Acatalepsy [Gr. akatalhyia].
Unknowableness; a term used by the Greek Sceptics. See UNKNOWABLE, and SCEPTICISM.
Acatamathesia (or Akat-) [Gr. a+kata+
learn]: Ger. Akatamathesie; Fr. aprosexie (inability to attend);
Ital. acatamatesi. Inability to comprehend ordinary conversation, accompanied
by a blunting of the perceptions. It appears as a degenerative symptom in various
forms of chronic INSANITY (q.v.). (J.J.)
Acataphasia (or Akat-) [Gr. a+kata+fanai,
to speak]: Ger. Akataphasie; Fr. paraphasie (see APHRASIA - P.J.);
Ital. acatafusia. A disorder of speech appearing as an inability to connect
words properly in sentences; a disorder of the syntactical arrangement of words.
It is thus an aphasic defect which involves the most complicated components
of spoken language. The coarse outlines of speech -- words and their meanings
-- are understood and spoken, but their finer relations in the sentence are
confused. The term was suggested by Steinthal and adopted by Kussmaul, Störungen
der Sprache, chap. XXX. See SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS. (J.J.)
Acceleration (law of): Ger. Heterochronie (Haeckel); Fr. loi d'accélération de développement, tachygénèse; Ital. legge di acceleramento ontogenetico. 'All modifications and variations in progressive series tend to appear first in the adolescent or adult stages of growth, and then to be inherited in successive descendants at earlier and earlier stages according to the law of acceleration, until they either become embryonic, or are crowed out of the organization, and replaced in the development by characteristics of later origin' (Alphaeus Hyatt).
This 'law' was put forth independently by A. Hyatt and E. D. Cope, who lay much stress on its importance. Meynert regards acceleration in the embryological development of an organ as definitely correlated with the biological importance of that organ. (C.LL.M.)
Darwin called this principle that of 'earlier inheritance.' A very similar principle of ontogenetic acceleration has also been made use of by Haeckel ('heterochrony') and by Lankester ('precocious segregation') to explain the early appearance of certain characteristics in embryos. (E.S.G.)
Literature: A. HYATT, Mem. Bost. Soc. Nat. Hist. (1866), 193; E.D. COPE, Trans. Amer. Philos. Soc. (1866), 398; The Origin of the Fittest (1887); The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution (1896); ERNST MEYNERT, Biomechanik erschlossen aus dem Princip der Organogenese (1898). (C.LL.M.)
Also E. HAECKEL, Anthropogenie, 3. Aufl. (1877); E. R. LANKESTER, Notes on
Embryology and Classification, Quart. J. Microsc. Sci., N. S., xvii. (1877).
Accent [Fr. accent, from Lat. accentus, blast or tone]: Ger. Accent; Fr. accent; Ital. accento. A term employed in phonology, with some confusion of use, to denote the varying quality, pitch, or stress of vowel-sounds. It may also be applied to the conventional marks for denoting the same; as in French or Greek.
The Greek proswdia (pros,
in addition, + wdh, song), of which the Lat. accentus
(ad + cano, sing) is a mere translation, was used by the Greek grammarians
to include all the written signs, the marks of quantity, the breathings, the
three accents proper, the hyphen, the apostrophe, &c., which were added
to the letters to guide pronunciation. The Greek word-accent was a matter of
varying pitch, accompanied also undoubtedly by some distinction of stress. That
which the French accents mark is only a variety of quality, and that now often
only of historical value; é is usually close e, è
open. The English word-accent is distinguished most prominently by stress, or
relative force of expulsion. The term accent is also loosely used to denote
a peculiar colouring of pronunciation in the dialect of an individual or a community.
Accentuation (in psychology): Ger. Betonung; Fr. accentuation; Ital. accentuazione. The subjective emphasis put upon certain terms of a series in consciousness, which makes the series more or less rhythmical. (J.M.B. - G.F.S.)
The German equivalent is used by Wundt (Outlines of Psychol., §
II, B) in discussing auditory tone series. See RHYTHM. (J.M.B.)
Acceptance [Lat. acceptatio]. Recommended
to replace the word recognition, sometimes used as translation of the German
Anerkennen (-ung). Cf. Hegel's use of Anerkennung in his Philos. of
Mind; and Eisler, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe,
sub verbo. (J.M.B.)
Accessory: see PRINCIPAL.
Accident: see ESSENCE AND ACCIDENT, and
Accident (1) and Accidental (2) [Lat. ad + cadere, to fall]: Ger. Accidenz (1), zufällig (2); Fr. accident(-el); Ital. accidente (-tale). (1) That which is not essential or substantial. See ESSENCE, and SUBSTANCE; also the equivalent terms in the Latin and Greek glossaries under TERMINOLOGY.
(2) From this the further meaning of that which is disconnected with substance,
and so uncaused and fortuitous. A 'pure accident' or the 'purely accidental'
indicates that which is uncaused, and which thus illustrates chance in the old
sense of the Greek tnah. As the word chance has come
to mean subject to the law of probability, and hence not fortuitous, this meaning
of accident should be retained. (J.M.B.)
Accidentalism. The theory that events may
occur absolutely without cause. In ethics it is INDETERMINISM (q.v., also for
foreign equivalents); in metaphysics it is TYCHISM. Cf. ACCIDENT, and CHANCE.
Accidenter: see PER ACCIDENS.
Acclimatization: see ACCOMMODATION
Accommodation (in biology): Ger. Accomodation, Anpassung; Fr. accommodation, adaptation; Ital. adattamento. (a) The process by which an organism reaches functional adaptation. (b) The state attained by the process (a). These meanings were suggested by J. Mark Baldwin (1896). Cf. Nature, 1v. 558. (C.LL.M.)
The term applies to any acquired alteration of function resulting in better adjustment to environment; and to the functional changes which are thus effected. For special cases we have the terms Acclimatization (accommodation to new climatic conditions), Naturalization (accommodation of an organism as a whole to new bionomic conditions), and Equilibrium or Balance (a state of relatively good adjustment due to structural adaptation of the organism as a whole). On the distinction between accommodation and ADAPTATION see the latter term. See also MODIFICATION.
Literature: DE VARIGNY, art. Acclimatation in Richet's Dict. de Physiol.
(with literature); CONTAULIN, Accommodation des Plantes, &c., Bull. Soc.
France-Belg., xxx. 489; Les Végétaux et les Milieux cosmiques
(1897); DAVENPORT, Exper. Morphol., ii; BALDWIN, Ment. Devel. in the Child and
the Race (1895). Also under MODIFICATION. (J.M.B.)
Accommodation (in psychology) [Lat. ad + commodus, fit]: Ger. Accomodation; Fr. accommodation; Ital. accomodazione. The determination of a function as modified by the incorporation of new elements. A single case of such incorporation is an accommodation, and the generalization that the mind's progress and growth is by such modifications is the law or principle of accommodation.
Analysis shows that the element most prominently involved is conation; and the conation involved in the function passes from an initial stage of less voluntary, or perhaps completely non-voluntary, conation up to more voluntary conation, culminating in intensely felt effort. This progressive modification of the conditions of determination through a series of stages is, when considered as characteristic of mental progress, a genetic principle the reverse of HABIT (q.v.). As habit is the principle of mental 'conservation of type,' so accommodation is the principle of modification of type. This sort of determination has been called by Stout 'relative suggestion' (Analytic Psychol.). He now restricts this phrase, however, to accommodations resulting in modifications in trains of thought. The process by which accommodation is secured is said to be 'adaptive.' The term adaption, however, is ambiguous. See ADAPTATION (in biology). The process is one of attention, and has been variously described as SELECTION (mental), SELECTIVE THINKING, &c. See those terms.
Literature: see SELECTION, and HABIT; also BIBLIOG. G. I, f,
and 2, f. (J.M.B. - G.F.S.)
Accommodation (visual): Ger. Accomodation; Fr. accommodation; Ital. accomodamento. The adjustment of the eye to objects at different distances by alterations in the distance between the lens and the retina (Cephalopods, Fish, Amphibians, and Snakes) or in the convexity of the lens by the contraction or relaxation of the ciliary muscle (Chelonians, Crocodiles, Lizards, Birds, Mammals). (C.LL. M. - E.S.G.)
Literature: M. FOSTER, Textbook of Physiol. (5th ed.), 1151; LECONTE, Sight (2nd ed.); TH. BEER, Proc. Int. Physiol. Cong. (1898); J. of Physiol., xxiii. (1898-9); WERTHEIMER, art. Accommodation in Richet's Dict. de Physiol. (with bibliography); NORRIS and OLIVER'S System of Diseases of the Eye, i. 501. See Eye under VISION, and LABORATORY AND APPARATUS (phakoscope). (E.S.G. - J.M.B.)
The true theory of accommodation dates from Descartes (HELMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optik, 2nd ed., 154). See WALLER, Human Physiol., 414; WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 107; ARRER, in Philos. Stud., xiii. 116, 222; SANFORD, Course in Exper. Psychol., expts. 105-8. (E.B.T.)
Also M. TSCHERNING, Le mécanisme de l'accommodation, Rev. Gén.
des Sci. (1894), 80f.; Étude sur le mécanisme de l'accommodation,
Arch. de Physiol. (1894), 158 f.; Recherches sur les changements optiques de
l'œil pendant l'accommodation, Arch. de Physiol. (1895), 158-69, 181-94. (L.M.)
Accommodation (principle, in theology). A term commonly used in connection with biblical interpretation. A doctrine is set forth, not absolutely and in its full meaning and consequences, regardless of all other considerations, but in relation to the circumstances or capacities of those for whom the teaching is intended. Primarily, it may be viewed as an integral part of divine grace condescending to human frailty. Secondarily, it is often employed in relation to all kinds of instruction connected with religion. Parable, metaphor, analogy are common instances of it.
Literature: ZACHANIA, Essay upon the Condescension of God toward Man
(1763). See ESOTERIC. (R.M.W.)
Physiologically such movements are secondary to the reactions which the stimulus normally excites, or correlated with them; such as symmetrical movements of both sides, two arms, &c., when the stimulus is applied to the apparatus of one side only. The phenomenon is held to illustrate the irradiation of nervous discharges, particularly under intense stimulation. In voluntary movements they are more marked when effort is intense.
Literature: VIERORDT, Physiol. d. Kindesalters; MÜNSTERBERG, Beitr.
z. exper. Psychol., iv; BALDWIN, Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race, chap.
iv. § I; citations under LOCALIZATION (cerebral); the textbooks of physiology.
Accountable [ME. accompt. from Lat. computum]: Ger. verantwortlich; Fr. comptable, responsable; Ital. responsabile. The relation of the agent to some judge in respect to his action.
The term is jural in orgin; but its application is extended when transferred
to ethics. The accountableness is regarded sometimes as social or legal (e.g.
a man is accountable to the laws of his country), or theological (he is accountable
to God -- a quasi-legal conception). Sometimes a purely personal significance
is given to the conception. Thus a man is said to be accountable to his own
conscience, which passes judgment upon his conduct by reference to an ideal
code of rules, or to an ideal self, conformity to which he acknowledges to be
his duty. A late statement in terms of the ideal self is that of Baldwin (Social
and Eth. Interpret., chap. ix). See OBLIGATION. (W.R.S.)
Accuracy of Discrimination.
See DIFFERENCE (just noticeable), and cf. WEBER'S LAW.
Achenwall, Gottfried. (1719-72.)
German writer on statistics; professor of philosophy at Göttingen.
He introduced the term Staatswissenschaft.
Achilles Argument: see ZENO (of
Achillini, Alessandro. (1463-1512.)
Celebrated lecturer in medicine and in philosophy, chiefly in Bologna:
was styled the second Aristotle. He and Mundinus were the first, after
the permission given by Frederick II, to dissect dead bodies.
Achromatopsia [Gr. a+crwma,
colour, + oyiV, sight]: Ger. Achromatopsie;
Fr. achromaiopsie; Ital. acromaiopsia. A defective perception
of colour: COLOUR BLINDNESS (q.v.). See also VISION (defects of). (J.J.)
Aconative. Not involving CONATION (q.v.) Cf.
ACTION, and NON-VOLUNTARY (also for foreign equivalents). (J.M.B.,
world]: see PANTHEISM.
Acoumetry [Gr. akonein, to hear, + metron, measured]: Ger. Akumetrie; Fr. acoumétrie, acumétrie; Ital. acumetria. The quantitative determination of hearing capacity, e.g. of the distance at which a sound of standard loudness is heard with variations according to direction. The standard clinical instrument in Politzer's acoumeter, in which a c2 is given by the drop of a steel point upon a steel rod. In psychological laboratories the telephone is often adapted to this purpose (Münsterberg, Cattell).
Literature: SANFORD, Course in Exper. Psychol., expt. 61. (E.B.T. - J.M.B.)
Acoumetry is also used to include the investigation of the hearing of pitch
and timbre. (J.Mc K.C.)
Acousma [Gr. akonsma,
from akonein, to hear]: Ger. Akusma; Fr. illusion
ou hallucination auditive; Ital. acusma. A form of auditory hallucination.
See HALLUCINATION, and ILLUSION. (J.J.)
Acoustics (psychological) [Gr. akonstikoV, relating to hearing]: Ger. Akustik; Fr. acoustique; Ital. acustica. The science of HEARING (q.v.). (J.M.B.)
It rests upon (1) the physical doctrine of sound, and (2) the results of anatomical and physiological investigation into the structure and function of the auditory apparatus. It includes (1) the psychophysics of simple tone and noise; (2) the psychophysics and psychology of the perception of sound; and (3) the psychology of music. (E.B.T.)
Literature: HELMHOLTZ, Sensations of Tone, trans. from the 4th ed. (1877)
of the German work (Tonempfindungen) by A.J. Ellis (last ed., 1895); STUMPF,
Tonpsychologie, i (1883) and ii (1890), and Beitr. z. Ak. u. Musikwiss., i.
ii. (1898); HENSEN in Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., iii. 2 (1880); KÖNIG,
Quelques expériences d'acoustique (1882). (E.B.T.)
Acquired (in psychology) [Lat. ad + quaerere, seek]: Ger. erworben; Fr. acquis; Ital. acquisito. Added during the individual's life to the original or innate equipment of the mind; experiential.
This term had considerable currency during the early controversy on innate ideas, in the phrases 'acquired' ideas, perceptions, notions, judgments, capacities. It was made much of by the Scottish philosophers, indicating what was not 'intuitive' (Reid, Hamilton, McCosh). It thus came to mean 'due to experience' in discussions which discriminated sharply between what was 'native' and what 'acquired.' It is analogous to the use of the same term in biology -- in the phrase ACQUIRED CHARACTERS (q.v.) -- as contrasted with those which are congenital. Cf. INNATE IDEAS.
Literature: HAMILTON, Metaphysics, chap. xviii; REID, Active Powers,
and Essays, iii. Pt. I. chap. iii; McCOSH, Cognitive Powers, chap. i. §§
Acquired (1) and (2) Congenital Characters: Ger. erworbene und congenitale Eigenschaften; Fr. caractères acquis et caractères innés; Ital. caratteri acquisiti e caratteri congeniti. (1) Those modifications of bodily structure or habit which are impressed on the organism in the course of individual life. (C.LL.M.)
(2) Those characters or properties with which the organism is originally endowed. (E.S.G.)
Acquired characters are logically, but not practically, distinguishable from congenital characters. An organism being the result of the interaction between its innate or congenital qualities and its environment, every particular character is developed under the influence of certain stimuli, and so partakes of the nature both of an acquired and of a congenital character (cf. Delage, Structure du Protoplasma; Roux, Kampf der Theile im Organismus). Some go so far on the strength of this as to contend that all characters are alike 'acquired' (Ortmann, Biol. Centralbl., Feb. 15, 1898). When the complex of stimuli, which constitute the normal environment, are sufficiently altered (to upset that balance established between environment and innate qualities resulting in the production of a normal individual) to produce an appreciable change, such a modification or 'difference' (Sedgwick, Pres. Addr. Brit. Assoc., Nature, Sept. 21, 1899) may be called an acquired character. The response to a stimulus is determined, apart from the properties of the stimulus itself, by the degree of plasticity of the organism (its responsiveness). Acquired characters may be grouped in three classes: (1) Mutilations; (2) Modifications brought about directly by the environment (the cause of evolution according to Buffon and Saint-Hilaire); (3) Modifications brought about indirectly through use and disuse, Use-Inheritance (Ball) or Kinetogenesis (the cause of evolution according to Lamarck's theory). The transmissibility of acquired characters depends in the first place on whether they persist after the cessation of the stimulus under the influence of which they arose, or whether they disappear or become obliterated by the modifications called forth by the succeeding stimulus. In the latter case there can be no question of hereditary transmission. On the other hand, if a stimulus can so affect an organism as to leave an impress, which persists, and is not obliterated by the effect of succeeding stimuli, such modification would obviously affect succeeding generations in cases of fission and budding, and possibly also in cases of sexual generation, by its supposed effect on the germ-cells (or embryo in viviparous forms). For further discussion see HEREDITY, and VARIATION.
Although Prichard, in 1826, had clearly distinguished between acquired and congenital characters, and had denied the transmissibility of the former, and Galton, in 1875, had independently come to the same conclusion, it was not till 1883 that the inheritance of modifications was seriously questioned by zoologists. (E.S.G. - J.M.B.)
Up to 1883, the inheritance of modifications played a leading part in the conception of organic evolution as presented by Lamarck and expounded by Herbert Spencer, but held a subordinate position in that formulated by Darwin.
In that year Weismann denied the possibility of hereditary transmission of such acquired characters. Weismann claims, in the first place, that there is no sufficient evidence that modifications are transmitted, and in the second place that, on the CELL-THEORY (q.v.) as now understood, the line of hereditary continuity and descent is through the germinal cells, and not through those which compose the substance of the rest of the body. It is claimed, on the other hand, by those who still adhere to the view that acquired characters are (sexually) transmitted, that, although the body-cells are not in the line of direct hereditary transmission, they may none the less in some way influence the germ-plasm so as to impress upon it the tendency to give rise to variations similar to the modifications acquired by the body-cells. Darwin's view was that they throw off gemmules which are collected in germ-cells (see PANGENESIS). W. K. Brooks remodelled the theory in 1883, but modern investigation lends little support to this view. Weismann held that the modifications of the cell-substance of the unicellular organisms were transmitted. Even this is denied by those who hold that the CHROMOSOMES (q.v.) of the nucleus are independent of the cell-substance; but in cases of fission (as said above) modifications must be carried on. (C.LL.M.)
Various names have been suggested for acquired and congenital characters; for the latter, the terms blastogenic, centrifugal, inborn, innate, and inherent character are used; for the former, the terms somatogenic and centripetal character. (E.S.G.)
Literature: J. C. PRICHARD, Researches into the Physical History of
Mankind (2nd ed., 1826) (cf. E. B. POULTON, A Remarkable Anticipation of Modern
Views on Evolution, Sci. Progress, 1896); A. WEISMANN, Ueber Vererbung, in Essays,
i; The Germ-Plasm (1893); C. DARWIN, Animals and Plants under Domestication
(1st ed., 1868); W. K. BROOKS, The Law of Heredity (1883); The Foundations of
Zoology (1899); TH. EIMER, Organic Evolution, trans. by J. T. Cunningham (1890);
HERBERT SPENCER, Princ. of Biol. (2nd ed., 1899), also Contemp. Rev. (Feb. and
March, 1893); J. DELAGE, L'Hérédité (1895); G. J. ROMANES,
Darwin and after DARWIN; W. HAACKE, Gestaltung und Vererbung (1893), and Grundriss
der Entwicklungsmech. (1897): O. HERTWIG, Zeitsch. u. Streitfragen d. Biol.
(1894); K. GROOS, Die Spiele der Thiere (1896; Eng. trans., 1898); E. B. WILSON,
The Cell (1896); E. D. COPE, The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution (1896);
A. SEDGWICK, Pres. Addr. Brit. Assoc. (Section Zoology, 1899); G. WOLFF, Beitr.
z. Krit. d. Darwin'schen Lehre (1898). (C.LL.M.
Acquisitiveness [Lat. acquisitus, from acquirere, to acquire]: Ger. Habsucht (1), Lernfähigkeit (2); Fr. instinct d'appropriation (1), faculté d'acquisition (2); Ital. istinto di appropriazione (1), appropriatività (2). (1) In general; the propensity to appropriate objects so as to make them part of one's personal belongings. (G.F.S.)
(2) In psychology; relative ease of acquiring or learning, considered usually
as part of a person's natural endowment. (J.M.B.)
Acro- [Gr. akro-, combining
form of akroV, high, extreme]: Ger. (not used): Höhenfurcht
(acrophobia); Fr. acro-; Ital. acro-. A prefix used to express
an extreme form of a condition, such as Acroaesthesia, exaggerated sensitiveness;
Acromania, pronounced or uncurable insanity. It has a more literal sense
in Acrophobia, a term used (by Verga) to indicate an extreme or morbid
dread of being at a great height and a marked uneasiness when in such positions.
See PHOBIA. It is further used in its original sense of high, as in Acrocephalic.
Acroamatic [Gr. akroama,
things heard]. ESOTERIC (q.v.). Applied to the more private lectures and teachings
given by Aristotle to his pupils. (J.M.B.)
Act [Lat. actio, a deed, an action]: Ger. That;
Fr. acte; Ital. atto. A deed performed with some foresight and
deliberation, whether carried out in muscular movement or not. See ACTION (in
psychology), meaning (1). (J.M.B. - G.F.S.)
Act (in ethics). An event which is due to human ACTIVITY (q.v.) and is not merely the result of the laws of nature. It includes any volition, whether an external effect follows the 'inner act' or 'act of will,' or not.
In more popular usage the term is applied not only to changes brought about by a volition or 'act of will,' but also to those due to organic reflexes. Hence the distinction of voluntary and involuntary acts. It is commonly held that morality, as distinct from law, takes cognizance only of the former. Cf. CONDUCT.
Literature: KANT, Werke (ed. Hartenstein), vi. 125-6, and Theory of
Ethics, Abbott's trans. (3rd ed.), 337-8; POLLOCK, First Book of Jurisprudence,
Pt. I. chap. vi. (W.R.S.)
Act (in law): Ger. (1) That, Hundlung; (2), (3) Acte (Act of the German Confederation, Bundesacte; Act of Accusation, Anklageacte); (4) Rechtsgeschäft; Fr. (1), (2), (3) acte; (2) loi; (4) acte juridique; Ital. atto. (1) A determination of will, producing an external effect in the world of sense. See FACT. (2) An act of legislation; a statute. Public Acts are statutes passed to regulate matters of general concern, and all subjects of the enacting power are bound to know them. Private Acts are statutes passed to regulate private interests, and the general public are not presumed to know them. (3) Rarely (except on the Continent of Europe), an act of administrative government, as a notarial protest, or an act of accusation (equivalent to indictment). (4) Juristic Act, an act producing an effect which was intended by the doer (Holland, Jurisprudence, 100; Markby, Elements of Law, chap. vi. § 235). Act of God, any event resulting from forces beyond human control, and which a man cannot be expected to foresee, or foreseeing, to prevent or oppose; Vis maior (Hohenmacht). Cf. a somewhat broader definition in Pollock on Contracts, chap. vii. 366; 'Under the term act of God are comprehended all misfortunes and accidents arising from inevitable necessity, which human prudence could not foresee or prevent.' Williams v. Grant, I Conn. Law Reports, 491. 'Vis maior, quam Graeci qeon bian, id est, vim caelestim appellant' (Dig. xix. 2, Locati Conducti, 25, § 6). It excuses a man from the performance of what would otherwise be a legal duty, unless he has bound himself by contract to the contrary. It is a legal maxim that Actus dei nemini facit iniuriam.
Literature: POLLOCK, First Book of Jurisprudence, chap. vi. 132 f. (1896);
ZITELMANN, Irrtum und Rechtsgeschäft: eine psychologisch-juristische Untersuchung
Act of God: see ACT (in law).
Actio ad Distans: see GRAVITATION.
Action (in law): Ger. Rechtshandel, Process, Klage (civil action, Civilklage; criminal prosecution, Kriminalklage); Fr. action, procès; Ital. azione giudiziaria. A lawsuit; a particular right growing out of the violation of other rights, and given by law, either to put a stop to such violation, or to give redress for the injury already suffered, or both. Redress is secured sometimes through restitution, sometimes through compensation. An action in personam seeks to enforce a right against a person; an action in rem, a right to a thing against all persons whatsoever. Chose in action, a thing to which a person is entitled who is not in possession of it. The moving party in an action in personam is styled the actor, plaintiff, complainant, demandant, petitioner, orator (in equity suits), libellant (in admiralty); the party against whom he moves, the reus, defendant, or respondent (in equity suits).
Austin, in his Jurisprudence (Lectures xx, xxiv, xxv), considers the
liability of a wrongdoer to an action at law as the sanction imposed by law
for its transgression, and so a penalty for disobedience. Cf. Holland, Jurisprudence,
chap. xiii. (S.E.B.)
Action (in psychology): Ger. (1) Action, Thätigkeit (general, contrasted with Passion), (2) Thätigkeit (e.g. Reflexthätigkeit); Fr. action; Ital. azione. (1) A general term for deeds or ACTS (q.v.) and the doing of them. See CONDUCT. (2) Used also in phrases for various sorts of motor processes, as (q.v.) REFLEX ACTION, VOLUNTARY ACTION. See also REACTION.
We recommend the following scheme of terms for the different sorts of action; it is carried out under the various headings: actions are (1) 'Voluntary,' (2) Non-voluntary,' (3) 'Involuntary.' Voluntary actions are those which (a) are and (b) may be performed by an act of will, i.e. (a) 'Volitional,' and (b) 'Unvolitional' or 'Spontaneous.' Non-voluntary are those which are performed quite in independence of the will, i.e. 'Reflex,' 'Automatic' actions. Involuntary actions are those which are opposed by the will; they occur in spite of a volition to the contrary. See VOLITION, and Veto under FIAT. In terms of conation, actions are: (1) 'Conative,' (2) 'Aconative,' (3) 'Contra-conative.'
Literature: general words on psychology and ethics. (J.M.B.,
Action and Reaction (law of): Ger.
Einwirkung und Gegenwirkung, Action und Reaction, Reactionsprincip;
Fr. action et réaction; Ital. azione e reazione. The law
that whenever one body, A, exerts a mechanical force or system of forces
upon another body, B, the latter exerts an equal force or system of forces
on A in the same lines but in the opposite direction. For example, when
the foot presses down upon the ground, the latter presses upward against the
foot with equal force. First clearly stated by Newton in his Principia.
See FORCE (S.N.)
Action Current: see NEGATIVE VARIATION.
Active Powers: Ger. Actionsvermögen; Fr. facultés actives; Ital. facoltà attive. The capacities of impulse and desire which lead to or determine human action, as distinguished from the capacities of reasoning, judging, conceiving, &c. (called Intellectual or Cognitive Powers). It is no longer in use as a technical term.
The distinction is derived from Aristotle's analysis of the capacities of powers (dunameiV) of living beings into nutrition, appetite, perception, movement, and reason. Of these, reason is held to be peculiar to man, in whom, however, appetite (including desire, sensuous impulse, and will) partakes of reason in the sense of being able to obey it. On the distinction thus reached between the appetitive and the purely rational functions of man was founded the distinction of moral and intellectual virtues. Aristotle's fivefold distinction of powers was adopted by Aquinas, but he discussed in detail only the intellectual and appetitive powers -- the latter including desire and will. Thomas Reid gave currency to this dual division in the early philosophical literature of the 19th century, although the psychologists preceding Kant had substituted a tripartite division by the separation of feeling and activity. Thus Tetens reckons three fundamental powers of the soul: feeling, understanding, and active power. Later writers who retain a twofold division (e.g. McCosh) include feeling among the active or 'motive' powers. Cf. CLASSIFICATION (of mental functions), and CONATION. Reid distinguished will from the principles of action, and included under the latter (1) mechanical principles (instinct and habit); (2) animal principles (appetite, desire, &c.); (3) rational principles (e.g. duty, rectitude).
Literature: ARISTOTLE, De Anima, ii. 3; Eth. Nic., i. 7, 13; REID, Intellectual
Powers (1785), and Active Powers (1788); TETENS, Versuche über die menschliche
Natur (1777), i. 625; McCOSH, Motive Powers, and Cognitive Powers. (W.R.S.)
Activity [Lat. activitas]: Ger. Thätigkeit, Activität; Fr. activité; Ital. attività. (1) The state of any being at the time when it is changing. (2) Any operation or change itself. In the first sense one says that the object is 'in activity.' In the second sense one speaks of the 'activities' of the mind; or of bodies, as in the phrase actio ad distans, action over an intervening space. (3) In case of those who regard activity and real being as essentially the same thing, to be in actu, or sometimes to be active, has on occasion meant the same as to be real. (4) Activity, in Aristotle's list of the categories, is opposed to such categories as substance, quality, &c. It is here a name for a doing, as opposed to a being, a character, or passive state. Physical Activity is the operation of a being in the physical world. Mental Activity is a process supposed to be directly observable, or else otherwise verifiable, in mental life, -- a process whereby either the 'mind' or 'Ego' acts, or else an operation occurs, for which see ACTIVITY (mental). Self-activity is variously used to mean: (1) the activity of something whose operation is solely the result or effect of its own nature; (2) the activity of a being already called, for other reasons, a Self. See SELF-ACTIVITY, and SELF.
The whole history of the term activity, and of its related terms, has been greatly influenced by an unfortunate ambiguity in Aristotle's terminology. Act, or actuality (energeia), in Aristotle's sense, is first opposed to potential being, or to what is merely possible. Yet, as thus opposed, energeia is not the category poiein. But since Aristotle's account of God makes him, in the terms used by the scholastics, actus purus, or purely actual, this expression, and its Greek originals, have suggested that to be real, and to be active, must mean precisely the same thing, and by contrast the passive has even thus been sometimes confused with the merely possible. Apart from this historical misfortune of terminology, the idea of activity goes back of course to primitive speech, and to popular interpretations of experience. Two regions of experience especially gave origin to the notion of activity, and have controlled its development. On the one hand, physical things (e.g. the sun, or fire) appeared to affect or to act upon other things in observable ways. On the other hand, the process of effort and volition, as observed within, suggested the existence and the nature of active processes in a very complex but interesting way. Primitive thought brought these two sets of facts, the outer and the inner 'active' processes, into a close relation in the animistic interpretation of nature. Thought has ever since been busy, as science and reflection have developed, (1) in trying to distinguish and to contrast the two sorts of 'active processes' which animism confused; (2) in trying in various ways once more to synthesize the two, or to reduce one of them, despite the recognized distinction, to the other as its source, basis, or explanation; or finally, (3) in trying to explain how the activities, whatever they may be as activities, are related to the other modes of reality, such as Matter, Soul, Qualities, Relations, &c. The story of these efforts would involve the greater part of the history of psychology and philosophy. SEE IMMANENT AND TRANSIENT, and CAUSE. (J.R.)
Literature: the general works on metaphysics. Recent: LOTZE, Metaphysics;
LADD, Theory of Reality (1899), chaps. v, x; WARD, Naturalism and Agnosticism;
WUNDT, Syst. d. Philos., and Logik; ORMOND, Basal Concepts in Philos.; PAULSEN,
Introd. to Philos.; HODGSON, Metaphysics of Experience. (J.M.B.)
Activity (mental): Ger. psychische Activität, Thätigkeit, Action; Fr. activité mentale; Ital. attività mentale. If and so far as the intrinsic nature of conscious process involves tendency toward a TERMINUS (q.v.), it is active process, and is said to have activity. See END, and TENDENCY. (G.F.S. - J.M.B.)
It is a disputed point whether a distinctive activity-experience exists other than sensations of motor strain and the like. Our definition leaves that question unanswered, and relates to activity considered as a form of process and not as a peculiar experience. The older conception of active process is well expressed by Locke (Essay on Human Understanding, Bk. II. chap. xxi. § 72): 'The active power of motion is in no substance which cannot begin motion in itself, or in another substance, when at rest. So likewise in thinking, a power to receive ideas or thoughts, from the operation of any external substance, is called a power of thinking: but this is but a passive power or capacity. But to be able to bring into view ideas out of sight at one's own choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an active power.' We have generalized this view so as to include all direction toward a terminus as well as explicit choice. Older psychologists often draw a sharp line of distinction between active processes and passive processes. Some limit activity to practical activity, and regard the cognitive side of our nature as purely passive. Reid, e.g., distinguishes between intellectual and ACTIVE POWERS (q.v.). The modern tendency is to regard the distinction as one of degree rather than of kind, the element of conation being in some measure present in both. In recent times there has been much discussion concerning the nature and even the existence of mental activity. Ward regards it as a simple and ultimate datum of consciousness. According to him it is essential to all consciousness, and no account of it can be adequate which does not emphasize the concept of efficiency. The notion of causal efficiency in general is ultimately derived from mental activity. Wundt speaks of an 'immediate feeling of activity' (Thätigkeitsgefühl). Bradley, on the other hand, regards the experience of activity as a comparatively late and complex product of mental development. It is difficult to say whether he regards in the same way activity itself in distinction from the experience of it. Shadworth Hodgson entirely denies validity to the conception of mental activity. Activity-experiences are, according to him, indications of the existence of an activity which is not mental, but neural. We have tried to evade these debated questions by defining activity as a certain form of process which appears certainly to exist, whatever we may think of its origin and implications. The limiting cases would seem to be (1) so-called 'anoetic' or 'passive' consciousness, in which the whole question of 'conscious process,' as a narrower term than 'conscious experience, would be in debate, and (2) cases of non-voluntary process, of such an automatic or habitual kind that the concept of terminus loses its application.
Literature: JAMES, Princ. of Psychol., i. 296-305; WUNDT, Grundzüge
der physiologischen Psychologie, Syst. d. Philos.; REHMKE, Allg. Psychol., 348-425;
BRADLEY, Appearance and Reality (2nd ed.), 96-100, 603-7; Mind, O.S., 43, 47;
HÖFFDING, Wiedererkennen, Association und psychische Activität, Vtljsch.
f. wiss. Philos., xiv.; WARD, Mind, O.S.; STOUT, Analytic Psychol., i. Bk. II.
chap. i; BALDWIN, Handb. of Psychol., Senses and Intellect, 64, 69, and Psychol.
Rev., i. 6. (G.F.S. - J.M.B.)
Actuality and Actual [Lat.
actus]: Ger. Actualität, Wirklichkeit; Fr. actualité;
Ital. attualità ed attuale. That which is in phenomenal
reality or fact is actual, and is said to have actuality. The terms are opposed
to POTENTIAL, and POTENTIALITY (q.v.). See also REAL AND ACTUAL, and HEGELIAN
TERMINOLOGY, VI. (J.M.B.)
Actuality Theory. The theory that all
existence is activity; opposed to substantiality. In psychology it makes the
essence of the mental life entirely activity or process. For further discussion
and literature, see SUBSTANTIALITY. (J.M.B.)
Actus (purus, and in other phrases):
see ACTIVITY, and LATIN AND SCHOLASTIC TERMINOLOGY (glossary).
Adam [Heb. Adam, human beings (Gen. i); personal name of the first man (Gen. ii); probably connected with Assyrian adâmu, to build, form]. Adam occupies an important place in that section of doctrinal theology which treats of man in his actual and ideal relations to God. Here the dogmas of the Fall and of the Imputation of Adam's Guilt may be regarded as principal sources of sin. In connection with this arises the dogma of the means of deliverance from God's wrath and its penalty -- of a universal condemnation to eternal perdition. This dogma constitutes the objective aspect of God's relation to man in connection with reconciliation, just as 'conversion' constitutes the subjective.
Literature: EDWARDS, Works, ii. 303 f.; J. MÜLLER, Origin of Sin;
KAHNIS, Dogmatik, ii. 107 f.; VAN OOSTERZEE, Christian Dogmatics, 466 f., 628
f.; O. PFLEIDERER, Philos. of Religion, iv. 10f. (R.M.W.)
Adaptation [Lat. adaptare]: Ger. Anpassung; Fr. adaptation; Ital. adattamento. (1) A word signifying adjustment or fitness; as of means to ends, organ to function, &c. (2) In biology, adaptation is a general term used to signify the adjustment of the organism or its organs to the environment, with especial reference to other organisms. (J.M.B.)
The doctrine of evolution has rendered the study of adaptation of scientific importance. Before that doctrine was formulated, natural adaptations formed part of the mystery of special creation, and played a great rôle in natural theology through the use of the argument from 'design in nature.' The term, as now employed, includes both that which is hereditary and that which is acquired. In view of modern biological theory and discussion, two modes of adaptation should be distinguished: (1) adaptation through variation (hereditary); (2) adaptation through modification (acquired). For the functional adjustment of the individual to its environment (2, above), J. Mark Baldwin has suggested the term ACCOMMODATION (q.v.), recommending that adaptation be confined to the structural adjustments which are congenital and hereditary (1, above). On this distinction adaptations are phylogenic (and blastogenic), and accommodations are ontogenic (and somatogenic). (C.LL.M.)
Before the formulation of the principle of natural selection, the existence of special adaptations so called was a great difficulty to the theory of evolution; now cases of lack of adaptation are cited as furnishing objection to the principle of natural selection. Darwin very early considered that adaptations were the real difficulty to be met by one who would attempt to solve the problem of evolution. He expresses this in the Introduction to the Origin of Species, and more epigrammatically in his letter to Asa Gray (Sept. 5, 1857): 'The facts which kept me longest scientifically orthodox are those of adaptation -- the pollen-masses of asclepias -- the mistletoe, with its pollen carried by insects, and seed by birds -- the woodpecker, with its feet and tail, beak and tongue, to climb the tree and secure insects. To talk of climate or Lamarckian habit producing such adaptation to other organic beings is futile. This difficulty I believe I have surmounted' (Life and Letters, J. Linn. Soc., 1858). (E.B.P.)
Literature: H. SPENCER, Princ. of Biol. (2nd ed., 1898); CH. DARWIN,
Origin of Species (1859); A. WEISMANN, Essays on Heredity (1889); J. MARK BALDWIN,
Nature, lv. 588; POULTON, Charles Darwin, 42, 43, 68. See also under EVOLUTION,
DESIGN, and NATURAL SELECTION. (C.LL.M.)
Adaptation (visual): Ger. Adaptation; Fr adaptation; Ital. accomodazione (visiva -- E.M.) Adjustment of the eye to altered objective illumination, which takes place through change in the size of the pupil and in the sensitiveness of the retina. (J.McK.C.)
(1) If the retina is exposed continuously to the same objective stimulus, sensation tends towards a medium degree of brightness, and, so far as colour is involved, towards neutrality. This is 'general adaptation' (Hering). If the edges of adjacent fields, that differ in brightness or colour tone or both, are fixated, a similar mutual compensation takes place: Hering's 'local adaptation' (Ebbinghaus, Psychol., 230). This is brought under fatigue or 'partial' adaptation by many.
(2) To be distinguished from this is the adaptation to a faint illumination, which takes place in from fifteen minutes to half an hour, and which has been connected with the production of visual purple (rod-purple or rod-pigment) in the rods of the retina. Experiments on direct and indirect vision, with adaptation to light and darkness, are theoretically important, e.g. as possibly aiding us to distinguish the sense functions of rods and cones. Cf. v. Kries, in Zeitsch. f. Psychol., xiii. 241, and see COLOUR-MIXTURE, VISION, and PURKINJE PHENOMENON. (E.B.T. - C.L.F.)
Literature: AUBERT, Physiol. d. Netzhaut, 25; Grundzüge
d. Physiol. Optik (1876), 483; SANFORD, Course in Exper. Psychol., expt. 123;
H. PARINAUD, La sensibilité de l'oeil aux couleurs spectrales; fonctions
des éléments rétiniens et du pourpre visuel, Ann. d'Ocul.
(1895), cxii. 225 f.; Rev. Scient. (1895), iii. 4e s., 709 ff.; iv.
134 f. (cf. J. of Ophthal., Otol., and Laryngol., 1896, viii. 15 f.); and (especially)
La Vision (1898); A. CHARPENTIER, L'adaptation rétinienne et le phénomène
de Purkinje, Arch. d'Ophthal., xvi. 188 ff. (E.B.T./A>
Adaptive (mental process): Ger. sich anpassend;
Fr. adaptif; Ital. adattabile. Mental activity is adaptive if
and so far as its mode of pursuing its end is varied in accordance with varying
conditions. The process of adaptation is still going on so long and so far as
its modes take the form of trial and failure upon variations of content. The
completed state of adaptation has been reached when no further trials are required.
See ACCOMMODATION, SELECTIVE THINKING, and DETERMINATION (mental). (G.F.S.
Adaptive Characters: see CONVERGENCE
Adelard of Bath. Lived in England
in the 12th century. Wrote De Rerum Naturis, and translated Euclid
from Arabic into Latin.
Adendritic [Gr. a +
dendrithV, pertaining to a tree]: Ger. adendrit; Fr. sans dendrites;
Ital. adentritico. Without dendrites or protoplasmic processes. Said
of a nerve-cell when giving rise only to a neurite, or axis-cylinder process.
Cf. NEUROCYTE. Embryonic nerve-cells are often adendritic, but it is doubtful
if such a cell can function perfectly. (H.H.)
Adequate [Lat. ad + aequus, equal]: Ger. adäquat; Fr. adéquat; Ital. adeguato. (1) Used of the DEFINITION (q.v.) in which the 'generic and specific marks' are sufficiently determined.
(2) The term has also been applied by individual philosophers to knowledge,
ideas, causes, to indicate sufficiency or exactness in various ways. Locke and
Hume (Treat., ii. § 2) discuss the adequacy of ideas to their objects.
Leibnitz (Op., ed. Erdmann, 29) considers knowledge adequate when 'all
that is contained in the concept is unfolded.' See these and other citations
in Eisler, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, sub
verbis. Spinoza uses adequate to express the 'intrinsic' characters of a true
idea as opposed to the 'extrinsic' agreement of the idea and its object (Ethics,
Pt. II, def. 4). (J.M.B.)
Adevism [Lat. a + deus, God] (no foreign equivalents in use). Adevism designates denial of gods, as contrasted with Atheism -- denial of God. It is applied by F. Max Müller to consequences of the teaching of the Vedanta Philosophy. True science (Vidya) conquers Nescience (Avidya) with its accompaniment of Adevism.
Literature: F. MAX MÜLLER, Gifford Lectures (1892), chap. ix; The
Vendanta Philos., 100 f. (R.M.W.)
Adiaphora [Gr. adiafora]:
see INDIFFERENCE, and STOICISM.
Adiaphoristic Controversy [Gr. adiaforoV, indifferent]: Ger. adiaphoristischer Streit; Fr. controverse adiaphoristique; Ital. controversia adiaforistica. The "Form of Concord' was the name given to the latest of the Lutheran Creeds or Confessions (1577-80). Its tenth article grew out of the Adiaphoristic controversy. Substantially it teaches that rites and ceremonies which the Scriptures do not impose or forbid are indifferent (neutra), although in certain circumstances they may become affairs of conscience and adhesion to principle.
After Luther's death, the 'hard' Protestants revolted from the observation of Roman Catholic rites and ceremonies required by the 'Augsburg Interim,' and especially by the 'Leipzig Interim,' which the Elector Maurice passed in 1548 with the active support of Melanchthon, whose humanistic tendencies kept him from extremes. Flacius, Amsdorf, and other zealous Lutherans could not bring themselves to view as 'indifferent' the Mass, Feasts, Images, Extreme Unction, Confirmation and Ordination by bishops, to all of which Melanchthon had temporarily assented for the sake of peace. Flacius in particular attacked Melanchthon and his associates as 'the dangerous rabble of Adiaphorists.' With the civil and religious changes effected by the Treaty of Augsburg (1555) the question ceased to be part of ecclesiastical practical politics.
Literature: GIESELER, Church Hist., iv. 193 f., 201 f., 435; Die Theol.
d. Concordien-formel, iv. I f. (R.M.W.)
Adjective: see SUBSTANTIVE AND ADJECTIVE.
Adjective Law: Ger. zum Rechtsverfahren
gehörig (Rechtsverfahren, as contrasted with Wesen des Rechts);
Fr. loi de procédure; Ital. diritto processuale (as contrasted
with diritto positivo). The law defining or creating the means of enforcing
rights, as distinguished from the law defining or creating the rights themselves
(substantive law); the law of procedure. (S.E.B.)
Adjudication [Lat. adiudicatio]: Ger. gerichtliche Zuerkennung; Fr. jugement, arrêt, jurisprudence des tribunaux; Ital. aggiudicazione. The sentence of a judicial tribunal -- a final judgment.
In Great Britain and the United States adjudication is a recognized source
of law, when it ascertains something which before was uncertain. It cannot vary
or abrogate a law previously established by the legislature, but it may fix
upon it a particular meaning. It may assert that to be a rule of the common
or unwritten law, which was never before stated in form, but which, in the opinion
of the judges, is properly deducible from other rules of that law, which are
generally acknowledged as obligatory. A rule thus asserted or affirmed by courts
of last resort becomes the law of the jurisdiction, and may affect past transactions
as well as future ones. Such decisions are known as judicial precedents, and
out of them most of the private law of England and the United States has been
judicially built up. The Roman law gave them no such force. 'Non exemplis, sed
legibus iudicandum.' Code VII. 45, de Sententiis et Interlocutionibus
Omnium Iudicum, 13. (S.E.B.)
Adjustment of Observations:
see OBSERVATION (experimental).
Administrative Law: Ger. Verwaltungsrecht; Fr. droit administratif; Ital. diritto amministrativo. That branch of public law defining or creating the way in which the active exercise of the powers of government is maintained and conducted.
Under the influence of Montesquieu's l'Esprit des Lois, it became a
common belief of publicists and framers of Constitutions in the 18th century
that the functions of government could be reduced to three divisions -- executive,
legislative, and judicial. Experience has taught that a considerable body of
law, in all civilized communities, must exist which is not strictly referable
to either of these heads. Most of it is now termed administrative. See In
re Application of Clark, 65 Connecticut Law Reports, 38; Norwalk Street
Railway Company's Appeal, 69 Connecticut Law Reports, 597, 606. (S.E.B.)
Admiralty Jurisdiction: Ger. Admiralitätsgerichtbarkeit; Fr. la connaissance des affaires relatives à la marine, la compétence de la cour de l'amirauté; Ital. giurisdizione maritima. The jurisdiction exercised by Courts of Admiralty: in England confined to dealing with acts done upon the high seas, and demands for seamen's wages or on bottomry bonds; in the United States extending also over all navigable waters of the United States, salt or fresh, and to all contracts for maritime service, or respecting maritime transactions or casualties, wherever executed; on the Continent of Europe, generally as wide as in the United States, or wider. See Insurance Company v. Dunham, I Wallace's United States Reports. The forms of proceeding in general are similar to those of the Civil Law. Process is issued both in rem and in personam. If admiralty jurisdiction attaches to a ship, the decree, in case of a sale, will bind the ship and all interested in her, in any country into which she may afterwards come (Woolsey's Int. Law, §§ 141, 143).
Modern admiralty practice rests on the foundations of the Roman law, which
in turn embodied part of the maritime law of Rhodes (Dig. xiv. 2, de
Lege Rhodia de Iactu). A compilation of the sea-laws of the Mediterranean
(Il Consolato del Mare) of the 13th century has also had great authority.
Admiration [Lat. admiratio]: Ger. Bewunderung; Fr. admiration; Ital. ammirazione. (1) Feeling as going out in active approval. (2) Aesthetic feeling as so going out.
The term originally denoted primarily WONDER (q.v.) or amazement, or was used to characterize the mingled intellectual and aesthetic feeling. The feeling now denoted by the term may contain in varying degree the element of wonder, but this latter cannot be regarded as an essential constituent.
Literature: MARTINEAU, Types of Ethical Theory (2nd ed., 1886),
ii. 152-60. See also under FEELING. (J.H.T.)
Adolescence (psychological) [Lat. ad + olescere, from alere, to nourish, grow]: Ger. Jünglingsalter; Fr. adolescence; Ital. adolescenza. A period in the development of the individual introductory to the attainment of maturity. Legally, it is from 12 in girls and 14 in boys to 21; physiologically, to about 25 for boys and 21 for girls.
General usage makes adolescence apply to the time between beginning of puberty and maturity. Clouston would confine the term to the later part of this period, i.e. from '18 to 25' (Clouston, Ment. Diseases, 542). (J.J. - C.F.H.)
The term is usually, but not exclusively, confined to human developmental stages. It is customary to distinguish the periods of infancy, childhood, puberty, adolescence, the adult state, and senescence; a distinction between the early and the later periods of adolescence seems also desirable. The more distinctive characteristics of adolescence are of a physiological nature related in great part to the unfoldment of sexual functions; but the accompanying secondary psychological tendencies are hardly less characteristic and important. The appearance of the beard, the change in voice, the assumption of the adult form, the more pronounced differentiation of sex characteristics, the final consolidation of the bones, the appearance of latent propensities, the change of features to show new characters, the prominence of hereditary influences, as well as other less objective and more subtle changes, serve to distinguish adolescence. The period appears earlier in the female than in the male, and its advent is somewhat affected by racial and social influences.
The psychological traits of adolescence are prominent, but their variability and complexity render an adequate description difficult. In thought and feeling, as well as in appearance, the boy becomes specifically masculine and the girl feminine. There is in both a fundamental change and expansion of the emotional life. The mind is filled with hopes and ideals, dreamy longings and fervid passions. Ethical, religious, and intellectual motives become more cogent; conscientiousness and seriousness inspire action. Great emotional fluctuations occur; periods of enthusiastic energy and spasmodic attempts at high achievement giving place at times to languor and depression, to doubt, dissatisfaction, and morbid rumination. It is a period of violent affections for the opposite sex, of intense friendships, of pledges and vows. It is a period when home surroundings begin to seem narrow, and the desire to wander, to do and dare, seizes the adolescent enthusiast. It is a period of adventure, of romance and poetry and artistic sensibility. In its later stages it may usher in the period of doubt and speculation, of the desire to reform existng evils, and the ambition to accomplish great things. Many deeds and movements of historical importance found their origin in the impulses and strivings of adolescents, while the description of this period in their own career or in that of others has offered an inviting field for the biographer and the novelist. The storm and stress periods of Goethe and John Stuart Mill, of Tolstoi and Marie Bashkirtseff, no less than the masterly delineations of George Eliot's Gwendolen Harleth and Maggie Tulliver, form a valuable and suggestive contribution to the psychology of adolescence. The period has been recognized by primitive peoples, and in past civilizations by special rites and cults. In its educational as well as psychological aspect the study of adolescence is of great importance; the utilization of the enthusiasms and good impulses and the avoidance of the dangers and excesses of this period form a part of teh duty of the educator, the physician, and the parent, to which renewed attention is being directed.
Literature: CLOUSTON, Ment. Diseases, 542 ff., and art. Developmental
Insanities, in Tuke's Dict. of Psychol. Med., i. 360-71; also, Neuroses of Devel.;
BURNHAM, The Study of Adolescence, Pedag. Sem., i. 174-95; LANCASTER, The Psychology
and Pedagogy of Adolescence, Pedag. Sem., v. 61-129 (with literature); A. MARRO,
La pubertà studiata nell' uomo e nella donna (1898); W. WILLE, Die Psychosen
des Pubertätsalters (1898); H. P. BOWDITCH, The Growth of Children, Mass.
State Board of Health Rep. (Boston, 1877); LOUIS N. WILSON, Bibliog. of Child
Study (1898, for numerous references). (J.J. - C.F.H.)
Adoptionism [Lat. adoptare, to choose, select]: Ger. Adoptionismus; Fr. adoptionisme; Ital. adottazionismo. The doctrine according to which Christ is viewed, in his human nature, as the Son of God by adoption only.
The union of two natures, divine and human, in the person of Christ has given rise to many difficulties, which, in turn, have occasioned numerous controversies. Of these last, 'adoptionism' is one. Similar tendencies manifested themselves early, and still continue to exist. Adoptionism proper was formulated near the close of the 8th century, vigorously opposed by Alcuin in particular, and condemned by the Council of Frankfurt in 1794. It arose in Spain, where its chief exponents were Eliphantus, archbishop of Toledo, and Felix, bishop of Urgel. Their teaching substantially was that, in his divine nature, Christ is the real Son of God; in his human nature he is the Son by adoption only. This view probably recommended itself to the Spanish dignitaries, because of the emphasis it put upon the human element, and the consequent access of power with which Christian doctrine could be pressed upon a Mohammedan community. The difficulty of the non-divinity of the human nature was supposed to be lessened by the doctrine that it won God's adoption by its inherent virtue. From the standpoint of the Church, this view was heretical, because it implied a manhood separated completely from God before the right to adoption has been earned. And the Church was so far correct in this judgment; for the implied independence of the human nature involved an irreducible dualism. Several centuries earlier germs of a similar view are to be found in the teaching of Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia (400 A.D.). With him the difficulty of the independence of the human nature is removed by the supposition that, through the indwelling of the Logos, the man Jesus became the second Adam; this indwelling (and here lies the important point) is distinctively ethical. It is obvious that, whenever ethical considerations, especially such as imply normal development, predominate, parallel problems must arise; naturally these made their influence most felt after the Reformation.
Literature: DORNER, Hist. of the Devel. of the Doctrine of the Person
of Christ (Eng. trans.), Division II, i. 248 f., ii. 338 f., iii. 301 f. (R.M.W.)
Adoration [Lat. adoratio]: Ger. Anbetung; Fr. adoration; Ital. adorazione. An act of solemn worship, accompanied by suitable observances, usually paid to divine, or quasi-divine, beings. and later to gods or God.
In the course of history, the Roman Catholic Church has come to differentiate
adoration of God from the secondary adoration paid to the Host, the Virgin,
the saints and martyrs of the Church, the crucifix. Protestant teaching regards
all this, with the exception in some cases of the last, as idolatry. (R.M.W.)
Adrastus. Supposed to have lived in 1st
or 2nd century A.D. A Greek commentator on Aristotle, and author of an
extant work on music.
Advent [Lat. adventus, from ad + venire, to approach]: Ger. Advent; Fr. avent (in opposition to carême), avênement (in opposition to the 'second coming'); Ital. avvento. The time of the 'Christian Year' which immediately precedes Christmas; the period of the Nativity.
In the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches Advent has come to be recognized
as beginning on the Sunday nearest to St. Andrew's Day, November 30. This custom
probably dates from so early a period as the 4th century. Two centuries later
the custom of regarding Advent as the beginning of the 'Christian Year' became
prevalent. In the Eastern Church Advent dates from St. Martin's Day, November
Advent (the second): see MILLENNIUM.
Advocate [Lat. advocatus]: Ger. Advokat; Fr. avocat; Ital. avvocato. One who makes it his profession to conduct the trial of causes before judicial tribunals. Especially used for admiralty lawyers who conduct the trial, as distinguished from admiralty lawyers, known as proctors, who prepare the cause for trial.
Advocacy as a profession was first developed at Rome. The patrons were naturally
advocates of the causes of their clients, but their position was a political
one, and implied no special legal education. Servius Sulpicius, a contemporary
of Cicero, was the first great pleader of causes (orator), who also was
a learned jurisconsult (Dig. i. 2, de Origine Iuris, &c.,